2021-05-15

An Inferentially Robust Look at Two Competing Explanations for the Surge in Unauthorized Migration From Central America

Nick Santos
University of San Diego

AN INFERENTIALLY ROBUST LOOK AT TWO COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SURGE IN UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL AMERICA

by

Nick Santos

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2021

Dissertation Committee

Fred Galloway, EdD, Chair
Antonio Jimenez Luque, PhD, Member
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, PhD, Member

University of San Diego

University of San Diego
School of Leadership and Education Sciences

CANDIDATE'S NAME: Nick Santos

TITLE OF DISSERTATION: An Inferentially Robust Look at Two Competing Explanations for the Surge in Unauthorized Migration From Central America

APPROVAL:

_____, Chair
Fred Galloway, EdD

_____, Member
Antonio Jimenez Luque, PhD

_____, Member
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, PhD

DATE:

ABSTRACT

The last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of Central American apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol. Explanations for this surge in apprehensions have been split between two leading hypotheses. Most academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human rights organizations identify poverty and violence (the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis) in Central America as the primary triggers responsible. In contrast, while most government officials, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm admit poverty and violence may underlie some decisions to migrate, they instead blame lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes (the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis) as the real cause of the surge. Despite the existence of opposing claims, neither side has provided a clear data-based explanation regarding what has caused the sudden surge of unauthorized immigration from Central America.

To address these competing claims, this study explored both hypotheses from a macrolevel using an empirically-driven quantitative research design. The study first identified the universe of data as tracked and gathered by large reputable organizations for the seven relevant countries/regions in the study (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Latin America, and United States). A total of 195 independent variables were selected with 181 of them being specific to each country/region. This data produced a series of 68 independent stepwise regression models that explored the direct and indirect effects of both competing hypotheses. Ultimately, the study found more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, though it did not produce findings that confidently dismiss the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, findings do suggest the often-cited Poverty and Violence Hypothesis has

likely been overstated and exaggerated as a cause of the Central American migration surge. Furthermore, while neither hypothesis had enough inferentially robust support to conclusively back its claims, the findings do provide credence to the argument that the often-dismissed Policy and Loophole Hypothesis must be considered along with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in any analysis looking at unauthorized immigration from Central America.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I do not have many people to acknowledge or thank. No one helped me in this pursuit, and I pretty much did everything on my own. However, I would like to thank my son, Keanu. You have been such a good kid and have required so little hand holding that I could not be prouder. I was able to pursue my PhD because of you. I know you will accomplish great things in life. S*igues siendo mi bebé*. Lastly, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Fred Galloway. I loved every class you taught and the conversations we had. I will miss all that. The academy appears to be losing professors like you and that is a shame. Fortunately, I was able to enjoy what the academy was meant to be through your classes and lectures. Thank you, brother.

ORDER OF PAGES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

The last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of Other-than-Mexican (OTM) *apprehensions* by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), as seen in Figure 1.[1] [2] These unauthorized immigration flows have consisted of mostly Central American migrants from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras.[3] These three countries historically accounted for only about 2% of all yearly apprehensions along the Southwest Border.[4] Beginning in 2012, that share began to increase at an alarming pace, and, today, apprehensions from these three countries account for 71.4% of all apprehensions along the Southwest Border. This spike of OTM apprehensions has raised new concerns for border enforcement and government officials.

Academic literature, news reports, and government hearings began to address the issue of unauthorized immigration from Central American soon after a never-before-seen surge of Central American children began arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. Since then, the consensus among most scholars and the mass media has been that poverty and violence in Central America are the primary drivers of the surge (Brendem et al., 2017; Campos & Friedland, 2014; Chishti & Hipsman, 2016; Clemens, 2017; De Jesus & Hernades, 2019;

---

[1] OTM is the official categorization for migrants apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) before it, that are not Mexican nationals.

[2] According to CBP, *apprehensions* refer to the physical control or temporary detainment of a person who is not lawfully in the U.S. which may or may not result in an arrest. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics. Simply put, for this study, it is the arrest of an undocumented individual in the United States by USBP.

[3] For the purposes of this study the terms Northern Triangle, OTM, and Central America will be used interchangeably to mean El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras unless otherwise specified. Because El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are part of Central America (along with Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), the region known as the Northern Triangle of Central America, and they make up 90% of OTM apprehensions and 98% Central American apprehensions, these terms are commonly used interchangeably in studies, government reports, and the media.

[4] The Southwest Border refers to the U.S.-Mexico border located to the southwest of the United States. The terms Southwest Border and U.S.-Mexico border will be used interchangeably.

Dominguez-Villegas, 2017; Dominguez-Villegas & Rietig, 2015; Government Accountability Office, 2015b; Hiskey et al., 2016; International Crisis Group, 2017; Isacson et al., 2014; Kandel, 2017; Kandel & Seghetti, 2015; Kandel et al., 2014; Lesser & Batalova, 2017; Lorenzen, 2017; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017; Meyer, 2017; Migration Crisis, 2015; Manuel, 2014; Meyer & Margesson, 2016; Obinna, 2019; Preston, 2014; Rosenblum & Ball, 2016; Seelke, 2017; Semple, 2019; Willis & Seiz, 2019). In contrast, government officials and the agencies that work in the immigration enforcement realm blame recent immigration related policy changes and loopholes for the surge (Arthur, 2018; Asylum Abuse, 2013; Asylum Fraud, 2014; Government Accountability Office, 2015a, 2015c, 2016; Inserra, 2014; Kandel, 2017; Kandel & Seghetti, 2015; Manuel, 2014; McAleenan, 2019; Migrant Children and Border Security, 2019; Ongoing Migration from Central America*,* 2015; Seelke, 2017; Sessions, 2017; Sussis, 2019; "TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien Children," 2018; "Unaccompanied Alien Children," 2015; Wasem, 2011, 2014).

Problem Statement

Despite the existence of opposing claims, neither side has provided a clear data-based explanation regarding what caused the sudden surge of unauthorized immigration from Central America. One of the main problems surrounding this topic is literature investigating Central American migration is very limited. The reason for the lack of research is due to the simple fact that, historically, OTM unauthorized migration along the Southwest Border represented only a tiny fraction of all apprehensions as displayed in Figures 2. In fact, between 1980 and 2019, total OTM apprehensions across the Southwest Border accounted for only 8.4% of all apprehensions. In other words, Mexican apprehensions were 91.6% of all apprehensions between 1980 and 2019. More importantly, 63.7% of all OTM apprehensions since 1980 took place between 2012

and 2019. Due to the historic low flows of OTM unauthorized migration and the large flows of Mexican unauthorized migration, the majority of the literature on unauthorized immigration has focused almost exclusively on unauthorized immigration from Mexico. Equally important, what makes the existing literature on Central American immigration especially problematic is the fact that there are two opposing camps of experts and advocates that clash over the cause of the recent migration surge.

Figure 1

Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates all Other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by USBP. OTM apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section.

Figure 2

Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions by Percentage (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates the percentage of apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico Border by USBP that were either Mexican or Other-than-Mexican. Mexican and OTM apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section.

As previously noted, the two camps consist of those that identify poverty and violence in Central America as the primary triggers responsible and those that admit poverty and violence underlie decisions to migrate, but blame lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real reasons for the surge. The two camps consist of different types of experts and advocates. Most

academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human rights organizations identify poverty and violence as the primary reason for the surge (hereinafter referred to as the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis), while government officials, practitioners, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm overwhelmingly identify lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the principal culprits (hereinafter referred to as the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis).

Interestingly, this is not anything new regarding this topic. Political scientist William D. Stanley (1987) identified this ideological divide as far back as the mid-1980s when Central America was in the middle of a number of civil wars that caused many to migrate to the United States. Stanley (1987) stated:

> It is difficult to reconcile these two diametrically opposed evaluations of the motivations behind the Central American exodus. Both sides of the debate have access to individual case information about Central American migrants, yet they arrive at opposite conclusions. The two sides have different views as to what U.S. policy should be, and their respective analyses of the situation reflect these biases. (p. 133)

Due to the two opposing views, it is difficult to ascertain facts simply from the contemporary literature. In addition, there are large gaps and issues in the research on both sides of the argument. Currently, the camp that identifies existing immigration policies and loopholes as the problem lack any kind of analytical or statistical studies to back their claims. Most of their evidence comes in the form of expert testimony from employees and practitioners before Congressional hearings and internal investigations that are often alluded to but never released for public scrutiny.

However, possibly even more problematic are the studies that support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. As the Literature Review chapter will explain, despite the fact that this hypothesis has been advanced by mostly academic scholars, and despite their claims of worsening socioeconomic conditions in Central America, little statistical evidence has been provided and few studies have attempted to conduct inferentially robust analytical research that take into account immigration officials' key concerns.

The reason why the poverty and violence hypothesis less-than-adequate analysis can be perceived as especially problematic is because of its impact on the media and its sway on public opinion. In theory, the academy's well-established peer review process should correct methodological issues and hypotheses that fail to provide adequate empirical evidence and findings. However, the peer review process has failed to catch some of these glaring issues. As a result, studies blaming poverty and violence for the surge in Central American unauthorized immigration have led to a commonly believed and unchallenged hypothesis that has become the consensus narrative in the media and with the public (Beinart, 2019; Correal & Specia, 2018; Greenberg, 2018; Preston, 2014; Schwartz, 2018; Semple, 2019; Talbot, 2019; Willis & Seiz, 2019).

Ultimately, new research is needed that scrutinizes both camps' hypotheses. Currently empirical evidence is lacking for both hypotheses. Therefore, there is a need for a large quantitative study that analyses the socioeconomic and immigration policy data available to arrive at more inferentially robust findings.

Purpose of the Study

Poverty and violence in Central America have become the consensus root cause among most experts, scholars, and news outlets for the never-before-seen Central American

unauthorized migration flows. Conversely, government officials, practitioners, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm have blamed lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real reasons for the surge. Due to these "diametrically opposed evaluations" (Stanley, 1987), and research gaps in both sides of the argument, it is difficult to arrive at an objective, data-based explanation for the dramatic rise in Central Americans illegally entering the United States. For these reasons, an extensive quantitative study is needed that takes into account the most important variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, due to methodological issues in the literature with regard to time frame selection issues, extended time frames that take into account decades, not just single year data points or very selective short time frames, will be pursued to better measure the impact of socioeconomic and policy changes over time on unauthorized migration from Central America.

Ideally, a more comprehensive study that takes into account more variables, longer time frames, and both conflicting hypotheses will provide more inferentially robust findings. More importantly, this study will help policymakers and leaders make better decisions regarding what is currently known as the Central American Migration Crisis,[5] while at the same time contributing significantly to the fields of immigration and national security.

---

[5] The Central American Migration Crisis, sometimes called the OTM Crisis, is what this study explores. The consensus among experts and immigration officials is that the real start of the crisis was 2012 when OTM apprehensions along the Southwest Border increased from 46,997 in 2011 to 94,532 in 2012. It includes the Unaccompanied Children (UAC) Crisis which made headlines in 2014 and brought to light the surge of unauthorized immigration from Central American.

Research Questions

The study being proposed here will focus on the following research questions:

1. What is the universe of poverty and violence data for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the available data in an inferentially robust way?
3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain the recent surge in Central American migration?

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

As previously mentioned in the Problem Statement section, literature investigating Central American migration is very limited due to the simple fact that OTM unauthorized migration along the Southwest Border represented only a tiny fraction of all apprehensions. In fact, as displayed in Figure 3, 2014 was the first year OTM apprehensions accounted for more apprehensions than Mexican apprehensions along the Southwest Border. Simply put, the field has historically focused on unauthorized Mexican migration because Mexican migration had historically accounted for an overwhelming majority of the unauthorized immigration across the Southwest Border.

However, despite the limited research on Central American migration, historic socioeconomic and political conditions in Central America are well known and literature on these topics are extensive. Although the literature on socioeconomic conditions in Central America has been used to explain some of the small-scale Central American migration of the past, today's literature fails to consider that past data from previous eras that suggest current issues associated with poverty and violence are nothing new. Instead, the most recent literature only considers contemporary data on socioeconomic conditions to explain the current phenomenon. Simply put, contemporary literature on the topic appear to ignore past data and research that suggests conditions in Central America today are no worse than in the past and, if anything, appear to have improved over time.

The literature review will focus on the poverty and violence literature of Central America. There are four primary reasons to focus on the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis for the literature review: (a) to determine whether poverty and violence are indeed the causal

factors responsible for the record number of Central Americans crossing illegally into the United States, a historic look at the region is required to see if poverty and violence are new contemporary issues; (b) to determine if there currently exists what President Obama defined as a "humanitarian crisis at the border" due to poverty and violence, literature on the current Central American situation must be reviewed; (c) to support or dismiss the theory that various policy and loophole issues in the immigration process are to blame, a complete picture of possible systemic push factor causes must be explored; and lastly (d) as alluded to in the Problem Statement section, there is in fact very little academic or statistical research to review on the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. As previously stated, most of the claims behind the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis come in the form of expert testimony from employees and practitioners before Congressional hearings and internal investigations that have not been released to the public. Ultimately, original research must be conducted to arrive at more concrete conclusions, but the first step is to understand Central America's history of poverty and violence.

This literature review will be broken down into five parts. The first part of the literature review will look at the historical ideological divide in the literature concerning Central American migration. Although this was already briefly mentioned in the Problem Statement section, a detailed look at the literature is warranted due to the influence this ideological divide has had on academic research, the media, and policy over the decades. The second part of this review will look at the literature on Central America from the 1920s to the mid-1990s. This part will focus on the era commonly referred to as the Central American Crisis; however, earlier historic socioeconomic and political conditions will also be briefly discussed to provide context. The third part will review literature on Central America from the mid-1990s to 2012. This is the period between the end of the Central American Crisis in the mid-1990s, to the start of the most

recent Central American migration surge in 2012. The fourth part will look at literature on Central America from 2012 to today. This is contemporary literature on Central American migration from the start of the Central American Migration Crisis in 2012 to the current situation in 2020. Finally, the fifth part will summarize the literature, address some of the issues in recent research, and make an argument as to why a more comprehensive study is needed.

Figure 3

Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates all Mexican and Other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico Border by USBP. Mexican and OTM apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section.

The Historical Ideological Divide in the Literature

As discussed in the previous sections, current literature exploring the cause of the recent wave of Central American migration is problematic due to two opposing camps of experts and advocates. Most academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human rights organizations identify poverty and violence as the primary reasons for the surge. Government officials, practitioners, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm admit poverty and violence underlie decisions to migrate, but overwhelmingly identify lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the principal culprits.

Despite all the literature and expert analysis, due to the opposing views, it is difficult to ascertain facts simply from the contemporary literature. Interestingly, however, this is not anything new. Poverty, violence, and Central American migration have been topics of debate going back to the 1970s thanks in large part to what became known as the Central American Crisis (Leiken & Rubin, 1987; Morrison & May, 1994). The Central American Crisis is typically dated from 1960 to 1996, and it consisted of a series of civil conflicts and civil wars between leftwing militias and rightwing military regimes and dictators. The era included the Guatemalan Civil War (1960–1996), the Salvadoran Civil War (1979–1992) and the Nicaraguan Revolution and subsequent Contra War (1962–1990). Honduras avoided the long civil wars that plagued its neighbors, but government paranoia of leftist movements led to state sponsored clandestine campaigns against leftist militias and their supporters. In addition, the neighboring civil wars caused hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Honduras, negatively impacting an already unstable and weak economy.

As the conflicts in Central America picked up steam in the late 1970s, civil wars, communist revolutions, and U.S.-backed paramilitary groups ravaged the region. In the wake of the ongoing conflicts, unauthorized migration and asylum claims from the region began to increase. According to a study done by political scientist William D. Stanley (1987) on whether migrants from Central America were either economic migrants or refugees from violence, he acknowledged a seemingly ideological divide between camps even back then. According to Stanley (1987), the Reagan administration pointed to "the fact that many Central Americans pass[ed] through Mexico on their way to the United States [as] evidence of their economic motivations" (p. 132). On the other side, humanitarian groups such as

> members of private agencies aiding Central Americans in the United States argue[d] that most of the Salvadorans and Guatemalans who [came] to the United States d[id] so out of fear for their lives because of political violence in their home countries. Workers aiding refugees who were interviewed for this study reported that their clients moved to the United States only reluctantly and plan[ed] to return home when it [was] safe to do so, although most [were] uncertain as to when th[at] time w[ould] come. (Stanley, 1987, p. 133)

Stanley managed to summarize back then exactly what could be summarized today from the contemporary literature. Stanley (1987) stated:

> It is difficult to reconcile these two diametrically opposed evaluations of the motivations behind the Central American exodus. Both sides of the debate have access to individual case information about Central American migrants, yet they arrive at opposite conclusions. The two sides have different views as to what U.S. policy should be, and their respective analyses of the situation reflect these biases. (p. 133)

Not much has changed since then. The assertions remain unchanged between those that believe Central Americans are refugees "escaping poverty, [or] seek[ing] protection from violence" (Meissner et al., 2018, p. 5) and those that believe that while poverty and violence are always underlying reasons to migrate, the immigration "system is being gamed" and the asylum system specifically, is being "subject[ed] to rampart abuse and fraud" (Sessions, 2017).

Today's surge of Central American migrants, which includes an overwhelming number of unaccompanied children (UAC) and family groups, presents the leaders of the immigration and national security agencies a new challenge both legally and logistically. Although government officials, experts, and agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm have openly stated underlying decisions to migrate lie with issues pertaining to poverty and violence in the region (Gonzalez-Barrera et al., 2014), they have remained firm in their view that the exploitation of immigration system loopholes has been one of the largest, if not the largest, contributor to the recent surge in OTM migration. The loopholes found in the asylum process have been identified by some as suffering from the most abuse and fraud according to the testimony and analysis of some experts (Asylum Abuse, 2014; Asylum Fraud, 2013; Government Accountability Office, 2015, 2016; Migration Crisis, 2015; Sessions, 2017). However, it must be noted that the reason for this view is not so much that migrants are getting asylum fraudulently or finding loopholes to win their immigration cases, even though that is a concern. The real issue in the eyes of many immigration officials is that all these asylum claims, along with the increased number of immigration hearings, overwhelm the immigration system creating huge backlogs. As the system becomes backlogged by cases that are over two years behind schedule, detention space runs out (it actually ran out years ago), resulting in the release of asylum seekers and other migrants into the United States while they await their hearings.

According to immigration officials, the release of migrants into the country soon after arrest[6] creates an incentive for people to come over with a child or claim asylum, especially because migrants can be granted employment authorization while having their asylum applications reviewed and their cases heard (Bruno, 2019).

Immigrant advocate groups, some scholars, and many legislators state like the Obama administration clearly stated, there is a "humanitarian crisis" in Central America and these immigrants are refugees fleeing for their lives. Most advocate groups do not deny the fact asylum fraud occurs or some try to scam the system, they just believe it is not as rampant as some suggest and current fraud detection capabilities are adequate enough to screen out most abusers. According to Human Rights First director Eleanor Acer:

> U.S. authorities have a range of tools to address these abuses . . . including multiple identity and background checks, personnel in multiple agencies charged with detecting and investigating fraud, and the ability to refer for prosecution those who perpetrate fraud. (Asylum Fraud, 2014, p. 32)

Ultimately, the main concern for most human rights advocates is not whether the wrong person fraudulently gets asylum or scams the system to remain in the country, but whether the right person is afforded every legal and humanitarian opportunity to remain in the country if they are eligible under the law.

Much like what Stanley (1987) stated 3 decades ago, the two camps continue to be ideologically split, and due to this it is difficult to reconcile these "two diametrically opposed evaluations" (p. 133). Although both sides admit there is some fraud going on and that there are high levels of poverty and violence in Central America, they cannot agree on which one is the

---

[6] Releasing migrants soon after arrest is known as "catch and release" in immigration enforcement agencies.

main driver of the Central American surge. These diametrically opposed evaluations make it difficult to arrive at an objective conclusion. This is a reason why there is a need for a more comprehensive study.

Literature on Central America From the 1920s to the Mid-1990s

The earliest and most reliable studies on the topic of Central American migration were a trilogy of studies written in the late 1980s and early 1990s that attempted to create frameworks and models for the then small-scale emigration that arose out of Central America. In addition to highlighting the ideological divide between camps with regard to Central American migration in the 1980s, Stanley (1987) attempted to gauge the impact of political violence on Salvadoran migration to the United States, concluding, "The fact that political violence variables account for more than half of the variance in Salvadoran apprehensions . . . suggests that fear of political violence is probably the dominant motivation for these migrants" (p. 147). In addition, Stanley (1987) found economic variables were not statistically significant in his model.

In theory, Stanley's (1987) model appears to explain the recent Central American surge if one subscribes to the violence driven narrative that is often cited by many experts and the media. However, when contemporary data are applied to his model, it fails to explain today's surge in Salvadoran apprehensions, and it actually contradicts much of the current literature that says violence and crime are the root cause of the Central American surge. Stanley's model is not an ideal model for today's migration crisis because he studied politically motivated murders only. Today, politically motivated murders are not what is blamed for the Salvadoran exodus, it is general delinquency, crime, and violence—generally viewed in the form of overall homicides. However, even if one were to substitute overall homicides for politically motivated murders and

try to arrive at the same conclusion as Stanley, one would fail to explain the current surge because the numbers are simply too divergent to draw any correlations.

To provide an example of this divergence in numbers, one can explore the time frames in Stanley's study: 1976 to 1984. The most Salvadoran apprehensions by INS numbered only 11,916 in 1984, and the average number of apprehensions over the 8 years studied was 7,324 apprehensions. Yet, the number of political killings from 1976 to 1984, far exceed the number of overall homicides seen in recent years, especially if one were to adjust for today's larger population. This suggests current homicide numbers should not be causing the recent surge of unauthorized migration from El Salvador. In 1981, for example, there were 12,700 political killings in El Salvador but only 9,996 INS apprehensions. Comparatively, in 2014, when the Central American Migration Crisis hit the headlines, there were 3,942 homicides in El Salvador but an astonishing 66,419 apprehensions by USBP alone. In other words, plugging in the number of apprehensions and homicides today into Stanley's model, with a time series that goes back to Stanley's original time frame, would produce results with no correlation and may in fact even result in a negative correlation.

Sociologists Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991) also made an early attempt at "develop[ing] a framework for analyzing [Central American] migration that takes into account historical and contemporary dimensions, economic and political motivations and domestic and international structures" (p. 76). Simply put, according to Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991), although violence played a key role in the decision to migrate, it was difficult to separate whether that decision was the result of a political or economic factor. The constructs Hamilton and Chinchilla identified for their framework were the same ones every scholar and expert has long associated with migration, namely politics and economics.

Although their framework identified two key constructs (politics and economics) that are applicable today regarding Central American migration, their framework was limited and not robust enough. Although providing a statistical analysis like Stanley's (1987) was not their intent or necessary to create their framework, models like Stanley's do manage to provide a better assessment of a variable's exact impact on migratory patterns. However, the biggest issue with Hamilton and Chinchilla's (1991) study was that they missed on a few key variables that were crucial in explaining Mexican migration since the 1970s that could have been applied to their Central American migration framework. Those variables consist of immigration policy in the United States (Alden, 2012; Anderson, 2003; Congressional Research Service, 1980; Durand & Massey 2001; Durand et al., 1999; Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, 2007; Massey, 1998, 2010; Orrenius, 2001; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2012; Phillips & Massey, 1999; Rosenblum et al., 2012), demographic changes (Alden, 2012; Hanson & McIntosh, 2009; Passel et al., 2012; Terraza et al., 2011; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011; Zuniga & Molina, 2008), and border enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border (Angelucci, 2012; Alden, 2017; Lessem, 2012, 2018; Santos, 2014). Without considering U.S. immigration policy, an originating country's demographics, or U.S. border enforcement efforts, any framework looking at migration to the United States will have limitations.

The last of the trilogy was a study by Morrison and May (1994) that looked at the influence of political and economic variables between 1976 and 1981 in Guatemala. Morrison and May found economic factors were a much more powerful influence than violence, somewhat contradicting Stanley's (1987) study on El Salvador. According to Morrison and May (1994), "If both source violence and destination wages were to double, the wage increase would account for ten times as many emigrants as the increase in violence" (p. 125). In fact, Morrison and May

(1994) found “violence was found to be significant only above a certain critical level; minimal-level violence appears to have no significant effect on migration” (p. 127). That critical level of violence, however, was not very high, with Morrison and May (1994) pegging it at “between 6 and 10 percent of the level found in the most violent department” (p 127).

Much like Stanley (1987) and Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991), Morrison and May’s (1994) framework also fails to explain today’s Central American migration problem. It was simply too narrow in scope. The study only looked at Guatemala between 1976 and 1981, it only considered politically motivated deaths not overall homicides, and it focused on internal migration not international migration to the United States.

Regardless of the fact that these three frameworks and studies cannot be used to explain today’s migration phenomenon, they provided a rich history of the foundations of systemic poverty and violence in the region. The one thing that was clear in all three papers was economic and societal conditions in the region were always considered substandard, and conditions since then were generally described as ranking at the near bottom in the western hemisphere in almost every major category measured by organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In fact, Hamilton and Chinchilla’s (1991) historical account of the economic, political, and societal conditions of the region found the region has been plagued by low wages, high levels of poverty, high inflation, damaging price shocks to agricultural and manufacturing sectors, high unemployment, and political instability that date back as far as data are available. In the same vein, Morrison and May (1994) concluded, “Violence has permeated the Central American landscape for much of its history” (p. 111). Morrison and May (1994) added that in countries like Guatemala, “violence ha[d] been relatively constant [in its politics] since colonial times . . . motivated at least in part to by racial and ethnic conflict” (p. 113).

Moreover, these are not the only papers arriving at this conclusion. Writing in the late 1980s about the then ongoing Central American Crisis, child rights activist Anita Ronstrom (1989) stated, “Central America has been a region in conflict for a long time” (p. 145), with active civil wars and armed struggles in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala that had their roots in the 1960s. The prevalence of violence was so ingrained in the culture of Central America that historian Thomas P. Anderson (1976) “suggest[ed] that there are specific facilities of violence, both personal and organized, that have roots in the cultural formation of the Central American peoples” (p. 249). Anderson (1976) added ideological violence had a long history in Central America beginning with “the organization of leftwing labor movements there in the 1920s” (p. 250) like the Guatemalan Communist party and other “similar groups in Honduras and El Salvador” (p. 250) that formed soon after. According to Anderson (1976), massive violence and repression erupted soon after the creation of these groups. In early 1932, for example, “the Communist Party of El Salvador led the first organized Communist uprising in the Western Hemisphere. Some 10,000 to 15,000 people were killed, mostly in the military massacre that followed this abortive revolt” (Anderson, 1971, as cited in Anderson, 1976, p. 250). By the same token, according to historian Robert H. Holden (2004), the history of violence and state formation in Central America was such that “the persistence of public violence in Latin America orgininat[ed] in the patrimonial institutions – among them patronclientage [sic] – that have ruled the region since the sixteenth century” (pp. 20–21).

Ultimately, as far as one goes, the consensus among the experts suggests poverty and violence were long-standing issues. Basically, at no point during the 20th century was Central America not described as suffering from systemic poverty or not involved in some type of violent civil conflict. As the Central American Crisis ended in the mid-1990s and Central

America began to join the world economy, many experts, international organizations, and world governments increased their expectations of the region with hopes they would catch up to the more developed nations of Latin America.

Literature on Central America From the Mid-1990s to 2012

Even after the Central American Crisis ended, Central America did not jump into a period of prosperity. Despite the initial optimism by major western governments after the fall of the Soviet Union and the positive impact they expected it could have on Latin America, the tone of the literature on Latin American poverty and violence, and Central America specifically, remained as glum and despairing as the previous era. Literature linking those socioeconomic conditions to immigration were limited, but on the conditions themselves the literature was quite extensive with major organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and the IMF making major contributions.

Poverty

During this era, the research moved away from political ideological issues and began focusing more on Central American economic integration. A UN report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) provided a general overview of Central America during this period of reform and recovery following the Central American Crisis:

> Since 1990 the region has been subject to periods of economic volatility and external shocks such as the contagion affects [sic] of the Mexican currency crisis (or Tequila Crisis) in 1994–95, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and a variety of commodity price shocks to key export industries. In addition, the subregion is susceptible to natural

> disasters due to its geographical vulnerability to hurricanes, exemplified by Hurricane Mitch hitting Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1998. (Hammill, 2007, p. 12)

Despite a focus by the UN (Hammill, 2007), the World Bank (2004a, 2004b, 2005), and the IMF (Desruelle & Shipke, 2008; Rodlauer & Shipke 2005) on Central American trade and global market integration, recurring themes seen before and during the Central American Crisis continued to play a major role in the literature including, chronic poverty, inequality, corruption, unemployment, child malnutrition, poor education levels, and weak institutional structures.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided some of the easiest to follow analyses by publishing reports on each country every year or two. Although each report provided the most up to date economic data and analysis, usually citing World Bank, IMF or UN data, their analyses failed to point out whether there were improvements or declines from year to year. The main issue with the CRS reports was they contained very few time series analyses with sufficient time domains on key indicators. This made it nearly impossible to detect overall trends. The narrative of the reports themselves also provided little insight as to the direction of the data because new data were usually simply "plugged into" the previous year's paragraph. Because the very first reports contained bleak data, and new data changed only slightly from year to year, the narratives had little reason to change so they maintained the same morose tone found in the first reports.

However, if one paid attention to the year-to-year changes by plotting them on a graph, one noticed that things were in fact moving in a general positive direction, even if unevenly and at a less than an ideal pace. Although World Bank and IMF reports also did not generally contain the most optimistic language, their economic outlooks usually matched the data, and their reports usually provided enough data to draw a general direction regarding key economic indicators.

Although these reports tended to consistently state these three countries suffered from chronic poverty, high levels of inequality, corruption, child malnutrition, poor education levels, and weak government structures, data trends in those reports showed overall improvements on most economic indicators.

Violence

The subject of violence in Latin America never left the conversation and it continued to be highlighted as a key problem in Latin America. According to an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB):

> Even a cursory view of daily newspaper headlines and conversation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean reveals that the subject of violence is foremost on the minds of citizens. Few in the region have remained unaffected by what is widely recognized as a multidimensional, multifaceted problem; nearly everyone has a story to tell, often in graphic terms. Survey after survey consistently underscores the gravity and prevalence of the concern. (Buvinic et al., 1999, p. 3)

That same year the World Bank published a study on youth gangs and violence that also highlighted violence as being a "chronic feature of Latin American and Caribbean societies" (Rodgers, 1999, p. 1). Moreover, Rodgers (1999) provided some important insight on the topic of how violence changed in Latin America.

Rodgers (1999) stated the manifestation of violence in the region changed beginning in the early 1990s from a political one based on conflicts over political systems, to one based on delinquency and crime where youth gangs became "among the main features of the new landscape of violence" (p. 1). According to the Organización Panamericana de Salud (1996, as

cited in Rodgers, 1999), “Violence in the region has not lessened, however, and it arguably remains the ‘social pandemic’ of Latin America in the late twentieth century” (p. 1).

Shockingly, violence in certain countries like El Salvador did not decrease after the 12-year civil war ended in 1992. According to political scientist, Charles T. Call (2003), general violence and crime quickly supplanted civil war issues like war and politics with the first signs coming from 1992 polling data that showed “crime almost tripled in frequency as a perceived problem facing the country” (p. 839). Call (2003) added that between 1993 and 1999, polling data consistently showed crime was “the single most important problem facing the country” (p. 839). Other studies, such as those done by the World Bank, showed even in the mid-1990s, the *maras* were said to “dominate the landscape of violence [as] gangs of youths and young adults . . . staked out their turf in all but the smallest settlements of the country” (Tuckman, 1996, as cited in Rodgers, 1999, p. 9).

Rodgers (1999) added, although Guatemala was not as violent as El Salvador, “there is also a ‘culture of violence’ in Guatemala as a result of the 30-year civil war that ended in 1996” (p. 10). According to Rodgers (1999), the *maras* were “much less violent and destructive than their Salvadoran namesakes” (p. 10); however, they were nevertheless very present “hav[ing] existed in Guatemala since the 1980s, mainly in urban areas” (p. 10).

