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International Regulatory Entrepreneurship: Uber’s Battle with Regulators in France

J. DOMENIC MARTINI*

ABSTRACT

Uber is a regulatory entrepreneur: a company that seeks to change the law in its favor. In the United States, Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship changed the American taxi industry and the laws that regulate it. But the company’s venture into France presented unique challenges. This Comment examines Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France and analyzes the factors that hindered Uber’s quest to revolutionize the French taxi industry. It discusses the tension between Uber and the French government and the policies behind both sides’ goals. It also seeks a compromise between Uber and the French regulators: one that acknowledges the issues with both Uber’s aggressive business model and France’s heavy government regulations.

* © 2017 J. Domenic Martini. J.D. 2018 Candidate, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Jordan M. Barry for his guidance and feedback. Without it, this publication would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Professor Barry and Professor Elizabeth Pollman for allowing me to add to the literature on regulatory entrepreneurship.
I. INTRODUCTION

Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) is a ride sharing company that connects drivers with passengers through its mobile phone application. Passengers can select their current location and destination, and request that a nearby driver take them to their chosen destination. The company is “essentially running a taxi dispatch service for the smartphone age.”

Yet Uber’s business model is at odds with the highly-regulated taxi industry. Taxis are licensed vehicles driven by professional drivers and are extensively regulated by governments. Cities issue taxi medallions or permits that allow a taxi to operate. The number of permits is regulated,
and a few medallion owners will then lease their medallions to drivers.\textsuperscript{6} Taxi drivers will often rent taxis from the medallion owners, and may have to pay as much as $1.32 million if they want to buy a medallion\textsuperscript{7} and own their right to operate a taxi.\textsuperscript{8}

Uber’s requirements are less strict. The company only requires that drivers meet their insurance requirements and go through a background check.\textsuperscript{9} Uber drivers can use their own car, so long as it meets the vehicle requirements.\textsuperscript{10} This simple means of signing up, without going through the process of leasing a taxi and medallion, is an advantage Uber has over taxis. Uber’s number of drivers is not fixed by the company, but rather driven by the free market, allowing Uber drivers more opportunity and freedom than taxi drivers.\textsuperscript{11} This difference between regulation and non-regulation creates tension between the taxi industry and Uber, as Uber essentially runs a taxi service without having to submit to the vast regulations with which traditional taxis must comply.\textsuperscript{12}

Uber revolutionized the way that people view taxi cab services and personal transportation.\textsuperscript{13} It brought cab services into the sharing economy, where services such as personal transportation and housing are shared among consumers.\textsuperscript{14} Uber focuses on affordability and convenience, two staples of the sharing economy.\textsuperscript{15} In most cities, it is cheaper to take an Uber than

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Snead, supra note 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} See Elliott, supra note 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} See Alamea D. Bitran, Comment, \textit{The Uber Innovations That LIFTED Our Standards Out of Thin Air\texttrademark}, Because Now, “There’s an App for That”, 8 ELON L. REV. 503, 505 (2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Id. at 513.
\end{itemize}
it is to take a traditional taxi.\textsuperscript{16} It is also faster to take an Uber than it is to take a taxi,\textsuperscript{17} and the software is free and easy to download on any smartphone.\textsuperscript{18} The idea of a stranger picking up a passenger may seem dangerous, but Uber is now thought to be safer than traditional taxis.\textsuperscript{19} The impact of ridesharing is apparent in many different aspects of today’s economy, as even the trucking industry could be threatened by the ride sharing Uber created.\textsuperscript{20}

Since its founding in 2009, Uber has seen exponential growth despite battling regulators throughout every step of its expansion.\textsuperscript{21} Uber has an estimated worth of $68 billion, which is more than General Motors,\textsuperscript{22} and Uber has not even made an Initial Public Offering.\textsuperscript{23} As of 2015, 160,000 people drove for Uber in the United States, and in one month Uber added 40,000 new drivers.\textsuperscript{24} This growth is fueled by Uber’s 15.8 million monthly active users in the United States,\textsuperscript{25} as well as its operations in more than

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21. For purposes of this Comment, a regulator is a government agency, legislative body, commission, or any other government group whose job is oversight or passing laws that regulate an industry.


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60 countries and almost 300 cities across the globe. Uber is a powerhouse in the start-up world.

Uber’s explosive expansion does not come without its fair share of controversy. Since its inception, Uber has fought United States regulators on insurance, employee benefits, taxi licensing, and many other issues. Entrenched incumbents like taxi medallion owners protest Uber because the company’s ride share success is dependent on deregulating the taxi industry and upsetting the status quo that kept medallion prices high.

Yet, Uber supporters have gone to great lengths to support Uber in its regulation battles, showing just how polarizing the company’s business model is.

Uber’s legal issues are different from those of a typical company. Uber is a regulatory entrepreneur, as it “makes changing the law a material part of its business.”

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of its business plan.” Uber’s business does not conform to the regulatory standards set forth for other taxi services, and its ridesharing service has been battling the status quo ever since the company first entered the market. Uber intentionally takes advantage of legal gray areas, disregards cease-and-desist letters, and actively tries to lobby for deregulation by mobilizing its customers and taking part in traditional political processes. Its regulatory entrepreneurship is necessary for its growth and survival.

Uber’s expansion into France posed a new set of challenges, as both government regulators and traditional taxi drivers sought to stifle the company’s growth. The French government fined Uber drivers and arrested both the Uber France CEO and the Uber Europe General Manager. Taxi drivers and their supporters burned tires and attacked Uber drivers in protest. Overall, compared to the United States, the legal challenges in France were tougher for Uber to overcome, and the protests were more violent. Yet, Uber is far from giving up its fight to operate its business in France, and the battle over ride sharing in the country is not yet over.

This Comment will focus on Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France and the possible solutions to the battle between Uber and the French government. First, this Comment will define and explain regulatory entrepreneurship, using Uber’s business model as an example to illustrate the

34. Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 385.
35. Id. at 386–87.
42. France is not the only country in Europe that Uber is currently fighting. Italy, Germany, and Spain have also attempted to ban or have successfully banned Uber. See Elliot, supra note 4.
term. Second, this Comment will analyze Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in the United States. This analysis will include Uber’s strategies, regulators’ responses, and the factors that allowed Uber to succeed in the United States. Third, this Comment will analyze Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France by drawing distinctions between the company’s regulatory entrepreneurship in the United States. Once again, Uber’s strategies and regulators’ responses will be examined, and the factors that led to the different outcome in France will be identified and analyzed.

