Title

The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

Abstract

The fact that persons are separate in some descriptive sense is relatively uncontroversial. But one of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the descriptive fact of our separateness is normatively momentous. John Rawls and Robert Nozick both take the separateness of persons to provide a foundation for their rejection of utilitarianism and for their own positive political theories. So why do their respective versions of liberalism look so different? This paper claims that the difference is based in Rawls' and Nozick's differing understandings of the morally significant aspects of personhood, and argues that respect for separateness is a value better suited to defend Nozickian libertarianism than Rawlsian liberalism.

Publication Information

© 2008 Springer

Published in final form at:

"The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory" The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 42, no. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 147-165.