Due in large part to Honduras not experiencing “political conflict similar to Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua” (Blanchard et al., 2011, p. 62), it was less studied by scholars. Regardless, “Honduras was not entirely exempt from the violence that affected other Central American countries [and they too] experienced repression, militarization, and human rights abuses” (Blanchard et al., 2011, p. 80). Despite all that, Honduras maintained relatively low homicide rates of around 10 per 100,000 for much of the 1980s. However, by the late-1980s,

Honduras' homicide rate began to shoot up surpassing 30 per 100,000 by the mid-1990s and the increased levels of criminality began to call the attention of experts (Leyva, 2001).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, numerous studies on crime, violence, and the growing gang phenomenon began to appear. Although there appeared to be a lot of disagreement, there was a consensus that identified the root cause of crime and violence on income inequality and less so on poverty or overall levels of development (Fajnzylber et al., 1998, 2002). In addition, contrary to what one would expect, research during this era found little empirical evidence linking Central American gangs to violent crime and drug trafficking.

One of the principal issues affecting the theory that gangs were the primary cause of violent crime, was the research that took place did not necessarily support the theory. One of the first comprehensive studies on crime in Central America was done by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the mid-2000s. The study found violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras attributable to gangs varied between 10%–60% (UNODC, 2007). The large range made it difficult to accurately determine the gangs' direct impact on violent crime despite media reports. Another study on gangs and urban violence by Jutersonke et al. (2009) found "the extent and scale of urban violence attributed to *pandillas* and *maras* [was] likely to be overstated" (pp. 380–381), adding "the scale and virulence of Central American gang violence may be less than widely claimed." (p. 381). According to Jutersonke et al. (2009), "Numerous alarmist accounts linking Central American gangs" (p. 381) to organized type level crime fall short because "it is clear from qualitative studies that both *pandillas* and *maras* are principally involved in small-scale, localized crime and delinquency such as petty theft and muggings" (p. 381).

Contrary to what one would expect, as more and more studies began to pour in, not much changed with regard to the empirical evidence linking gangs to drug trafficking or mass violence.

The World Bank's (2011) study on crime and violence in Central America found there was "little empirical analysis . . . and reliable data on the role of youth gangs in the narcotics trade" (p. 15), and that although

> there is evidence that the *maras* in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are involved in the extortion of protection money from local businesses and from buses and taxis as they go through gang-controlled territories. . . . Qualitative studies of Central American gangs suggest that they are mainly involved in small-scale, localized crime and delinquency, such as petty theft and muggings, which are typically carried out by individual gang members. (p. 17)

Similarly, in terms of homicide, there were few empirical links to gangs. According to data from El Salvador's Institute of Legal Medicine, only between 8%–13.4% of the homicides were linked to gang crime between 2003 and 2006 (World Bank, 2011). In Honduras, only 15% was linked to gang crime (Casa Alianza, 2006). According to the World Bank (2011), "Guatemala is another case in which data paint a mixed picture of [gangs'] overall contribution to violent crime" (p. 16). The World Bank (2011) added that, in Guatemala,

> during a month in which the number of homicides was especially high, police statistics attributed only 14 percent of them to gangs . . . [and that] data from the Guatemalan penitentiary system indicate[d] that gang members accounted for 5.8 percent of the total arrestees in June 2006, a figure suggesting that others are behind the high levels of violence in Guatemala. (p. 16)

The World Bank (2011) summarized it best, stating:

> While gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the very limited evidence indicates that they are responsible for only a

> minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest that perhaps 15 percent of homicides are gang related. Furthermore, reliable data related to the role of youth gangs in the narcotics trade are scarce. (p. ii)

Even in terms of Central Americans' perception of gangs, the data told a mixed story. According to the World Bank (2011), "The overall perception among Central American citizens remains that youth gang members are primarily responsible for crime" (p. 17). However, as the surveyed areas got smaller moving from urban cities toward rural areas, respondents' perception of how greatly gangs affected their neighborhoods precipitously dropped from 21%–24% in the capitals, to 10% in medium size towns, all the way to 3% in rural areas (World Bank, 2011).

As the unaccompanied child (UAC) crisis hit the headlines in 2014, a new era regarding Central American migration began. More literature than ever began to be produced about the Central American migration surge, and much like in previous eras, poverty and violence became the focal points. However, there was one thing that was clear from literature during this postconflict era: poverty and violence were not new phenomena that arose out of nowhere in the early 2010s to all of a sudden create a need to illegally migrate to the United States. These were long-standing issues that despite the tone of most of the literature, did show improvements during most of the postconflict era.

Literature on Central America From 2012 to Today

The Central American migration surge hit the headlines in 2014 when tens of thousands of UACs began to turn themselves in at the U.S.-Mexico border. What was generally cited in the news like *The New York Times* was that they were "driven out by deepening poverty but also by rampart gang violence" (Preston, 2014, para. 4). Some government officials and the Obama administration quickly labeled the issue a "humanitarian crisis." Academic papers and

government reports (such as those by the Congressional Research Service) supported such statements blaming the UAC migration crises on "out-migration-related factors" like "high violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth rates, relatively high poverty rates, and the presence of transnational gangs" (Kandel et al., 2014, p. 3). Although initial Congressional Research Service reports were careful to highlight their reports did "not intend to be an exhaustive review of all factors that potentially underlie the surge in unaccompanied children" (Kandel et al., 2014, p. 1), they admitted these were the "major possible contributing factors that had been widely cited in published reports" (p. 1).

The following year, new studies and reports continued to cite "violence and economic insecurity" (Rosenblum, 2015, p. 12) as push factors. Even in 2016, more than 2 years since the UAC crisis hit the headlines, and 4 years since the actual start of the Central American Migration Crisis, the highly regarded Migration Policy Institute continued to cite that the main push factors responsible for the immigrant outflows were "high levels of violence, food insecurity, and poverty" (Rosenblum & Ball, 2016, p. 3). By 2019, the Central American Migration Crisis was surpassing anything that had ever been predicted or seen, yet the literature remained unchanged maintaining the theme of a poverty and violence created issue. A common overview typically found in the literature in 2019 generally stated "narcotic and migrant flows [were] the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment" (Meyer, 2019, "Summary").

Blaming poverty and violence had become almost a matter-of-fact statement for some government officials, news agencies, and more importantly, even the academic literature. What the contemporary literature generally contained were recurrent matter of fact statements blaming

poverty and violence with no references, the use of single year data points as evidence for the current migration crisis, the dismissal of other potential variables, and a deeply flawed analysis that appeared to try to support the hypothesis that the Central American Migration Crisis was a poverty and violence created phenomenon.

There was in fact very little original statistical research looking at explanatory variables like poverty and violence with regard to Central American migration. In addition, the few contemporary studies that attempted to look at explanatory variables were full of inconsistencies, flawed research, and contained major gaps in the data. Economists Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Thitima Puttitanam (2016) conducted one of the few original studies that attempted to actually look at multiple variables, like the impact of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), to explain the then spike of UACs. Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanam (2016) found:

> DACA has not had a significant impact on those apprehensions once we account for traditional pull and push factors and a range of unobserved country of origin and border patrol sector time-varying and fixed effects. Rather, the 2008 [William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act] TVPRA, along with violence in the originating countries and economic conditions both in the origin countries and the United States, emerge as some of the key determinants of the recent surge in unaccompanied minors apprehended along the southwest US-Mexico border. (p. 113)

Although their research factored out DACA as a contributing factor, and factor in violence (homicide rate) and economic conditions in originating countries, it also identified the immigration policy TVPRA in 2008, as a potential causal factor. However, their research was limited. Their study was constrained by limited CBP data, the research focused only on UACs, and most importantly, they only looked at the years from 2007 to 2013. This very selective time

frame, which was due to limited CBP data on UAC apprehensions, could only have produced the results found. However, if that exact same model was expanded to include data from 2014 to 2019, those findings would be less significant, and more likely than not, would find the opposite effect. The reason for that is because the push factors they used in their paper, homicide rate data and real GDP per capita in the home countries, have improved from 2013 to 2019, yet the apprehensions of UACs, and Northern Triangle migrants, have remained near record highs.

Wong (2014) was another researcher that attempted a statistical analysis that concluded "it is not U.S. policy but rather violence and the desire to find safety that is the impetus for these children's journeys" (p. 1). Much like Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanum (2016), the big flaw in this study was the time frames that only focused from 2009 to 2013. As previously explained, simply extending the time frame would result in no statistical significance because homicide rates declined considerably overall since 2012, while UAC apprehensions continued to hit near all-time highs.

Contrary to studies by Wong (2014) and Rosenblum and Ball (2016), Donato and Sisk (2015) found "violence and poverty are structural conditions that underlie migration decisions, but on their own, they d[id] not predict child migration" (p. 59). Donato and Sisk's (2015) findings indicate "the migration of children is closely linked to that of the parents, and that a minor child is significantly more likely to go on a first US trip if their parent has US migration experience" (p. 73). Although Donato and Sisk (2015) had a longer time domain than most other studies, their study had numerous limitations making it hard to compare to other research. Their study used Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) survey data, not apprehensions. Although they provided reasoning behind their decision to use MMP and LAMP survey data, it was not convincing enough to justify its use. The reasons are

numerous. First, even if survey results were accurate, they would always produce much different results than using apprehension data regardless of study. In addition, they included in their regressions countries that are not important to the UAC or Northern Triangle migration issue, namely Mexico, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, while excluding Honduras due to nonexistent LAMP data. More specifically, Guatemala, El Salvador and the rest of the countries in the study, had relatively tiny sample sizes relative to Mexico's—often 30 to 1 ratios in sample size differences. Such a disproportionate difference in sample size could only result in Mexico disproportionately affecting the findings.

Interestingly, another study that used LAMP data relating to Salvadoran migration (Flores-Yeffal & Pren, 2018) found the opposite effect of Donato and Sisk (2015). Flores-Yeffal and Pren (2018) found increases in civil violence and personal economic issues in fact increased first time unauthorized migration likelihood. In addition, Flores-Yeffal and Pren's (2018) study found "no evidence that social networks play[ed] a role on providing support to those taking the first unauthorized migration trip" (p. 11). However, much like Donato and Sisk's study and other studies relying on LAMP data, the sample sizes are much too small to draw any generalizations. In Flores-Yeffal and Pren's study, the total sample size that was used to predict Salvadoran migrants' first migration trip to the United States between 1965 and 2007 was only 382 households. Expecting 382 households over a 40-year time span to provide predictive results is a stretch and similar studies with such small sample sizes should be interpreted cautiously.

Particularity interesting is the fact that since before the UAC crisis hit the headlines, the U.S. government was well aware of the issues relating to Central American migration, and Congress held numerous hearings to address the issue. In fact, in 2013, a year before the UAC crisis, Congress held a hearing to address the issue of asylum abuse, which had been long

discussed among immigration officials (Asylum Abuse, 2013). During and since the UAC crisis, numerous Congressional hearings have been held that were much like those in the past, one side identified poverty and violence as the principal drivers, while the other side agreed those are underlying issues, but stated immigration system loopholes were what was pulling Central Americans in record numbers (Asylum Fraud, 2014; Building America's Trust Through Border Security, 2017; Challenges at the Border; Migration Crisis, 2015; Ongoing Migration from Central America, 2015; Oversight of Customs and Border Protection's Response to the Smuggling of Persons at the Southern Border, 2019; Oversight of Immigration Enforcement and Family Reunification Efforts, 2018; Oversight of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2018; Strengthening and Reforming America's Immigration Court System, 2018; The Unaccompanied Children Crisis, 2016; TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien Children, 2018; Unaccompanied Alien Children, 2015). Much like Stanley (1987) identified over 30 years ago, there continues to be an ideological divide where both sides of the debate provide examples and evidence always arriving at their own conclusions. Regardless of these differences in ideology among politicians, what was surprising was that in the academic literature, expert testimony provided by border security and immigration officials, often fell on deaf ears. Even when immigration officials' evidence and data were cited in the literature, it was done so in passing and no significant study has taken place addressing some of the data they mentioned.

An influential study by highly regarded economist and immigration expert Michael Clemens (2017) is a perfect example of how even the best experts dismiss immigration officials' key concerns and fail to include their concerns in their analyses. Clemens's paper relegated the idea of U.S. immigration policy changes having an impact on UAC migration to a single footnote. In the footnote Clemens (2017) stated, "Some U.S. politicians have characterized the

increase in UAC arrivals as a consequence of changes to U.S. policy regarding the deportation of unauthorized immigrant children in 2013 (Kandel, 2017, p. 1), but there is no sign that UAC arrivals discontinuously rose after the policy change (Amuedo-Dorantes & Puttitanun 2016)" (p. 6). Not only did Clemens dismiss the idea of that immigration policy changes could have an impact, but he misinterpreted Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun's (2016) paper, which, as mentioned earlier, clearly stated TVPRA appeared to be a major factor that influenced UAC migration. The dismissal of such a critical variable by an expert of such high regard is especially problematic because of the influence of his work which was covered in *The New Yorker* (Talbot, 2019), *The Washington Post* (Schwartz, 2018), *The Wall Street Journal* (Leubsdorf, 2017), *The Atlantic* (Beinart, 2019), *The American Prospect* (Madrid, 2018), *Forbes* (Anderson, 2018), and *PolitiFact* (Greenberg, 2018).

Clemens's (2017) paper was arguably the most sophisticated statistical paper on the topic. It explored the apprehensions of individual UACs by area of birth and associated them with municipal level effects of local homicide while controlling for a number of variables like income, poverty rate, and school enrollment. However, much like the few papers that also conducted statistical analyses, the paper was limited to only UAC apprehension data between 2011 to 2016. In addition, and maybe more importantly, it completely disregarded immigration officials' key concerns regarding policy changes and loopholes that they argue have allowed UACs, families units, and other Central Americans to gain entry into the United States.

This is why Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanum's (2016) study was particularly interesting. Despite its limitations and short comings, the study actually considered variables immigration officials often highlight as key culprits, DACA and the 2008 TVPRA. Amuedo-

Dorantes and Puttitanum provided a summary about why TVPRA is often considered a potential factor among immigration officials:

> In sum, the 2008 law significantly changed the way in which unaccompanied minors were handled by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which had previously removed unaccompanied minors using expedited procedures. The new legislation was accompanied by a surge in the flow of unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, worsening the bottleneck in the handling of unaccompanied minors' deportation. The confluence of all these factors led some to conclude that the 2008 TVPRA might have led the increase in inflows from those countries. (p. 104)

Early on the UAC crisis, even a Migration Policy Institute paper by Chirshi and Hipsman (2014) managed to mention there was some evidence that the growing perception about the treatment of minors due to TVPRA, and possibly DACA, created more child friendly policies and perceptions that might be responsible for spurring minors to migrate. However, studies highlighting other potential causal factors are few and far between, and statistical studies factoring other variables, like immigration system loopholes, have become essentially nonexistent.

Despite these issues with the contemporary literature, where the recent literature really falls short, is in the persistence of much of the research to use single year data points as evidence. Simply put, there is a lack of time series analyses that encompass sufficient time spans relating to poverty and violence. Graphs found in most studies and reports often only include the years that benefit their findings, and I have not found a recent study that considers the latest socioeconomic data from 2014 to 2019.

Take the issue of poverty in El Salvador as an example. A recent report by the Migration Policy Institute stated, "Economic hardship and an absence of economic opportunities, two other

common drivers of migration, are reflected in persistently high poverty rates, which in 2017 stood at 29 percent in El Salvador" (Soto et al., 2019). The study went on to suggest the poverty rate, among other socioeconomic factors, were responsible for the surge in migration in recent years. More importantly, poverty rates from previous years are not mentioned in the rest of the 43-page report. Although it is true that a 29% poverty rate is high by first world standards, that statistic is not telling us anything about the direction of El Salvador. To suggest a 29% poverty rate is significant, it has to be compared to previous years' numbers, and preferably it has to be included in a time series that shows a pattern or some historical context. With no context, one year's worth of data cannot be used to support or predict much of anything, much less a migratory trend. Moreover, when this poverty data are actually explored, we find El Salvador's poverty rate has dropped significantly since 2011, when it was a little over 40%.

To provide another example commonly seen in the literature, take another indicator commonly associated with poverty, the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Another recent 2019 CRS report exploring the recent migration to the United States from Central America stated, "According to the 2018 Global Hunger Index, Guatemala and Honduras ranked second and third in hunger levels in Central America and the Caribbean, behind Haiti" (Wilson et al., 2019, p. 5) and that such food insecurity is strongly linked to migration (Wilson et al., 2019). What the report also failed to mention is that Honduras and Guatemala have consistently been ranked at the bottom of the GHI since the inception of the index. Once again, this is not telling us much because we do not know if these rankings represent worsening conditions that could justify a sudden spike in unauthorized migration. In fact, the GHI website shows Honduras had consistent improvements every year the data are plotted from 2000 to 2019 (see Figures 114 and 115). In addition, Honduras' current GHI score of 12.9 is considered "moderate" by the GHI. Guatemala,

the second lowest ranked country, also shows steady improvements with a decline from 27.7 in 2000, to 20.6 in 2019. More interestingly, 3 of the 4 GHI indicators for Honduras showed improvements from 2000 to 2019, and one indicator, "prevalence of wasting in children under five years," slightly increased from 1.3% in 2000 to 1.5% in 2019. Guatemala showed improvement in all four indicators from 2000 to 2019.

Lastly, take another large multi-organization report undertaken by IDB, Investing in Rural People (IFAD), the UN's International Organization for Migration (IMO), More Rights for More People (OAS), and the World Food Programme (WFP) from 2017 that in the title blamed food insecurity for the mass emigration of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The 93-page report was full of data in the form of surveys, graphs, and charts, yet the entire report contained zero time series analyses of economic indicators including food insecurity. The only variable that had more than a single year's data was USBP apprehensions, and even those data were not linked to any other data to find any correlation. The entire study was attempting to draw conclusions from single data points. Even if the small sample sizes of survey interviews provided accurate generalizable answers, they cannot be used because we do not know what responses could have been provided by interviewees in previous years. Single year survey results cannot be used to suggest a higher or lower migration likelihood unless we have survey data over multiple years showing some kind trend or change.

By and large, the literature during this era painted the same dire picture of worsening conditions in Central America like those seen in previous eras. Few studies attempted to conduct proper analytical research, and those that did, failed to provide adequate answers due to issues pertaining to weak analyses, insufficient data sets, and a dismissal of immigration officials' key concerns. Even on the issue of gangs, despite the major groundwork conducted in the mid-2000s,

new research was surprisingly thin, and the research that did take place fell way below the quality found between the mid-1990s and 2012. Even today, the gang research from the mid-1990s to 2012 continues to be the seminal work in the field that is most often cited. Despite all these shortcomings, where the literature really came up short was in the way a lot of the research tried to formulate narratives around single year data points instead of multiyear time series analyses. All in all, despite the constant media attention, the era provided very little original groundbreaking research leaving the Central American Migration Crisis with as many questions as when it started.

Conclusion

What this literature review meant to do was provide an analysis of poverty and violence during three critical eras of Central American history. The literature in all three eras provided no clear answers on the true impact of poverty and violence on the Central American migration surge. Weak research, insufficient time series analyses, a dismissal of immigration officials' key concerns, and narrative driven studies failed to provide adequate answers. Simply put, the literature, regardless of era, has always painted a dire picture of Central America. Yet, despite the dire picture painted in previous eras, unauthorized immigration from Central America never surged the way it did beginning in 2012. Conversely, if one simply digs a little more, we find Central America has in fact improved over the years. Although this does not mean that improvement has been evenly distributed or at desirable levels, they are improvements none the less that must be acknowledged when devising a study. There is no doubt that improvement is needed in Central America in a multitude of facets. However, to claim all of the sudden a shock of poverty and violence lead hundreds of thousands to *flee* from one year to the next requires closer examination and a new approach to the problem.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Purpose of the Study

Poverty and violence in Central America have become the consensus root cause among most experts, scholars, and news outlets for the never-before-seen Central American unauthorized migration flows. Conversely, government officials, practitioners, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm have blamed lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real reasons for the surge. Due to these "diametrically opposed evaluations" (Stanley, 1987), and research gaps in both sides of the argument, it is difficult to arrive at an objective, data-based explanation for the dramatic rise in Central Americans illegally entering the United States. For these reasons an extensive quantitative study is needed that considers the most important variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, due to methodological issues in the literature regarding time frame selection issues, extended time frames that take into account decades, not just single year data points or very selective short time frames, will be pursued to better measure the impact of socioeconomic and policy changes over time on unauthorized migration from Central America.

Ideally, a more comprehensive study that considers more variables, longer time frames, and both conflicting hypotheses will provide more inferentially robust findings. More importantly, this study will help policymakers and leaders make better decisions regarding what is currently known as the Central American Migration Crisis, while at the same time contributing significantly to the fields of immigration and national security.

Research Questions

The study focused on the following research questions:

1. What is the universe of poverty and violence data for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the available data in an inferentially robust way?
3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain the recent surge in Central American migration?

Research Design

To test the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, the study employed a quantitative analysis research design. Independent regression models for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras used a wide range of shared and country-specific macrolevel push and pull factors over time frames extending up to 39 years. To make sense of unauthorized immigration from each country, the study used and tested a number of robust regression models that took into account as much relevant data as possible over extended time frames to see to what extent the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and Policy and Loophole Hypothesis were associated with the flows of unauthorized immigrants from the Northern Triangle.

The sections in this chapter will explain some of the key variables and design choices for the study. The first section titled, Why Focus on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?, will provide a little more detail about why El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras were chosen as the focus of the study. The second section, Comparing the Northern Triangle to Its Neighbors, will explain why neighboring countries and regions were also be included in the study. The third section, Apprehensions – The Dependent Variable, will explain why Southwest Border USBP

apprehensions from each Northern Triangle country were chosen as the dependent variable for the study. The fourth section, Time Frames for the Study, will explain reasons for specific time frame selections in the study. Lastly, the fifth section, Independent Variables, will provide an overview and explanation of how the 195 independent variables were used and interpreted in the study. In addition, due to their importance, this section will include a subsection explaining in more detail the four key dummy variables that represent the critical immigration policy changes and loopholes that this study identified specifically for this study.

Why Focus on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?

Immigration out of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was the focus of this study. There were two powerful reasons to focus on these three Northern Triangle Central American countries. First, these are the nations at the center of the controversy due to their surging apprehension numbers along the Southwest Border, as displayed in Figures 2, 3, and 4.[7] Second, these three nations make up the lion's share of the apprehensions along the Southwest Border. Between 1980 and 2010, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras accounted for approximately 78.5% of OTM apprehensions. However, between 2011 and 2019, that share increased to 90.8%. In addition, while apprehensions from the Northern Triangle region used to account for just about 2% of total yearly apprehensions along the Southwest Border, that share has increased at an alarming pace since 2012, and in 2019 accounted for 71.4% of total apprehensions along the Southwest Border.

[7] Also refer to Figure 12 in Appendix C.

Figure 4

El Salvador – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates all El Salvadoran apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by USBP. Apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section. Note the Y axis for El Salvador is on a different scale from the Guatemala and Honduras figures due to lower overall apprehension numbers.

Figure 5

Guatemala – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates all Guatemalan apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by USBP. Apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section.

Figure 6

Honduras – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure demonstrates all Honduras apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by USBP. Apprehensions from 1980–1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section.

Comparing the Northern Triangle to Its Neighbors

To better analyze and compare both hypotheses, I also included the Northern Triangle's neighbors, Mexico to the north and Nicaragua to the south. In addition, the larger overall region of Latin America and the Caribbean (herein after called Latin America) was included. There were two reasons behind the idea of including Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America. One was to see whether each hypothesis impacted these countries and region differently, and the second was to provide some perspective by comparing socioeconomic indicators between the Northern Triangle and its neighbors.

Did the two competing hypotheses impact Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America differently? In theory, the variables in the stepwise regression models related to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis should have had similar impacts on Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America as the Northern Triangle. In other words, changes in poverty and violence in those areas should have impacted unauthorized immigration to the United States similarly as the Northern Triangle. On the other hand, the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis should not have impacted Mexico because the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, which will be explained in detail in the Independent Variables 188 to 191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes subsection of this chapter, were not directed at Mexicans. These four key policy changes and loopholes should have only impacted OTMs. For this reason, Nicaragua should have been similarly impacted by the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as the Northern Triangle. Though admittedly that impact should have been less powerful because

apprehensions coming out of Nicaragua were very few in number relative to the Northern Triangle.[8]

It was unclear how the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis was supposed to impact Latin America. There was one main issue that in hindsight made Latin America a bad candidate for the stepwise regression analysis. That main issue was that Mexican apprehensions made up 98% of all Southwest Border apprehensions for a considerable part of the time frames in question, as seen in Figure 2. The large make up of Mexican apprehensions, especially from 1980 through the mid-2000s, disproportionality influenced the dependent variable of Latin American apprehensions. In other words, we might have been in fact applying the dependent variable of Mexican apprehensions more than the dependent variable of Latin American apprehensions for all the models. In fact, the correlation coefficient for Mexican and Latin American apprehensions from 1980 to 2019 was .970. Even when just considering the years 2000 to 2019, the correlation coefficient between Mexican and Latin American apprehensions was .944. This is important because between 2000 and 2019 Northern Triangle apprehensions began to make up a larger share of total Latin American apprehensions. Nevertheless, the correlation was largely influenced by Mexican apprehensions due to their overwhelming numbers from 2000 to around 2012.

Nevertheless, regardless of these limitations, these countries and region were included because they at the very least provide some perspective for the socioeconomic data. Appendix D includes a large number of time series graphs for many of the socioeconomic indicators used in

---

[8] Generally speaking, as a country is farther away from the U.S.-Mexico border fewer migrants will attempt to illegally migrate to the United States. Simply put, logistics and costs greatly change the farther away you are from the U.S.-Mexico border. The journey becomes longer, more costly, and more dangerous. In addition, Nicaraguan migrants have historically migrated to Costa Rica due to Costa Rica's stronger economy, proximity, and relatively open borders.

the models. These graphs provide visual aids to help us compare the performance of the three Northern Triangle countries relative to their neighbors. Simply put, we wanted to know: Did El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras perform better or worse than their neighbors over the selected time frames? Such insight might provide a better understanding and perspective of the situation in these nations that could better help explain reasons for the surge.

Apprehensions – The Dependent Variable

USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras served as the dependent variables for this study. USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border was the main measure used to analyze the flow of unauthorized immigration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.[9] There were three primary reasons why apprehensions from each of these three countries were used as the dependent variable. First, apprehensions have historically been used to measure the flow of unauthorized migration along the Southwest Border (Hanson et al., 2001). Second, while not perfect, apprehension data have been recorded every year going back to 1925. This year-to-year recording serves as a good proxy for the flow of unauthorized immigration. Lastly, because the number of USBP apprehensions of unauthorized migrants along the Southwest Border from the Northern Triangle are at the center of the controversy, USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border from each of these three countries must serve as the dependent variable.

Time Frames for the Study

This study focused on annual time series data between 1980 and 2019. The time series data and the difference-in-differences data varied by regression model, and multiple regression

---

[9] Apprehensions along the Southwest Border from Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America will also be the dependent variable for those countries and region in their respective models. Figures showing Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Latin American USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border are displayed in Appendix C for reference.

analyses were conducted using several time frames. In addition, time-lags were included in the models to increase the robustness of the models and to ensure data were analyzed in a myriad of ways.

Three base years were established for the regressions. Those base years are 1980, 1992, and 2000. Using those base years, time frames were adjusted depending on the technique being used to create different models, as seen in Table 1. The result was each base year having a total of four regression each. For example, as displayed in Table 1, the base year 1980 had models using the time frames 1980–2018, 1981–2018, 1981–2019 and 1982–2019. Each of those different time frames were the result of using different techniques such as a 1-year time lag or a difference-in-differences technique.

I chose to limit the data from 1980 to 2019 for several reasons. First, apprehension data between those dates were the only apprehension data that could be gathered and properly estimated to ensure reliable figures that could be used in a regression analysis. Second, many important macrolevel socioeconomic indicators this study used, only started to be recorded in the late 70s and early 80s. Although large organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and UN had started to gather large macrolevel socioeconomic data on nations around the world in the 1960s, it was in the 1970s and 1980s when these organizations enlarged their data gathering process efforts as part of their expanded mission of poverty eradication and social development (World Bank, n.d.-b). Due to those efforts, from 1980 onwards we finally start to get more complete data sets and a greater variety of socioeconomic indicators. However, that is not to say all data sets start in 1980, many data sets start later, and models adjusted to include or exclude data sets and independent variables depending on the date range of the model.

Independent Variables

All the 195 independent variables are found in Tables 17–28 in Appendix A. Of the 195 independent variables, 181 of them are country or region specific. In other words, every country and region in the study had the same 181 independent variables, but each county and region had independent data for each variable that corresponded to each country/region. For example, GDP was one of 181 country-specific independent variables. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America each had GDP data that corresponded to each of them, and that data were used in each regression that corresponded to each specific country/region. The remaining 14 independent variables were shared by all the countries/region. These included four dummy variables that represent the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, six variables that dealt with worldwide coffee pricing, and four variables that constituted U.S.-related economic pull factors. The section, Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes, will expand the explanation of the four Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables.

All the independent variables were either associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis or the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.[10] This is important to know because each hypothesis had independent variables that were specific to it and, for the purposes of this study, did not overlap into the competing hypothesis. For example, Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change), was an independent variable that was only associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and had no association to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

---

[10] Nationwide USBP Apprehensions, Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions, and Inadmissible Aliens at Southwest Offices while found in the tables were ultimately not used in the models due to limited data. They were intended to be used as possible independent variables and were even considered as alternative dependent variables.

Another important concept to understand is that an independent variable being significant in the model did not necessarily imply it supported the hypothesis it is associated with. The direction of that support was determined by the interpretation of the independent variable and whether the independent variable lead to more or fewer apprehensions (dependent variable). In other words, the estimated coefficient for each significant variable had to be interpreted individually. Only after that estimated coefficient was interpreted could one determine if the independent variable supported or contradicted the hypothesis.

To better illustrate this relationship between the dependent and independent variable, consider the independent variable Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change). The Poverty and Violence Hypothesis suggests as economic conditions improve in a Northern Triangle country, fewer people are forced to migrate due to economic hardships. In other words, as real GDP growth for a Northern Triangle country increases (improves), there should be fewer apprehensions (dependent variable) from that respective Northern Triangle country. However, if the estimated coefficient shows that as the real GDP growth increased so did the number of apprehensions (dependent variable), then this contradicts the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Other independent variables must be interpreted differently. For instance, Inflation (% Change in Average CPI) is interpreted differently than Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change) because while a higher real GDP growth is good, a higher inflation rate is generally bad for these countries. So, if inflation in a Northern Triangle country increased but produced fewer apprehensions that contradicts the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. According to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, we would expect higher inflation in the sending country to lead to more apprehensions.

Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were interpreted slightly different. According to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, the implementation of TVPRA should have been followed by more unauthorized immigration (apprehensions) from Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua but should not have affected Mexican apprehensions. So, if TVPRA is found to be significant in a model, but it suggests it caused a decline in apprehensions from one of the three Northern Triangle countries or Nicaragua, that contradicts the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Simply put, each estimated coefficient and independent variable had to be interpreted individually in each regression to see whether the independent variable supported or contradicted the hypothesis it was associated with.

Ultimately, all the variables were categorized and divided into the 12 different tables and those tables were titled based on their categorization. Detailed information regarding the variables selected and the universe of data for this study are found in the first section of Results chapter.

Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes

Due to the complexity and importance of these four key variables in the study, it is important to explain these variables in more detail. These four independent variables were all dummy variables created for this study. Although other Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study, they are considered indirect variables for a few reasons. First, determining whether the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were the cause or the effect of more apprehensions is hard to determine. Certain of these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables, such as Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open, might just simply be the result of more apprehensions at the border. Second, some of these indirect variables might be the result of other issues not explored in detail in this study,

such as detention space issues and asylum claims. Third, these indirect variables could be more of a side effect that stems out of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. For example, the independent variables Immigration Court Cases in Backlog (see Table 26) or Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal; see Table 17) might just be the result of more migrants arriving at the borders because they were incentivized to migrate as a result of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Lastly, while immigration officials have pointed out some of these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, such as the increasing percentage of immigration cases resulting in relief and an overwhelming number of immigration court case backlogs, they generally put the blame on three of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Ultimately, disentangling a lot the previously mentioned issues was done in the following sections of this chapter and final chapter of the study.

Of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, three of them have to do with U.S. immigration policy changes. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), the executive action Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in 2012, and the judicial expansion of TVPRA and the Flores Agreement in 2015.