Finally, this Comment will propose a solution to the battle between Uber and French regulators in the hopes that both regulators and regulatory entrepreneurs can learn from Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France. Regulators in France and Uber can compromise on taxi regulations to ensure that Uber can continue to operate while still complying with insurance and consumer safety laws. A full ban on Uber is unnecessary and will deter other regulatory entrepreneurs from entering France’s market, which means the jobs created by these companies will not be available for French workers. Furthermore, as regulatory entrepreneurship becomes more common for companies, governments should compromise in order to obtain efficient solutions. As other United States regulatory entrepreneurs expand overseas, they will meet similar challenges and Uber’s experience may be instructive in resolving these issues.

II. WHAT IS REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP?

Regulatory Entrepreneurship is a term advanced by Professors Jordan M. Barry and Elizabeth Pollman. The following is an analysis of this concept, which is critical to understanding this Comment’s theoretical basis.

Regulatory Entrepreneurs’ success depends on “the resolution of legal issues concerning a core aspect of their business.” Examples of legal issues include uncertainty in the current law’s application, the application of new regulations, and the existence of current restrictions that hinder a companies’ business. Companies have always lobbied to ensure the law stays favorable to their business, but regulatory entrepreneurship is different in that companies enter a market with legal uncertainty and attempt to

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47. Id. at 392.
conform the law to their business from the outset;⁴⁸ hence, the “entrepreneurship” in regulatory entrepreneurship.

Uber is “the country’s most famous regulatory entrepreneur,” but it is not the only one.⁴⁹ Lyft, Airbnb, Tesla, FanDuel, DraftKings, and FedEx are all examples of regulatory entrepreneurs.⁵⁰ Lyft is Uber’s competitor in the rideshare industry and has the same business model as Uber.⁵¹ Airbnb challenges the hotel industry’s regulations by connecting individuals that rent their personal homes and apartments to customers in the same way that a hotel rents a room to its guest.⁵² Airbnb had to beat short-term rental regulations in jurisdictions where it operates in order to successfully run its business.⁵³ Tesla, an electric car manufacturer, could not get car dealers to sell a product contrary to their gasoline powered cars.⁵⁴ In order to get around regulations that limited car sales to car dealers, Tesla had to sell its cars directly to customers through its own store.⁵⁵ FanDuel and DraftKings both operate fantasy sports sites that are contrary to gambling laws.⁵⁶ Perhaps surprising, even FedEx is a regulatory entrepreneur.⁵⁷ FedEx competed with heavy cargo regulations and eventually succeeded in deregulating the industry.⁵⁸ These examples help to illustrate exactly what regulatory entrepreneurs are.

A. Methods of Regulatory Entrepreneurship

Regulatory entrepreneurs use four main tactics to change the law, though these are not exhaustive. First, they may break the law or take advantage of legal gray areas.⁵⁹ The idea behind this strategy is that “it is

⁴⁸. Id.
⁴⁹. Id. at 385.
⁵⁰. See generally id.
⁵³. Id.
⁵⁵. Id.
better to enter markets and start providing services to the public, legally or otherwise, than to seek approval from regulators. 60 Companies may “take an aggressively favorable reading of the relevant law,” 61 or even completely ignore cease-and-desist letters. 62

Second, companies attempt to grow too big for the government to ban. 63 This growth serves two purposes: it improves the company’s valuation and increases its political strength by increasing its number of customers. 64 Companies will often value growth over profits to increase their customer base. 65 A company’s popularity places pressure on regulators, especially elected officials, because the popular support makes regulators reluctant to upset their voters. 66

Third, regulatory entrepreneurs motivate their users to lobby on their behalf. 67 This is easier in the digital age, where companies can send emails to their customers asking them to advocate for the company. 68 Companies ask their customers to sign petitions, contact government officials, and even canvas door-to-door. 69 Since many regulatory entrepreneurs’ businesses center around smartphone applications, this mobilization can be done quickly and effectively. 70

Finally, regulatory entrepreneurs also use traditional political lobbying techniques. 71 Regulatory entrepreneurs hire political operatives as board members or executives in order to prepare for political battles. 72 In addition, companies also hire professional lobbyists to help win battles with state

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60. Id.
61. Id.
62. E.g., id. at 399.
63. Id. at 400.
64. Id. at 401.
65. See id. at 401–02.
66. See id. at 403.
67. Id.
68. Helderman, supra note 33.
69. See id. See also Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 405.
These techniques are distinguishable from those employed by non-regulatory entrepreneurs because regulatory entrepreneurs enter the market with plans to change the law and take these measures from the outset of their business.74

B. Factors That Influence Regulatory Entrepreneurs’ Success or Failure

Various business and legal factors affect whether regulatory entrepreneurs succeed.75 The business factors mentioned include scalability, connectedness, and mass appeal.76

Scalability involves whether the business is able to quickly and easily expand its user base.77 Businesses like Uber that use software-based platforms are scalable because they can efficiently provide the same service to 1 or 1,000 consumers.78 Regulators move slowly, and are unable to stop a regulatory entrepreneur before its consumer base is too large to regulate without backlash.79 To take advantage of this, regulatory entrepreneurs use guerilla growth tactics; by not including customized service or capital investment, the company is able to grow quickly.80 This enables the company to obtain sufficient support to battles regulators.81

Connectedness refers to the company’s ability to interact with its consumers and mobilize them to act on its behalf.82 Smartphone app based platforms make this easy because these companies can quickly send emails or in-app notifications to their consumers to keep them informed on the company’s business.83 Users must also feel connected to the company before they will advocate on the company’s behalf, and companies that obtain user information can adequately connect with these individuals by analyzing that information.84

73. Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 406.
74. Id. at 407.
75. Id. at 410.
76. Id. at 411.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 416.
79. Id. at 411.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 416.
Mass appeal means creating a business that everyone wants to consume.85 Uber and Airbnb post about the political issues that affect their respective drivers and hosts.86 This allows the companies to gain sympathy and favorable public opinion while they work behind the scenes to change laws.87 A company’s ability to sell its product to all social and economic classes helps the company build a consumer base that yields significant political power across a variety of states and countries.88