According to immigration officials, the 2008 TVPRA fundamentally changed the way unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries (meaning all countries except Mexico and Canada) were processed, detained, and handled by the DHS. Previously, unaccompanied minors could be removed using more expedited procedures and went through the immigration system similar to adults. TVPRA changed all that by requiring an immigration hearing for all unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries. In addition, due to the existing 1997

Flores Agreement,[11] which had been in part codified into federal law under TVPRA, the detention rules and procedures for juveniles dramatically changed. Not only had the Flores Agreement expanded in scope overtime, but its court supervised enforcement also increased. Coupled with TVPRA, a lack of adequate bed space and facilities to house juveniles and families forced the release of all unaccompanied minors to relatives and guardians in the United States while they awaited their immigration hearings, which were usually a year or more down the road. The new TVPRA legislation was accompanied a few years later by a surge of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle that many immigration officials partly blamed on DACA, worsening the bottleneck of an already strained immigration system.

According to immigration officials, the 2012 DACA did not create loopholes or change immigration law for incoming juveniles. What it did was create and spread incorrect perceptions of the policy. According to these officials, these incorrect perceptions caused tens of thousands of juveniles to believe they were being allowed to stay in the United States as long as they got to the border and turned themselves in to immigration authorities. Since TVPRA was in effect, it certainly did appear to people from the Northern Triangle that DACA was allowing juveniles into the country. The media coverage of DACA and the release of unaccompanied juveniles as a result of TVPRA, ultimately led to a snowball effect of misinformation that spread through the migrant social networks and smuggling networks prompting more juveniles and people to migrate to the United States.

---

[11] The Flores Settlement Agreement is a 1997 court supervised settlement stemming from a lawsuit against INS by immigrant advocate groups on behalf of an immigrant minor that began in 1985. Although the Flores Agreement was intended to be temporary, it set the standards and regulations for the treatment and detention of children since 1997.

Lastly, in 2015, TVPRA and the Flores Agreement were expanded by District Judge Dolly M. Gee. Judge Gee ruled that the Flores Agreement not only applied to unaccompanied children, but also to accompanied children. To the immigration enforcement agencies, like CBP and ICE, this was the straw that broke the camel's back. According to immigration officials, this expansion opened the door to adult migrants who could now use their children, or other peoples' children, to gain entry and release in the country.

The last independent variable is one that has not been mentioned by immigration officials, the media, or scholars – the new Mexican Migration Law of 2011.[12] After years of complaints over human rights abuses at the hands of Mexican officials, cartels, and locals, including the mass media coverage of 72 dead Central and South American migrants in 2010, activist organizations, Central American governments, the UN, and the US, pressured Mexico to update and change their immigration laws. The result was the unanimously approved new *Ley de Migración* (Alba & Castillo 2012).

Essentially, the new Mexican immigration law gave all OTM migrants equal treatment under the law, a right to due process and justice, access to health services, and maybe, most importantly, it "decriminalized irregular immigration and discourage[d] and penalize[d] abuses committed by authorities against migrants" (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012). Prior to this law, not only was it illegal for OTM migrants to be in transit through Mexico, but OTM migrants who engaged in this practice were denied simple human rights protections. The new law also limited local authorities' jurisdiction on control and verification of immigrants' status, and it tackled the arbitrariness and corruption of such officials (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012). For example,

---

[12] Despite an extensive literature review and working in the immigration field for over 14 years, I have not seen, heard, or read once about the new Mexican Migration Law playing a factor in the Central American migration surge.

the practice of local municipal police setting up and conducting immigration checks points, which were used as fronts to extort OTM migrants, were forbidden under the new immigration law (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012).

The new immigration law also called for the dissemination of these policy changes to inform the public and migrants. The new immigration law changes were broadcast over the radio, internet, and television. However, the most interesting thing about the law was that Mexico actually tried to enforce it.[13] Specialized units and departments were created and expanded (such as Grupos Beta) with the purpose of protecting the well-being and rights of all migrants. These groups not only had the mission of providing migrants with emergency medical help, social aid, communication assistance, protection from local gangs and bandits, and help with orientation, but they were also required to patrol risky areas, monitor local authorities for abuses and violations, and help locate missing persons (Secretaria de Gobernación, n.d.). What the new Mexican Migration Law intended to do was make it safer, easier, and ultimately cheaper for OTM migrants to traverse Mexico on their way to the United States. Although it could be argued the new law and its implementation still lacked adequate protections and did not go far enough to ensure safety, it was by all measures a step in the right direction. Furthermore, it is hard to argue that it was safer to traverse Mexico before the new law because the previous immigration law legally forbade most basic human migrant protections and it actually allowed most arbitrary and corrupt practices by local officials. Prior to this law, many OTM migrants' greatest fear was not USBP apprehension, but extortion by Mexican authorities and criminal gangs. The new law may have led to a new sense of security for OTMs, which may have

[13] Mexico was being closely monitored by human rights organizations, watch groups, the UN, and other nations' governments to ensure the new immigration law was properly enforced and implemented

prompted more Central American migration through Mexico and into the United States, opening the door to new smuggling routes and smuggling networks. Ultimately, the Mexican Migration Law may have inadvertently triggered the Central American migration surge, making this variable a critical component of the issue that must be considered when analyzing Central American migration.

TVPRA was signed in late December 2008, but it took effect in 2009, so it was recognized as beginning in 2009 in the models. DACA was signed on June 15, 2012. Because the fiscal year ends on September 30, DACA appeared in 2013 in the models to allow for a slight lag in implementation and the word spreading among the migrant social networks. The expansion of TVPRA and the Flores Agreement was signed on July 24, 2015. Once again, due to the fiscal year ending on September 30, the TVPRA Expansion started in 2016 of the models to allow for a slight lag in implementation. Lastly, the Mexican Migration Law was signed May of 2011, but it went into effect closer to 2012, so in the models it takes effect in 2012.

Data Collection Procedures

Narrowing down which socioeconomic variables to use in a regression analysis will always draw criticism, regardless of the study. There is no consensus regarding which or how many independent variables one should use when studying socioeconomic conditions in a region or country. Because this study intended to look at the large macrolevel socioeconomic changes that many experts blame for forcing people to flee Central America (push factors), I decided to include some of the most used macrolevel socioeconomic indicators used by scholars, international organizations, and governments. In addition, I included some of the most used pull factor macrolevel socioeconomic indicators that are generally associated with the United States.

To answer the first research question which asked, what is the universe of data with regard to poverty and violence, I attempted to find as much socioeconomic data as possible for the countries in this study. The data were gathered from large reputable international organizations and U.S. agencies whose data are commonly used and widely cited. The most comprehensive data bases were the data bases for the World Bank, IMF, and UN. These data bases contain thousands of datasets that go back decades for a number of macrolevel socioeconomic indicators. I referred to the World Bank for the large majority of the data due to their level of completeness, accessibility, and clarity. For some data I referred to the IMF and other data to the UN. Other data on U.S. immigration enforcement were gathered from DHS and old INS reports, while other data on immigration courts were gathered from Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearing House. Lastly, I used the USDA to get coffee production and coffee supply data, the Intercontinental Exchange for coffee prices, and the data for the Global Hunger Index came from globalhungerindex.org.[14]

As mentioned in the Independent Variables subsection, 195 independent variables were gathered and are found in Tables 17–28 of Appendix A. In the tables, the source of the data is also found next to the corresponding variable. Furthermore, an explanation of whether the table and variables are a pull or push migratory factors are explained in the notes section of below the tables. Lastly, the Results chapter will provide an overview and provide details regarding the variables that made up the universe of data.

---

[14] The Global Hunger Index is currently published by Concern Worldwide, a humanitarian agency, and Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, an NGO.

Data Analysis Procedures

To ensure the inferential robustness of all findings, I attempted assortment of regression models that tested the two competing hypotheses popular in the relevant literature. These models included traditional multiple regression models, hierarchical multiple regression models, and differences-in-differences regression models. Ultimately, I settled on running the stepwise regression method for all countries in the study, along with varied models that included time lags, different time frames, and the difference-in-differences technique.

Stepwise regressions were used because it is a statistical technique that is commonly used when there is a large pool of explanatory variables like in this study. The technique considers all the independent variables entered in the model while simultaneously removing the independent variables that are not statistically significant. The stepwise regression method allowed for the most uniformed analysis of all countries and variables in the study by allowing very similar models and variables to be used for all the countries.

Table 1 displays the stepwise regression models performed for each country and region. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Latin America each had 12 stepwise regressions performed with all available independent variables in the time frames stated. The lone exception was Nicaragua which only had eight stepwise regression models due to insufficient data for the first four stepwise regressions. The heading Stepwise Regression Number simply states which stepwise regression number the model is. On that same row, under the heading Time Frame and Method, is the time frame and method used for that specific stepwise regression. Although the Time Frame and Method is descriptive of the model, the last three columns under the headings 1-Year Time Lag, Difference-in-Differences, and Number of Years attempt to better explain each stepwise regression model. The heading 1-Year Time Lag specifies whether the stepwise

regression model used a 1-year time lag or not. The Difference-in-Differences heading specifies if the stepwise regression model used a difference-in-differences technique or not. Lastly, the Number of Years heading, simply lets us know the number of years in the time frame of the model.

To better explain, look at Stepwise Regression 4 in Table 1. This stepwise regression used the dependent and independent variables between the years 1982 and 2019, it used a 1-year time lag, it also employed the difference-in-differences technique, and lastly, it consisted of a 38-year time frame (which corresponds to the time frame 1982-2019). Each country and region in the study, used these same models, time frames, and techniques unless specified.

For all these models, the testing hypotheses was set at the $p <= .05$ level and relied on both t- and F-statistics to conduct the various tests of significance. To measure the extent of variation and variance explained by the models, R-squared and adjusted R-squared statistics were used. In addition, simple bivariate analyses were be conducted for a few interesting findings to provide some added detail and descriptive figures. All regressions and analyses were be done on SPSS software. Lastly, number of descriptive statistics such as tables and graphs were included in Appendices B, C, and D to show general trends, a summary of data, added perspective, and to provide a better understanding of independent variables and their association with the surge of unauthorized immigration from Central America.

Table 1

Stepwise Regression Model Methodology

Stepwise Regression Number	Time Frame and Method	1-Year Time Lag	Difference-in-Differences	Number of Years
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	No	No	39
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	No	Yes	38
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	Yes	No	39
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	Yes	Yes	38
5	1992-2018 No Time Lag	No	No	27
6	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	No	Yes	26
7	1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag	Yes	No	27
8	1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	Yes	Yes	26
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	No	No	19
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	No	Yes	18
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	Yes	No	19
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	Yes	Yes	18

Note. Since El Salvador began recording the homicides in 1994, which was later than the other countries in the study, El Salvador's time frames had to be changed slightly to include homicide rate in as many stepwise regressions as possible. As a result, four of El Salvador's stepwise regressions are 2 years shorter than the other countries. Stepwise Regression 5 is from 1994-2018 (25 years), Stepwise Regression 6 is from 1995-2018 (24 years), Stepwise Regression 7 is from 1995-2019 (25 years), and Stepwise Regression 8 is from 1996-2019 (24 years). Lastly, Nicaragua does not have Stepwise Regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4 due to incomplete dependent variable data (apprehensions data).

Limitations and Significance of the Study

This study explored the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis from a macrolevel. In other words, it was not geared to explain regional socioeconomic shocks in originating countries that could impact unauthorized immigration. The same goes for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. It could be possible that regional policy changes in specific USBP sectors could potentially influence unauthorized migration through specific sectors. However, this study was not looking at those small regional-level effects. Because the flow of unauthorized immigration from Central America appears to be a macrolevel issue due to the large never-before-seen flows of unauthorized immigration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, it was fitting for this study to focused exclusively on macrolevel factors**.** Despite the decision to focus exclusively on macrolevel, it is important to note that potential important micro level changes could arguably limit the study's overall robustness.

Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions

It is important to note that using apprehensions as a measure for unauthorized immigration does have some limitations in this study. The most important limitation is that the data are not complete. There are a number of gaps in the apprehension statistics along the Southwest Border. From 1980 to 1985, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) accurately recorded apprehensions at the national level and along the Southwest Border for migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize/British West Indies, the Dominican Republic, and Canada. However, apprehensions from other North American countries were not recorded separately and all other North American apprehensions were thrown into a "other North American" apprehension category, which included Honduras, Nicaragua and other Caribbean

and Central American nations. Therefore, exact Honduras apprehension data cannot be gathered from 1980 to 1985.

That being said, numbers can be cross referenced with other INS statistics to arrive at reasonably accurate Honduran apprehension estimates. Although the estimates are not exact, estimates for Honduras should not vary much from the true numbers, and due to their small totals and small variances, these estimates should not create significant statistical changes in any times series or regression analysis.

Another problem with the apprehension data set is the years between 1986 and 1991. For whatever reason, these 6 years resulted in a lapse of INS apprehensions data gathering where not even Southwest Border apprehensions were tracked, much less apprehensions broken down by specific country. National level apprehension data were recorded for OTMs and Mexican apprehensions, but not for the Southwest Border. However, using percent averages from 1980 to 1985 and from 1992 to 1997, coupled with national-level data and other INS data, we can arrive at some reasonably accurate estimates for migrants apprehended along the Southwest Border from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Latin America.[15] The same could not be said for Nicaragua. Because accurate numbers could not be gathered or estimated for Nicaragua from 1980 to 1992, it was decided to not include Nicaraguan models for the base year of 1980, resulting in Nicaragua only having eight stepwise regressions in contrast to all the other countries' (and region) 12 stepwise regressions.

Although some of the apprehension figures along the Southwest Border from 1980 to 1991 are estimates, we do know the upper and lower limits of the apprehension data due to INS

---

[15] This is also the case for Nicaraguan apprehensions. Nicaragua as previously noted, will be used as a control country.

statistics. Due to the knowledge of that range between the upper and lower limits, the estimates did not create large variances in the data, so it was reasonable to use those estimates in some regression or time series analyses.

Time Frame Limitations

As mentioned in the Time Frame of the Study subsection, due to insufficient time series data and variables that do not stretch back to 1980, no regression included all the independent variables found in Tables 17–28. For example, models beginning in 1980, generally had fewer independent variables than models that started in 2000 because many variables simply were not recorded in the 1980s. In other words, models with longer time frames had fewer independent variables and that produced vastly different results than models with shorter time frames and more variables. In addition, time frame selection mattered in the models even if the variable is available for all the time frames. For example, measuring the effects of GDP growth on apprehensions from 1980–2018 produced vastly different results than measuring the effects of GDP growth on apprehensions from 2000–2018. It is important note such data limitations and time frame changes produced different results. However, because this study intended to make inferential robustness a focus, these limitations had to be risked.

Missing Data Points

Many data sets were not used due to too many gaps in the time series. These variables were omitted for the stepwise regression models. On the other hand, many data sets with missing data points were still used in the models because estimation techniques were employed to fill in those missing gaps. Missing data points were filled using the SPSS estimation method *linear trend at point* technique.

Nevertheless, despite some data sets not being complete enough to be used in the regression models, these data sets were not completely omitted from the study. They were plotted in various graphs found in Appendices C and D. These figures provide the reader a much-needed perspective and frame of reference regarding the general trend and direction of many of these socioeconomic and immigration related variables.

Nonoperational and Omitted Independent Variables

While this study attempted to gather the most comprehensive and relevant collection macrolevel variables seen in any study of its kind, it is likely some variables were missed. Although most critical macrolevel socioeconomic variables were taken into account, a few variables that fell within the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis were left out. The most important variable that was not included in the regression analyses was the credible fear and asylum variable.[16]

According to those that work in the immigration enforcement realm, the credible fear and asylum loophole is key variable that has contributed to the increase in the flow of unauthorized immigration from Central America. However, attempting to create an adequate dummy variable or dummy variables proved impossible. Due to a large number of complex changes in asylum laws and polices overtime, proper dummy variables could not be created that would work in stepwise regression models that used yearly data.

The complexity of changes in asylum laws and polices came in the form of legal and administrative changes created by Congress, the Supreme Court, district federal judges, the U.S. court of appeals, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office of the White House, Department

---

[16] It is important to note that depending on how one defined and wanted to measure credible fear and asylum, it could be possible to consider these multiple variables.

of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), DHS, INS, USBP, CBP, USCIS and ICE. Those laws and policies changed too frequently to properly track, and often contradicted and overlapped each other. In addition, the polices and guidance varied by area due to different field offices, sectors, and circuit courts, and were generally implemented unevenly and at different times across Southwest Border.

In addition to the complexities previously mentioned above, the credible fear and asylum variable would have required to somehow take into account a well-documented and troubling issue regarding large variances in asylum grant and denial rates between immigration judges and immigration courts (Chen, 2010; Executive Office of Immigration Review, 2009; GAO, 2008; GAO, 2016; Legomsky, 2007; Ramji-Nogales et al., 2006; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2006; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2007; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2009a; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2009b; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2010, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2016, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2010). Despite this issue being well documented and acknowledged by government officials and legal scholars, it could not be operationalized for the purposes of this study.[17]

Other important independent variables that were left out were detention space related variables. Due to similar legal and administrative issues seen with asylum and credible fear,

---

[17] To provide an example of the large variances in asylum grant rates consider the Los Angeles immigration court. Judge Hye Y. Chon denied asylum to 4.5% of the 378 cases she heard between 2014-2019. On the other hand, Judge Gita Vahid-Tehrani denied asylum to 65.9% of her 317 cases between the same time period. Such ranges in asylum grant/denial rates are common between immigration judges in the same courts. Between different courts similar variances are found. Between 2012 and 2017, the San Francisco immigration court denied 32.6% of asylum cases, while during the same period the Los Angeles immigration court denied 68.1%.

arriving at yearly operational dummy variables could not be done in this study. There were simply too many changes, too close to each other, at too many agencies, at too many district courts, and in too many regions that resulted in too many polices that contradicted each other or that were quickly superseded or ignored. The contradicting policies and confusion lead to uneven and incomplete implementation of detention policies that created large tensions and operational issues between the numerous immigration agencies. Due to those issues, operationalizing yearly variables for detention space policy could not be done for this study.[18]

Significance of the Study

Currently empirical evidence is lacking for both hypotheses. This study intended to scrutinize both hypotheses. Therefore, there was a need for a large quantitative study such as this that analyzed the socioeconomic and immigration policy data available over various extended time frames to arrive at more inferentially robust conclusions regarding the cause of the surge of unauthorized immigration from Central America. This study intended to help policymakers and leaders make better decisions regarding the current Central American Migration Crisis, while at the same time contributing significantly to the fields of immigration and national security.

---

[18] To illustrate this topic a little further consider the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) statutory detention framework. Despite clear laws regarding who should be detained, the INA detention statutes also grant DHS a large amount of *discretion* in basically every circumstance. This results in the opening of countless subjective *discretionary* decisions and policies at every level of government. Ultimately, *discretion* related decisions are based on a number of operational, executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative factors that are often times subjective in nature. In addition, there are usually no public laws or public policies that create some of these *discretionary* changes because most of the *discretionary* decisions are done internally behind closed doors resulting in very little evidence in the public record.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

What Is the Universe of Data?

The first research question asked: What is the universe of poverty and violence data for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? This question was partially covered in the Methodology chapter. To reiterate, to answer the first research question, I attempted to find as much socioeconomic data as possible for the countries in this study. Data were gathered from large reputable international organizations and U.S. agencies whose data are commonly used and widely cited.

Admittingly, the universe of data on poverty was quite extensive. Depending on how narrow one wanted to get regarding socioeconomic indicators, and how much one expanded what constituted a poverty related variable, it was easy to come up with poverty related variables that numbered in the thousands. However, drawing on a lot of those variables would not have been appropriate for this level of analysis as previously stated. This study intended to look at large-level effects at a country level, not at small regional effects in small sectors and industries. For example, *cereal yield per hectare* could have been included as a socioeconomic indicator related to poverty if one assumes a change in the yield of cereal could result in more poverty and hunger. However, if one focused on such a small sector, one could get caught up in very narrow indicators that could incorrectly impact any macrolevel analysis. Delving this much into narrower and narrower variables would result in hundreds, if not thousands, of marginal variables changing the level of analysis of a study. Moreover, variables like *cereal yield per hectare* are included in larger aggregate indicators, such as the *food production index* or *agriculture, forestry, and fishing*, so getting too variable specific is unnecessary for macrolevel analyses.

Conversely, violence related variables were extremely limited. Ultimately, homicide rate was the most reliable metric of violence. There were data on assaults, rapes, and robberies, but that data were very inconsistent and unreliable. The underreporting of crime is well known in the region, and data tracking for many crimes was simply too unreliable to include in the study. Take violent assault as an example. According to the UNODC, the serious assault rate in the United States is 4 times worse than El Salvador, 11 time worse than Honduras, and 22 times worse than Guatemala. Those data suggest something that is completely inaccurate, especially if one believes that the Northern Triangle is a hotbed of gangs and violence and that is why people are fleeing the region. Other crimes like robbery, rape, and theft showed similar differences between the United States and the Northern Triangle. Worldwide Governance Indicators tracked by the World Bank such as *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism* and *Rule of Law* metrics could be used as proxies for violence, but they do not quite measure violence per se. Regardless, these Worldwide Governance Indicators were included in the models and analysis because they are the best measures out there for political stability, rule of law, corruption, and governmental effectiveness. Despite these proxy Worldwide Governances Indicators, when all things are considered, the universe of data related to violence was basically limited to homicide rate and the subsection Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate will elaborate on this variable.

All selected variables were categorized and divided into 12 different tables found in Appendix A. The tables were titled based on their categorization. In addition, the notes below the tables indicate whether they were independent variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis or the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In all there were 12 categories which corresponded with the 12 tables. To add some clarity to the tables, a brief explanation of each table and category is required.

Table 17 is made up of seven USBP, CBP and ICE related variables and it includes the dependent variable of Southwest Border USBP apprehensions. This table demonstrates variables associated with immigration enforcement efforts over time by the primary immigration enforcement agencies of the DHS.[19] Independent Variables 4, 5, and 6 are all associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis because they partly deal with the removal polices of unauthorized migrants living in the United States. However, it is important to note that while these were associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, they are considered indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables for the purpose of this study. As has been explained some and will be elaborated on in this chapter, this study's focus were the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in Table 27.

Table 18 consists of 48 variables related to gross domestic product, gross national income, and inflation over time. These measures are large macrolevel economic variables that measure the overall value, production, and output of goods and services of a country. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 19 includes 33 indicators that have to do with life and well-being over time. Some of these variables include indicators such as life expectancy, malnutrition, infant mortality rate, immunization, and homicides. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. The homicide variable required special attention so it will be further explained in the subsection titled Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate.

Table 20 includes 13 variables associated with the internal infrastructure of each country and region. Indicators looking at access to electricity, sanitation, access to water, and cell phone

---

[19] Ultimately, despite being in the table, Nationwide Apprehensions, Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions, and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) were not used in the models due to insufficient data and methodology choices.

subscriptions are all included in this category. In a sense, this table's variables look to see how these countries have been doing from an infrastructure standpoint over time. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 21 focuses on education. Some of the 13 indicators include the education index, literacy rates, pupil teacher ratios, and school enrollment. This table's variables look to see the education status of each country overtime and were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 22 includes only three variables. These variables have to do with legal migration to the United States. These variables look to see if there have been limits or expansions on legal migration from the originating countries to the United States. In addition, the number of people from each country that naturalize is also in this table. The reason to include naturalization is because naturalized immigrants open legal migration pathways for families and relatives. These independent variables were all associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis but are considered indirect variables for the purposes of this study.

Table 23 is made up of 39 variables that consist of industry, agriculture, and business-related indicators. These variables consist of a wide range of industries and businesses including, banking, access to credit, tourism, manufacturing, food production, and even the ease of doing business. The shared variables dealing with worldwide coffee pricing are also included in this table. These variables look to see how these nations are doing from an industrial and business standpoint in range of sectors over time. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 24 focuses on poverty and inequality. Some of the 14 variables consist of the Gini coefficient, income distribution, and different poverty measures. Simply put, these indicators

look to assess the state of poverty and inequality in each country over time and were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 25 looks at 12 different government related variables. These variables simply look to see the state of each countries' respective governments over time in important factors such as stability, corruption, rule of law, and overall government effectiveness. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 26 includes six variables associated with the U.S. immigration court system. It includes immigration court case backlogs, percentage of cases granted relief (allowed to stay in the United States) and number of days an immigration case takes to complete. These variables look to see if whether immigration court issues such as backlogs are creating some of the immigration system loopholes many immigration experts often mention. These independent variables were all associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis but are considered indirect variables for the purposes of this study.

Table 27 consists of four dummy variables created for this study. These dummy variables looked at key policy changes that many immigration officials blame for creating to the surge of unauthorized immigration from Central American. Due to the complexity of these variables, the subsection, Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes, in the Methodology chapter, provided a detailed explanation and use of these variables.

Lastly, Table 28 adds four more Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables. These variables are pull factor variables associated with the U.S. economy. These independent variables are not country specific and apply equally to all countries in the study. Some key variables in this table are the U.S. unemployment rate and U.S. economic growth.

Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate

According to most scholars, homicides[20] have historically served as the best proxy for violence and crime in a country. Writing in his provocative analysis about the history of violence in *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, Pinker (2011) stated:

> Homicide is the crime of choice for measures of violence because regardless of how the people of a distant culture conceptualize crime, a dead body is hard to define away, and it always arouses curiosity about who or what produced it. Records of homicide are therefore a more reliable index of violence than records of robbery, rape, or assault, and they usually (though not always) correlate with them. (p. 62)

Simply put, while homicide rate data from Central America have their limitations, they are the best data available to analyze trends in violence. In addition, other studies looking at Northern Triangle migration and violent crime have used homicides as the proxy for violent crime (Clemens, 2017).

It is important to note that El Salvador and Guatemala experienced prolonged civil wars that limited the accurate data gathering of homicide statistics until their civil wars began to wind down and then, end. In Guatemala, for example, accurate data, according to the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stretches back to 1992. For El Salvador, the most recent data stretch back to only 1994. For Honduras, UNODC's data only start in 1999. However, there are reliable homicide data gathered by Honduran scholars going back to 1990 that are often used in most analyses of Honduran socioeconomic conditions (Gabaldon, 2002; Leyva, 2001; Salomon, 1993).

---

[20] Homicide rate is measured by number of homicides per 100,000 of the population.

All things considered, it is technically possible to take the number of people that were killed in the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran civil wars and average them out over the 1980s and early 1990s to draw a more seemingly complete homicide picture for those countries.[21] However, because death by violence during the civil wars varied from year to year and are themselves estimates, coupled with the fact that apprehension data for some of those years in the 1980s are estimates and not official numbers,[22] careful consideration must be given to any regression analysis that combines homicide and apprehension data prior to 1992.

Which of the Two Hypothesis Are Supported by the Models?

The goal of this study was to determine to what extent were each of the two competing hypotheses supported by the universe of available data. Producing a series of inferentially robust models would either support both hypotheses, neither hypotheses, or one of the hypotheses. The universe of data allowed each country and region in the study to have 12 different stepwise regressions, except for Nicaragua which only had eight. In total, 68 different stepwise regressions were produced. In this section, each stepwise regression was explored and summarized along with some key findings from each of the stepwise regression models. Because the stepwise regressions produced findings that answered the remaining two research questions simultaneously, this section combined the last two research questions into one section. Once again, the last two research questions asked:

2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the available data in an inferentially robust way?

---

[21] Refer to Appendix D Figures 46 and 47 to see how that data would look on a graph.
[22] The limitation of apprehensions numbers for certain years is explained in the "The Limitations of the Dependent Variable - Apprehensions" subsection.

3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain the recent surge in Central American migration?

This section will be broken down into subsections divided country. Each of the subsections will provide two different tables aimed at trying to simplify and summarize the findings into an easy to consume analysis.[23] Although a lot of detail and nuance will be missing from this chapter, the Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion chapter will provide some necessary detail and nuance to better explain the study's findings, short comings, and future research implications.

El Salvador – The Models

El Salvador was the first country explored. To better explain how tables like Table 2 work in the study, we will use the first stepwise regression (Stepwise Regression 1) found in Table 2 to explain. The heading Stepwise Regression Number is the number of each stepwise regression. Under the heading Time Frame and Method is the label 1980-2018 No Time Lag. This label corresponds to the time frame used in the model (1980 to 2018) and it informs us that there was no time lag applied to the model. In addition, because this stepwise regression does not include the label Difference-in-Differences that tells us the difference-in-differences technique was not used in the regression. The Number of Candidate Variables used in the model was 92 and the Number of Years, which corresponds to the time frame of 1980 to 2018, was 39 years. Lastly, and maybe most important, the Number of Significant Variables, was three. In other words, out of 92 independent variables that went into the model, only three variables were statistically significant.

---

[23] Each stepwise regression model will have accompanying tables in Appendix B. These tables will provide all the statistical information of the model including the R^2, Adjusted R^2, and estimated coefficient values.

Table 2

El Salvador – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	92	39	3
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	74	38	4
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	92	39	2
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	74	38	2
5	1994-2018 No Time Lag	140	25	4
6	1995-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	104	24	1
7	1995-2019 1-Year Time Lag	140	25	3
8	1996-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	104	24	0
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	175	19	4
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	139	18	5
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	175	19	3
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	139	18	7
	Total Number of Significant Variables			38

As shown in Table 2, there is a trend in which the Number of Candidate Variables increase as the time frames decrease. As we will see, this was the general trend for all the countries in the study. This trend occurs because the number of available indicators increased in more recent years, expanding the number of potential candidate variables. As more candidate variables became available and were entered into the models, so did generally the Number of Significant Variables. However, the Number of Significant Variables alone does not suggest support of any hypothesis. What exactly these significant variables mean in the models must be further explored, bringing us to the focus of the study.

To provide a summary of all 12 stepwise regressions for any given country, tables like Table 3 were created for each country and region. Although there is a lot of nuance missing from the tables, their intention was to provide a general overview of the findings regarding each stepwise regression model's support for each hypothesis. Accompanying tables in Appendix B will provide more detail for each model, and the commentary in this chapter and the next chapter will provide some much-needed nuance for the models and findings.

Table 3 summarizes all 12 stepwise regressions models ran for El Salvador. The first three columns of Table 3 contain the same data as the columns found in Table 2. The last four columns attempt to summarize the stepwise regression models and their support for each hypothesis. The heading labeled Number of Variables Showing Support has two subheadings. These subheadings labeled Poverty & Violence and Policy & Loophole, take the significant variables, and associate them with either the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis or the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, these same subheadings specify how many of the significant variables support each of the hypotheses. Under the heading, Level of Support, two more subheadings also labeled Poverty and Violence and Policy and Loophole break down whether the significant variables provided total support, contradictory support, or no support for each hypothesis.

Table 3

El Salvador – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1	92	3	1 of 2	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
2	74	4	1 of 2	2 of 2	Contradictory	Support
3	92	2	1 of 1	1 of 1	Support	Support
4	74	2	1 of 2	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
5	140	4	2 of 3	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
6	104	1	1 of 1	0 of 0	Support	None
7	140	3	0 of 2	1 of 1[a]	Contradictory	Support[a]
8	104	0	0 of 0	0 of 0	None	None
9	175	4	1 of 3	1 of 1[b]	Contradictory	Support[b]
10	139	5	2 of 3	0 of 2[c]	Contradictory	Contradictory[c]
11	175	3	3 of 3	0 of 0	Support	None
12	139	7	2 of 4	2 of 3[d]	Contradictory	Contradictory[c]
Total		38	15 of 26	9 of 12	3 of 12	6 of 12

Note. This table shows a summary of findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 29–40 of Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected *support* and *contradictory* results in the tables. This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing the indirect variables from the El Salvadoran models would result in 5 out of 12 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. None of the models would have produced contradictory results, and seven models would have had no support. In addition, 6 of the 6 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

[a] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed with Noncriminal Status.

[b] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed).

[c] Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR.

[d.] Two of the 3 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court Case Backlog and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR.