The legal factors, referenced above, that affect regulatory entrepreneurs’ success include penalties imposed on violators and the government structure of the jurisdiction where the regulation is taking place.89 Some penalties are relatively harmless, such as fines or citations.90 A company may pay these penalties as they occur rather than trying to change the law.91 Such penalties are on the low end of the spectrum when it comes to deterring regulatory entrepreneurs.92

The government structure is a complex factor, and depends on (1) whether the regulation is determined at a local, state, or national level, and (2) whether the public office administering the regulation is susceptible to public opinion.93 The level of government that enforces the regulation can influence regulatory entrepreneurship in a variety of ways.94 Local laws can generally be changed quicker than laws at the state or national level.95 For regulatory entrepreneurs, this is extremely important, as their escalating growth can be affected by

88. Id. at 412.
89. Id. at 417–18.
92. See id. at 423.
93. Id. at 410.
94. Id. at 418.
95. Id.
an ability to quickly change the law. State laws are the next easiest to change, and laws that fall on either the local or state level are generally easier for regulatory entrepreneurs to bend to their purposes because they use up less company resources to influence. The many state and local jurisdictions also allow regulatory entrepreneurs to isolate their battles to favorable locations and increase their chances of success. Furthermore, many state judges are elected, which allows companies like those mentioned to influence those campaigns to ignite favorable changes in the courts. This is not to say that regulatory entrepreneurs cannot win at the federal level: VCR manufacturers and FedEx have shown that change is possible even at the highest level of government. However, the federal government has more resources to resist regulatory entrepreneurs.

An additional factor that does not quite fall into either the business or legal factors is the fact that startup companies make up the largest number of regulatory entrepreneurs. Startups are naturally innovative and their contributions to the tech and business world often make them regulatory entrepreneurs by default. Startups typically use guerilla growth tactics to quickly expand their user base. Regulatory entrepreneurship is fraught with risk, but venture capitalists and angel investors are willing to take high risks to support startup companies. Some companies, like Airbnb, do not even make a profit, so the investors’ support is necessary to the success of the companies.

These above factors demonstrate that no single strategy will ensure a regulatory entrepreneur’s success. Regulatory entrepreneurship is a complex line of business that has many moving parts and requires companies to have effective business and legal plans in order to succeed.

96. Id. at 417–18.
97. Id. at 418–19.
98. Id. at 419–20.
100. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see generally Fisch, supra note 58.
101. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and Tesla were all startups. See Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 424–30.
102. Id. at 424.
103. Id.
C. Regulatory Entrepreneurship’s Future

As Barry and Pollman point out, predicting the future is “a difficult prospect at best,” but trends in regulatory entrepreneurship allow educated guesses about where the industry will go and which factors will influence its success.106 There are additional factors in the business and legal world that will help regulatory entrepreneurship grow.

Technology is the basis for many regulatory entrepreneurs’ businesses, and as technology exponentially increases, so does the opportunity for regulatory entrepreneurship.107 This coupled with laws allowing new investment will help to boost regulatory entrepreneurship in the coming years.108 Regulatory entrepreneurship is now commonplace, and investors are comfortable investing in regulatory entrepreneurs.109

From a political standpoint, regulatory entrepreneurs have a slight advantage given the current political atmosphere. The political gridlock that currently keeps Congress stagnant will also affect regulatory entrepreneurship by slowing federal regulators’ ability to inhibit entrepreneurs, thus shifting regulatory pressure to local and state governments where regulatory entrepreneurs have the most success.110

Yet, regulatory entrepreneurs also face challenges. Occupational licensing—government permission to operate a business or profession—and incumbent industries threatened by regulatory entrepreneurship will often push regulators to maintain these licensing requirements.111 This type of regulation has increased dramatically over the past sixty years, and resulted in negative effects on unemployment and product costs.112

Restrictive zoning, where the government places limits on the activities that occur in certain areas, is another challenge. For example, commercial activity cannot occur in certain residential areas, which conflict with Airbnb’s business plan of allowing homeowners to rent out their rooms.113

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106. Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 430.
107. Id. at 433–34.
110. Id. at 430.
111. Id. at 438.
112. Id.
In turn, Airbnb has fought restrictive zoning as part of their regulatory entrepreneurship. These factors are by no means all-inclusive or individually material to a regulatory entrepreneur’s success, but they provide examples of what will influence regulatory entrepreneurship’s success or failure. Success will depend on the company’s business model and a combination of these factors. Furthermore, it is important to note that regulatory entrepreneurs seek to make a profit, and do not necessarily want to make society perfect. Instead, they want to shape society according to their interests in succeeding as a business. Popular support for a company does not mean that the change they are enacting is good for society as a whole. For example, Tesla has permission to operate its car dealerships in a number of states, but in at least one of them, the law effectively applies only to Tesla. This shows that regulatory entrepreneurs’ success in changing the law will not necessarily mean effectively changing the law for everyone. Accordingly, these concerns do not always favor giving regulatory entrepreneurs vast amounts of political power.

A proper analysis of these factors requires looking at all of the circumstances, some of which do not yield a clear right or wrong answer. However, they are helpful in advising a solution to regulatory entrepreneurs’ battles with regulators.

Now that the theory of regulatory entrepreneurship has been explained, this Comment will turn to Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship specifically. The rest of this Comment will focus on how Uber fought regulators in the United States and France, deriving from these examples the factors that made the difference in Uber’s push to change the law. This Comment will then propose a solution to Uber’s current legal battles in France. With more American regulatory entrepreneurs expanding into foreign countries, and foreign regulators fighting changes in the status quo, a study of Uber’s

116. Id.
117. Id.
120. Id. at 446–47.
challenges in France will be helpful to both regulatory entrepreneurs and regulators who will face similar challenges in the future.

III. Uber’s Regulatory Entrepreneurship in the United States

Uber started when Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp decided to challenge San Francisco’s taxi problem in 2009.121 Taxis were inefficient and customers were often stranded while waiting to be picked up.122 Kalanick and Camp created Uber to challenge the entrenched taxi industry, and this motivation shows that even from the beginning, Uber was meant to be a regulatory entrepreneur. Uber has been extremely successful in the United States, and setting these goals from inception likely influenced its success.

In analyzing Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in the United States, this section will examine Uber’s strategy for changing the law, and regulators’ responses to that strategy. The factors that influenced Uber’s success will be examined and used for a comparison with Uber’s expansion into France, which is examined in Part IV of this Comment.

A. Uber’s Strategy for Changing the Law

Uber set out with the goal of providing an alternative to the taxi industry, an industry with heavy regulations.123 To overcome this challenge, Uber needed to face not only the taxi companies and taxi drivers themselves, but also the regulatory system that supported each. Concerns over insurance, accidents, driver and vehicle quality, and costs have largely driven these heavy regulations.124 Uber needed to address these issues and show that they could be managed by a company even without extensive government regulation.

Uber used strategies in line with the theory of regulatory entrepreneurship while expanding its business in the United States. The company ignored cease-and-desist letters, grew too big to ban, mobilized its users to take action on its behalf, and lobbied legislators through traditional political means.

122. Id.
123. Id.
Uber is known for receiving and ignoring cease-and-desist demands from regulators attempting to halt its business.125 In fact, there are several cities where Uber has ignored such demands.126 Where regulations are lax or Uber will not suffer a penalty for continuing to operate, the incentive to stop services is low, especially when Uber’s plan is for its customer growth to outpace regulators.

Uber set its sights on growing too big to ban.127 The goal was to grow big enough that there would be too high a political price for regulators to stop the company.128 To achieve this growth, Uber started drastically reducing prices, to the point where it was actually losing money on the average ride.129 While there are debates over the sustainability of this strategy, it brought in customers who wanted affordable rides and the new demand allowed Uber to expand its business to cities all across the world.130 Uber’s response when met with regulators’ threats of shutdown in San Francisco: keep expanding.131 The more that people invest in the company as riders and drivers, the more pressure that regulators feel not to attempt to shut down the business.132 No government entity wants to be responsible for costing people jobs.

This strategy came at a cost, as Uber has reportedly operated with massive losses.133 However, the company is worth $63 billion, so despite the losses, investors still support the business model.134 The customers that Uber adds to its base are more valuable to the company than a profit margin.

Uber’s riders have shown their worth each time Uber mobilized them to put pressure on regulators. While fighting an insurance bill in New York City, Uber gave free rides to and from city hall so that supporters could protest the bill.135 Uber encouraged riders to contact city hall and

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127. Wohlsen, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
134. See Chen, supra note 22.
express their opinions, generating 17,000–20,000 emails.\(^{136}\) Uber also mobilized its users to sign petitions on its behalf.\(^{137}\) Uber’s messages often specifically detail which politicians to contact with a description of the bill or law at issue.\(^{138}\) When users open the app in areas where a law is at issue, Uber will automatically show them this information and ask for responses.\(^{139}\) The app makes it hard for users to avoid getting at least minimal details about the issues, establishes a personal connection between Uber and its users, and increases the chance that a user will participate in the action Uber seeks.\(^{140}\)

Traditional lobbying techniques are still part of Uber’s arsenal. Uber has hired at least 161 lobbyists in over 50 cities and states in the United States,\(^{141}\) and in the first quarter of 2016, Uber increased its congressional lobbying spending by 191% over the first quarter of the previous year.\(^{142}\) The city of Portland, Oregon even fined Uber for violating lobbying rules in its attempt to lobby politicians.\(^{143}\)

Similar to other regulatory entrepreneurs, Uber has employed political operatives. Uber added David Plouffe, a former advisor to President Obama, as a board member and senior advisor.\(^{144}\) Plouffe ran President Obama’s 2008 campaign, and Uber essentially brought him on board to run a political campaign for Uber.\(^{145}\) Adding Plouffe to the board shows just how political Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship has become.

\(^{136}\) Chris Smith, Battlin’ Bill de Blasio’s Uber Fight, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/battlin-bill-de-blasio-uber-fight.html [https://perma.cc/HMB5-SUTC].


\(^{139}\) Id.

\(^{140}\) Id.


Uber’s tactics combine both innovative techniques—using the mobile app to mobilize users—and traditional techniques—lobbying governments—to carry out change. The benefit of being a regulatory entrepreneur with an app-based business is that there are avenues of strategy not available to companies that do not rely on technology. The success of these strategies often depends on one another as well. For example, without a large user base, mobilization of these users would be more difficult for Uber to accomplish.

B. Regulators’ Responses

Though Uber has been successful in the United States, its strategies have been met with resistance. Government regulators and the taxi lobby fought tooth and nail to stop Uber from operating on turf usually reserved for traditional taxis. The slow nature of regulators meant that Uber had a lot of time to operate and grow its business before any real crackdown began. The penalties imposed in the United States were also not severe enough to deter Uber’s services, though Uber compromised on some of its practices.

As mentioned briefly above, many of these fights were over legislation meant to regulate Uber. When Uber entered these markets, ridesharing did not fit within the existing regulatory scheme, so Uber had room to wiggle around regulations that applied to taxis. As regulators slowly caught up, the fight focused on methods for regulating Uber.146

Most of these battles went Uber’s way and many of Uber’s business policies were adopted as law. “Each government, whether municipal or state, goes through its own process to craft rules, but in the end, officials generally codify the insurance coverage, background-check policies, and inspection protocols Uber already has in place.”147 Once Uber won the popular support of the voters and taxpayers, there was little keeping it from winning the legislative battles as well.148 Josh Alpert, director of strategic initiatives for Portland’s mayor, said of Uber’s hold on Portland’s city council, “They kind of run this. I feel like they will just wear you down. If we end up in court, we will have to lose just based on resources.”149

Uber’s battles are not just with regulators. Taxi drivers themselves have taken up the fight against Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship. Just as Uber mobilized its users to lobby the government, taxi cab companies mobilized their drivers to protest laws favorable to Uber.150 The threat of

146. Cf. Hawkins, supra note 90.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Rhodan, supra note 41.
the taxi companies was legitimate given the industry’s strong lobbying presence in many cities. For example, the New York taxi industry made massive contributions to Bill de Blasio’s New York City mayoral campaign.\footnote{Michael Grynbaum, \textit{Taxi Industry Opens Wallet for de Blasio, a Chief Ally}, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/nyregion/de-blasio-reaps-big-donations-from-taxi-industry-he-aided.html?_r=0.} These contributions led to accusations that the taxis owned de Blasio,\footnote{Yoav Gonen, \textit{Taxi Industry Gave de Blasio Over $550,000 for Campaign}, N.Y. POST (May 17, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/05/17/taxi-industry-gave-de-blasio-over-550000-for-campaign [https://perma.cc/9QSG-ECUP].} and fueled Uber’s attacks on de Blasio’s regulation plans.\footnote{Fitz Tepper, \textit{Uber Launch “De Blasio’s Uber” Feature in NYC with 25-minute Wait Times}, TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/16/uber-launches-de-blasio-uber-feature-in-nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times [https://perma.cc/NB48-QWU7].} But taxi industry support was not enough to stop Uber from getting its way with regulations.\footnote{Issie Lapowsky, \textit{Uber Wins its Battle Against NYC’s Mayor-for Now}, WIRED (July 22, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-wins-battle-nyc-mayor-now [https://perma.cc/4QW3-6ZPM].} Despite these attempts to regulate Uber, the company flourished in the United States.