To better illustrate this breakdown, look at Stepwise Regression 1 in Table 3. Under the heading Number of Significant Variables, we see that the stepwise regression found three significant variables out of 92 candidate variables that went in the model. Under the heading Number of Variables Showing Support, of the three significant variables, two were associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and one was associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Under the subheading Poverty and Violence, we see that only one of the two significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis gave support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. The other significant variable did not give support, and in fact provided contradictory support. Under the Policy and Loophole subheading, the only significant variable associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

To reiterate, the last two columns under the heading Levels of Support attempt to summarize the findings by showing if there was total support for the hypothesis, contradictory support for the hypothesis, or showed no support for the hypothesis. In Stepwise Regression 1, the first model showed contradictory support for Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, while showing total support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In these tables, for there to be

support for a hypothesis, all the significant variables associated with a hypothesis must support the hypothesis. If one or more significant variables contradict the hypothesis, then level of support for the hypothesis will be labeled as *contradictory*. If the hypothesis had no significant variables, it will be labeled *none.*

Tables 29–96 in Appendix B will help us understand exactly how we arrived at those *support*, *contradictory,* or *none* findings by showing the estimated coefficient of each significant variable found in each stepwise regression. Table 29 in the Appendix B corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1. The two significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis were Manufacturing, Value Added (% GDP) and Agriculture Forestry and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth). Although both variables were significant, both variables do not support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. The variable Manufacturing Value Added (% GDP) suggested, as the value added from manufacturing to the El Salvadoran GDP increased, fewer El Salvadorans illegally migrated. This makes logical sense because one would assume that as an important economic indicator such as manufacturing output improves, the economic situation also improves hence fewer people should migrate out of El Salvador. On the other hand, another important economic variable, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth) suggests as the value-added growth of agriculture, forestry, and fishing improves, more El Salvadorans illegally migrate. This is the complete opposite effect one would expect. For this reason, while there were two significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, they in fact contradict each other, resulting in an overall contradictory finding for this model (see Table 3). Conversely, DACA, which is 1 of 4 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, is not only significant, but it also supports the Policy and Loophole

Hypothesis. DACA in Stepwise Regression 1 suggests once the DACA policy took effect, more El Salvadorans illegally migrated to the United States.

To reiterate once again, these tables attempt to simplify very complex and nuanced models and variables into an easy to digest analysis. In other words, these tables do not tell a complete picture, they only intend to provide an overall analysis of the models' findings. With this in mind, what do the 12 stepwise regressions say about unauthorized immigration from El Salvador? Simply put, looking at the last two columns in Table 3 under the heading Level of Support, we arrive at the conclusion that there appears to be more support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Of the 12 stepwise regressions, only three of the stepwise regressions found complete support for the Poverty and Loophole Hypotheses, while eight of the stepwise regressions produced contradictory results, and one found no support. In other words, while some of the models had a number of variables that supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, some of the same models also had variables that contradicted the hypothesis. Only three models, Stepwise Regressions 3, 6 and 11, produced significant variables that all supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

In contrast, 6 of the 12 stepwise regression models supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and two of the stepwise regressions provided contradictory results and four found no significant variables. However, it must be noted that although this may appear to suggest the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis had much greater support than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, the overall picture is not so clear when one digs into the details. To begin with, the support is not overwhelming because half of the models did not support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, in Stepwise Regressions 7, 9, and 10, the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables were indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables and not the

key variables this study meant to focus on. The same goes for Stepwise Regression 12, where two of the three were indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables (refer to the note section of Table 3 for more details).

Another finding that came about from the analysis of the stepwise regressions had to do with variable interpretation. In the study, a number of variables could be interpreted several different ways which could result in changes to the models' findings and analysis. One of the variables that was difficult to interpret, and that was seen in multiple models for other countries, was Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People), which appeared in Stepwise Regression 2. If one looks at this variable from an infrastructure point of view like this study did, then Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) is interpreted to mean that more telephone subscriptions (or access) suggest improvements in infrastructure and wealth. So, increases in Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) should not led to more unauthorized immigration. In Stepwise Regression 2, the variable Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) suggested that as more people got fixed telephone subscriptions, more people migrated out of El Salvador, contradicting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, another well-known theory, which was briefly discussed in the Literature Review chapter, suggests social networks and the facilitation of communication between those social networks drives a significant portion of migration (Curran et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2002; De Jong et al., 1996; Donato & Sisk, 2015; Garip, 2008; Massey & Espinosa, 1997; Massey & García-España, 1987; Massey et al., 1994; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011; Winters et al., 2001). Hence, it could be hypothesized using that social network theory that as more people have telephone access, they will have more contact with relatives and friends and any potential migration trip will be facilitated and encouraged. In other words, the reason why increases in fixed telephone

subscriptions are leading to more unauthorized immigration might be due to simply facilitating social network communication and might not have anything not do with the infrastructure aspect of the Poverty and Loophole Hypothesis. In this study, this variable along with other similar variables like Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Internet User, Total (% of Population), were associated with Poverty and Violence Hypotheses but it is important to note that applying another theory or interpretation on these variables could result in a different analysis.

Similarly, other variables that could be interpreted differently are indirect variables associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. For example, Nonimmigrant Visas Issued, People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status, and Persons Naturalized could be interpreted differently if one applies a different hypothesis, such as the social network theory. In this study they are interpreted to mean that an increase in nonimmigrant visas issued, an increase in more people obtaining legal resident status, or an increase in people receiving U.S. citizenship, should result in fewer unauthorized immigration. The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis suggests increasing legal migration pathways, should decrease unauthorized migration. However, as previously discussed, a social network theory approach suggests increasing the number social networks in United States could increase unauthorized migration. The formation of more concrete migrant social networks of family and friends with legal status could in theory have a pulling effect on potential migrants. Although this study used the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, this other interpretation and analysis must be considered when conducting an analysis.

Nevertheless, using the analysis of the study, the evidence supports the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis more than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, just how

significant that support for each hypothesis is not so clear due to methodological choices. In addition, questions remain about the inferential robustness supporting each hypothesis. The Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions chapter intends to look at some of those issues and try dig into some of the nuance needed to better understand the study's findings.

Guatemala – The Models

The 12 stepwise regressions for Guatemala resulted 88 significant variables (see Table 4). Despite Guatemala having fewer candidate variables than El Salvador, Guatemala had 50 more significant variables than El Salvador. The main reason for Guatemala having fewer candidate variables is because Guatemala falls slightly behind its neighbors regarding its data gathering capabilities. Additionally, they gather data slightly differently, producing arguably better but less consistent data.[24] However, despite the large number of variables that were found to be significant, the overall findings regarding the two competing hypotheses in Guatemala, were not too different from the El Salvador findings.

[24] El Salvador and Honduras gather data using yearly income-based surveys allowing for consistent, but less comprehensive and complete, yearly data points. In contrast, Guatemala gathers more comprehensive and complete consumption survey data, but they gather it much less frequently, usually every 4 or 5 years. Ultimately, Guatemala is missing too many data points in their time series to use some of their data in a regression analysis despite their data being considered more comprehensive and complete. Regardless, it is important to note, despite these limitations and a need for improvement in several areas, all three countries were said to "adhere to international best practice in poverty measurement" (World Bank, 2012).

Table 4

Guatemala – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	97	39	3
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	70	38	4
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	97	39	1
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	70	38	5
5	1992-2018 No Time Lag	115	27	13
6	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	79	26	9
7	1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag	115	27	1
8	1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	79	26	9
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	153	19	4
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	117	18	5
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	153	19	17
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	117	18	17
	Total Models			88

Overall, of the 12 stepwise regressions only two of the models supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, and 10 of the models produced contradictory findings (see Table 5). However, it is important to explain some of the models because while labeled *contradictory,* that does not tell the whole story. Stepwise Regression 6 for example, had 5 of 7 significant variables support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Stepwise Regression 8 similarly had 6 of 7 significant variables support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. In other words, despite being labeled *contradictory* in the table due to the methodology used, it could be argued that these two stepwise regressions provided more support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than not.

At the same time, the Policy and Loophole Hypotheses had more overall support with 6 of the 12 stepwise regressions supporting the hypothesis. However, that did not mean that the support was conclusive. That still left six stepwise regressions that found contradictory support or no support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Although it must be noted that some of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables in Guatemala's stepwise regressions skewed the findings somewhat against the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis (refer to the notes section of Table 5).

Another interesting finding was found in Stepwise Regression 11. This stepwise regression had DACA contradicting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This was the only time in any of the 36 Northern Tringle countries' stepwise regressions where any of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. To add to the confusion, also in Stepwise Regressions 1 and 5, DACA was found to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In other words, in one of the stepwise regressions DACA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, while in two other stepwise regressions it supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Table 5

Guatemala – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1	97	3	0 of 2	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
2	70	4	2 of 2	2 of 2	Support	Support
3	97	1	0 of 1	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
4	70	5	2 of 3	2 of 2	Contradictory	Support
5[a]	115	13	6 of 12[a]	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
6	79	9	5 of 7	2 of 2	Contradictory	Support
7	115	1	0 of 1	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
8	79	9	6 of 7	2 of 2	Contradictory	Support
9	153	4	2 of 3	0 of 1[b]	Contradictory	Contradictory[b]
10	117	5	3 of 3	0 of 2[c]	Support	Contradictory[c]
11*	153	17	8 of 13	1 of 4[d]	Contradictory	Contradictory[d]
12[e]	117	17	6 of 15	1 of 2[f]	Contradictory	Contradictory[f]
Total		88	41 of 69	12 of 19	2 of 12	6 of 12

Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 41–52 of Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected *support* and *contradictory* results in the tables. This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing the indirect variables from the Guatemalan models would result in the same overall level of support with 6 of 12 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. Only one model would have produced contradictory results, and five models would have had no support. In addition, 10 of the 11 key Policy and

Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

[a] Stepwise Regression 5 produced five distinct models with a total of 12 different significant variables. Internet Users, Total (% of Population) contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in 2 of the 5 models but supported the hypothesis in 1 of the 5 models. Due to the fact that it flip-flopped it was counted as an additional significant variable for a total of 13.

[b] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status).

[c] Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR.

[d.] Three of the 4 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court Case Backlog, Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR.

[e] Stepwise Regression 12 produced two distinct models with a total of 17 significant variables.

[f] Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Immigration Court Cases in Backlog.

*DACA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis in Stepwise Regression 11. This is the only time in all the stepwise regressions for the Northern Triangle where any of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables contradicts the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Another very important finding to note is that Stepwise Regressions 5 and 12 produced multiple independent models (see Tables 45 and 52 in Appendix B). Generally, in most of the stepwise regressions, models are built by adding one significant variable to each model in the stepwise regression, ultimately producing one model with several significant variables and the highest R^2. This was not the case in Stepwise Regressions 5 and 12. Stepwise Regression 5 had five distinct models that did not just build on significant variable after significant variable. To

better explain this anomaly, which is repeated in every country except El Salvador, let us look at the first two models of Stepwise Regression 5 in Table 45 in Appendix B.

The first model in Stepwise Regression 5 included Mean Years of Schooling and Internet Users for an R^2 of 0.89, but the second model used slightly different variables. It used Internet Users and DACA for an R^2 of 0.903. In other words, it kept one variable, threw out one variable, and added a new variable. Ultimately, five distinct models were created for Stepwise Regression 5. Overall, all the five models contained a combined 13 significant variables, but not all the models shared the exact same significant variables. Similarly, Stepwise Regression 12 produced two distinct models with a combined 17 significant variables (see Table 52 in Appendix B).

The difficult interpret variables of Internet Users Total (% of Population), Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) appeared extensively in the Guatemalan stepwise regressions. However, what is most interesting is that depending on the stepwise regression, some of these variables both supported and contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypnosis. Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) always supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in all four stepwise regressions it was significant in (Stepwise Regressions 4, 6, 8, and 11).[25] But on the other hand, Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Internet Users Total (% of Population) flip flopped depending on the model.

Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in Stepwise Regressions 5 (see Table 45) and 9 (see Table 49), but it contradicted it in Stepwise Regression 4 (see Table 44). The variable Internet Users Total (% of Population) is

[25] Refer to Tables 44, 46, 48, and 51 in Appendix B.

even more peculiar supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in six of the stepwise regressions (Stepwise Regressions 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8)[26] but contradicted it in four (Stepwise Regressions 1, 3, 5, and 7).[27] Interestingly, Stepwise Regression 5 produced five total models as previously discussed, and in two of those models Internet Users Total (% of Population) contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and supported it in one of the models. In other words, even in the same stepwise regression, this variable was found to support and contradict the hypothesis depending on what other variables were in the model. So, not only could these variables be interpreted differently using another hypothesis as previously discussed, but in the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis some of these variables both support and contradict the hypotheses.

Ultimately, using the methodology of this study, there was more support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Six stepwise regressions supported the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis versus two stepwise regressions that supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, like with El Salvador, there are several issues that make this analysis lacking the inferential robustness this study intended. The Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion chapter will explore those issues more and attempt to provide some much-needed nuance.

Honduras – The Models

Honduras is the last of the three Northern Triangle countries. Thus far, using the analysis of this study, the stepwise regressions for El Salvador and Guatemala have provided more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Loophole

---

[26] Refer to Tables 42, 44, 45, 46, and 48 in Appendix B.
[27] Refer to Tables 41, 43, 45, and 47 in Appendix B

Hypothesis. However, just how inferentially robust those finding are is not so clear. As we will see, Honduras will provide similar results as the other Northern Triangle countries.

Like with El Salvador and Guatemala, a total of 12 stepwise regressions were performed (see Table 6). Overall, Honduras had more candidate variables than Guatemala but fewer than El Salvador. In total, 62 significant variables were found, placing Honduras between El Salvador's 38 and Guatemala's 88 significant variables.

Table 6

Honduras – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	95	39	3
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	68	38	9
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	95	39	3
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	68	38	3
5	1992-2018 No Time Lag	133	27	5
6	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	97	26	2
7	1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag	133	27	6
8	1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	97	26	3
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	170	19	10
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	134	18	8
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	170	19	3
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	134	18	7
	Total Models			62

Much like with El Salvador and Guatemala, the stepwise regressions for Honduras provided more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Of the 12 stepwise regressions, only one, Stepwise Regression 11, supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, as seen in Table 7. Out of the 12 stepwise regressions, 11 had contradictory findings for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Once again, like with the other Northern Triangle countries, plenty of significant variables in each stepwise regression supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, but plenty other significant variables contradicted it, resulting in an overall *Contradictory* finding. Although support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis was once again stronger with 8 of the 12 stepwise regressions supporting the hypothesis, it must be noted that there were a lot of indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables in the models.

As previously stated, this study's intended focus were the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables of DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Expansion, and the Mexican Migration Law. Although most of the stepwise regressions for Honduras supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, 4 of the 8 stepwise regressions were only represented with indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables. Although results in the tables support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, those results somewhat miss the goal of the study and skew the study's analysis (see notes section of Table 7 for more detail).

One key finding was that whenever any of the four key Policy and Loopholes variables were found in the Honduran stepwise regressions, they supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This is a key finding in the study. Only once did any of these four key variables in any of the Northern Triangle stepwise regressions ever contradict the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, making it one of the most consistent findings in the study.

Similar to two of Guatemala's stepwise regressions, Honduras's Stepwise Regressions 1, 7, and 9 all produced multiple models in each stepwise regression (see Tables 53, 59, and 61 in Appendix B). Stepwise Regression 1 produced two different models using a total of three significant variables, Stepwise Regression 7 produced two different models using six different significant variables, and Stepwise Regression 9 produced three different models using 10 different significant variables. As we will see with the countries and region left in the study, stepwise regressions producing multiple models in the same stepwise regression is the norm and not the exception. In fact, El Salvador is the only country that did not produce multiple models in any stepwise regression.

Taken together, findings for the Honduran stepwise regressions were not too different from the other two Northern Triangle countries. Based on this study's analysis, there was more support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Although more discussion is needed to fully explain these findings, it is telling that in all three Northern Triangle countries, while running independent regressions that used independent data sets (aside for the shares variables the study identified), there was more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 7

Honduras – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1[a]	95	3	0 of 2	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
2	68	9	4 of 8	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
3	95	3	0 of 3	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
4	68	3	1 of 2	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
5	133	5	2 of 4	1 of 1[b]	Contradictory	Support[b]
6	97	2	1 of 2	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
7[c]	133	6	2 of 5	1 of 1[d]	Contradictory	Support[d]
8	97	3	0 of 1	2 of 2[e]	Contradictory	Support[e]
9[f]	170	10	5 of 8	1 of 2[g]	Contradictory	Contradictory[g]
10	134	8	1 of 4	2 of 4[h]	Contradictory	Contradictory[h]
11	170	3	1 of 1	2 of 2[i]	Support	Support[i]
12	134	7	3 of 5	2 of 2[j]	Contradictory	Support[j]
Total		62	20 of 45	14 of 17	1 of 12	8 of 12

Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 53–64 of Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected *support* and *contradictory* results in the tables. This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing the indirect variables from the Honduran models would result in 6 out of 12 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. None of the models would have produced contradictory results, and six models would have had no support. In addition, 6 of the 6 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

[a] Stepwise Regression 1 produced two distinct models with a total of three significant variables.

[b] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued.

[c] Stepwise Regression 7 produced two distinct models with a total of six significant variables.

[d.] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued.

[e] One of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued.

[f] Stepwise Regression 9 produced three distinct models with a total of 10 significant variables.

[g] One of the two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed With Criminal Status.

[h] Three of the 4 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open, Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closure).

[i] Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court Cases in Backlog and Nonimmigrant Visas Issued.

[j] Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued and Persons Naturalized.

Mexico – The Models

The first thing to note about Mexico's stepwise regressions is how Mexico had the most candidate variables in the study. Mexico's proximity to the United States and its economically advanced status, at least by Latin American standards, resulted in a larger number of socioeconomic indicators being tracked early on relative to other Latin American nations. As a result, there was much more data available for Mexico than its neighbors to the south. Mexico had a total of 97 significant variables as seen in Table 8. In addition, Mexico had more candidate variables than every other country in 10 of the 12 stepwise regressions while sharing an equal number of candidate variables with El Salvador on the other two stepwise regressions.

Table 8

Mexico – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	102	39	6
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	75	38	1
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	102	39	8
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	75	38	4
5	1992-2018 No Time Lag	140	27	12
6	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	105	26	22
7	1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag	140	27	7
8	1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	105	26	4
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	183	19	9
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	144	18	4
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	179	19	4
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	144	18	16
	Total Significant Variables			97

Four of the step regressions produced multiple models in each stepwise regression. Stepwise Regressions 1, 3, and 6 each produced two models a piece, and Stepwise Regression 5 produced five different models.[28] Stepwise Regression 6 was particularly interesting because it had 22 significant variables, the most out of any stepwise regression in the study. However, despite the large number of candidate variables and significant variables found in all these stepwise regressions, we do not get any solid support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

[28] Refer to Tables 65, 67, 70, and 69 in Appendix B.

The Poverty and Violence Hypothesis should in theory have produced a similar impact on Mexican migration as what was predicted for the Northern Triangle. However, we find, in 11 of the 12 stepwise regressions, there was contradictory support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis (see Table 9). However, it must be noted Stepwise Regression 1 had 4 of 5 significant variables supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis suggesting more support for the hypothesis than not. Regardless, the fact that so many significant Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables contradicted the hypothesis was unexpected. In fact, in all 12 stepwise regressions, more candidate variables contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than supported it. The only stepwise regression that had full support for the hypothesis was Stepwise Regression 2, which had only one significant variable.

As stated in the Methodology chapter, the purpose of including Mexico and Nicaragua in the study was to provide some points of comparison between the Northern Triangle and their neighbors to the north and south. According to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, the policies and loopholes that immigration officials blame for causing the surge of unauthorized immigrants from the Northern Triangle should not have influenced the flow of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. The reasoning according to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis was that such policies and loopholes only benefited non-Mexican migrants (OTMs). In other words, as explained in the Methodology chapter, policies like TVPRA and TVPRA Expansion, created beneficial policies and loopholes for individuals from all countries except Mexico and Canada (noncontiguous countries). By this rationale, the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables this study identified, should not have had much on an impact on the flow of Mexican migration.

Table 9

Mexico – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1[a]	102	6	4 of 5	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
2	75	1	1 of 1	0 of 0	Support	None
3[b]	102	8	2 of 7	0 of 1[c]	Contradictory	Contradictory[c]
4	75	4	2 of 4	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
5[d]	140	12	6 of 12[d]	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
6[e]	105	22	12 of 21	1 of 1[f]	Contradictory	Support[f]
7	140	7	3 of 7	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
8	105	4	1 of 4	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
9	183	9	4 of 8	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
10	144	4	1 of 4	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
11	179	4	2 of 3	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
12	144	16	6 of 13	3 of 3	Contradictory	Support
Total		97	44 of 89	7 of 8	1 of 12	5 of 12

Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 65–76 of Appendix B. Table 9 for Mexico is interpreted differently than the Tables 3, 5, and 7 for Northern Triangle countries. Primarily, the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables are not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis because in theory these four policies and loopholes were only supposed to impact non-Mexican nationals. Second, despite unintended and unexpected results around indirect Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis related variables with the Northern Triangle tables, indirect Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis related variables are supposed to have a similar impact on Mexican migration as on the Northern Triangle. Table 9 will be discussed in the narrative to clarify how it should be interpreted and analyzed.

[a] Stepwise Regression 1 produced two distinct models with a total of six significant variables.

[b] Stepwise Regression 3 produced two distinct models with a total of eight significant variables.

[c] TVPRA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. TVPRA is one of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. However, unlike with the Northern Triangle, these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. TVPRA in theory is not supposed to impact Mexican apprehensions because the policy only impacted people from noncontiguous countries.

[d.] Stepwise Regression 5 produced five distinct models with a total of 12 significant variables.

[e] Stepwise Regression 6 produced two distinct models with a total of 22 significant variables.

[f] The Mexican Migration Law supports the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. The Mexican Migration Law is one of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables and it is not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, upon second analysis, it could be argued that quite possible the Mexican Migration Law also made it easier for regular Mexicans to migrate because some of the protections intended for migrants crossing through Mexico could have extended to Mexican migrants also.

However, there are some issues with the theory that suggests the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were exclusive to non-Mexicans and could not have impacted unauthorized Mexican migration. For instance, DACA could theoretically have impacted Mexican migration because it was not specific to any migrant group, unlike TVPRA. DACA, according to immigration policy officials, created misinformation which resulted in migrants coming to the United States with the wrong assumption that they were eligible for DACA. Although only OTMs (mainly children and families) at the border were allowed into the United States due to TVPRA and TVPRA Expansion, DACA could have theoretically contributed to at least some Mexican migration due to misinformation. A similar assessment could be made regarding the Mexican Migration Law. The Mexican Migration Law was created for foreign migrants traveling through Mexico. However, the new legislation eradicated some dubious practices and implemented some general protections that also helped Mexican migrants traveling through Mexico. For example, the common practice of municipal police setting up check points and doing arbitrary shake downs under the guise of immigration enforcement was curbed by the new legislation. Shady police shakedowns did not just focus on non-Mexicans; instead, they focused on vulnerable people, even Mexicans. In a sense, the law could have also

made it safer for Mexican migrants to travel, thereby arguably influencing some Mexican migration.

However, despite the possibility that some key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables could have influenced Mexican migration, findings do not support that they did. Although 5 of 12 stepwise regressions supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, only in two stepwise regressions were any of the four key variables significant. In Stepwise Regression 3 (see Table 67), TVPRA was significant but contradictory. In other words, interpreting this variable with Mexico in mind it supported the hypothesis that TVPRA, a key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable, did not cause more Mexican migration. On the other hand, Stepwise Regression 6 (see Table 70) found the Mexican Migration Law did increase the number of Mexican apprehensions, contradicting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, as previously stated, the Mexican Migration Law could have theoretically impacted Mexican migration.

Regardless, the overall findings suggest the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis did not play much of a role on Mexican migration. In all 12 stepwise regressions, the only key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable that was found to have influenced Mexican apprehensions was the previously discussed Mexican Migration Law, and it was found in only one stepwise regression. Conversely, in Northern Triangle countries, these four key variables were significant and supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis in numerous stepwise regressions. The fact that in the Northern Triangle these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were so prolific while not important at all in Mexico's models, adds support to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. As previously stated, these four key variables were supposed to impact the Northern Triangle and not Mexico, and that is exactly what the findings suggest in this analysis.

The remaining stepwise regressions that supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis (Stepwise Regressions 1, 9, 11 and 12) did so only with indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables.[29] These indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were in theory supposed to be as impactful on Mexican migration as on the Northern Triangle.

Overall, there was a lack of support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, and this was an unexpected and a surprising finding. One would have predicted much more support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than what was found. At the same time, there was considerable support for the theory that the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were mostly specific to OTMs and specifically the Northern Triangle. However, that is not the whole story, and as will be discussed in the Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions chapter, there is a lot of nuance that needs to be explained to truly conclude one hypothesis had a larger impact than the other.

Nicaragua – The Models

Nicaragua is the Northern Triangle's southern neighbor. As shown in Table 10 and as previously discussed in the Methodology chapter, Nicaragua only had eight stepwise regressions. In addition, due to Nicaragua's substandard data collection methods, it had the fewest overall candidate variables. Despite so few candidate variables, Nicaragua's stepwise regressions did produce 57 total significant variables, which is more than El Salvador and almost as many as Honduras.

---

[29] Refer to Tables 65, 73, 75, and 76.

Table 10

Nicaragua – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1992-2018 No Time Lag	110	27	3
2	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	88	26	3
3	1993-2019 1 Year Time Lag	110	27	5
4	1994-2019 1 Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	88	26	3
5	2000-2018 No Time Lag	151	19	11
6	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	116	18	12
7	2001-2019 1 Year Time Lag	151	19	5
8	2002-2019 1 Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	116	18	15
	Total Significant Variables			57

Note. Nicaragua only had eight stepwise regressions due to limited data regarding the dependent variable.

According to both hypothesis Nicaraguan migration should have been impacted similarly as the Northern Triangle. In other words, we should have seen Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables impact migration from Nicaragua in a similar matter as what was predicted by each hypothesis. Interestingly, that was not found. Much like in Northern Triangle countries, the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis had very little overall support. In fact, only 1 of the 8 stepwise regressions had overall support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis (see Table 11). The other seven stepwise regressions had contradictory support. However, what makes Nicaragua different is that unlike the other three Northern Triangle countries, Nicaragua also had almost no overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Only 1 of the 8 stepwise regressions produced overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and in three of the models the overall findings were contradictory due to indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. To put it another way, one would have expected more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and it should have been similar as the support found in other Northern Triangle countries.

Be that as it may, the two times a key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable appeared in the models, they supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In other words, both times TVPRA Expansion appeared in Stepwise Regressions 3 and 8 (see Tables 79 and 84 in Appendix B), the variable supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This finding is important because it follows the same trend as what has been seen with the rest of Northern Triangle countries. Except for one occasion (Stepwise Regression 11 for Guatemala), every time any of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were significant in a Central American model, they supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis as predicted. Overall, while this analysis is missing some much-needed nuance, the overwhelming support by these four key variables for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is one of the most consistent findings in the study.

Table 11

Nicaragua – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1	110	3	3 of 3*	0 of 0	Support	None
2	88	3	1 of 3	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
3[a]	110	5	2 of 4	1 of 1	Contradictory	Support
4	88	3	2 of 3	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
5	151	11	6 of 9	1 of 2[b]	Contradictory	Contradictory[b]
6	116	12	4 of 10	1 of 2[c]	Contradictory	Contradictory[c]
7	151	5	2 of 5	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
8	116	15	9 of 12	2 of 3[d]	Contradictory	Contradictory
Total		57	29 of 49	5 of 8	1 of 8	1 of 8

Note. This table should be interpreted similarly to the Northern Triangle country tables. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 77–84 of Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected *support* and *contradictory* results in the tables. This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing the indirect variables from the Nicaraguan models would result in 2 out of 8 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. None of the models would have produced contradictory results, and six models would have had no support. In addition, 2 of the 2 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

[a] Stepwise Regression 3 produced two distinct models with a total of five significant variables.

[b] Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open and Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/ Terminated/ Closed).

[c] Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)

[d] Two of the 3 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status).

Latin America – The Models

Latin America was also included to see whether the Northern Triangle varied from the larger overall region. Unfortunately, Latin America did not provide the adequate point of comparison the study hoped for as was alluded to in the Comparing the Northern Triangle to its Neighbors section. As was predicted, the biggest issue was that Mexico dominated the apprehension data (the dependent variable) from 1980 to the early 2000s. Mexico after all accounted for over 98% of all apprehension along the Southwest Border for a large majority of the time frame in this study. Due to that, Mexican apprehensions likely skewed the data and findings for a lot of the models with longer time frames. The same could be said about the impact of Northern Triangle apprehensions on the stepwise regressions after 2000. Regardless, Latin America was included to demonstrate that multiple bases were covered to provide as complete a picture and as robust a finding as possible.

Overall, Latin America had the least number of candidate variables and second least number significant variables with 44 (see Table 12). This was largely due to data gathering difficulties in Latin America. For the Word Bank to have region wide data, it requires that each country track and provide their data. If one or more countries fail to provide the required data, then the World Bank cannot calculate a region wide indicator. Additionally, some indicators are

only country specific and cannot be extrapolated to a large region like Latin America ultimately resulting in fewer candidate variables.

Table 12

Latin America – Stepwise Regression Analyses

Stepwise Regression	Time Frame and Method	Number of Candidate Variables	Number of Years	Number of Significant Variables
1	1980-2018 No Time Lag	87	39	5
2	1981-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	70	38	5
3	1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag	87	39	3
4	1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	70	38	1
5	1992-2018 No Time Lag	113	27	4
6	1993-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	85	26	2
7	1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag	113	27	5
8	1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	85	26	2
9	2000-2018 No Time Lag	138	19	2
10	2001-2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	105	18	7
11	2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag	138	19	5
12	2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences	105	18	3
	Total Significant Variables			44

Using this study's analysis, the 12 stepwise regressions found more overall support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis (see Table 13). This is the first time in the study where the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis had more support than the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, these findings are not as straightforward as one might think.

Table 13

Latin America – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary

			Number of Variables Showing Support		Level of Support	
Stepwise Regression	# of Candidate Variables	# of Significant Variables	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole	Poverty & Violence	Policy & Loophole
1	87	5	2 of 4	0 of 1[a]	Contradictory	Contradictory[a]
2	70	5	3 of 5	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
3	87	3	2 of 2	0 of 1[a]	Support	Contradictory[a]
4	70	1	1 of 1	0 of 0	Support	None
5	113	4	3 of 4	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
6	85	2	2 of 2	0 of 0	Support	None
7	113	5	3 of 4	1 of 1[b]	Contradictory	Support[b]
8	85	2	1 of 2	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
9	138	2	1 of 2	0 of 0	Contradictory	None
10[c]	105	7	2 of 5	1 of 2[d]	Contradictory	Contradictory[d]
11	138	5	1 of 3	1 of 2[e]	Contradictory	Contradictory[e]
12	105	3	1 of 2	0 of 1[f]	Contradictory	Contradictory[f]
Total		44	22 of 36	3 of 8	3 of 12	1 of 12

Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 85–96 of Appendix B. Table 13 is meant to be interpreted differently than the Northern Triangle, Mexico and Nicaragua. The main issue is that the dependent variable, Latin American apprehensions, include Northern Triangle apprehensions and Mexican apprehensions. Mexico dominated the apprehension data from 1980 to the early 2000s skewing the data. After the early 2000s, apprehensions from the Northern Triangle begin to supersede Mexican apprehensions skewing the data the other way. Ultimately this resulted in difficult to analyze models. The narrative elaborates on this issue, but overall, findings in this table should be ignored.

[a] TVPRA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. TVPRA is one of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. However, unlike with the Northern Triangle, these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This is especially true in the earlier models because of how Mexican apprehensions dominated Latin American apprehensions skewing the data.

[b] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – People Obtaining Legal Resident Status.

[e] Stepwise Regression 10 produced two distinct models with a total of seven significant variables.

[d] One of the two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status).

[e] Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are an indirect variable – Aliens Removed With Criminal Status and People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status.

[f] This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Persons Naturalized.

Only 3 of the 12 stepwise regressions supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, and nine stepwise regressions had contradictory support. Once again like with the other countries, there were plenty of variables that supported the Poverty and Loophole Hypothesis, however, in those same models there were other variables contradicting it resulting in an overall contradictory finding.

The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis findings require a little more explanation. To begin with, only Stepwise Regression 7 supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and five stepwise regressions had contradictory findings and six had no support. However, those stepwise regression must be examined to see what exactly the variables suggest. First, Stepwise Regressions 7, 11, and 12 were only made up of indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables and did not include the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this study focused on. As previously stated, these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables should have had a similar effect on all countries in the study.

Second, while Stepwise Regressions 1 and 3 show contradictory support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, due to the methodology of the table, it actually supports the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables in both of those stepwise regressions is the variable TVPRA, 1 of our 4 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Because Mexican apprehensions accounted for such a large percentage of the

Latin American apprehensions, especially in the early years, it skewed the Latin American apprehension data. Under these conditions, TVPRA should not have had much support for increasing Latin American apprehensions. In other words, this contradictory finding in fact supports with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Third, in Stepwise Regression 10, two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are significant, with TVPRA Expansion showing support while Aliens Removed with Criminal Status (an indirect variable) showing contradictory support. The time frame for Stepwise Regression 10 was 2001–2018. Due to this time frame, and the fact that Northern Triangle apprehensions began to make up a larger share of Latin American apprehensions in the 2000s and 2010s, it is conceivable this key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable could have had a positive impacted on overall Latin American apprehensions.