\section*{C. Factors That Influenced Uber’s Success in the United States}

Due to the complexity of Uber’s business and its relationship with regulators, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which factors led to Uber’s success in the United States. However, it is possible to isolate some of the favorable circumstances which gave Uber an advantage.

Many of Uber’s toughest battles were at the local or state level, as opposed to battles with the federal government. This can be critical for successful regulatory entrepreneurship, as the federal government is much harder to avoid and has more resources to regulate companies. Taxi regulations usually come from cities as opposed to states, which gives Uber an advantage by allowing the company to use its resources on smaller markets in order to force change. Uber’s victories in cities like Memphis, San Francisco, and New York City show just how important battles at the smaller levels of government can be to regulatory entrepreneurship’s success.

Regulators imposed penalties against Uber for noncompliance, but most of these were small fines that Uber paid for its drivers. For example, in 2016 Uber agreed to pay up to $25 million in fines to settle a lawsuit filed
by San Francisco and Los Angeles.155 Uber made these penalties part of its business expenses, and the company continued to operate despite the fines.

Uber’s mass appeal also helped its success. Uber’s platform is convenient: a smartphone app that a user can download for free. It also provides a cheaper alternative to taxis, enticing customers who want to switch from taxis to Uber. As evidence of its mass appeal, Uber has completed over 1 billion rides since its inception.156

Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship relied on a combination of innovative and traditional techniques as laws changed in the United States. These efforts have been largely successful despite regulators resisting the change at every level. At the end of the day, Uber is operating in almost every major United States city, a feat that can only support the idea that the company has succeeded.

IV. UBER’S REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FRANCE

Ironically, though Kalanick and Camp came up with the idea for Uber in Paris,157 which is where Uber met some of its toughest challenges from regulators. Uber expanded into Europe by starting Uber France,158 which was Uber’s first test of the European market. Uber France ended up proving to be very different than Uber’s introduction into the United States, as the French government was more successful regulating Uber and forcing the company to concede on issues. As Uber France’s CEO, Thibaud Simphal, bluntly put it, “[France] has sadly been the most resistant to Uber. We were wrong to think that it could work here like it did in the United States where markets are a little more open to change.”159

Uber France offers similar services to its counterpart in the United States. Uber operates its UberPOP service in France, which is comparable in price and car size to UberX in the United States.160 Uber also has UberX

155. This fine was for misleading customers about safety. Uber claimed that it had the “safest rides on the road” and that its background checks were the most thorough in the industry, both of which were misleading. Elizabeth Weise, Uber to Pay up to $25 Million Fine, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2016, 7:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/04/07/uber-pay-up-25-million-fine/82769030 [https://perma.cc/XL3V-CYXH].
158. Alderman, supra note 36.
160. Alderman, supra note 36.
in France, but UberX functions more like UberBLACK in the United States because it requires that drivers have a limousine license and a black vehicle to drive.\textsuperscript{161} The important distinctions are the licensing requirements for the services. The limousine licenses are easier to get than a taxi license because the number of taxi licenses is fixed, whereas the number of limousine licenses is not.\textsuperscript{162} UberPOP allows drivers without any operational license to work for Uber, as long as the driver has a car, a driver’s license, and insurance.\textsuperscript{163} Because the service allows drivers to essentially operate a taxi service without a taxi license, UberPOP is the center of Uber’s battle with regulators in France.\textsuperscript{164}

This section will first discuss Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship strategies in France. Then, it will analyze French regulators’ responses. Finally, it will discuss the factors that allowed the government in France to have more success regulating Uber than regulators in the United States.

A. Uber’s Approach in France

Uber used many of the same tactics in France that it used in the United States, and for good reason. Its regulatory entrepreneurship was largely successful in the United States because of those tactics.\textsuperscript{165} However, Uber had to adjust its strategies as regulators responded to the company’s business operations.

In order to foster growth, Uber operated at a loss to provide bonuses to its French drivers.\textsuperscript{166} The bonuses depended on the number of rides a driver completed and their average rating for these rides.\textsuperscript{167} A driver that completed 75 rides in a week made €800 in bonuses.\textsuperscript{168} Based on Uber’s rates and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{161} Id.
\bibitem{163} Alderman, supra note 36.
\bibitem{165} See discussion supra Part III.
\bibitem{167} Id.
\bibitem{168} Approximately $1,100 USD. Id.
\end{thebibliography}
the percentage it keeps from the fare, Uber lost $1,100 USD in revenue per driver per week, three times what it took in.\(^{169}\)

Uber’s recruitment focused on getting limousine-licensed drivers into its ranks, as opposed to recruiting drivers with taxi licenses.\(^{170}\) There were two reasons for this: (1) limousine licenses allowed Uber to operate legally with its UberX service, and (2) recruiting from this pool allowed Uber to pull drivers from French ridesharing competitors such as LeCab and Chauffeur-Privé.\(^{171}\) When France issued a two-month ban on recruiting new drivers, Uber instituted its bonuses to draw drivers away from competitors in an effort to deplete the available pool of drivers.\(^{172}\)

Uber also launched billboard campaigns across France, showing individuals from diverse professions and ethnicities enjoying themselves in the back of an Uber.\(^{173}\) The campaign was an attempt to get French citizens’ focus away from the negative news about Uber and back on its product.\(^{174}\) This campaign was important to Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship as mass appeal affects whether it can achieve guerilla growth and mobilize enough political support from its users.