Ultimately, the stepwise regressions for Latin America did not provide much overall support for either hypothesis. Ideally, Latin America should have been dropped from the stepwise regression section of the study. The overall findings associated with Latin America should be ignored as they add nothing new and in fact muddy the waters by requiring a lot of debatable and problematic interpretations. Although it is possible to interpret individual variables in certain ways to arrive at a conclusion that supports or contradicts your hypothesis of choice like I did above, it is not the proper way to conduct a robust policy analysis.

Conclusion

In brief, using this study's analysis and methodology, this study found there was more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Simply put, more models supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Loophole Hypothesis. Be that as it may, there was also not enough evidence to

dismiss the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Despite there being fewer stepwise regressions supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, there were plenty of stepwise regressions that showed support for it. In addition, even in the models that had contradictory overall findings for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, there were a considerable number of variables in the models that supported the hypothesis. Moreover, with regard to the second research question which attempted to find whether the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis was supported by the available data in an inferentially robust way, the simple answer is no. There was no inferential robust support to back up the claims that poverty and violence were responsible for driving people out of the Northern Triangle and into the United States. Conversely, regarding the third research question which looked to see to what extent the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explained the recent surge in Central America migration, the study found there appears to be a modest amount of support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

All in all, where this study had its greatest strength was in providing evidence for the importance for the often-dismissed Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This analysis provided significant evidence that the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this study identified may have had a moderate impact on the flow of unauthorized immigration from the Northern Triangle. Although the findings supporting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis are not inferentially robust either, they nonetheless suggest they matter and at the very least should be considered in any analysis looking at the Central America Migration Crisis.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion

Despite this study's overall finding that suggests key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables impacted the flow of Central American migration, the study could not confidently determine exactly how much those variables impacted those migration flows. Simply put, this study could not make confident claims or determinations as to the extent or impact of each key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable. In addition, the study's empirical support for Policy and Loophole Hypothesis did not produce results that confidently dismissed the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. What this study confidently did was show that often-cited Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables and narratives were likely overstated and exaggerated and that the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is a relevant evidence-based theory that must be included and acknowledged in all studies and analyses that look at the topic of Central American migration.

Furthermore, the estimated coefficient, R^2, and Adjusted R^2 values produced from the models fall way short of what could ever be claimed to be as definitive or conclusive. The fact that simply changing time frames or techniques produced such vastly different significant variables and estimated coefficient values casts uncertainty on much weight one should place on these values. This is especially true of the R^2 and Adjusted R^2 values. Most models had several contradicting variables that contributed to the R^2 and Adjusted R^2, making those values highly flawed and of little worth. Even if all the variables were pointing in right direction, the fact that so many models had such high R^2 (0.80 and above) should be raise red flags. Simply put, very little (if anything) in the social sciences, especially in macroeconomics, produces R^2 that high. Although we can look at these models to provide a general overview of research strategies or to

provide direction as to where future research should go, one should not take the values themselves too seriously.

However, that is not to say that these variables cannot be looked at in a different way in other to inform the reader as to what exactly is going on with these indicators. The stepwise regressions left out a lot of nuance, and the various tables of numbers and estimated coefficients unfortunately did not convey to the reader exactly what was going on with the socioeconomic indicators overtime in the Northern Triangle or its neighbors. It is quite conceivable that many readers still believe the situation in Central America is as bad as ever, or maybe even worse. What has been presented to the reader to challenge the notion of worsening conditions besides a few critiques of the literature and narrative explanations of the quantitative data? Is that enough to covey what is really going on with the socioeconomic data? According to cognitive scientist Steven Pinker (1990), "A striking fact about human cognition is that we like to process quantitative information in graphic form . . . [and] both introspection and experimental evidence (citing Carter, 1947; Culbertson & Powers, 1959; Schutz, 1961a, 1961b; Washburne, 1927) suggest that, in fact, graphic formats present information in a way that is easier for people to perceive and reason about" (p. 73). This visual representation of the time series data for both immigration and socioeconomic variables was provided in 197 graphs found in Appendices C and D.

As the graphs will convey in graphic format, one key finding not discussed in the models was the direction of the socioeconomic data. The universal direction of socioeconomic trends found in the data was one of general improvement. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, by almost every metric, improved overtime and are doing better today than in the past. The Northern Triangle is not only showing overall general improvement, but in recent years they

have outperformed their neighbors to the north and south, and the overall region of Latin America, on a large number of indicators. The notion that the Northern Triangle sank into a hole of poverty and violence in recent years is simply not supported by the available evidence. Almost every indicator is pointing in a general positive direction and there has been no major collapse or crash in any major indicator to suggest otherwise. Although many might argue the improvements have not been large or comprehensive enough, they are improvements none the less, and those overall improvements do not support the notion that socioeconomic changes were responsible for a sudden spike of unauthorized immigration. Simply put, there was no increasing poverty and violence at any significant scale as has been suggested in much of the literature. Although it is possible to go into very specific sectors or pick out specific and narrow indicators that support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, that evidence is in no way inferentially robust. The overwhelming majority of indicators show improvements in wealth, living conditions, health, infrastructure, safety, education, and well-being. This is not an anomaly either, the general improvement of the human condition has been the general trend around the world as documented in two extremely detailed and highly cited books by Pinker (2011, 2018). The Northern Triangle is not an exception. The figures in the Appendices C and D will help readers understand the quantitative data better and help them understand why the stepwise regression models found so little support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

What Happened to Violence?

One specific variable that required a deeper look was violence. Violence was maybe the variable that was mentioned the most by the mainstream media and in the academic literature. According to numerous studies and news stories, Central Americans were fleeing escalating violence, and they frequently highlighted the high homicide rates as evidence of that violence.

Although homicide rate was not in all the models because data were not available before the early 1990s as the Results chapter detailed, it was still included in eight models for each of Northern Triangle countries. Yet, despite being in 24 total stepwise regressions, it was only significant in one of them, and in that model, it contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.[30] The lack of support for homicide rates as an explanatory variable added to the issues this study had with the literature surrounding the Central American Migration Crisis. If the homicides rate could only be found to be significant in one model for the three different Northern Triangle countries while using various techniques and time lags, then why were so many experts supportive of the notion that homicides were driving the migration from the Northern Triangle?

I looked deeper into homicide rate for each country to see if there was something missing or if there was even a correlation between apprehensions and homicides for each country as many experts and news sources claimed. I conducted a simple bivariate analysis between apprehensions and the homicide rate for each country and found not only was there no correlation, but if anything, there tended to be more of a negative correlation. In other words, apprehensions increased as homicides decreased.

Figure 7 shows El Salvador's Southwest Border USBP apprehensions and its respective homicide rate. Immediately noticeable is the light grey line that represents the homicide rate for El Salvador from 1994 to 2019. The line shows how the homicide rate was actually worse in the mid-1990s and visually there appears to be very little correlation with the dark black line that represents the El Salvadoran apprehensions.

---

[30] Refer to Table 40 in Appendix B. In this model there is a negative correlation between El Salvadoran apprehensions and the homicide rate, contradicting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Figure 7

El Salvador – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation (1994–2019)



Not only was the homicide rate higher in the mid-1990s, but homicides also began to rapidly decline in 2015 while at the same time apprehensions spiked, dropped, then spiked again. Coincidently, the lack of correlation one can visually notice in Figure 7 is supported by the correlation coefficient as displayed in Table 14. Without using a time lag, the correlation between these two variables is -0.34. Furthermore, adding a 1-year time lag, found similar results with a correlation coefficient of -0.31. Even with the difference-in-differences technique, the correlation coefficient with no time lag was almost zero at -.07. Adding the 1-year lag and the difference-in-differences resulted in a very weak 0.16 correlation. In other words, not only was there little to no correlation, but there was a moderate overall negative correlation.

Table 14

El Salvador – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation

	No Difference-in-Differences		*Difference-in- Differences*	
	No Lag	1-Year Lag	No Lag	1-Year Lag
Correlation Coefficient	-0.34	-0.31	-0.07	-0.16

The negative correlation for Guatemala was even more pronounced and the lack of overall correlation is evident by simply looking at Figure 8. Not only have homicide rates been higher in the past, but Guatemala's homicide rate has been in a steady decline since 2009 and in 2019 it reached its lowest number on record. However, despite that declining homicide rate, Guatemalan apprehensions along the Southwest Border have skyrocketed to never before seen levels.

Figure 8

Guatemala – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation (1992–2019)



Once again, the correlation coefficient reflects what the eye can clearly see from Figure 8. According to Table 15, not only was there no correlation, but there was an overall moderate negative correlation suggesting that as homicides declined apprehension increased. The exact opposite effect of what the media and many experts have suggested. There was a negative correlation of -0.43 with no time lag and a negative correlation of -0.37 with a 1-year time lag, as Table 15 shows. Adding the difference-in-differences technique reduced that negative correlation a little but it was still -0.20 with no time lag and -0.24 with a 1-year time lag.

Table 15

Guatemala – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation

	No Difference-in-Differences		*Difference-in- Differences*	
	No Lag	1-Year Lag	No Lag	1-Year Lag
Correlation Coefficient	-0.43	-0.37	-0.20	-0.24

Honduras produced similar results. Figure 9 shows an increase in the homicide rate from through the 1990s into the 2010s. However, apprehensions did not really increase much relative to the increase in homicides. What is interesting is homicides hit a peak in 2011 and 2012, and since then, they steadily and rapidly declined. In 2019 the homicide rate was the same as in 2006 and as in 1999, but apprehensions reached all-time highs.

Figure 9

Honduras – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation (1992–2019)



The correlation coefficients displayed in Table 16, once again suggests there is no evidence to support the notion that the homicide rate and apprehensions are closely correlated. The correlation coefficient with no time lag was nearly zero with 0.04 and it had a very weak positive correlation of 0.11 when adding a 1-year time lag. The difference-in-differences technique with no time lag sank the correlation deeper into the negative department with -0.12 and -0.15 with a 1-year time lag.

There is no doubt a bivariate correlation misses on a lot because it does not consider other variables that could potentially be impacting the dependent variable. But as we just saw in this study, 36 stepwise regressions were conducted with numerous variables across different time

frames and techniques, and the independent variable of homicide rate was only found to be significant in one of the models, and it contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.[31]

The only country besides El Salvador that found homicide rate to be significant in a stepwise regression was Nicaragua. But even that significance was contradictory. Although homicide rate was significant in Stepwise Regressions 7 and 8 for Nicaragua, the homicide rate variable only supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in Stepwise Regression 7 (see Table 83). In Stepwise Regression 8 (see Table 84) it contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. In other words, a mixed finding that provides little support for the hypothesis.

Table 16

Honduras – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation

	No Difference-in-Differences		*Difference-in- Differences*	
	No Lag	1-Year Lag	No Lag	1-Year Lag
Correlation Coefficient	0.04	0.11	-0.12	-0.15

Ultimately, what is most concerning is the fact the homicide rate has been touted as a key push factor by the news media and many experts. Simply graphing each country's homicide rate over time would show it was very unlikely homicides could have been that critical of a factor on unauthorized immigration from the Northern Triangle as many suggest. Although it is common to cherry pick single year data points to back up the claims that homicides are an explanatory variable, that is a journalism tactic not a proper social science methodology. Furthermore, narratives that ignore overall downward trends in variables such as homicides in favor of single

[31] Interestingly, the homicide rate was also not found to be significant in any of Mexico's stepwise regressions, and Mexico had enough homicide rate data to include homicide rate in all 12 stepwise regressions.

data points must be looked at with suspicion. Moving forward, careful consideration must be made looking at studies that put a large emphasis on homicide rates, unless they delve deeply into small regional areas.

The Mid-2000 OTM Spike

As can be seen in Figure 1, there was a spike of OTM apprehensions in the mid-2000s composed of mostly Northern Triangle migrants that by the end of 2005 constituted 13% of all Southwest Border apprehensions.[32] The spike begins to be noticed around 2003, hitting a peak in 2005, and then dropping back down, but never to the levels seen before 2003. This spike has not been discussed in this study and is surprisingly absent from the academic literature. However, there was one Congressional Research Service report (Nunez-Nieto et al., 2005) along with several Congressional hearings in 2005 that directly looked at this spike of OTM apprehensions (Coping With Unauthorized Immigration on the Southwest Border, 2005; The Southern Border in Crisis: Resources and Strategies to Improve National Security, 2005). Two main issues emphasized by immigration officials were interconnected and related to loopholes in immigration policy and bed space issues.

The bedspace issue pertained to legal requirements regarding removal procedures. Unlike Mexicans who could be returned to Mexico via Voluntary Return (VR), prior to fiscal year 2006 OTMs apprehended between port of entry (USBP apprehensions) were required to be removed by an immigration judge. This meant OTMs had to be held in detention facilities until their immigration hearing. However, despite increases in bed space capacity, the years of compounding immigration case backlogs led to a severe shortage in bed space in immigration

---

[32] Refer to Figure 12 in Appendix C.

detention facilities.[33] Insufficient bed space problems eventually led to more and more OTMs being released on their own recognizance or on bond in the early 2000s. According to immigration officials at the time, word of the loophole spread through the migrant social networks and smuggling networks to such extent that by 2005 a record number of OTMs were apprehended along the Southwest Border. Even Brazilians came to represent a significant number of OTM apprehensions.[34] According to immigration officials, these OTMs would usually simply give up to USBP, knowing they would be released into the country soon after their arrest due to the loophole (Coping With Illegal Immigration on the Southwest Border*,* 2005; Nunez-Nieto et al., 2005).

According to Nunez-Nieto et al. (2005), the proportion of OTMs released on their own recognizance had increased to 50% by 2004. By 2005, that percentage had swelled to 72% and in some sectors like Del Rio and McAllen, it had reached over 90%. Furthermore, of those released on their own recognizance, only 30% made their immigration hearing and "only 15 percent of those who appeared at their hearings and [were] ordered removed, but [were] not detained, appeared for their removal" (The Southern Border in Crisis: Resources and Strategies to Improve National Security, 2005). Seeing a need to end this loophole, DHS began to implement initiatives to end what many critics called "catch and release." At the beginning of fiscal year 2005, "DHS announced plans to detain 100% of removable non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until their removal orders could be finalized and executed" (Rosenblum, 2012, p. 9). Although DHS increased bed space temporarily slowing down the immediate release of migrants who were waiting to see an immigration judge, they more importantly tried to eliminate the "catch and

---

[33] Refer to Figure 29 in Appendix C for some additional detail.
[34] USBP recorded 31,063 Brazilian apprehensions in 2005.

release" loophole by expanding on another program aimed at expediting the formal removal of unauthorized migrants.

Expedited removals (ERs) became part of the INA in 1996 under IIRIRA, but the policy was limited to the ports of entry (Rosenblum, 2012). In other words, the ER program was not an option for migrants apprehended by USBP. OTMs apprehended by USBP along the Southwest Border were placed in formal removal proceedings, which resulted in extended detention times to await an immigration hearing, ultimately resulting in large numbers of OTMs being released on their own recognizance.

ERs, on the other hand, allowed for "certain aliens to be formally removed from the United States without appearing before an immigration judge" (Rosenblum, 2012, p. 8). ERs essentially carried all the same penalties as a formal removal order by an immigration judge, but they were faster because they were done by the agency at the time of arrest, and they did not allow for releases into the United States under most circumstances. The most important policy implication in the eyes of immigration officials was that ERs allowed for the mandatory detention of the migrants until removal.[35] According to Nunez-Nieto et al. (2005):

> As part of the ER process, the OTMs must be mandatorily detained. Once an OTM is placed in the ER process, on average it takes 32 days for that alien to be removed. This compares to an average of 89 days for an alien who has been detained and is in the regular removal process. (p. 8)

As a result of this OTM spike in the mid-2000s, then USBP Chief Aguilar and immigration officials pushed for the inclusion of ERs for migrants apprehended between the

---

[35] It is important to note that mandatory detention was full of caveats and exceptions that over the years expanded eroding the mandatory detention requirement. Today, the release of a migrant under ER is common and it appears no different than the pre-ER days.

ports of entry. ERs were expanded to include "aliens who had entered the United States within the previous two weeks and who were apprehended anywhere within 100 miles of a US land or coastal border" (Rosenblum, 2013, p. 7). USBP began the implementation of ERs in Laredo and Tucson in late fiscal year of 2005. By fiscal year 2006, USBP finally used the ER program with OTMs fully.[36] Migrants removed under an ER were forced to remain in DHS custody until their removal back to their home country, thereby eliminating the mandatory release of OTM migrants into the United States. Much like the word had spread when the "catch and release" loophole existed, this shift in policy quickly spread among the migrant social networks leading to a drop in OTM apprehensions of over 62% from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007.

While one cannot be certain whether this loophole in the immigration policy was the cause of the mid-2000s OTM apprehension surge, it was largely supported by immigration officials. More importantly, the policy changes pushed by immigration officials appear to provide solid evidence that detention space and policy loopholes might have been a large cause of the mid-2000 surge. Ultimately, after the policy changes and increases in temporary detention space, OTM apprehensions declined until they reversed trend in 2012.

Notwithstanding, it is important to note OTM apprehensions did not drop to pre-2003 levels despite the introduction of ERs. Why that is it is not exactly clear. Apprehensions from Central America had been rising slowly since the 1990s, so ERs might just have temporarily slowed a growing problem. However, it could also be ERs were a temporary fix to one loophole out of many existing loopholes. Many immigration officials today suggest even with the implementation of ER, there were several other loopholes that were not closed, such as the

---

[36] ERs were allowed for Mexican migrants, that practice was very limited because Mexican migrants were usually set up for VR. However, over time, ERs became the standard removal procedure for all migrants, including Mexicans.

asylum loophole, and new loopholes were created with policies like TVPRA in 2008. In addition, the bedspace issue was never resolved. Although DHS increased bedspace, that increase had a temporary impact. Over a short time, frame bedspace reached maximum capacity again resulting in the release migrants on bond or on their own recognizance a few years after ERs were implemented.

In short, this section looked to provide an explanation for the 2005 OTM spike. Although academic literature investigating this mid-2000 spike is nonexistent, we are unfortunately left with the immigration officials' hypothesis to formulate an explanation. However, as previously stated, there is evidence to support this hypothesis. Moreover, the mid-2000 OTM spike does appear to mirror somewhat the current Central American Migration Crisis. Ultimately, such close parallels could provide further support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Regardless, without a proper statistical analysis, it is hard to arrive at a strong conclusion for the mid-2000s spike.

Recommendations

Study Limitations and Concerns

The methodology used in any study could drastically change the outcomes of a study. This study is no different. In the process of formulating, conducting, and running countless models, stepwise regressions, and multivariate regression analyses it became apparent it was possible to fit or create a model or methodology that supported whatever point of view or hypothesis one liked. This fact was especially troubling because due to the field being so politically and ideologically charged, any researcher could potentially come up with a study to influence policy based on their inclinations. In my analysis of the academic literature, it became apparent that ideology was playing a role in several studies. The main example I provided was

the insistence of many researchers to ignore immigration officials concerns regarding the policy and loopholes issues. However, not including immigration officials' concerns was not the only place to manipulate the findings. Other ways models and studies could be manipulated ranged from time frame selection to independent variable selection.

For example, this study used three different times frames and those reasons were provided in the Methodology chapter. But just changing the time frames from a start of 1980 to a start of 1992 or 2000, produced different results. Models that used the time frames from 2000 to 2018 varied greatly from the ones that used the time frames from 1980 to 2018. The same goes for selecting other time frames. In other words, looking at Guatemala using the exact same data but switching the time frames to 1998 to 2015 would produce different results. As to why one would select a time frame from 1998 to 2015, I am not sure, but I am certain it would not be hard to justify that selection. Another easy way to change the results is to simply select variables that suit what you are trying to find. If the goal of a study is to find a model that works to support your hypothesis, simply running several different models with cherry-picked variables would ultimately produce a model with the right combination of variables that fits one's hypothesis. Another way is to include different time lags. This study used a 1-year time lag in some of the models. As seen in the stepwise regressions for each country, they produced very different results. So, changing time lags around or lagging some variables but not others would ultimately produce completely different findings making it possible to fit a model into almost any hypothesis one likes. Lastly, simply eliminating a country from the study that does not fit a specific hypothesis could also produce findings one prefers.

Ultimately, the different ways one could manipulate findings was concerning and created a sense of pessimism and concern for this field of research. However, this once again reinforces

the idea of why inferential robustness is needed and why inferential robustness was not only wanted in this study but required. Although undoubtedly more needs to be done to get the inferential robustness needed to conclusively support or dismiss any of these two hypotheses, this study is a step in the right direction.

Variable Interpretation

Variable interpretation was one aspect this study admittedly overlooked. Only after the stepwise regressions were ran did the interpretation of many variables begin to shift in their association to the hypotheses. Some variables briefly that could be interpreted differently were some Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables such as Immigration Court Cases in Backlog, Days an Immigration Case if Open, Cases Resulting in Removal or VR, Percentage of Cases Resulting in Removal or VR, Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed), and Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closure). The biggest issue with these variables was they could be interpreted to mean they were part of the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis or just a byproduct of increased unauthorized immigration. In other words, determining which was the causal factor was not so clear and it could always be questioned.

Variable interpretation also applied to numerous Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables. For example, due to the complexity of macroeconomics, macrolevel indicators such as Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Value Added (% of GDP) could be interpreted to mean a decline in the indicator is a bad thing or a good thing. In this study, it was interpreted to mean it was a bad thing because this sector is an important part of the Northern Triangle's economy. However, it could be interpreted to mean the decline of this indicator is a good thing. In some rich countries for example, this indicator has been on a decline for years because they

have moved away from these types of sectors and toward other sectors such as services. Simply put, it can get very complicated and different researchers can interpret variables differently. Regardless, while this study remains firm on the interpretation of its variables, it is important for researchers and consumers to note just how important variable interpretation is because different interpretation can impact the analysis.

Implications for Future Research

This study showed the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is a relevant empirically supported hypothesis that helps explain the surge of unauthorized immigration from the Northern Triangle. Simply put, the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis must be considered in all research exploring the topic of Central American migration. Simply ignoring these variables or ignoring immigration officials' statements should not be an accepted practice in the field. Future research must take these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables into account, and ideally should create some additional Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this study missed, such as asylum and detention (next subsection will discuss).

All things considered, I believe combining these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables along with monthly data that extends years, preferably back to 1980 or the early 1990s, is the best way to arrive at an inferentially robust finding. Monthly data would allow for the largest number of data points for each variable and would allow for researchers to track monthly changes in socioeconomic and policy variables. However, the main issue with formulating a study that uses monthly data is for most of variables, such as those used in this study, the data does not exist in monthly form. Most importantly, monthly apprehension data for OTMs (the

dependent variable) simply does not exist prior to 2007.[37] Unfortunately, that impediment does not allow for the extended time frames required to conduct a proper analysis. Regardless, researchers must make an effort to figure out how to make inferential robustness the gold standard in this area of research.

Asylum and Detention Space Need to be Operationalized

Future researchers must find a way to create usable independent variables for asylum and detention space. These two variables have been key according to immigration officials as far back as the 1980s. As previously discussed in the Omitted Independent Variables subsection, this will be a difficult task due to the numerous hard-to-track policy and legal changes. But as Figures 25, 29, 36, 37, and 38 in Appendix C show, immigration officials appear to have some basis concern. The data suggest credible fear and asylum claims have increased, the number of cases in backlog have increased year over year, the lack of bed space has resulted in large numbers of migrants being released into the country, and the number of migrants not showing up to their immigration hearings is remarkably high in the eyes of most immigration officials. If the goal is to get a complete picture of what is causing the surge in Central American migration, researchers must make an effort to quantify and consider asylum and bedspace in their analysis and models. Ignoring these variables is leaving a large gap in the research.

Conclusion

The main take away from this study is Policy and Loophole Hypothesis must be considered when trying to understand the Central American Migration Crisis. Although this study did not provide conclusive evidence to dismiss the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, it did

---

[37] At least it does exist in dissemination form. Refer to footnote 38.

show key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables may have had more of an impact on Central American migration than Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables. Another key take away is there simply is no inferentially robust support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis as many experts and news sources have long claimed.

Regardless, the field is a long way from coming up with inferentially robust findings for either hypothesis, but researchers must make a greater effort considering the claims and hypotheses of immigration officials and practitioners. Although immigration officials could be wrong, it falls on the researchers to take their hypotheses into account in the research. In addition, researchers must do a better job ignoring personal ideology and feelings in favor of rigorous objective social science research. Although this is unlikely today due to how politicized the topic of immigration has become, the pursuit of truth should be the goal of the research. In addition, and maybe more importantly, CBP and DHS must do a better job producing the data researchers require. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data requests are absurdly cumbersome, and they take months to get if even approved. Much of these data should be readily available on open-source DHS maintained websites. This will reduce the backlog of FOIA requests, and it will allow researchers to conduct better research that could ultimately produce better research.[38] Taxpayer funded immigration data should not be a highly guarded government secret or hidden behind "law enforcement sensitive" classifications. DHS must do a better job.

---

[38] Despite CBP and DHS's improvements in making data available compared to a decade ago, they are still way behind where they should be. DHS lacks the data not because it does not exist, but because until recently they did not record a lot of the necessary data in a data base. In other words, the needed data regarding apprehensions for example, is locked away in physical files that require someone to go through boxes and files in storage to record by hand in a data base or spreadsheet demographic information such as country of citizenship, age, gender, location of apprehension, etc. This tedious work should ultimately help researchers and government officials because this data could improve research significantly.

Ultimately, like most social science research, more research is needed. Future research in this area should be ambitious and researchers should strive to make inferential robustness the gold standard. That is not to say that research that falls short on inferential robustness is useless, but it also should not be treated as conclusive. It should be used as a jumping off point for other researchers. But most importantly, research that does not meet the standards of inferential robustness should be treated with skepticism, and it should never drive policy. Edward Leamer (1983) believed "the consuming public [was] hardly fooled by [the] chicanery" of researchers selecting one or several of the thousands of statistical models they ran on their computer terminals (pp. 36–37). But he was wrong. The consuming public is fooled, and more troubling is many are happily fooled when the models and findings support their set of beliefs or ideology. Researchers must do better for this very reason. The idea of a researcher "pull[ing] from the bramble of computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray as a rose" (Leamer, 1983, p. 37) simply will not do in this area of study. There is simply too much at stake.

REFERENCES

Alden, E. (2012). Immigration and border control. *Cato Journal*, *32*(1), 107–124.

Alden, E. (2017). Is border enforcement effective? What we know and what it means. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, *5*(2), 481–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500213

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Pozo, S. (2016). DACA and the surge in unaccompanied minors at the US-Mexico border. *International Migration*, *54*(4), 103–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12250

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Pozo, S., & Puttitanum T. (2015). Immigration enforcement, parent-child separations, and intent to remigrate by Central American deportees. *Demography*, *52*(6), 1825–1851.

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Puttitanum, T. (2016). DACA and the surge in unaccompanied minors at the US-Mexico border. *International Migration, 54*(5), 102–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12250

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Puttitanum, T. (2017). Was DACA responsible for the surge in unaccompanied minors on the southern border? *International Migration*, *55*(6), 11–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12403

Anderson, S. (2003). *The impact of agricultural guest worker programs on illegal immigration*. The National Foundation for American Policy. http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/Nov_study1.pdf

Anderson, S. (2018, May 24). Reagan versus Trump on the free movement of people. *Forbes.* https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/05/24/reagan-versus-trump-on-the-free-movement-of-people/#1235e5ed3571

Anderson, T. P. (1971). *Matanza: The 1932 "slaughter" that traumatized a nation, shaping US-Salvadoran policy to this day*. University of Nebraska Press.

Anderson, T. P. (1976). The social and cultural roots of political violence in Central America. *Aggressive Behavior*, *2*(4). 249–255.

Andreas, P. (1998/1999). The escalation of US immigration control in the post-NAFTA era. *Political Science Quarterly, 113*(4), 591–615.

Andreas, P. (1999a). Borderless economy, barricaded border. *NACLA Report on the Americas, 33*(3), 320–325.

Andreas, P. (2003). Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. *International Security, 28*(2), 78–111. http://www.jstor.org/pss/4137469

Angelucci, M. (2005). *U.S. border enforcement and the net flow of Mexican illegal migration* (IZA Discussion Paper No. 1642).

Angelucci, M. (2012). U.S. border enforcement and the net flow of Mexican illegal migration. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, *60*(2), 311–357. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/662575

Arthur, A. R. (2018). *Catch and release escape hatches: Loopholes that encourage illegal entry*. Center for Immigration Studies. https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/arthur-caravan_0.pdf

Asylum abuse: Is it overwhelming our borders? Hearing before the Committee of the Judiciary House of Representatives, 113th Cong. (2013). https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113-56_85905.pdf

Asylum fraud: Abusing America's compassion? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 113th Cong. (2014). https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113-66-86648.pdf

Ataiants, J., Cohen, C., Riley, A. H., Lieberman, J. T., Reidy, M. C., & Chilton, M. (2018). Unaccompanied children at the United States border, a human rights crisis that can be addressed with policy change. *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health, 20*(4), 1000–1010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-017-0577-5

Baker, B. (2017). *Immigration enforcement actions: 2016.* Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf

Barnett, D. (2002). *The coming conflict over asylum: Does America need new asylum policy?* Center for Immigration Studies. https://cis.org/Report/Coming-Conflict-Over-Asylum

Beinart, P. (2019, April 1). Beto sees Trump's Immigration trap clearly: Most Democrats are playing into the president's hands on border security, but the ex-congressman has a different idea. *The Atlantic.* https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/beto-orourke-has-way-out-trumps-immigration-trap/586201/

Bjerke, J. A., & Hess, K. K. (1987). *Selected characteristics of illegal aliens apprehended by the US Border Patrol* [Paper presentation]. Annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Chicago, IL, United States.

Blanchard, S., Hamilton, E. R., Rodriguez, N., & Yoshioka, H. (2011). Shifting trends in Central American migration: A demographics examination of increasing Honduran-U.S. immigration and deportation. *The Latin Americanist*, *55*(4), 61–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1557-203X.2011.01128.x

Brenden, S., Campbell, J., Dotson, H., Gunderson, M., Murphy, M. A., Raffa, N., Ranjar, E., Ruiz, S. R., Piton, I., & Schram, N. (2017). *The cycle of violence: Migration from the northern triangle*. University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/38696

Bruno. A. (2019a). *Immigration: US asylum policy* (CRS Report No. R45539). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45539.pdf

Bruno. A. (2019b). *Unauthorized childhood arrivals, DACA, and related legislation* (CRS Report No. R445995). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45995

Building America's trust through border security: Progress on the Southern Border: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2017). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/building-americas-trust-through-border-security-progress-on-the-southern-border

Buvinic, M., Morrison, A. R., & Shifter, M. (1999). Violence in the Americas: A framework for action. In A. R. Morrison & M. L. Biehl (Eds.), *Too close to home: Domestic violence in the Americas* (pp. 3–34). Inter-American Development Bank.

Caldeira, T. P. R. (1996). Crime and individual rights: Reframing the question of violence in Latin America. In E. Jelin & E. Hershberg (Eds.), *Constructing democracy: Human rights, citizenship, and society in Latin America* (pp. 197–211). Westview Press.

Caldwell, A. A. (2015, October 30). Immigrants caught at the border believe families can stay in US. *Associated Press.* http://news.yahoo.com/immigrants-caught-border-believe-families-stay-us-081038988--politics.html

Call, C. T. (2003). Democratisation, war and state-building: Constructing the rule of law in El Salvador. *Journal of Latin American Studies, 35*(4), 827–862.

Campos, S., & Friedland, J. (2014). *Mexican and Central American asylum and credible fear claim: Background and context.* American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/mexican-and-central-american-asylum-and-credible-fear-claims-background-and-context

Carter, L. F. (1947). The relative effectiveness of presenting numerical data by the use of tables and graphs. In P. F. Fitts (Ed.), *Psychological research on equipment design* (pp. 65–90). U.S. Government Priming Office.

Casa Alianza. (2006). http://www.casa-alianza.org/docs/2006/2006-12-26-hond-ejec.pdf

Challenges at the border. Examining the causes, consequences, and responses to the rise in apprehensions at the Southern Border: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 113th Cong. (2014a). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91171/html/CHRG-113shrg91171.htm

Challenges at the border. Examining and addressing the root causes behind the rise in apprehensions at the Southern Border: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 113th Cong. (2014b). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91171/html/CHRG-113shrg91171.htm

Chen, M. H. (2007). Explaining disparities in asylum claims. *Georgetown Public Policy Review*, *12*(1), 29–48.

Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (20146). *Dramatic surge in the arrival of unaccompanied children has deep roots and no simple solutions*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/14659

Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (2016). *Increased Central American migration to the United States may prove an enduring phenomenon*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/increased-central-american-migration-united-states-may-prove-enduring-phenomenon

Clemens, M. A. (2017). *Violence, development, and migration waves: Evidence from Central American child migrant apprehensions* (CGD Working Paper 459). Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/violence-development-and-migration-waves-evidence-central-american-child-migrant.

Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico. (1994). *Guatemala, memoria del silencio*. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/guatemala/docs/publications/UNDP_gt_PrevyRecu_MemoriadelSilencio.pdf

Congressional Research Service. (1980). *Temporary worker programs: Background and issues a report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kenney, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, for the use of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy*. U.S. Government Printing Office. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00087217/00001

Coping with illegal immigration on the Southwest Border: Hearing before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Chief Patrol Agent David V Aguilar). https://www.c-span.org/video/?187587-1/customs-border-protection-operation

Coping with illegal immigration on the southwest border: Hearing before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Acting Deputy Director for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Leonard Kovensky). https://www.c-span.org/video/?187587-1/customs-border-protection-operation

Cornelius, W. A. (2001). Death at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration control policy. *Population and Development Review, 27*(4), 661–685. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695182

Cornelius, W. A., & Members of the Mexican Migration Field Research and Training Program Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD. (2009). *Migration trends from Mexico: What are the impacts of the economic crisis and U.S. enforcement strategy*? Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.

Cornelius, W. A., & Salehyan, I. (2007). Does border enforcement deter unauthorized immigration? The case of Mexican migration to the United States of America. *Regulation Governance, 1*, 139–153.

Correal A., & Specia, M. (2018, October 26). The migrant caravan: What to know about the thousands traveling north. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/world/americas/what-is-migrant-caravan-facts-history.html

Cruz, J. M., Trigueros Arguello, A., & Gonzalez, F. (2000). *El crimen violento en El Salvador: Factores sociales y económicos sociados*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Culbertson, H. M., & Powers, R. D. (1959). A study of graph comprehension difficulties. *Audio Visual Communication Review*, *7*(2), 97–110.

Curran, S., Garip, F., & Chung, C. (2004). *Advancing theory and evidence about migration and cumulative causation: Destination and gender in Thailand*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA.

Davis, B., Stecklov, G., & Winters, P. (2002). Domestic and international migration from rural Mexico: Disaggregating the effects of network structure and composition. *Population Studies*, *56*(3), 291–309.

De Jesus, M., & Hernandes, C. (2019). Generalized violence as a threat to health and well-being: A qualitative study of youth living in urban settings in Central America's "Northern Triangle." *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, *16*(18), 3465-3482. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6765918/

Desruelle, D., & Schipke, A. (2008). *Central America: Economic progress and reforms*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2008/dp0801.pdf

Dominguez-Villegas, R. (2017). *Strengthening Mexico's protection of Central American unaccompanied minor in transit*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/strengthening-mexicos-protection-central-american-unaccompanied-minors-transit

Donato, K. M., & Sisk, B. (2015). Children's migration to the United States from Mexico and Central America: Evidence from Mexican and Latin American migration projects. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, *3*(1), 58–79.

Dunn, T. J. (1999). Military collaboration with the Border Patrol in the US-Mexico border region: Inter-organizational relations and human rights implications. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Winter*, 257–277.

Dunn, T. J. (2001). Border militarization via drug and immigration enforcement: Human rights implications. *Social Justice*, *28*(2), 7–30.

Durand, J., & Massey, D. S. (2001). Border sanity. *The American Prospect, 12*(17), 28–31.

Durand, J., Massey, D., & Parrado, E. A. (1999). The new era of Mexican migration to the United States. *The Journal of American History, 86*(2), 518–536. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567043

Eagly, I., & Shafer, S. (2016). *Access to counsel in immigration court*. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf

Eagly, I., & Shafer, S. (2020). Measuring in absentia removal in immigration court. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, *168*(4), 817–876.

Escudero, I., Anil, O., Montero, M., & Jose, J. (2016). *Weathering storms: Understanding the impact of natural disasters on the poor in Central America*. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 2543914679 93466399 /Weathering-storms-understanding-the-impact-of-natural-disasters-on-the-poor-in-Central-America

Espenshade, T. J. (1995). Using INS border apprehension data to measure the flow of undocumented migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico frontier. *International Migration Review*, *29*(2), 545–565. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546793

Estados Unidos Mexicanos. (2012). *Mexico's new law on migration*. http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/028/12460.pdf

Examining the problem of visa overstays: A need for better tracking and accountability. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2017). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/examining-the-problem-of-visa-overstays-a-need-for-better-tracking-and-accountability

Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (1998). *Determinants of crime rates in Latin American and world: An empirical assessment*. World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/198251468752978462/pdf/multi-page.pdf

Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002). Inequality and violent crime. *The Journal of Law & Economics*, *45*(1), 1–39.

Fernandez-Kelly, P., & Massey, D. S. (2007). Borders for whom? The role of NAFTA in Mexico-US migration. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *610*, 98–118.

Flores-Yeffal, N. Y., & Pren, K. A. (2018). Predicting unauthorized Salvadoran migrants' first migration to the United States between 1965 and 2007. *Journal on Migration and Human Society, 6*(2), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/2311502418765404.

Franco-Agudelo, S. (1990). *Violence: A growing public health problem in the region*. Pan American Health Organization. https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/32623

Gabaldón, L. G. (2002). Tendencias y respuestas hacia la violencia delictiva en Latinoamerica. In R. Briceño-León (Ed.), *Violencia, sociedad y justicia en América Latina* (pp. 245–258). CLACSO.

Garip, F. (2008) Social capital and cigration: How do similar resources lead to divergent outcomes? *Demography*, *45*(3), 591–617.

Global Hunger Index. (2020). *2020 Global hunger index by severity*. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/ranking.html

Gobierno de Mexico. (n.d.). *Grupos Beta de Protección a Migrantes.* https://www.gob.mx/inm/acciones-y-programas/grupos-beta-de-proteccion-a-migrantes

Gonzalez-Barrera, A., Krogstad, J. M., & Lopez, M. H. (2014). *DHS: Violence, poverty are driving children to flee Central America to US*. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-central-america-to-u-s/

Government Accountability Office. (1987). *Asylum: Uniform application of standards uncertain – few denied applicants deported* (Publication No. GAO/GGD-87-33BR). https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76210.pdf

Government Accountability Office. (1989a). *Refugees and US asylum seekers from Central America* (Publication No. GAO/T-NSIAD-89-16). http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat15/138146.pdf

Government Accountability Office. (1989b). *Conditions creating refugees and US asylum Seekers from Central America* (Publication No. GAO/T-NSIAD-89-25). https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/102517.pdf

Government Accountability Office. (2015a). *Asylum: Additional actions needed to assess and address fraud risks* (Publication No. GAO-16-50). https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-50

Government Accountability Office. (2015b). *Central America: Improved evaluation efforts Could enhance agency programs to reduce unaccompanied child migration* (Publication No. GAO-15-707). http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671724.pdf

Government Accountability Office. (2015c). *Unaccompanied alien children: Improved evaluation efforts could enhance agency programs to reduce migration from Central America, Statement of Kimberly Giannopoulos* (Publication No. GAO-16-163T). https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673248.pdf

Government Accountability Office. (2016). *Asylum: Variation exists in outcomes of application across immigration courts and judges* (Publication No. GAO-17-72). http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680976.pdf

Greenberg, J. (2018, June 29). Does America face a refugee or an immigration problem? *Politifact.* https://www.politifact.com/article/2018/jun/29/does-america-face-refugee-or-immigration-problem/

Gzesh, S. (2006). *Central Americans and asylum policy in the Reagan Era*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era

Haddal, C. C. (2010). *Border security: The role of the U.S. Border Patrol* (CRS Report No. RL32562). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf

Hamilton, N., & Chinchilla N. S. (1991). Central American migration: A framework for analysis. *Latin American Research Review*, *26*(1), 75–110.

Hammill, M. (2007). *Growth, poverty and inequality in Central America*. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/5025-growth-poverty-and-inequality-central-america

Hanson, G. H. (2007). *The economic logic of illegal immigration* (No. 26). Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/report/economic-logic-illegal-immigration

Hanson, G. H., & McIntosh, C. (2009). The demography of Mexican migration to the United States. *The American Economic Review*, *99*(2), 22–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592369

Hanson, G. H., Sheve, K. F., Slaughter, M. J., & Spilimbergo, A. (2001). *Immigration and the US economy: Labor-market impacts, illegal entry, and policy choices*. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.296108

Hanson, G. H., & Spilimbergo, A. (1999). Illegal immigration, border enforcement, and relative wages: Evidence from apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border. *American Economic Review*, *89*(5), 1337–1357.

Heinemann, A., & Verner, D. (2006). *Crime and violence in development: A literature review of Latin America and the Caribbean* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4041). https://ssrn.com/abstract=938907

Hiskey, J. T., Córdova, A., Orcés, D., & Malone, M. F. (2016). *Understanding the Central American refugee crisis: Why they are fleeing and how U.S. policies are failing them*. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/understanding-central-american-refugee-crisis

Holden, R. H. (2004). *Armies without nations: Public violence and state formation in Central America, 1821-1960*. Oxford University Press.

House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. (2017). (statement of David Bier) *The Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act (H.R. 391)*. House of Representatives. https://www.cato.org/publications/public-comments/statement-hr-391-asylum-reform-border-protection-act

House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. (2017). *The Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act (H.R. 391)*. House of Representatives. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/391/

Immigration Equality. (2014). *Immigration equality asylum manual*. http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Immigration-Equality_Asylum_Manual.pdf

Immigration Policy Institute. (2010). *Immigration enforcement in a time of recession: Explaining the recent decline in unauthorized migration*. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Enforcement_During_Recession_090910_0.pdf

The impact of high levels of immigration on U.S. workers. Hearing before the subcommittee on immigration and the national interest of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/the-impact-of-high-levels-of-immigration-on-us-workers

Inserra, D. (2014). *Children illegally crossing the US border: Responding requires policy changes*. Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/children-illegally-crossing-the-us-border-responding-requires-policy-changes

Inter-American Development Bank, Investing in Rural People, International Organization for Migration, More Rights for More People, & World Food Programme. (2017). *Food security and emigration: Why people flee and the impact on family members left behind in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras*. World Food Programme.

International Coffee Organization. (n.d.). *Historical data on the global coffee trade*. http://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp

International Crisis Group. (2017). *Mafia of the poor: Gang violence and extortion in Central America*. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/62-mafia-poor-gang-violence-and-extortion-central-america

International Monetary Fund. (2020). *World economic outlook*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO

Isacson, A., Meyer, M., & Morales, G. (2014). *Mexico's other border security, migration, and the humanitarian crisis at the line with Central America*. Washington Office on Latin America. https://www.wola.org/files/mxgt/report/

Ishizawa, O. A., & Miranda, J. J. (2016). *Weathering storms: Understanding the impact of natural disasters on the poor in Central America*. World Bank Group.

Jutersonke, O., Muggah, R., & Rodgers, D. (2009). Gangs, urban violence, and security interventions in Central America. *Security Dialogue, 40*(4–5), 373–391. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010609343298

Kandel, W. A. (2017). *Unaccompanied alien children: An overview* (CRS Report No. R43599). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf

Kandel, W. A., Bruno, A., Meyer, P. J., Seelke, C. R., Taft-Morales, M., & Wasem, R. E. (2014). *Unaccompanied alien children: Potential factors contributing to recent immigration* (CRS Report No. R43628). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf

Kandel, W. A., & Seghetti, L. (2015). *Unaccompanied alien children: An overview* (CRS Report No. R43599). Congressional Research Service. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P11312.pdf

Leamer, E. E. (1983). Let's take the con out of econometrics. *The American Economic Review*, *73*(1), 31–43.

Legomsky, S. H. (2007). Learning to live with unequal justice: Asylum and the limits to consistency. *Stanford Law Review*, *60*(2), 413–474.

Leiken, R. S., & Rubin, B. M. (1987). *The Central American crisis reader*. Summit Books.

Lessem, R. (2012). Mexico-U.S. Immigration: Effects of wages and border enforcement. *Carnegie Mellon University*. http://repository.cmu.edu/tepper/1454/

Lessem, R. (2018). Mexico-U.S. Immigration: Effects of wages and border enforcement. *Review of Economic Studies*, *85*(4), 2353–2388.

Lesser, G., & Batalova J. (2017). *Central American immigrants in the United States*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/central-american-immigrants-united-states

Leubsdorf, B. (2017, July 27). Violence can be as powerful as economics in driving immigration. Study: More homicides in Central America led to more unaccompanied children apprehended at the U.S. border. *The Wall Street Journal.* https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/07/27/violence-can-be-as-powerful-as-economics-in-driving-immigration/

Leyva, H. M. (2001). *Delincuencia y criminalidad en las estadísticas de Honduras, 1996-2000.* Proyecto Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil.

Long, C. (2019, May 1). US government to give DNA tests at border to check for fraud. *Associated Press.* https://apnews.com/article/9a5ca4eba65b41f9b881dc1911aa1f2e

Lorenzen, M. (2017). The mixed motives of unaccompanied child migrants from Central America's Northern Triangle. *Journal on Migration and Human Society*, *5*(4), 744–767. https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500402

Lynch, C. (2019). The impacts of warming coffee: The climate change-coffee-migration nexus in the northern triangle of Central America. *SIT Digital Collections*. https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/3008/

Macrotrends. (n.d.). *Coffee prices – 45 year historical chart*. https://www.macrotrends.net/2535/coffee-prices-historical-chart-data

Madrid, M. (2018, January 5). The other imperiled immigrants: For no good reason, other than spite and symbolism, Trump goes after Central American immigrants with temporary protected status. *The American Prospect.* https://prospect.org/health/imperiled-immigrants/

Manuel, K. M. (2014). *Asylum and gang violence: Legal overview* (CRS Report No. R43716). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43716.pdf

Massey, D. S. (1998). March of folly: US immigration policy after NAFTA. *The American Prospect, 37*, 22–33.

Massey, D. S. (2010). Immigration statistics for the twenty-first century. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *631*(1), 124–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716210373329

Massey, D. S., & Espinosa, K. E. (1997). What's driving Mexico-U.S. migration? A theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, *102*(4), 939–999. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2782024

Massey, D. S., & García-España, F. (1987). The social process of international migration. *Science*, *237*(4816), 733–738. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.237.4816.733

Massey, D. S., Goldring, L., & Durand, J. (1994). Continuities in transnational migration: An analysis of nineteen Mexican communities. *American Journal of Sociology*, *99*(6), 1492–1533. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2782582

Matter of Acosta, 19 Immigration & Nationality Decisions 211 (BIA 1985) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2986.pdf

McAleenan, K. (2019, August 21). *Migrant family detention policy* [Press release]. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.c-span.org/video/?463599-1/acting-dhs-secretary-mcaleenan-holds-press-conference-family-detention-policy

Medecins Sans Frontieres. (2017). *Forced to flee Central America's Northern Triangle: A neglected humanitarian crisis*. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MSF_Forced-to-flee-Central-America_s-Northern-Triangle.pdf

Meissner, D., Hipsman, F., & Aleinikoff, T. A. (2018). *The U.S. asylum system in crisis: Charting a way forward.* Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward

Meyer, P. J. (2013). *Honduras-US relations* (CRS Report No. RL34027). Congressional Research Service. https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/Honduras_US%20Relations%202013.pdf

Meyer, P. J. (2017). *Honduras-US relations* (CRS Report No. RL34027). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf

Meyer, P. J. (2019). *US strategy for engagement in Central America: Policy issues for Congress* (CRS Report No. R44812). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44812.pdf

Meyer, P. J., & Margesson, R., Seelke, C. R., & Taft-Morales, M. (2016). *Unaccompanied children from Central America: Foreign policy considerations* (CRS Report No. R43628). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf

Migrant children and border security: Hearing before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (2019). https://www.c-span.org/video/?462642-1/migrant-children-border-security&start=2195

Migration Crisis: Oversight of the Administration's proposed $1 Billion request for Central America Committee: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015). http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20150430/103407/HHRG-114-FA07-Transcript-20150430.pdf

Morrison, A. R., & May, R. A. (1994). Escape from terror: Violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala. *Latin American Research Review*, *29*(2), 111–132.

Nunez-Neto, B. (2008). *Border security: The role of the U.S. Border Patrol* (CRS Report No. RL32562). Congressional Research Service.

Nuñez-Neto, B., Siskin, A., & Viña, S. (2005). *Border security: Apprehensions of 'other than Mexican' aliens* (CRS Report No. RL33097). Congressional Research Service. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf

Obinna, D. N. (2019). Transiciones e incertidumbres: Migration from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. *Latino Studies, 17*(6), 484–504. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41276-019-00209-8

Ongoing migration from Central America: An examination of FY2015 apprehensions, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015). (testimony of Chris Cabrera, National Border Patrol Council). https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/ongoing-migration-from-central-america-an-examination-of-fy2015-apprehensions

Organización Panamericana de la Salud. (1996). *La violencia en las Américas: La pandemia social del siglo XX.* http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/3286

Orrenius, P. M. (2001). Illegal immigration and enforcement along the US-Mexico border: An overview. *Economic and Financial Review*, *Q1,* 2–11. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/fipfedder/y_3a2001_3ai_3aqi_3ap_3a2-11.htm

Orrenius P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2003). Do amnesty programs reduce undocumented immigration? Evidence from IRCA. *Demography*, *40*(3), 437–450.

Orrenius P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2012). The economic consequences of amnesty for unauthorized immigrants. *Cato Journal*, *32*(1), 85–106.

Oversight of Customs and Border Protection's response to the smuggling of persons at the Southern Border: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 116th Cong. (2019). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-customs-and-border-protections-response-to-the-smuggling-of-persons-at-the-southern-border

Oversight of immigration enforcement and family reunification efforts: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2018). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-immigration-enforcement-and-family-reunification-efforts

Oversight of U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2018). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-us-customs-and-border-protection

Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012). *Net migration from Mexico falls to zero-and perhaps less*. Pew Hispanic Center. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 2250/mexican-immigration-immigrants-illegal-border-enforcement-deportations-migration-flows

Phillips, J. A., & Massey, D. S. (1999). The new labor market: Immigrants and wages after IRCA. *Demography*, *36*, 233–246.

Pinker, S. (1990). A theory of graph comprehension. In R. Freedle (Ed.), *Intelligence and the future of testing* (pp. 73–126). Psychology Press.

Pinker, S. (2011). *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*. Penguin Books.

Pinker, S. (2018). *Enlightenment now: The case for reason, science, humanism, and progress.* Penguin Books.

Preston, J. (2014, April 10). Hoping for asylum, migrants strain U.S. border. *The New York Times.* http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/us/poverty-and-violence-push-new-wave-of-migrants-toward-us.html

Prillaman, W. C. (2003). *Crime, democracy, and development in Latin America*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/policy-papers-americas-crime-democracy-and-development-latin-america-volume-xiv-2003

Quijada, J. A., & Sierra, J. D. (2019). Understanding undocumented migration from Honduras. *International Migration, 57*(4), 3–20.

Ramji-Nogales, J., Schoenholtz, A. I., & Schrag, P. G. (2010). Refugee roullette: Disparities in asylum adjudication. *Stanford Law Review*, *60*(2), 295–411.

Refugees and the US asylum seekers from Central America: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 101st Cong. (1989). http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-89-16

Rivera, M. (2016). The sources of social violence in Latin America: An empirical analysis of homicide rates, 1980-2010. *Journal of Peace Research, 53*(1), 84–99.

Rodgers, D. (1999). *Youth gangs and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A literature survey*. The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/474291468770479198/Youth-gangs-and-violence-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-a-literature-survey

Rodlauer, M., & Schipke, A. (2005). *Central America: Global integration and regional cooperation*. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/243/index.htm

Ronstrom, A. (1989). Children in Central America: Victims of war. *Child Welfare*, *68*(2), 145–153.

Rosenblum, M. R. (2012). *Border security: Immigration enforcement between ports of entry* (CRS Report No. R42138). Congressional Research Service. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20120106_R42138_c04d33b3818f51bc204e82c2def580ad30902181.pdf

Rosenblum, M. R. (2013). *Border security: Immigration enforcement between ports of entry* (CRS Report No. R42138). Congressional Research Service. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20130503_R42138_c727b9137035e3a404795c314a2990b9b40e26ee.pdf

Rosenblum, M. R. (2015). *Unaccompanied child migration to the United States: The tension between protection and prevention*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention

Rosenblum, M. R., & Ball, I. (2016). *Trends in unaccompanied child and family migration from Central America*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/UnaccompaniedMinors-Factsheet-FINAL.pdf

Rosenblum, M. R., & Brick, K. (2011). *US immigration policy and Mexican/Central American migration flows: Then and now*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/RMSG-us-immigration-policy-mexican-central-american-migration-flows

Rosenblum, M. R., & Hipsman, F. (2016). *Border metrics: How to effectively measure border security and immigration control*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/border-metrics-how-effectively-measure-border-security-and-immigration-control

Rosenblum, M. R., Kandel, W. A., Seelke, C. R., & Wasem, R. E. (2012). *Mexican migration to the United States: Policy and trends* (CRS Report No. RL33539). Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42560.pdf

Salomon, L. (1993). *La violencia en Honduras*. Centro de Documentación de Honduras.

Santos, N. (2014). *The effects of enforcement on the flow of illegal immigration* (Publication No. 1555831) [Master's thesis, San Diego State University]. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global.

Schutz, H. (196la). An evaluation of formats for graphic trend displays: Experiment II. *Human Factors*, *3*(2), 237–246.

Schutz, H. (1961b). An evaluation of methods for presentation of graphic multiple trends: Experiment III. *Human Factors*, *3*(2), 108–119.

Schwartz, R. (2018, June 19). Why are so many children coming to the U.S. from Central America in the first place? *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/29/why-are-so-many-children-coming-to-the-u-s-from-central-america-in-the-first-place/

Semple, K. (2019, April 4). Migration surge from Central America was spurred, in part, by Mexican policies. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/world/americas/mexico-migration-border.html

Seelke, C. R. (2013). *El Salvador: Political and economic conditions and US relations* (CRS Report No. RS21655). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21655.pdf

Seelke, C. R. (2014a). *Gangs in Central America* (CRS Report No. RL34112). Congressional Research Service. http://www.unhcr.org/585a987a4.pdf

Seelke, C. R. (2014b). *El Salvador: Background and US relations* (CRS Report No. R43616). Congressional Research Service. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/53b5072a4.pdf

Seelke, C. R. (2016a). *El Salvador: Background and US relations* (CRS Report No. R43616). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43616.pdf

Seelke, C. R. (2016b). *Gangs in Central America* (CRS Report No. RL34112). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf

Seelke, C. R. (2017). *El Salvador: Background and US relations* (CRS Report No. R43616). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43616.pdf

Sessions, J. (2017). *Attorney General Jeff Sessions delivers remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review.* https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review

Siskin, A. (2015). *Alien removals and returns: Overview and trends* (CRS Report No. R43892). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43892.pdf

Smith, H. R. (2018). *Expedited removal of aliens: Legal framework* (CRS Report No. R45314). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45314.pdf

Smith, H. R. (2019a). *The law of immigration detention: A brief introduction.* Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11343

Smith, H. R. (2019b). *Immigration detention: A legal overview* (CRS Report No. R45915). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45915.pdf

Smith, H. R. (2019c). *Immigration arrests in the interior of the United States: A brief primer* (CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10362). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/ LSB10362.pdf

The Southern Border in crisis: Resources and strategies to improve national security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005). (testimony of Acting Director of Detention and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Wesley Lee). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-southern-border-in-crisis-resources-and-strategies-to-improve-national-security

The Southern Border in crisis: Resources and strategies to improve national security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005). (testimony of Chief Patrol Agent David V. Aguilar). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-southern-border-in-crisis-resources-and-strategies-to-improve-national-security

Stanley, W. D. (1987). Economic migrants or refugees from violence? A time-series analysis of Salvadoran migration to the United States. *Latin American Research Review*, *22*(1), 132–154.

Strengthening and reforming America's immigration court system: Hearing before the subcommittee on border security and immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2018). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/strengthening-and-reforming-americas-immigration-court-system

Sussis, M. (2019). *The history of the Flores settlement: How a 1997 agreement cracked open our detention laws*. Center of Immigration Studies. https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement

Taft-Morales, M. (2014). *Guatemala: Political, security, and socio-economic conditions and US relations* (CRS Report No. R42580). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf

Talbot, M. (2019, May 26). The challenge at the border shows no signs of abating. *The New Yorker.* https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/03/the-challenge-at-the-border-shows-no-signs-of-abating

Terrazas, A., Papademetriou, D. G., & Rosenblum, M. R. (2011). *Evolving demographic and human-capital trends in Mexico and Central America and their implications for regional migration*. Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-human-capital.pdf.

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2006). *Immigration judges*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2007). *Asylum disparities persist, regardless of court location and nationality*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 183/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2009a). *Latest data from immigration courts show decline in asylum disparity*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2009b). *Immigration courts: Still a troubled institution*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2010). *Asylum denial rate reaches all time low: FY 2010 results, a twenty-five year perspective*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2011). *About the data*. https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/about_data.html

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2016a). *Asylum outcome increasingly depends on judge assigned*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/447/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2016b). *What happens when individuals are released on bond in immigration court proceedings?* http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2017). *What happens when individuals are released on bond in immigration court proceedings?* http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2020). *Asylum denial rates continue to climb*. https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (n.d.). *About the data*. https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/about_data.html

Tuckman, J. (1996, September 27). Criminals take up soldiers' weapons. *Financial Times,* 3.

TVPRA and exploited loopholes affecting unaccompanied alien children: Hearing before the subcommittee on border security and immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (2018) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/tvpra-and-exploited-loopholes-affecting-unaccompanied-alien-children

The unaccompanied children crisis: Does the administration have a plan to stop the border surge and adequately monitor the children? Hearing before the subcommittee on immigration and border security of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/the-unaccompanied-children-crisis-does-the-administration-have-a-plan-to-stop-the-border-surge-and-adequately-monitor-the-children

The unaccompanied alien children: Improved evaluation efforts could enhance agency programs to reduce migration from Central America: Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. (2015) (testimony of Kimberly Gianopoulos, International Affairs and Trade Director). https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Gianopoulos-2015-10-21.pdf

United Nations Development Programme. (2020). *Human development reports*. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Crime and development in Central America: Caught in the crossfire*. United Nations Publishing. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Central-america-study-en.pdf

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Global study on homicide*. United Nations Publishing. https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/ background-information/Crime_Statistics/Global_Study_on_Homicide_2011.pdf

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (2013). *Global study on homicide*. United Nations Publishing. https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/ 2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf

United Nations Security Council. (1993). *From madness to hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the commission on the truth for El Salvador*. http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2009). *National security and records verification directorate fraud detection and national security division: I-589 Asylum benefit fraud and compliance report*. https://fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/Asylum_Fraud_DraftReport.pdf

U.S. Department of Agriculture. (n.d.). *Foreign agricultural service*. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/home

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). *Lawful permanent residents (LPR).* https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents

U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). *Nonimmigrant visa statistics*. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/nonimmigrant-visa-statistics.html

U.S. Department of State. (2005). *El Salvador: Homicide rate rises to wartime levels*. http://www.wikileaks.elfaro.net/es/201105/cables/4168/

U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office of Immigration Review. (2009). *Asylum and withholding of removal relief convention against torture protections: Relief and protections based on fear of persecution or torture*. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf

Wasem, R. E. (1997). *Central American asylum seekers: Impact of 1996 immigration law* (CRS Report No. 97-810 EPW). Congressional Research Service. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs463/

Wasem, R. E. (2011a). *US Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers* (CRS Report No. RL32621). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf

Wasem, R. E. (2011b). *Asylum and credible fear issues in U.S. immigration policy* (CRS Report No. R41753). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41753.pdf

Wasem, R. E. (2014). *Asylum policies for unaccompanied children compared with expedited removal policies for unauthorized adults* (CRS Report No. R43664). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43664.pdf

Washburne, J. N. (1927). An experimental study of various graphic, tabular, and textual methods of presenting quantitative materials. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, *18*(6), 361–376

Willis, E., & Seiz, J. (2019, April 9). Troubled countries can't keep people from leaving: Trump wants El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to stop emigration by force of will. They can't. *The Atlantic.* https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/central-american-governments-cant-stop-migration/586726/

Wilson, J. H., Bruno, A., Elsea, J. K., Kandel, W. A., & Kapp, L. (2019). *Recent migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently asked questions* (CRS Report No. R45489). Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45489.pdf

Winters, P., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2001). Family and community networks in Mexico-U.S. migration. *Journal of Human Resources*, *36*(1), 159–185.

Wong, T. K. (2014). *Statistical analysis shows that violence, not US immigration policies, is behind the surge of unaccompanied children crossing the border*. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2014/07/08/93370/statistical-analysis-shows-that-violence-not-deferred-action-is-behind-the-surge-of-unaccompanied-children-crossing-the-border/

World Bank. (n.d.-a). *Indicators*. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator

World Bank. (n.d.-b). *World Bank group archives history*.