**B. The French Government’s Response**

Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship contradicted the tough regulations that the French government imposed on commercial activity. “France, home of the 35-hour work week and one of the most protective regulatory regimes in Europe, sees it differently. UberPOP, with its nonchalance about regulation and its gig-economy boosterism, is radically un-French.”\(^{175}\) This contrast fueled many of the battles between Uber and France.

Fines were the most common method of cracking down on Uber drivers. Paris created a special law enforcement department, called the Boers, to stop Uber drivers and issue tickets.\(^ {176}\) Once Uber drivers were ticketed, they were told to stop driving for the company.\(^ {177}\) However, Uber paid for these tickets, and the drivers kept driving.\(^ {178}\)

\(^{169}\) For a more detailed explanation of the mathematics, see id. \(^{170}\) See id. \(^{171}\) LeCab and Chauffeur-Privé run similar rideshare services to Uber, yet they also protest Uber’s methods for being allegedly anti-competition. Id. \(^{172}\) Id. \(^{173}\) Lucinda Shen, *This is Uber’s Plan to Fix it’s Image in France*, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/10/uber-france-ad-campaign-fix [https://perma.cc/6FSB-D2VK]. \(^{174}\) Id. \(^{175}\) Alderman, *supra* note 36. \(^{176}\) Id. \(^{177}\) Id. \(^{178}\) Id.
Regulations focused on punishing both the drivers and the company itself. The French government tried regulations that hit specific areas of Uber’s business model, such as driver recruitment and passenger pickup. The government halted issuing new limousine licenses for two months to slow Uber’s growth. It also instituted a 15-minute wait law that required drivers to wait 15-minutes from the time a ride was requested before they could pick up a passenger. The 15-minute wait law sought to drive users away from Uber by lengthening their ride time. Additionally, taxi unions called on the government to ban Uber’s smartphone app; however, it still remains operational.

In 2014, France passed comprehensive national legislation that regulated Uber. Called the Thévenoud law, the law banned UberPOP and required Uber drivers to conform to many of the same regulations as taxi drivers. Drivers could be fined up to $17,000 and serve a year in prison for picking up passengers in an UberPOP. Despite these penalties, Uber was undeterred. Thibaud Simphal, stated, “If a judge tomorrow says UberPop should stop, we would stop. But we don’t see there’s a reason to stop now.”

Uber challenged the Thévenoud law in multiple courts and on different grounds. France’s highest constitutional court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, held the Thévenoud law constitutional, despite Uber’s challenges.

180. Dillet, supra note 162.
182. See id.
183. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 179.
186. Id.
However, Uber succeeded in another court, the Conseil d’État, France’s highest court for administrative law, which struck down part of the law that banned Uber’s app from showing car locations. The court deemed providing the locations an “information society service,” and European Union law requires notifying the European Union before a country can regulate those services. Since France had not notified the European Union, the law violated EU law. During the time that these cases were pending, Uber continued to operate UberPOP, showing just how bold the company’s disregard for the law could be.

Uber’s relaxed compliance with French law ended abruptly in 2015. The French government raided Uber’s Paris headquarters, held its employees for six hours and seized documents, emails, and cellphones. Uber protested the raid as “a disproportionate action,” a choice of words that revealed just how startlingly aggressive the government raid was. In contrast, Uber’s United States offices were never searched by police, and the French government’s willingness to take such action highlights the differences between the countries’ regulatory actions.

A few months after the police raid, Paris police arrested Thibaud Simphal and Pierre-Dimitri Gore-Coty, Uber Europe’s General Manager, charging them with running an illegal taxi company and concealing digital documents. Violent taxi protests over Uber’s disregard for the ban on UberPOP and an expansion of the service into smaller French towns pressured the French government into making the arrests. The executives faced up to five years’ imprisonment and personal fines of €300,000. Uber itself faced a fine of €1.5 million. The possible prison sentence underlined how serious the French government considered these violations. Uber and its executives

189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
194. Dillet, supra note 38.
195. See id.
197. Id.
were convicted, but did not receive prison time. Instead, the court ordered Uber to pay €800,000, Simphal to pay €20,000, and Gore-Coty to pay €30,000.

Uber suspended its UberPOP service shortly after its executives were arrested. Uber never resumed UberPOP in France, and now only operates its UberX and UberBLACK services in accordance with the limousine and taxi licenses that the government requires. While Uber still has those regulated services, giving up UberPOP, the service that was by nature anti-regulation, was a defeat for Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship.

C. Factors That Influenced Regulators’ Success in France

French regulators had more success regulating Uber and maintaining the status quo in the taxi industry than regulators in the United States. Two discernible factors allowed France to succeed where United States regulators could not. First, France’s government structure as a civil law based European Union member with a Socialist regime places a higher focus on regulation than the United States does. Second, France’s culture tends to tolerate riots and protests, and anti-Uber protests influenced regulators’ responses and public opinion about the company, making it harder to gain a political advantage.

1. France’s Government

The French government has several advantages that influenced regulators’ ability to control Uber. Regulations on Uber came from the French national government, which has the resources and power necessary to issue laws controlling Uber. France’s socialist structure encouraged regulation to come from the national government. Its place within the highly regulated European Union also encouraged regulation from the highest levels of government.

France is a civil law country with a socialist government, so national regulation is common in all aspects of French life. Paris struggled to contain

199. Id.
Uber, and the Paris prosecutor’s office requested that the national government step in: prompting the government to raid Uber and arrest its executives. As Barry and Pollman point out, Uber has the most success when it is battling smaller municipal or state governments because its resources and agility match up favorably against the slower bureaucratic process. This regulation from the top down allowed the French government to match Uber’s resources and limit its ability to sidestep the law. Uber had an easier time battling cities in the United States, where political pressure was easier to create and Uber’s business resources went further against a governing body with less resources.

France is also a member of the European Union, which means that regulations at the national level may be subject to scrutiny at the transnational level. French regulations must be consistent with EU law, as the Conseil d’État’s decision held. Uber is currently litigating its business model in the European Court of Justice, and if Uber is deemed a cab service by the European Court of Justice then it will fall under stricter regulations. However, if it is merely a digital service that connects riders and drivers, then it can operate with less restrictions and easily expand across Europe.

The case is especially important because Uber has faced similar resistance in almost every country in Europe. Uber’s entire European market may well depend on this case being decided in its favor.