World Bank. (2004). *Honduras: Drivers of sustainable rural growth and poverty reduction in Central America*. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14560/311911GT0rev1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

World Bank. (2004). *Guatemala: Drivers of sustainable rural growth and poverty reduction in Central America*. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/101471468216596017/pdf/311911GT0rev1.pdf

World Bank. (2005). *DR-CAFTA: Challenges and opportunities for Central America.* http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-1119648763980/DR_CAFTA_Challenges_Opport_Final_en.pdf

World Bank. (2011). *Crime and violence in Central America.* https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf

World Bank. (2012). *Assessing poverty measurement practices and statistical capacity in Central America.* http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/486921468213001154/pdf/722880ESW0P12 https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history

World Bank. (2020). *Doing business: Measuring business regulations*. The World Bank Group. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/doingbusiness

World Food Programme, Inter-American Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Organization of American States, and International Organization for Migration. (2017). *Food Insecurity and Emigration: Why people flee and the impact on family members left behind in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.* World Food Programme. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000019629/download/

Zong, J., & Batalova, J. (2015). *Central Americans immigrants in the United States*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states

Zuniga, E., & Molina, M. (2008). *Demographic trends in Mexico: The implications for skilled migration*. Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Zuniga-Paper.pdf

APPENDIX A

The Variables

Table 17

Variables: USBP, CBP, and ICE Related Variables

Variable Number	Variable Description	Source
Dependent Variable 1*	Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 1	Nationwide USBP Apprehensions	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 2	Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 3	Inadmissible Aliens at Southwest Field Offices (Port of Entry)	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 4	Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 5	Aliens Removed With Criminal Status	Department of Homeland Security
Independent Variable 6	Aliens Removed With Noncriminal Status	Department of Homeland Security

Note. This table consists of seven variables associated with immigration enforcement efforts over time by the primary immigration enforcement agencies of the DHS. USBP enforcement efforts account for dependent variable 1 and independent variables 1 and 2. CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) enforcement efforts, OFO operates at the ports of entry, account for independent variable 3. Lastly, ICE accounts for independent variables 4, 5, and 6. *This is the dependent variable. Despite being the dependent variable, it was included in this table because the Southwest Border USBP apprehensions of each country are a result of immigration enforcement efforts. These variables are associated to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Table 18

Variables: Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income-Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
7	GDP Real per Capita Growth (Annual %)	IMF
8	GDP Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
9	GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
10	GDP per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
11	GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
12	GDP (Current USD)	World Bank
13	GDP per Capita (Current USD)	World Bank
14	GDP per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 International $)	World Bank
15	GDP per Capita PPP (Current International $)	World Bank
16	GDP PPP (Constant 2011 International $)	World Bank
17	GDP PPP (Current International $)	World Bank
18	GDP per Person Employed (Constant 2011 PPP $)	World Bank
19	GDP Per Capita as a % of USA GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
20	GDP as a % of USA GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
21	GDP Per Capita PPP as a % of U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 USD)	IMF
22	GDP PPP Current Prices in Billions of Dollars	IMF
23	GDP (Constant LCU)	World Bank
24	GDP (Current LCU)	World Bank
25	GDP Deflator (Base Year Varies by Country)	World Bank
26	GDP per Capita (Constant LCU)	World Bank
27	GDP per Capita (Current LCU)	World Bank
28	Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	IMF
29	Personal Remittances, Received (Current USD)	World Bank
30	Remittances as a Share of GDP	World Bank
31	GDP Per Capita PPP Constant Prices in 2011 Dollars	IMF
32	Total Investment (% of GDP)	IMF
33	Gross National Savings (% of GDP)	IMF
34	Gross Savings (% of GDP)	World Bank
35	Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	World Bank
36	Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	World Bank
37	Trade (% of GDP)	World Bank
38	Trade in Services (% of GDP)	World Bank
39	GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)	World Bank
40	GNI per Capita PPP (Current International $)	World Bank
41	GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)	World Bank
42	GNI (Current USD)	World Bank
44	GNI (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
45	GNI per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 International $)	World Bank
46	GNI per Capita Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
47	GNI per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. $)	World Bank
48	GNI Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
49	GNI PPP (Constant 2011 International $)	World Bank
50	Gross Savings (% of GNI)	World Bank
51	GNI (Constant LCU)	World Bank
52	GNI (Current LCU)	World Bank
53	GNI per Capita (Constant LCU)	World Bank
54	GNI per Capita (Current LCU)	World Bank

Note. IMF = International Monetary Foundation. This table consists of 48 variables associated with macrolevel economic indicators over time (e.g., gross domestic product, gross national income, inflation). Independent variables in this table are considered pushed factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 19

Variables: Life and Well-Being Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
55	Homicide Rate (per 100,000 People)	United Nations, World Bank, Insight Crime
56	Human Development Index	United Nations
57	Child Mortality Rate Under-5 Years (per 1,000 Live Births)	World Bank
58	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)	World Bank
59	Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman)	World Bank
60	Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19)	World Bank
61	Population Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
62	Life Expectancy	World Bank
63	Death Rate, Crude (per 1,000 People)	World Bank
64	Malnutrition Prevalence, Height for Age (% of Children Under 5)	World Bank
65	Malnutrition Prevalence, Weight for Age (% of Children Under 5)	World Bank
66	Prevalence of Overweight (% of Adults)	World Bank
67	Global Hunger Index	Global Hunger Index
68	Contraceptive Prevalence Any Method (% of Women Ages 15-49)	World Bank
69	Immunization BCG (Tuberculosis) (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	World Bank
70	Immunization Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months)	World Bank
71	Immunization HepB3 (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	World Bank
72	Immunization, DPT (% of Children 12-23 Months)	World Bank
73	Immunization, Hib3 (% of Children 12-23 Months)	World Bank
74	Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	World Bank
75	Hospital Beds (per 1,000 People)	World Bank
76	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	World Bank
77	Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of Current Health Expenditure)	World Bank
78	Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of GDP)	World Bank
79	Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP)	World Bank
80	Current Health Expenditure per Capita (Current USD)	World Bank
81	Current Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current International $)	World Bank
82	Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current International $)	World Bank
83	Domestic Private Health Expenditure (% of Current Health Expenditure)	World Bank
84	Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita	World Bank
85	Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)	World Bank
86	Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population)	World Bank
87	Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of Working-Age Population)	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 33 variables associated with life and well-being over time. Independent variables in this table are considered pushed factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 20

Variables: Infrastructure Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
88	People Practicing Open Defecation (% of Population)	World Bank
89	People Using Basic Drinking Water Services (% of Population)	World Bank
90	Access to Electricity (% of Population)	World Bank
91	Secure Internet Servers (per 1 Million People)	World Bank
92	Internet Users Total (% of Population)	World Bank
93	Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (per 100 People)	World Bank
94	Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	World Bank
95	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	World Bank
96	People Using Basic Sanitation Services (% of Population)	World Bank
97	Electric Power Consumption (kWh per Capita)	World Bank
98	Agricultural Irrigated Land (% of Total Agricultural Land)	World Bank
99	Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	World Bank
100	Arable Land (% of Land Area)	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 13 variables associated with the internal infrastructure of each country and region over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 21

Variables: Education Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
101	Education Index	United Nations
102	Mean Years of Schooling	United Nations
103	Literacy Rate Adult Total (% of People Ages 15 and Above)	World Bank
104	School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	World Bank
105	School Enrollment Ratio, Secondary (% Gross)	World Bank
106	School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)	World Bank
107	Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)	World Bank
108	Primary Completion Rate (% of Relevant Age Group)	World Bank
109	Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary (% of Cohort)	World Bank
110	Government Expenditure on Education (% of GDP)	World Bank
111	School Enrollment, Primary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI)	World Bank
112	School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI)	World Bank
113	School Enrollment, Tertiary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI)	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 13 variables associated with education by each country and region over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 22

Variables: Legal Immigration to the United States Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
114	Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	U.S. Department of State
115	People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status	Department of Homeland Security
116	Persons Naturalized	Department of Homeland Security

Note. This table consists of three variables associated with legal migration and naturalization in the United States from each country and region over time. Independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory variables for all countries and regions in this study. These variables are associated to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Table 23

Variables: Industry, Agriculture, and Business-Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
117	Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	U.S. Department of Agriculture
118	Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	U.S. Department of Agriculture
119	Worldwide Coffee Average Closing Price	Intercontinental Exchange
120	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Open	Intercontinental Exchange
121	Worldwide Coffee Price Year High	Intercontinental Exchange
122	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Low	Intercontinental Exchange
123	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Close	Intercontinental Exchange
124	Worldwide Coffee Price Annual % Change	Intercontinental Exchange
125	Food Production Index (2004-2006=100)	World Bank
126	Manufacturing Value Added (Annual % Growth)	World Bank
127	Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 of USD)	World Bank
128	Manufacturing Value Added (% of GDP)	World Bank
129	Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual % Growth)	World Bank
130	Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
131	Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (% of GDP)	World Bank
132	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	World Bank
133	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
134	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	World Bank
135	International Tourism, Receipts (in Current USD)	World Bank
136	International Tourism, Number of Arrivals	World Bank
137	Ease of Doing Business Ranking	World Bank
138	Ease of Doing Business Score	World Bank
139	Ease of Starting a Business Score	World Bank
140	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	World Bank
141	Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	World Bank
142	Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	World Bank
143	Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)	World Bank
144	Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	World Bank
145	Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	World Bank
146	Economic Fitness Metric (Legacy)	World Bank
147	Economic Fitness Ranking	World Bank
148	Exports of Goods and Services (Annual % Growth)	World Bank
149	Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD)	World Bank
150	Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	World Bank
151	Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	World Bank
152	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	World Bank

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
153	Employment in Services (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	World Bank
154	Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	World Bank
155	Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 39 variables associated with business and industry related indicators from each country over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Coffee price variables are set by the commodities market (futures contracts) and serve as the basis for all countries' coffee prices. Better coffees at are a premium and while inferior coffees are at a discount. Central American coffee is generally considered to be at a premium.

Table 24

Variables: Poverty and Inequality Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
156	GINI Coefficient	World Bank
157	Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population)	World Bank
158	Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) (% of Population)	World Bank
159	Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population)	World Bank
160	Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line)	World Bank
161	Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line)	World Bank
162	Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line)	World Bank
163	Income Share Held by Lowest 20%	World Bank
164	Income Share Held by Second 20%	World Bank
165	Income Share Held by Third 20%	World Bank
166	Income Share Held by Fourth 20%	World Bank
167	Income Share Held by Highest 20%	World Bank
168	Income Share Held by Lowest 10%	World Bank
169	Income Share Held by Highest 10%	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 14 variables associated with poverty and inequality related indicators from each country over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 25

Variables: Government Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
170	Control of Corruption: Estimate	World Bank
171	Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank	World Bank
172	Government Effectiveness: Estimate	World Bank
173	Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank	World Bank
174	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism: Estimate	World Bank
175	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism: Percentile Rank	World Bank
176	Regulatory Quality: Estimate	World Bank
177	Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank	World Bank
178	Rule of Law: Estimate	World Bank
179	Rule of Law: Percentile Rank	World Bank
180	Voice and Accountability: Estimate	World Bank
181	Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank	World Bank

Note. This table consists of 12 variables associated with government related indicators from each country over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

Table 26

Variables: Immigration Court Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
182	Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
183	Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
184	Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
185	Percentage of Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
186	Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/ Closed)	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
187	Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closure)	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse

Note. This table consists of six variables associated with the U.S. immigration court system from each country over time. Independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory variables for all countries and regions in this study. These variables are associated to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.

Table 27

Variables: Immigration Policy Changes and Loophole Related Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
188	Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 2008-2019	Created Variable – Dummy Variable
189	Deferred Action Childhood Arrivals 2012-2019	Created Variable – Dummy Variable
190	Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Expansion 2015-2019	Created Variable – Dummy Variable
191	Mexican Migration Law 2011-2019	Created Variable – Dummy Variable

Note. This table consists of four dummy variables associated with key policy changes and loopholes that many immigration officials blame for creating to the surge of Central American unauthorized migration. Independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory variables for all countries and regions in this study.

Table 28

Variable: United States Related Pull Factors

Independent Variable	Variable Description	Source
192	U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
193	U.S. GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)	World Bank
194	U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	International Monetary Fund
195	U.S. Unemployment Rate, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	World Bank

Note. This table consists of four variables associated with the U.S. economy. All the independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.

APPENDIX B

The Stepwise Regression Models

Table 29

El Salvador – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	60523.71	19287.67	0.004	0.772	0.752	38.412	0.000
DACA	32955.34	4312.79	0.000				
Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-2.65E+05	1.07E+05	0.018				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	75979.24	31785.29	0.023				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 30

El Salvador – 1981–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Significant	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	41944.00	6366.30	0.000	0.731	0.698	22.364	0.000
DACA	19986.59	4724.03	0.000				
Prevalence of Overweight (% of Adults)	-5.37E+06	8.21E+05	0.000				
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 People)	5294.89	1720.51	0.004				
TVPRA Expansion	15552.77	6446.94	0.022				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 31

El Salvador – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	29217.18	7133.00	0.000	0.742	0.728	51.835	0.000
Mexican Migration Law	32440.92	6362.79	0.000				
Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	-8.46	3.31	0.015				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3.

Table 32

El Salvador – 1982–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-4628.53	3637.69	0.212	0.238	0.194	5.455	0.009
GNI, Atlas Method (Current US$)	3.015E-05	0.00	0.002				
GNI Per Capita (Current LCU)	-123.78	51.82	0.022				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4.

Table 33

El Salvador – 1994–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	1.75E+05	45342.91	0.001	0.874	0.849	34.728	0.000
DACA	35532.97	5964.50	0.000				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	2.25E+05	42993.74	0.000				
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	-23.13	5.40	0.000				
Manufacturing, Value Added (Constant 2010 of USD)	-4.14E-05	1.32E-05	0.005				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 34

El Salvador – 1995–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	3288.94	2596.00	0.218	0.300	0.268	9.440	0.006
Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)	-1.65E+05	53679.22	0.006				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 35

El Salvador – 1995–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-88961.78	33360.11	0.014	0.800	0.772	28.075	0.000
International Tourism, Receipts (in Current U.S. $)	8.865E-05	0.00	0.000				
Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	3.07E+05	1.28E+05	0.026				
Aliens Removed With Noncriminal Status	-1.44	0.64	0.035				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 36

El Salvador – 1995–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
No Significant Variables							

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8. This stepwise regression produced zero significant variables.

Table 37

El Salvador – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	51961.82	36724.16	0.179	0.935	0.917	50.424	0.000
Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/ Closed)	3.34	0.32	0.000				
Immunization, BCG (Tuberculosis) (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-2.22E+05	29405.54	0.000				
Immunization, Measles (% of Children 12–23 Months)	1.88E+05	35452.37	0.000				
Control of Corruption: Estimate	51301.60	13798.95	0.002				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 9.

Table 38

El Salvador – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-53432.95	31708.57	0.118	0.924	0.893	29.380	0.000
Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open	-112.46	21.47	0.000				
Immunization, BCG (Tuberculosis) (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-134546.99	22421.91	0.000				
Prevalence of Overweight (% of Adults)	-3211134.50	607440.80	0.000				
Cases Resulting in Removal or VR	0.67	0.15	0.001				
Immunization, Hib3 (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	87973.45	34458.16	0.025				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 10.

Table 39

El Salvador – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	323793.45	69372.53	0.000	0.858	0.830	30.245	0.000
Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	-44.67	5.60	0.000				
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank	-4834.56	1368.15	0.003				
USA GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual %)	382636.76	161297.28	0.031				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 11.

Table 40

El Salvador – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	25789.42	6445.24	0.003	0.966	0.942	40.541	0.000
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	-1.83E+05	16216.53	0.000				
Homicide Rate	-411.79	105.33	0.003				
Primary Completion Rate, (% of Relevant Age Group)	-4.25E+05	70132.80	0.000				
Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current USD)	1023.32	158.56	0.000				
Cases Resulting in Removal or VR	-0.66	0.15	0.002				
Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	-0.88	0.23	0.004				
Mexican Migration Law	12221.01	4988.71	0.034				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 12

Table 41

Guatemala – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	3321.42	1623.48	0.048	0.930	0.924	154.031	0.000
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	42427.07	19792.89	0.039				
DACA	33967.49	6081.54	0.000				
Personal Remittances, Received (Current U.S. $)	2.88E-06	0.00	0.006				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 42

Guatemala – 1981–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	1537.80	1289.59	0.242	0.645	0.602	15.005	0.000
Mexican Migration Law	15560.48	3946.34	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-1.74E+05	31436.67	0.000				
TVPRA Expansion	23916.14	6022.33	0.000				
Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-24607.59	11362.04	0.038				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 43

Guatemala – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	2153.43	3421.31	0.533	0.846	0.841	202.685	0.000
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	2.73E+05	19165.57	0.000				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3.

Table 44

Guatemala – 1982 – 2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	4534.13	2977.40	0.138	0.738	0.697	17.991	0.000
TVPRA Expansion	93459.41	13504.76	0.000				
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 People)	-18885.31	3446.78	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-2.69E+05	68059.45	0.000				
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (Per 100 People)	828.83	275.48	0.005				
Mexican Migration Law	19056.71	8506.80	0.032				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4.

Table 45

Guatemala – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Models

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-50519.33	14993.30	0.003	0.890	0.881	97.367	0.000
	Mean Years of Schooling	15722.42	4090.24	0.001				
	Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	63668.72	25188.64	0.018				
2	(Constant)	6982.37	2260.31	0.005	0.903	0.895	112.273	0.000
	Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	80269.46	18856.85	0.000				
	DACA	35811.27	7995.57	0.000				
3	(Constant)	-2.68E+05	96355.79	0.011	0.957	0.949	121.581	0.000
	DACA	22389.51	6364.94	0.002				
	GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)	6.75E-06	1.27E-06	0.000				
	GDP (Current LCU)	-6.01E-07	1.29E-07	0.000				
	Population Growth (Annual %)	1.01E+05	39451.99	0.018				
4	(Constant)	-3.11E+05	82319.82	0.001	0.969	0.963	170.182	0.000
	Atlas Method (Current USD)	7.35E-06	1.01E-06	0.000				
	GDP (Current LCU)	-5.77E-07	1.08E-07	0.000				
	Population Growth (Annual %)	1.45E+05	34841.65	0.000				
	Immunization Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-92099.81	18231.42	0.000				
5	(Constant)	-3.36E+05	32733.34	0.000	0.998	0.997	910.634	0.000
	Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-1.23E+05	8095.30	0.000				
	GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)	9.71E-06	4.75E-07	0.000				

GDP (Current LCU)	-5.56E-07	5.90E-08	0.000
Population Growth (Annual %)	1.01E+05	18424.82	0.000
Immunization Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-92426.62	8560.75	0.000
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-384.72	37.92	0.000
Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD)	-8.80E-06	9.61E-07	0.000
Immunization DPT – Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	33651.82	10168.20	0.004
GDP Growth (Annual %)	1.02E+05	30410.83	0.004
School Enrollment, Primary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI)	1.40E+05	61354.66	0.036

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 46

Guatemala – 1993–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	2402.43	1185.81	0.060	0.938	0.903	26.761	0.000
Mexican Migration Law	17537.04	2587.47	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-1.92E+05	19716.21	0.000				
TVPRA Expansion	23568.68	4409.24	0.000				
Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-1.35E+05	17286.26	0.000				
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-5351.17	1095.44	0.000				
Immunization, DPT-Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	1.26E+05	24887.10	0.000				
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	-2.25E+05	79028.14	0.012				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-2.90E+05	89864.89	0.005				
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	1.13E+05	49666.28	0.038				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 47

Guatemala – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	497.86	5326.09	0.926	0.833	0.826	124.733	0.000
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	2.77E+05	24824.89	0.000				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 48

Guatemala – 1994–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	26797.91	5939.50	0.000	0.971	0.954	58.889	0.000
TVPRA Expansion	93112.50	6788.99	0.000				
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-24040.69	1848.97	0.000				
Mean Years of Schooling	-38352.29	5461.28	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-2.87E+05	31522.25	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-7.43E+05	1.44E+05	0.000				
Mexican Migration Law	18011.45	4702.34	0.001				
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	3.37E+05	86444.23	0.001				
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	-3.56E+05	1.28E+05	0.013				
Child Mortality Rate Under 5 Years (per 1,000 Live Births)	5822.30	2608.78	0.040				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8.

Table 49

Guatemala – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variable	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-33359.83	2174.54	0.000	0.993	0.991	470.937	0.000
GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD)	4.00E-06	7.51E-07	0.000				
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-499.04	33.91	0.000				
Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	1.19	0.14	0.000				
GNI (Current USD)	-2.03E-06	6.75E-07	0.009				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 9.

Table 50

Guatemala – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	43238.29	5714.54	0.000	0.969	0.956	75.491	0.000
Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	1.70	0.11	0.000				
Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman)	3.06E+05	30706.61	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-97361.13	14290.53	0.000				
Cases Resulting Removal or VR	1.13	0.36	0.009				
Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of Working-Age Population)	6.40E+05	2.32E+05	0.017				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 10.

Table 51

Guatemala – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	74317.55	2.74	0.000	1.000	1.000	3.82E+11	0.000
Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	2.59	0.00	0.000				
Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/ Closed)	-8.95	0.00	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-1.08E+06	12.62	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-1.94E+05	1.18	0.000				
Worldwide Coffee Average Closing Price	-26920.07	0.34	0.000				
Access to Electricity (% of Population)	3.87E+05	4.62	0.000				
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	-1588.41	0.03	0.000				
Worldwide Coffee Price Annual % Change	-28561.48	0.75	0.000				
Worldwide Coffee Price Year Close	26734.13	0.61	0.000				
Regulatory Quality: Estimate	-22844.85	0.73	0.000				
Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	4827.63	0.15	0.000				
Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)	2.64E+05	14.68	0.000				
DACA	-9149.25	0.56	0.000				
Worldwide Coffee Price Year Open	-11516.37	1.01	0.000				
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP	13322.51	5.97	0.000				

Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-23.66	0.06	0.002
Aliens Removed with Criminal Status	4.52E-03	4.40E-05	0.006

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 11.

Table 52

Guatemala - 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-51712.79	7793.56	0.000	0.996	0.993	305.535	0.000
	Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	2.38	0.12	0.000				
	Aliens Removed With Criminal Status	8.39	0.40	0.000				
	Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	1.97E+05	11421.34	0.000				
	Immunization, DPT-Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	-1.90E+05	18132.38	0.000				
	Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 Live Births	-33304.72	6895.21	0.001				
	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	4.23E+05	51213.95	0.000				
	Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	-4.43E+05	83477.87	0.000				
	USA Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	3104.39	1102.27	0.020				
2	(Constant)	12384.81	0.35	0.000	1.000	1.000	3.71E+11	0.000
	Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	1.85	0.00	0.000				
	Aliens Removed With Criminal Status	9.24	0.00	0.000				

Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	1.87E+05	0.86	0.000
Immunization, DPT – Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	-1.93E+05	1.00	0.000
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	4.10E+05	1.42	0.000
Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	-1.19E+06	25.34	0.000
U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	3044.67	0.05	0.000
Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of Working-Age Population)	1.71E+06	287.23	0.000
GNI growth (Annual %)	7.19E+05	10.48	0.000
GDP Per Capita as a % of USA GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)	3.27E+06	523.89	0.000
Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	5.44	0.00	0.000
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	-25032.95	2.30	0.000

	Worldwide Coffee Price Annual % Change	466.32	0.14	0.000
	U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)	45800.62	31.89	0.000
	Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)	485.16	0.73	0.001
	Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population)	-32202.65	266.10	0.005

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 12.

Table 53

Honduras – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Significant	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Model	Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-19807.12	6699.33	0.005	0.78	0.77	65.076	0.000
	Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD)	5.76E-06	1.24E-06	0.000				
	DACA	25062.14	6730.04	0.001				
2	(Constant)	29.22	2383.92	0.990	0.821	0.811	82.607	0.000
	DACA	36136.16	4635.48	0.000				
	Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	3.62E+05	62446.46	0.000				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 54

Honduras – 1981–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	2322.97	1625.96	0.164	0.805	0.742	12.852	0.000
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	1.09E+06	1.41E+05	0.000				
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	-1.02E+06	1.94E+05	0.000				
Total Investment as a % of GDP	6.61E+05	1.44E+05	0.000				
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP	195431.82	53299.17	0.001				
TVPRA Expansion	23908.06	4982.66	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-3.92E+05	93461.16	0.000				
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	-1422.75	488.54	0.007				
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-5121.99	2069.36	0.020				
Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100)	831.59	359.50	0.028				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 55

Honduras – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-5.45E+05	1.67E+05	0.002	0.677	0.649	24.440	0.000
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	5.68E+05	83445.16	0.000				
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	5042.67	1547.73	0.002				
U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	5387.25	2286.07	0.024				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3

Table 56

Honduras – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-2530.64	3880.63	0.519	0.657	0.627	21.726	0.000
School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)	16826.65	4234.34	0.000				
TVPRA Expansion	48802.33	14419.48	0.002				
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	-18.54	6.40	0.007				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4

Table 57

Honduras – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	5.42E+05	2.13E+05	0.019	0.883	0.855	31.563	0.000
Exports of Goods and Services (constant 2010 USD)	1.58E-05	2.67E-06	0.000				
Primary Completion Rate, (% of Cohort)	-3.05E+05	57884.73	0.000				
Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	3.28E+05	67693.90	0.000				
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-0.84	0.32	0.016				
School Enrollment, Primary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI)	-4.95E+05	2.05E+05	0.025				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 58

Honduras – 1993–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	1444.24	3422.17	0.677	0.437	0.388	8.935	0.001
Primary Completion Rate, (% of Cohort)	-4.17E+05	1.03E+05	0.001				
School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)	7329.83	3002.38	0.023				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 59

Honduras – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-1.48E+06	2.89E+05	0.000	0.766	0.735	25.054	0.000
	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Constant 2010 USD)	1.50E-04	2.25E-05	0.000				
	School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	8425.56	1981.85	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	6.43E+05	2.47E+05	0.016				
2	(Constant)	-7.04E+05	1.66E+05	0.000	0.925	0.907	51.529	0.000
	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Constant 2010 USD)	2.61E-04	2.62E-05	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	6.22E+05	1.96E+05	0.005				
	Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-4.38	0.57	0.000				
	Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100)	-2825.20	519.84	0.000				
	Income Share Held by the Highest 20%	5.31E+05	1.81E+05	0.008				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 60

Honduras – 1994–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
	B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	*Adjusted* R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-6125.65	5762.76	0.299	0.723	0.685	19.122	0.000
School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)	15599.12	5482.09	0.009				
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-2.83	0.84	0.003				
Mexican Migration Law	22859.99	10176.56	0.035				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8.

Table 61

Honduras – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	36873.50	22584.34	0.123	0.779	0.735	17.618	0.000
	DACA	32389.20	6362.97	0.000				
	Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	5.33E+05	1.86E+05	0.012				
	Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank	-1.16E+05	51215.44	0.038				
2	(Constant)	87317.46	13805.80	0.000	0.920	0.897	40.150	0.000
	Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	4.95E+05	1.17E+05	0.001				
	Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank	-2.49E+05	34623.12	0.000				
	Aliens Removed With Criminal Status	4.58	0.52	0.000				
	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Open	-15579.24	5467.10	0.013				
3	(Constant)	-95906.84	38403.61	0.032	0.992	0.986	158.512	0.000
	Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank	-1.44E+05	18718.25	0.000				
	Aliens Removed With Criminal Status	6.76	0.39	0.000				
	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Open	-14825.46	2127.23	0.000				

Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.24E+06	1.12E+05	0.000
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	30342.16	13124.84	0.043
Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	4.68E+05	1.00E+05	0.001
Arable Land (% of Land Area)	-1.31E+06	3.47E+05	0.004
Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	1.23E+05	44970.66	0.021

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 9.

Table 62

Honduras – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	7949.298	3703.874	0.060	0.993	0.987	160.159	0.000
Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open)	-219.221	17.756	0.000				
TVPRA Expansion	28082.738	2809.370	0.000				
Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in Unite States (Relief/ Terminated/ Closure)	79542.650	11364.700	0.000				
Immunization, DPT – Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months)	2.50E+05	30796.171	0.000				
Current Health Expenditure Per Capita, PPP (Current International $)	258.201	60.180	0.002				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	3.82E+05	6.85E+04	0.000				
Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	0.463	0.156	0.016				
Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 Live Births	9449.609	3998.071	0.042				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 10.

Table 63

Honduras – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-6200.06	40956.74	0.882	0.901	0.882	45.717	0.000
Immigration Court Cases in Backlog	2.13	0.20	0.000				
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-4.76	0.72	0.000				
Rule of Law: Estimate	-1.74E+05	50869.61	0.004				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 11.

Table 64

Honduras – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	60185.57	4543.23	0.000	0.991	0.985	165.110	0.000
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-5.37	0.29	0.000				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	-8.14E+06	5.45E+05	0.000				
Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population)	4.14E+05	45037.82	0.000				
GDP Deflator (Base Year Varies by Country)	-2733.19	447.89	0.000				
International Tourism, Receipts (in Current US$)	-2.96E-04	4.13E-05	0.000				
Persons Naturalized	3.73	0.90	0.002				
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	2326.13	631.16	0.004				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 12.

Table 65

Mexico – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

		Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Model	Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	1.04E+06	2.36E+05	0.000	0.861	0.849	72.376	0.000
	Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-2.66E+06	2.79E+05	0.000				
	Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	2.67E+06	7.95E+05	0.002				
	Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	-62047.17	19092.74	0.003				
2	(Constant)	2.41E+06	3.31E+05	0.000	0.914	0.901	70.142	0.000
	Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-2.02E+06	1.30E+05	0.000				
	U.S. Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	-68872.57	15354.52	0.000				
	U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	-29671.09	12467.52	0.023				
	Persons Naturalized	1.28	0.45	0.007				
	Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	-3.56E+06	1.52E+06	0.025				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 66

Mexico – 1981–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-5167.80	28942.63	0.859	0.118	0.094	4.823	0.035
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	-2.01E+06	9.17E+05	0.035				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 67

Mexico – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

		Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Model	Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-2.25E+06	6.75E+05	0.002	0.937	0.925	79.307	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-22083.32	1369.41	0.000				
	Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)	9.96E+05	6.22E+05	0.119				
	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Close	2.05E+05	51002.04	0.000				
	Primary Completion Rate (% of Cohort)	2.45E+06	8.53E+05	0.007				
	Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	-3.10E+05	1.07E+05	0.007				
	Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	1.75E+06	7.59E+05	0.027				
2	(Constant)	-1.38E+06	5.87E+05	0.025	0.956	0.946	96.510	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-20303.46	1610.76	0.000				
	Worldwide Coffee Price Year Close	2.79E+05	47102.20	0.000				
	Primary Completion Rate (% of Cohort)	2.21E+06	6.94E+05	0.003				
	Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	-5.27E+05	7.48E+04	0.000				
	Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	2.66E+06	5.57E+05	0.000				
	Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	-2.21E+06	6.05E+05	0.001				
	TVPRA	-1.85E+05	87929.31	0.043				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3.

Table 68

Mexico – 1982–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	52354.30	30240.15	0.093	0.514	0.456	8.742	0.000
Immunization, Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months)	4.58E+05	2.22E+05	0.047				
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-24822.45	7489.90	0.002				
Immunization, BCG (Tuberculosis) (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-9.27E+05	2.44E+05	0.001				
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	9.29E+05	3.87E+05	0.022				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4.

Table 69

Mexico – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-7.05E+06	2.16E+06	0.004	0.969	0.963	169.103	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-18603.76	1438.84	0.000				
	Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (modeled ILO Estimate)	-3.97E+06	1.53E+06	0.016				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.33E+07	3.17E+06	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	6.11E+06	2.43E+06	0.019				
2	(Constant)	-3.36E+05	1.97E+06	0.866	0.998	0.997	1142.33	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-10690.22	1105.15	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.55E+07	1.05E+06	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.33E+07	8.29E+05	0.000				

	Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)	-2.59E+06	3.07E+05	0.000				
	Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	3.78E+05	1.61E+05	0.031				
	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.78E+05	21155.19	0.000				
	Human Development Index	-2.15E+07	5.62E+06	0.001				
	Education Index	8.14E+06	3.18E+06	0.020				
3	(Constant)	-3.36E+05	1.97E+06	0.866	0.998	0.997	1142.33	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-1.07E+04	1105.152	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.55E+07	1.05E+06	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.33E+07	8.29E+05	0.000				
	Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)	-2.59E+06	3.07E+05	0.000				
	Inflation (% Change in Average CPI) 1992-2018 (IMF)	3.78E+05	1.61E+05	0.031				
	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.78E+05	21155.193	0.000				
	Human Development Index	-2.15E+07	5.62E+06	0.001				
	Education Index	8.14E+06	3.18E+06	0.020				

4	(Constant)	1.05E+07	9.23E+05	0.000	0.999	0.999	2314.800	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-14558.35	699.31	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.55E+07	5.94E+05	0.000				
	Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)	-1.81E+06	1.62E+05	0.000				
	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.75E+05	15107.53	0.000				
	Human Development Index	-3.41E+07	2.36E+06	0.000				
	Education Index	1.16E+07	1.25E+06	0.000				
	Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.27E+07	4.67E+05	0.000				
	Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	-6.51E+05	1.65E+05	0.001				
5	(Constant)	8.93E+06	9.99E+05	0.000	0.999	0.999	2761.85	0.000
	Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-13943.24	646.01	0.000				
	Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.59E+06	5.95E+05	0.016				

Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.59E+07	5.41E+05	0.000
Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)	-2.04E+06	1.65E+05	0.000
Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.71E+05	13104.83	0.000
Human Development Index	-3.20E+07	2.18E+06	0.000
Education Index	1.11E+07	1.10E+06	0.000
Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.29E+07	4.12E+05	0.000
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	-6.95E+05	1.43E+05	0.000

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 70

Mexico – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-1.37E+05	17041.23	0.000	0.999	0.998	9.1E+02	0.000
	Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	-3.00E+06	71166.87	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.68E+07	3.18E+05	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.29E+07	3.60E+05	0.000				
	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.51E+05	4244.29	0.000				
	Trade in Services (% of GDP)	9.53E+06	3.59E+05	0.000				
	Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-16131.69	3201.54	0.001				
	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-1.38E+07	8.68E+05	0.000				
	Mexican Migration Law	81447.17	5768.82	0.000				
	Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (%)	2.09E+06	1.77E+05	0.000				
	Income Share Held by Second 20%	1.23E+07	1.25E+06	0.000				

	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	-5.14E+05	81049.57	0.000				
	Internet Access, Total (% of Population)	-4.35E+05	76136.84	0.000				
	U.S. Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	11352.88	1898.84	0.000				
	Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD)	0.00	0.00	0.001				
	U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	6945.69	2951.58	0.040				
2	(Constant)	-1.61E+05	786.39	0.000	1.000	1.000	3.79E+05	0.000
	Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	-2.83E+06	4231.10	0.000				
	Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.55E+07	29035.61	0.000				
	Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.35E+07	22258.78	0.000				
	Physicians (per 1,000 People)	1.59E+05	222.74	0.000				
	Trade in Services (% of GDP)	9.47E+06	18049.45	0.000				
	Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-7564.42	190.56	0.000				

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-1.29E+07	52972.85	0.000
Mexican Migration Law	91119.60	273.84	0.000
Income Share Held by Second 20%	1.57E+07	1.41E+05	0.000
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	-4.46E+05	3681.29	0.000
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	-4.33E+05	3974.65	0.000
U.S. Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)	14978.98	93.42	0.000
Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD)	0.00	0.00	0.000
U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	15223.37	176.73	0.000
Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population)	2.39E+06	45177.09	0.000
Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19)	19886.32	370.44	0.000
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	-4.57E+05	11108.60	0.000

Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (%)	-1.47E+06	53403.00	0.000
Income Share Held by the Lowest 10%	1.83E+06	1.38E+05	0.000
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	-87214.44	9087.90	0.001
Income Share Held by the Highest 10%	-92225.93	23431.81	0.017

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 71

Mexico – 1992–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-3.15E+06	8.37E+05	0.001	0.993	0.990	381.801	0.000
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-30361.06	1546.88	0.000				
Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	1.26E+07	1.78E+06	0.000				
Trade (% of GDP)	1.12E+06	2.49E+05	0.000				
Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-1.04E+07	1.52E+06	0.000				
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	176.02	29.06	0.000				
Industry (Including Construction), Value Added (% of GDP)	-3.96E+06	8.94E+05	0.000				
GDP per Person Employed (Constant 2011 PPP $)	45.75	15.27	0.007				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 72

Mexico – 1992–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	8778.22	30924.63	0.779	0.700	0.642	12.225	0.000
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	114.26	37.84	0.007				
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	1.72E+06	4.68E+05	0.001				
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-18816.63	6179.42	0.006				
Trade (% of GDP)	9.83E+05	4.33E+05	0.034				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8.