The European Union has spent a few years adapting to the sharing economy or as it is called in Europe, the collaborative economy. In a staff working document, the European Commission seemed receptive to solutions that will best benefit both consumers and Uber. The report

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203. Schechner, supra note 159.
204. Duncan Robinson & Madhumita Murgia, European court takes up the question: what is Uber?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f2774e9a-b566-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.
205. Id.
207. For a detailed discussion of each country and the resistance Uber is facing, see Demasi, supra note 43, at 76–83.
209. Id.
stated that, “there is significant economic potential in the collaborative economy but also a large degree of uncertainty regarding rights and obligations.”

Furthermore, the report also stated that regulations that are too rigid can cause problems for European economies. The report discusses ridesharing with facts favorable to Uber. It notes that regulations and, in particular, licensing requirements for drivers stifle the business growth of ridesharing platforms. The report seeks a solution that fosters economic growth driven by Uber and other ridesharing companies but tempers it with moderate regulation that ensures the worrisome areas of Uber’s competitive business model are kept in check. In essence, the European Commission wants to protect all parties involved, which is a good sign for Uber in Europe considering the alternative.

Uber battled regulators at the municipal level, as it did in the United States, but it also contended with the French national government as well. This alone was enough to tilt the scale in favor of regulators. But the European Union has a say in the regulatory scheme as well, meaning Uber had an even tougher time escaping regulation. This regulatory ladder had more political power and resources to keep Uber from escaping their regulations. Uber faced no such national resistance in the United States. As a result, France was more successful in regulating Uber than jurisdictions in the United States because of its from-the-top regulatory scheme.

2. Cultural Challenges

Foreign culture poses interesting challenges for any company looking to expand overseas. France in particular is known for strikes, riots, and protests on a number of different issues. The taxi protests in France exerted pressure on regulators and forced the government into action. Full blown riots and violence over a company’s business model are almost unheard of in the United States, and riots of that caliber are generally over social issues such as race.

Parisian taxi drivers mobilized to fight Uber’s threat of deregulation. “Today, the city has just 17,702 taxis, only a few thousand more than it had before the Nazis invaded. Yet virtually every time the government

210. Id.
211. Id. at 4.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 16.
tries to expand the fleet, irate taxi drivers protest with a form of strike they call operation Escargot, in which cabbies inch along thoroughfares, snarling traffic all over the capital. The taxi drivers blockaded highways and setup checkpoints, even going so far as to smash Uber drivers’ windows and slash their tires.

These protests work, and are a sort of antithesis to regulatory entrepreneurship’s strategy of mobilizing users. The Uber executives’ arrests came directly after violent protests, and tension between taxi companies and Uber led to laws like the 15-minute law and the Thevenoud law. The French taxi industry was essentially beating Uber at its own game in the most violent and disruptive way possible. Witness reports from the riots made Paris sound like a war zone, and taxi drivers even protested the regulations that they asked for because they were not enough.

Essentially, taxi drivers made Uber more than just a business or economic issue. They made the company a safety issue. But it is important to note that these safety issues were not directly because of Uber. Uber’s drivers were not excessively dangerous on the road or committing criminal acts against their passengers. The danger came from taxi drivers who believed that Uber was threatening their jobs, violently protested against Uber, and wrought havoc on the streets of France. Regardless of the fact that Uber was not the direct problem, these protests succeeded by inserting safety into the conversation about regulating Uber. The French government had to take action to keep its citizens safe and maintain order. The obvious choice was regulating Uber, the foreign disruptor, rather than changing the status quo for an entrenched industry that was engrained in French culture.

Protests are common in any democratic society. However, the violence in the French taxi protests is surprising given the subject matter. The taxi drivers attacked Uber drivers for working for a company. In the United States, citizens tend to violently protest civil rights violations and social justice issues. When a corporation is involved, the protests are generally

215. Alderman, supra note 36.
216. Id.
218. Dillet, supra note 181.
220. Toor, supra note 164.
221. Taxi drivers wanted a 30-minute rule instead of a 15-minute rule. Dillet, supra note 181.
223. Id.
aimed at the corporation itself, not low-level employees.224 The idea that a protest would attack the people working for a company because of a company’s business model is quite foreign to the United States. This is not to say France is a more violent country than the United States, but that the protest culture in France allowed protests over Uber to escalate to the point that they became a safety issue ultimately requiring action on the part of the government. As a result, regulation was swift when public safety became an issue.

V. PROPOSED SOLUTION

There are valid public policy reasons in favor of France regulating and de-regulating Uber. These policy interests go to the heart of consumer protection laws, anti-competition laws, and anti-trust laws. This section will analyze these competing interests before it proposes a solution to Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France.

Regulation is meant to protect consumers and competition, and huge technology companies like Uber wield considerable power that makes consumer advocacy and antitrust groups nervous.225 Even in the United States, there are still valid concerns about how Uber treats its competitors, drivers226 and customers.227

Uber has used, and has been accused of using, unethical and borderline illegal tactics against its competitors. Uber allegedly launched a massive distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) attack on Gett cars, one of Uber’s


rideshare rivals, in New York City. Uber drivers allegedly ordered and cancelled more than 100 rides from Gett, slowing down the service and preventing legitimate customers from accessing rides. There is even evidence that Uber’s managers participated in these attacks.

Uber’s surge pricing feature, which increases fares to get more drivers on the road, has repeatedly been criticized as price fixing. For example, on a holiday weekend in San Diego, Uber stopped new drivers from driving so fares would increase for riders. Uber denied this, instead stating that it stopped new drivers from signing up the week before. The company maintained that it is merely a third party and that the market sets the price. However, the fact that Uber can control its supply of drivers says otherwise.

These concerns helped spark the protests throughout France and gave French regulators the political support they needed to pass laws that controlled Uber’s business. Although Uber did not cross the ethical line as much in France as it did in the United States, its reputation preceded it. This led French taxi drivers and government regulators to worry about how far Uber would push its aggressive policies.

On the other hand, economic policy and the free market favor deregulation, particularly in France. French foreign investment is down, and its economy is struggling to create jobs for the younger generation. Competition is healthy for economic growth, and Uber’s competition with taxis will help the economy grow. Also, Uber offers a partial solution that the currently regulated taxi system cannot solve.

There are numerous problematic reasons for allowing the current taxi system to remain. The French public is frustrated by the lack of innovation from the government when it comes to transportation. In Paris, where


229. Id.

230. Id.


232. Popper, supra note 231.

233. Id.

234. Id.

235. See discussion supra Part IV.B.

236. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 179.
the government directly controls taxi licenses, the number of taxis has not changed despite an increase in demand.\textsuperscript{237} This demand increase has led to scarce rides and high prices.\textsuperscript{238} Uber’s platform relies on the free market, and can help to alleviate this problem by placing more cabs on the road at competitive prices.

Uber has a different role in France’s economy than it does in the United States. While Uber does not have as many drivers in Paris as it has in New York City or San Francisco, 81% of the drivers in Paris do not have another form of employment\textsuperscript{239} This is in contrast to the United States, where Uber is mostly supplemental income, and shows just how important Uber is to its drivers in France.\textsuperscript{240} Furthermore, Uber does not have non-compete clauses for their drivers.\textsuperscript{241} As Uber told TechCrunch, “We don’t force our drivers to work exclusively for us. They always have the choice.”\textsuperscript{242} Thus, drivers may drive for other rideshare companies in Europe and support the economy in that way as well.

France’s broader economics also favor deregulation. France has an overall unemployment rate of 9.9%, but 25.1% of males age 15-24 are unemployed, and 22.5% of females aged 15-24 are unemployed.\textsuperscript{243} 20% of Uber drivers work more than 40 hours a week, and most drivers earn €20 an hour, which is more than double the minimum wage.\textsuperscript{244} Particularly in the poorer Parisian suburbs called banlieues, Uber is a beacon of possibility for lower class workers looking to lift themselves into better economic situations.\textsuperscript{245} A French bipartisan commission found that opening the taxi market to competition from rideshare platforms can create 35,000-45,000 driving jobs in Paris, and even more in the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Id.
  \item Id.
  \item Id.
  \item Id.
  \item Dillet, \textit{supra} note 162.
  \item Id.
  \item Chassany, \textit{supra} note 239.
  \item Id.
  \item Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
makes up 18% of the entire French population, so these numbers are important for French economic growth. French regulators should allow Uber to continue to operate UberPOP, or an alternative service that lets drivers without a taxi or limousine license operate under Uber. France’s economics favor allowing these services to continue. UberPOP can create economic opportunities for young French workers, and can help to heal the economy. As the European Commission keeps looking for efficient solutions, a compromise of this sort seems possible, at least at the transnational level. Whether France gives Uber regulatory leeway will remain to be seen.

France’s outright ban on UberPOP places the company in the exact same position as the taxi industry. There is little growth opportunity when the government sets the number of licenses available to drivers. If the French government shows flexibility by allowing innovative companies to enter the country and create jobs, then more regulatory entrepreneurs may attempt to do business in France. As the situation currently stands, Uber’s struggles in France send warning signs to other innovators looking to expand into France, turning away jobs for French citizens.

France is justifiably focused on its consumers given the concerns about Uber’s alleged anti-competition practices. Yet, a ban on UberPOP does not protect consumers; it harms them. The taxi industry in France has an incredible amount of power, none of which is in the hands of the consumer. Taxi strikes occur often, inconveniencing the average rider. The strict government regulations on licenses essentially give the industry a monopoly on prices and services, which are used to the driver’s advantage rather than for the rider’s convenience. Allowing Uber to operate its UberPOP service may improve the traditional taxi industry by forcing it to reassess its customer service to compete with Uber.

Rather than cracking down on Uber, France’s government should penalize taxi drivers for rioting and conducting other dangerous acts against Uber drivers. The government’s safety concerns stem from the taxi industry’s riots and attacks on Uber drivers, not from Uber’s cab service. Uber’s service is not making France less safe, but rather the French taxi industry’s response to Uber is. The fact that the French government arrested Uber France’s executives and placed them on trial, but did not take any action to deter taxi industry riots, is concerning. France should focus on the actual source of danger and crack down on taxi drivers looking to injure citizens.

Once the government quells the taxi protests, the French government and the French public may change their perspective on Uber. As a result of this shift in focus, France may view Uber as a vehicle for economic growth rather than associating the company with street violence. Damage to Uber’s public image may already be done, and unless Uber is separated from the taxi protests in the minds of the French government and its citizens, deregulation remains a distant goal and France will continue to ban UberPOP.

This solution is a compromise between the two sides that seeks to satisfy the policy goals of protecting consumers, ensuring healthy competition, and fostering economic growth. Uber brings benefits to France which outweigh the concerns raised by its regulatory entrepreneurship. France can allow Uber to operate while ensuring the company does not harm its consumers or the competing taxi industry.

VI. CONCLUSION: WHY UBER’S REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FRANCE MATTERS

Regulatory entrepreneurs are expanding across the world. Uber has drivers in over 50 countries,249 Lyft has expanded into east Asia,250 and Airbnb is in more than 191 countries.251 As more regulatory entrepreneurship startups and succeed, regulatory entrepreneurship will become common throughout the world. As these disrupters expand, they will inevitably meet resistance from new jurisdictions they enter, just as they did when they began in the United States.

It is important for regulators to know how these companies will act and how regulatory entrepreneurs change the law. Ten years ago, the concept of getting into a stranger’s personal car for a ride seemed, well, strange. Now however, it is commonplace to call an Uber or a Lyft. To try to guess where regulatory entrepreneurship will go in the next ten years is impossible, but regulators can learn from current companies and at least predict general strategies for regulatory entrepreneurship.

On the other side, it is important for regulatory entrepreneurs to determine factors that allowed other companies to succeed or caused them to fail while planning an expansion into a foreign country. In their quest for growth, regulatory entrepreneurs will keep expanding into these markets, and each time will meet a set of challenges similar to Uber’s expansion into France. Regulatory entrepreneurs will become more adequately prepared for these expansions by recognizing which countries’ political and cultural systems are the most receptive to the changes that they bring, and by understanding the factors that could hinder their entrepreneurship.

As technology pushes regulatory entrepreneurship forward, studies on regulatory entrepreneurs will become necessary to analyze the impact these companies have on society, the economy, and the law. Professors Barry and Pollman’s *Regulatory Entrepreneurship* lays a framework for analyzing these companies and the regulators that oppose them. The scholarly works that will grow around their theory will help regulators and entrepreneurs to efficiently come to solutions. This Comment seeks to contribute to that literature in an international context.