Table 73

Mexico – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-1.95E+07	5.74E+05	0.000	1.000	0.999	2484.200	0.000
Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population)	1.35E+07	3.35E+05	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	6.65E+06	6.39E+05	0.000				
Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	2.06E+07	1.14E+06	0.000				
Physicians (per 1,000 People)	2.08E+05	18112.47	0.000				
Total Investment as a % of GDP	-7.58E+06	8.28E+05	0.000				
Trade (% of GDP)	1.26E+06	1.39E+05	0.000				
Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)	-5.86E+06	1.25E+06	0.001				
Industry (Including Construction), Value Added (% of GDP)	-1.07E+06	4.05E+05	0.026				
Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/ Terminated/ Closure)	39652.43	16356.17	0.038				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 9.

Table 74

Mexico – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-1.10E+05	16937.87	0.000	0.902	0.872	30.043	0.000
Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	2.57E+07	3.15E+06	0.000				
International Tourism, Number of Arrivals	0.04	0.01	0.000				
Physicians (per 1,000 People)	86652.21	26239.71	0.006				
Mean Years of Schooling	-2.02E+05	79535.50	0.025				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 10.

Table 75

Mexico – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	3.55E+05	150595.86	0.034	0.987	0.983	267.976	0.000
Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-89356.30	4670.25	0.000				
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	2.80E+06	4.94E+05	0.000				
Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	3.46E+06	8.41E+05	0.001				
People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status	-1.21	0.49	0.028				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 11.

Table 76

Mexico – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-12665.57	1.01	0.000	1.000	1.000	3.0E+11	0.000
People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status	-1.54	0.00	0.000				
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	1.99E+06	7.68	0.000				
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-15268.20	0.04	0.000				
Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	5.08E+06	28.68	0.000				
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	-0.14	0.00	0.000				
Worldwide Coffee Price Annual % Change	-95499.97	0.54	0.000				
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	-1.19E+06	9.23	0.000				
Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)	1.55E+06	18.71	0.000				
Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (%)	-1.37E+06	37.72	0.000				
Employment in Agriculture (% of Total employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	2.26E+06	54.25	0.000				
GNI Growth (Annual %)	-58602.06	60.77	0.001				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	1.48E+06	176.97	0.000				
Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	2.13E+05	70.53	0.000				
Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/ Closed)	0.04	0.00	0.001				

Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of Working-Age Population)	36090.51	106.19	0.002
Industry (Including Construction), Value Added (% of GDP)	-1299.36	24.30	0.012

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 12.

Table 77

Nicaragua – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Models

Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
	B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-380.93	317.93	0.244	0.520	0.454	7.932	0.001
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	-2.04E+07	4.90E+06	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	62762.75	22393.00	0.010				
Mean Years of Schooling	6615.95	3186.86	0.050				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 78

Nicaragua – 1993–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
	B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-380.93	317.93	0.244	0.520	0.454	7.932	0.001
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	-2.04E+07	4.90E+06	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	62762.75	22393.00	0.010				
Mean Years of Schooling	6615.95	3186.86	0.050				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 79

Nicaragua – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	1932.943	555.492	0.002	0.684	0.627	11.926	0.000
	TVPRA Expansion	3539.07	967.70	0.001				
	Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	-75922.01	17274.59	0.000				
	Manufacturing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	27053.46	10644.60	0.019				
	U.S. GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)	57589.11	22718.19	0.019				
2	(Constant)	8594.73	1504.58	0.000	0.719	0.668	14.061	0.000
	Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)	-93527.10	15665.26	0.000				
	Manufacturing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	25484.16	10086.06	0.019				
	U.S. GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)	69539.55	21367.71	0.004				
	Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-89906.24	21364.61	0.000				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3.

Table 80

Nicaragua – 1994–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	592.11	149.61	0.001	0.896	0.882	63.451	0.000
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	-1.22E+08	1.23E+07	0.000				
GDP Per Capita as a % of U.S. GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)	2.37E+06	440413.26	0.000				
Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-19742.37	5787.68	0.003				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4.

Table 81

Nicaragua – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	14855.16	3707.60	0.005	0.999	0.999	1143.99	0.000
Remittances as a Share of GDP	1.07E+05	2302.37	0.000				
Child Mortality Rate Under 5 Years (per 1,000 Live Births)	268.38	19.67	0.000				
Domestic Private Health Expenditure (% of Current Health Expenditure)	-5951.93	664.80	0.000				
Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open	-8.46	0.50	0.000				
People Using Basic Sanitation Services % of the Population	61839.66	2818.48	0.000				
Access to Electricity (% of Population)	-52149.61	2198.21	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	34317.27	2199.00	0.000				
Mean Years of Schooling	-4577.50	379.96	0.000				
Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/ Closed)	0.41	0.07	0.000				
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	0.31	0.06	0.001				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-6733.63	2542.06	0.033				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 82

Nicaragua – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	13386.88	137.29	0.000	1.000	1.000	9762.167	0.000
Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open	-13.40	0.09	0.000				
Population Growth (Annual %)	-8779.79	96.78	0.000				
Access to Electricity (% of Population)	-26259.04	568.99	0.000				
GDP Deflator (Base Year Varies by Country)	-120.89	1.87	0.000				
Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	-0.68	0.02	0.000				
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags)	0.86	0.01	0.000				
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP	9843.32	596.05	0.000				
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)	-7504.59	281.31	0.000				
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank	-29.42	0.96	0.000				
Internet Users, Total (% of Population)	8407.00	524.97	0.000				
Mean Years of Schooling	-702.50	102.94	0.001				
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)	4111.67	844.02	0.005				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 83

Nicaragua – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-34797.22	9976.73	0.004	0.958	0.943	60.036	0.000
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank	-254.99	36.19	0.000				
Homicide Rate	-348.71	91.00	0.002				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	1.15E+05	19262.75	0.000				
Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-56927.71	14376.27	0.002				
Rule of Law: Estimate	-5735.00	1978.57	0.012				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 84

Nicaragua – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	3090.21	4.07	0.000	1.000	1.000	7.56E+06	0.000
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 USD)	-1.85E+08	94201.56	0.000				
GDP Per Capita as a % of U.S. GDP per Capita (constant 2010 USD)	4.34E+06	3157.54	0.000				
Immunization, HepB3 (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-23530.88	29.44	0.000				
People Using Basic Sanitation Services % of the Population	-1.63E+05	7475.97	0.002				
Homicide Rate	867.58	0.74	0.000				
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP)	10678.05	22.59	0.000				
Employment in Services (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	-32212.77	55.36	0.000				
Immunization, Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months)	-6401.62	14.88	0.000				
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued	0.23	4.26E-04	0.000				
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)	-2077.51	12.48	0.000				
Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	-0.10	0.00	0.000				
Life Expectancy	-404.57	17.78	0.002				
TVPRA Expansion	88.75	1.56	0.000				
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	-575.60	18.06	0.001				
People Practicing Open Defecation (% of Population)	1.14E+05	13247.87	0.013				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8.

Table 85

Latin America – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-1.36E+06	9.56E+05	0.164	0.898	0.882	57.877	0.000
TVPRA	-6.08E+05	7.17E+04	0.000				
USA Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	-3.31E+04	1.07E+04	0.004				
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	3.33E+04	7.72E+03	0.000				
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP	-7.37E+06	1.49E+06	0.000				
GNI Growth (Annual %)	3.71E+06	9.97E+05	0.001				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 1.

Table 86

Latin America – 1981–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-1.4E+05	44855.67	0.005	0.639	0.583	11.350	0.000
School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross)	22057.62	7227.37	0.005				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	8.06E+07	1.81E+07	0.000				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	-4.10E+06	9.34E+05	0.000				
U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)	4.40E+06	1.20E+06	0.001				
Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children)	-1.49E+06	5.98E+05	0.018				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 2.

Table 87

Latin America – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	2.20E+06	3.68E+05	0.000	0.763	0.742	37.466	0.000
TVPRA	-6.54E+05	7.74E+04	0.000				
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP	-6.55E+06	1.85E+06	0.001				
U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)	4.99E+06	1.87E+06	0.012				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 3.

Table 88

Latin America – 1982–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	15243.06	28980.59	0.602	0.278	0.258	13.871	0.001
School Enrollment Ratio, Secondary (% Gross)	-20686.84	5554.45	0.001				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 4.

Table 89

Latin America – 1992–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Models

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-1.28E+06	9.84E+05	0.206	0.964	0.958	148.373	0.000
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-11846.16	655.11	0.000				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-2.75E+07	3.41E+06	0.000				
Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)	1.94E+07	4.86E+06	0.001				
U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)	3.68E+06	1.35E+06	0.012				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 5.

Table 90

Latin America – 1993–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-54283.62	27101.91	0.057	0.441	0.392	9.059	0.001
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP)	-2.39E+07	6.31E+06	0.001				
Labor force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate)	-7.47E+06	3.13E+06	0.025				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 6.

Table 91

Latin America – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-2.12E+07	4.72E+06	0.000	0.957	0.947	93.020	0.000
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-13068.47	1726.29	0.000				
U.S. GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)	4.05E+06	1.82E+06	0.037				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	7.03E+07	1.49E+07	0.000				
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Constant 2010 USD)	-1.11E-05	0.00	0.007				
People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status	-0.92	0.42	0.038				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 7.

Table 92

Latin America – 1994–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-11565.88	49196.04	0.816	0.315	0.256	5.299	0.013
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-19759.22	6887.39	0.009				
Arable Land (% of Land Area)	8.65E+07	3.80E+07	0.032				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 8.

Table 93

Latin America – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-3.80E+07	8.34E+06	0.000	0.927	0.918	101.167	0.000
Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population)	2.44E+07	3.79E+06	0.000				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	6.89E+07	1.71E+07	0.001				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 9.

Table 94

Latin America – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

Model	Significant Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
		B	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
1	(Constant)	-1.213E+05	4.708E+04	0.023	0.814	0.756	14.204	0.000
	International Tourism, Number of Arrivals	4.001E-02	6.275E-03	0.000				
	Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status)	3.387E+00	7.337E-01	0.000				
	U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI)	-7.487E+04	2.141E+04	0.004				
	Arable Land (% of land Area)	5.135E+07	2.162E+07	0.034				
2	(Constant)	-2.003E+05	2.684E+04	0.000	0.934	0.906	33.936	0.000
	International Tourism, Number of Arrivals	2.821E-02	3.940E-03	0.000				
	Arable Land (% of land Area)	1.376E+08	1.582E+07	0.000				
	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % Growth)	-3.293E+06	4.498E+05	0.000				
	TVPRA Expansion	1.252E+05	3.566E+04	0.004				
	Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary (% of Cohort)	1.143E+05	4.678E+04	0.031				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 10.

Table 95

Latin America – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	-2.90E+07	4.97E+06	0.000	0.969	0.957	81.969	0.000
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)	-24281.89	2343.26	0.000				
Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)	7.35E+07	1.06E+07	0.000				
Aliens Removed with Criminal Status	2.49	0.84	0.011				
Immunization, Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months)	4.80E+06	1.55E+06	0.008				
People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status	-0.94	0.35	0.019				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 11.

Table 96

Latin America – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model

	Unstandardized Coefficients			Model Summary			
Significant Variables	*B*	*SE*	*p*	R^2	Adjusted R^2	*F*	*p*
(Constant)	2.79E+05	65812.00	0.001	0.718	0.657	11.875	0.000
School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)	-2.42E+05	41246.43	0.000				
Persons Naturalized	1.07	0.29	0.002				
Literacy Rate, Adult Total (% of people Ages 15 and Above)	3.27E+05	1.16E+05	0.013				

Note. This table corresponds to Stepwise Regression 12.

APPENDIX C

Immigration Related Figures

Figure 10

Nationwide and Total Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. Figure shows how Southwest Border USBP apprehensions account for between 90%–99% of all USBP apprehensions. Since 1986 Southwest Border USBP apprehensions account for over 97% of all nationwide USBP apprehensions. This is one of the key reasons why this study focused solely on apprehensions along the Southwest Border and why the Southwest Border is the focus of most studies and most government actions.

Figure 11

Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Nationwide USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. Figure shows how nationwide apprehensions look no different than Southwest Border apprehensions. This figure looks almost identical to Figure 3 which has Mexican and OTM USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border. This is a key reason why the Southwest Border is the focus of this study.

Figure 12

OTM and Northern Triangle – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure shows how OTMs have always been largely made up of Northern Triangle apprehensions. This is why the Northern Triangle is generally the focus of most studies looking at OTMs.

Figure 13

Latin American – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)



Note. This figure, coupled with Figures 10 and 11, shows how Latin American apprehensions along the Southwest Border have largely been made up from Mexican and Northern Triangle apprehensions. This is one of the reasons why historically Mexico, and more recently the Northern Triangle, are the focus of most research and government interest.

Figure 14

Nicaragua – Southwest Border USBP Nicaragua (1980–2019)



Note. Due to small apprehension numbers in comparison to Mexico and the Northern Triangle, Nicaragua is generally not a topic of great interest. However, as can be seen in this figure, the large spike in recent years closely matches the Northern Triangle even though the raw numbers are much smaller.

Figure 15

El Salvador – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America also increased.

Figure 16

Guatemala – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America also increased.

Figure 17

Honduras – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America also increased.

Figure 18

Mexico – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. ERs began to replace VRs for Mexican migrants in the mid-2000s suggesting the increase in removals was largely due to a change to ERs as part of the removal process.

Figure 19

Nicaragua – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America also increased.

Figure 20

Latin America – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019)



Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that in the mid-2000s, CBP began to implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America (including Brazil) also increased.

Figure 21

Northern Triangle – Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible at Ports of Entry (2005–2019)



Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land borders and airports) by CBP's Office of Field Operations. Like USBP apprehensions, the lion's share of arrests occurs on the Southwest Border for migrants from the Northern Triangle. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that although most Northern Triangle apprehensions are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components that must deal with the influx of Northern Triangle immigrants at the borders that add to the compounding immigration problem.

Figure 22

Mexico – Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible at All Field Offices (2005–2019)



Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land borders and airports) by CBP's Office of Field Operations. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that while most Mexican apprehensions are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components that must deal with the influx of Mexican immigrants at the borders that add to the compounding immigration problem.

Figure 23

Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible by Southwest Border Field Office (2005–2019)



Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land borders and airports) by CBP's Office of Field Operations. These POEs are in field offices that are located along the Southwest Border. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that while most apprehensions along the Southwest Border are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components that must deal with the influx of immigrants at the borders that add to the compounding immigration problem.

Figure 24

Total Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible Along All Southwest Border Field Offices (2005–2019)



Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land borders and airports) by CBP's Office of Field Operations. These POEs are in field offices that are located along the Southwest Border. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that while most apprehensions along the Southwest Border are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components that must deal with the influx of immigrants at the borders that add to the compounding immigration problem.

Figure 25

Credible Fear Cases and Percentage of Cases With Credible Fear Found (2007–2019)



Note. This figure highlights the increase in credible fear claims and the high approval rates for credible fear claims by asylum officers. It must be noted that a credible fear claim being approved by an asylum officer is only the first step and does not grant a migrant asylum. After credible fear is found by an asylum officer for migrants apprehended at the border, they are referred to an immigration judge for an immigration hearing where they can petition for asylum. Many immigration officials argue the increase in credible fear claims and the low bar for credible fear approval burdens the court system creating a huge backlog of cases. As of 2020, 18.1% of Salvadorans, 14.2% of Guatemalans, 12.7% of Hondurans, and 15% of Mexicans are granted asylum by immigration judges (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2020). In other words, despite the over 70% credible fear approval rate by asylum officers, only a fraction of those credible fear claims win their asylum cases. Many argue credible fear is used as a loophole that forces immigration agencies to release migrants into the country due to limited bedspace.

Figure 26

Southwest Border USBP Family Unit Apprehensions (2012–2019)



Note. CBP began officially recording family unit data in 2012. This is one of the reasons why strictly focusing on family units or UACs (began to be recorded in 2007) does not allow you to produce a long enough time series to adequately study the issue. Regardless, since CBP began to track this data, it is clear how the number of family unit apprehensions skyrocketed. Many immigration officials blame changes in policy, especially the expansion of TVPRA in 2015 which resulted in the release of family units similar to UACs. In other words, you could not detain family units resulting in their release. Other experts cite they are fleeing poverty and violence from their home countries. Something else of interest that is often highlighted by immigration officials is fraud. According to immigration officials, smugglers and migrants use children as a method gain entry and release into the country by claiming a child is their son or daughter. In April of 2019, ICE officials stated 101 family units suspected of fraud were referred for special investigation resulting in 28.7% (29 family units) of them being fraudulent (Long, 2019). In May of 2019, DHS conducted two internal investigation by collecting DNA samples of family units to get a better understanding of the issue. In Operation Double Helix 1.0, 19.0% of the samples (16 out of 84 family units) were found to be fraudulent based on DNA results. Similarly, Operation Double Helix 2.0 found 15.1% (79 out of 522 family units), were fraudulent based on DNA results. However, it is important to note these were not random samples. These were family units that were suspected of fraud and suspects had to volunteer to the DNA tests.

Figure 27

Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions (2007–2019)



Note. CBP began officially recording UAC data in 2007. This is one of the reasons why strictly focusing on UACs or family units (began to be recorded in 2012) does not allow you to produce a long enough time series to adequately study the issue. Regardless, since CBP began to track this data, it is clear how the number of UAC apprehensions from the Northern Triangle skyrocketed. Many immigration officials blame changes in policy, especially TVPRA in 2008 for the surge because it dramatically changed processing and detention guidelines for UACs from noncontiguous countries (all countries except Mexico and Canada).

Figure 28

Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions (2007–2019)



Note. Although it is hard to see there is a grey line touching the black line. The grey line is the total number of UACs apprehended who are from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. Simply put, these four countries make up over 96% of all UAC apprehensions along the Southwest Border.

Figure 29

Number of Immigration Detention Beds (1980–2019)



Note. Although bed space increased from 1980 to 2010, DHS has not added many beds since then. Also, it is important to consider these beds are for all immigrants, including family units and UACs. But due to regulation requiring special facilities for children and families, there are only approximately 3,300 beds for family units and UACs as of 2019. To provide some perspective as to the magnitude of the problem, USBP apprehended 473,682 family units along the Southwest Border in 2019 alone. That number does not include 76,020 UAC apprehensions made that same year or the other 126,001 family units and UAC apprehensions made by CBP (Office of Field Operations) at the ports of entry along the Southwest Border. In other words, in 2019 there were a total of 675,703 CBP related family unit and UAC apprehensions and there was only bedspace to detain about 3,300 of them. This is one of the main reasons why UACs and family units are generally released on their own recognizance.

Figure 30

Nonimmigrant Visas Issued (1991–2018)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure show how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Nonimmigrants visa refers to visas issued foreign nationals lawfully admitted to the United States for a specific purpose and period of time, including tourists, diplomats, students, temporary workers, and exchange visitors, among others (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

Figure 31

Nonimmigrant Visas Issued (1991–2018)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure show how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua.

*Nonimmigrants visa refers to visas issued foreign nationals lawfully admitted to the United States for a specific purpose and period of time, including tourists, diplomats, students, temporary workers, and exchange visitors, among others (U.S. Department of State, n.d.)

Figure 32

People Obtaining Legal Permeant Resident Status (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. *Lawful (legal) permanent residents (LPRs), also known as "green card" holders, are noncitizens who are lawfully authorized to live permanently in the United States. LPRs may accept an offer of employment without special restrictions, own property, receive financial assistance at public colleges and universities, and join the Armed Forces. They also may apply to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain eligibility requirements. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides several broad classes of admission for foreign nationals to gain LPR status, the largest of which focuses on admitting immigrants for the purpose of family reunification. Other major categories include economic and humanitarian immigrants, as well as immigrants from countries with relatively low levels of immigration to the United States (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).

Figure 33

People Obtaining Legal Permeant Resident Status (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua.

Figure 34

Persons Naturalized (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Naturalization confers U.S. citizenship upon foreign nationals who have fulfilled the requirements Congress established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). After naturalization, foreign-born citizens enjoy nearly all of the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that the Constitution protects for native-born U.S. citizens, including the right to vote (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).

Figure 35

Persons Naturalized (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua.

*Naturalization confers U.S. citizenship upon foreign nationals who have fulfilled the requirements Congress established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). After naturalization, foreign-born citizens enjoy nearly all of the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that the Constitution protects for native-born U.S. citizens, including the right to vote (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).

Figure 36

Immigration Court Cases in Backlog (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because the overall number of immigration court cases contribute to overall backlog, the number of court cases from all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Pending Case Counts. Pending cases count all Immigration Court proceedings that remain open at a given point in time. The current pending case count represents the latest point in time available that is covered by the data. Earlier pending case counts are computed for the last day of the last month in each fiscal year (September 30). Findings are based upon a detailed analysis of the millions of records covering each deportation proceeding initiated by the Department of Homeland Security and its predecessor agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in the Immigration Courts. These individual case records were obtained through requests made by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) under the Freedom of Information Act to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a unit in the Department of Justice in which these administrative courts are housed.

Figure 37

Immigration Court Cases in Backlog (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

*Pending Case Counts. Pending cases count all Immigration Court proceedings that remain open at a given point in time. The current pending case count represents the latest point in time available that is covered by the data. Earlier pending case counts are computed for the last day of the last month in each fiscal year (September 30; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 38

Average Number of Days an Immigration Case Is Open (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because the overall number of days an immigration case is open contributes to overall backlog, the average number of days an immigration case is open for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Average Days Pending. Average days measures the average length of time pending cases have been waiting. For example, for any case open at the end of a fiscal year, that date (September 30) is compared with the date the specific proceeding was opened and the number of days between these two dates is calculated. This is the number of days that case has been open. These individual time periods are then summed over all pending cases. This sum is finally divided by the number of pending cases to compute average days. For average days for a point in time other than at the end of the fiscal year, that date is substituted for September 30 and then the same procedure is followed (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 39

Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog contributes to overall backlog, cases resulting in removal or voluntary return for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues a removal order. The term "removal" is used in a generic sense and includes orders of deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from returning to the U.S. for a period of years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary departure. A so-called "voluntary departure" is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not legally barred from returning (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 40

Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua

*Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues a removal order. The term "removal" is used in a generic sense and includes orders of deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from returning to the U.S. for a period of years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary departure. A so-called "voluntary departure" is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not legally barred from returning (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 41

Percentage of Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog contributes to overall backlog, percentage cases resulting in removal or voluntary return for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Share of total cases that resulted in Removal or Voluntary Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues a removal order. The term "removal" is used in a generic sense and includes orders of deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from returning to the U.S. for a period of years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary departure. A so-called "voluntary departure" is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not legally barred from returning (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 42

Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog contributes to overall backlog, number cases resulting in stay in the United States for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Terminated (no grounds for removal). Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges against the individual are not sustained and "terminates" the case. Situations where the migrant has established eligibility for naturalization can be grounds for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the original charges are sustained but finds provisions in the immigration law entitle the individual to "relief" from removal, allowing them to remain in this country. Administrative/Other Closure: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge decides not to deport the individual for other unspecified reasons or closes the case administratively or because of the failure of the government to prosecute the case. This category also includes closures in which the individual is given temporary protected status (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 43

Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

*Terminated (no grounds for removal). Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges against the individual are not sustained and "terminates" the case. Situations where the migrant has established eligibility for naturalization can be grounds for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the original charges are sustained but finds provisions in the immigration law entitle the individual to "relief" from removal, allowing them to remain in this country. Administrative/Other Closure: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge decides not to deport the individual for other unspecified reasons or closes the case administratively or because of the failure of the government to prosecute the case. This category also includes closures in which the individual is given temporary protected status (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.).

Figure 44

Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) (1998–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog contributes to overall backlog, percentage cases resulting in stay in the United States for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.

*Share of total cases that resulted in relief, termination, or closure. Terminated (no grounds for removal). Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges against the individual are not sustained and "terminates" the case. Situations where the migrant has established eligibility for naturalization can be grounds for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the original charges are sustained but finds provisions in the immigration law entitle the individual to "relief" from removal, allowing them to remain in this country. Administrative/Other Closure: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge decides not to deport the individual for other unspecified reasons or closes the case administratively or because of the failure of the government to prosecute the case. This category also includes closures in which the individual is given temporary protected status.

Figure 45

Number of Immigration Judges (1998–2019)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. The number if immigration judges is important in the conversation because of the existing backlog of immigration cases (see Figure 36 and 37). Despite the increase in immigration judges in recent years, as of 2019 there were 442 immigration judges handling a backlog of 1,023,767 immigration cases. One must also consider that, since 2018, there has been a net increase of over 200,000 new cases added to the backlog every year through 2021.

APPENDIX D

Socioeconomic Indicator Figures

Figure 46

El Salvador – Homicide Rate Using Estimates Over Civil War (1980–2019)



Note. Data from 1980-1992 were calculated using total killed or forcefully disappeared count averaged over the length of the El Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1992) and 1992 population numbers. The homicide rate is on the conservative side because the population numbers used to measure the rate were from 1992 and not the 1980s when the population was smaller. Data for killed or disappeared comes from the Report on the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador (1993).

*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 47

Guatemala – Homicide Rate Using Estimates Over Civil War (1980 – 2019)



Note. Data from 1980-1991 were calculated using the total killed or forcefully disappeared count averaged over the length of the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996) and 1996 population numbers. The homicide rate is on the conservative side because the population numbers used to measure the rate were from 1996 and not the 1980s when the population was smaller. Data for killed or disappeared comes from Guatemala's Commission for Historical Clarification (1994).

*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded (World Bank, (n.d.-a).

Figure 48

Homicide Rate for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico (1981–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 49

Real GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross domestic product is the most commonly used single measure of a country's overall economic activity. It represents the total value at constant prices of final goods and services produced in a country during a specified time period, such as one year (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 50

Real GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*****Gross domestic product is the most commonly used single measure of a country's overall economic activity. It represents the total value at constant prices of final goods and services produced in a country during a specified time period, such as 1 year (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 51

GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region

*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 52

GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 53

GDP Per Capita Growth (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 54

GDP Per Capita Growth (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 55

GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 56

GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 57

GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 58

GDP PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 59

GDP PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua.

*PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 60

GDP PPP Per Person Employed (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1991–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP per person employed is gross domestic product (GDP) divided by total employment in the economy. Purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP is GDP converted to 2011 constant international dollars using PPP rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that a U.S. dollar has in the United States (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 61

GDP Per Capita as a Percentage of USA Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. The corresponding countries' GDP Per capita is divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 62

GDP Per Capita as a Percentage of U.S. GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. The corresponding countries' GDP Per capita is divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 63

GDP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region

*GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. The corresponding countries' GDP is divided into the U.S. GDP to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 64

GDP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. The corresponding countries' GDP is divided into the U.S. GDP to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 65

GDP Per Capita PPP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars. The corresponding countries' GDP Per Capita PPP s divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 66

GDP Per Capita PPP as a Percentage of USA GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars. The corresponding countries' GDP Per Capita PPP s divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP to get the percentage (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 67

GDP Deflator (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. The base year varies by country (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 68

Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Latin America and Mexico. Due to large differences in inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures.

*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country's average level of prices based on the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the percentage change in the average CPI (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 69

Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. Due to large differences in inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures.

*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country's average level of prices based on the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the percentage change in the average CPI (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 70

Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Nicaragua. Due to large differences in inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures.

*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country's average level of prices based on the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the percentage change in the average CPI (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 71

Personal Remittances Received (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. Data are in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 72

Personal Remittances Received (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. Data are in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 73

Remittances as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 74

Total Investment as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 75

Total Investment as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 76

Gross National Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross national saving is gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking account of an adjustment for pension funds. [SNA 1993] For many countries, estimates of national saving are built up from national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance of payments-based data on net foreign investment. (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 77

Gross National Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Gross national saving is gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking account of an adjustment for pension funds. [SNA 1993] For many countries, estimates of national saving are built up from national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance of payments-based data on net foreign investment. (International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Figure 78

Gross Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 79

Gross Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 80

Gross Domestic Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption) (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 81

Gross Domestic Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*****Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption) (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 82

Gross Capital Formation as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 83

Gross Capital Formation as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 84

Trade as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 85

Trade as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 86

Trade in Services as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Trade in services is the sum of service exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 87

Trade in Services as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provide a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Trade in services is the sum of service exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 88

GNI (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 89

GNI (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d-a).

Figure 90

GNI Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 91

GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure looks at how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual percentage growth rate of GNI per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 92

GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual percentage growth rate of GNI per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 93

GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 94

GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 95

GNI Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 96

GNI Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 97

GNI PPP (Constant 2011 Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 98

GNI PPP (Constant 2011 Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 99

Gross Savings as a Percentage of GNI (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 100

Gross Savings as a Percentage of GNI (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 101

Human Development Index (1990–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of achievements in three key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).

Figure 102

Child Mortality Rate for Children Under 5 Years of Age (Per 1,000 Live Births) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Under-5 mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age 5, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 103

Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 104

Fertility Rate Total Births Per Woman (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 105

Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15–19) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Adolescent fertility rate is the number of births per 1,000 women ages 15-19 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 106

Population Growth (Annual Percentage) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 107

Life Expectancy (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 108

Crude Death Rate (Per 1,000 People) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Crude death rate indicates the number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1,000 population estimated at midyear. Subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate provides the rate of natural increase, which is equal to the rate of population change in the absence of migration (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 109

Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) (1987–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Prevalence of stunting is the percentage of children under age 5 whose height for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. For children up to 2 years old height is measured by recumbent length. For older children height is measured by stature while standing. The data are based on the WHO's new child growth standards released in 2006 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 110

Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) (1987–2015)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Prevalence of stunting is the percentage of children under age 5 whose height for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. For children up to 2 years old height is measured by recumbent length. For older children height is measured by stature while standing. The data are based on the WHO's new child growth standards released in 2006 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 111

Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) (1987–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Prevalence of underweight children is the percentage of children under age 5 whose weight for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. The data are based on the WHO's child growth standards released in 2006 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 112

Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) (1987–2015)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Prevalence of underweight children is the percentage of children under age 5 whose weight for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. The data are based on the WHO's child growth standards released in 2006 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 113

Prevalence of Overweight Population (Percentage of Adults) (1980–2016)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Prevalence of overweight adults is the percentage of adults ages 18 and over whose Body Mass Index (BMI) is more than 25 kg/m2. Body Mass Index (BMI) is a simple index of weight-for-height, or the weight in kilograms divided by the square of the height in meters (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 114

Global Hunger Index (1990–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Global Hunger Index (GHI) scores are based on the values of four component indicators: undernourishment (share of the population with insufficient caloric intake), child wasting (share of children under age 5 who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition), child stunting (share of children under age 5 who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition), and child mortality (mortality rate of children under age 5, partly reflecting the fatal mix of inadequate nutrition and unhealthy environments). Based on the values of the four indicators, the GHI determines hunger on a 100-point scale where 0 is the best possible score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst (Global Hunger Index, 2020).

Figure 115

Global Hunger Index (1990–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Global Hunger Index (GHI) scores are based on the values of four component indicators: undernourishment (share of the population with insufficient caloric intake), child wasting (share of children under age 5 who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition), child stunting (share of children under age 5 who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition), and child mortality (mortality rate of children under age 5, partly reflecting the fatal mix of inadequate nutrition and unhealthy environments). Based on the values of the four indicators, the GHI determines hunger on a 100-point scale where 0 is the best possible score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst (Global Hunger Index, 2020).

Figure 116

Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (Percentage of Women Ages 15–49) (1981–2015)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of women who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, any form of contraception. It is usually measured for women ages 15-49 who are married or in union (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 117

Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (Percentage of Women Ages 15–49) (1981–2015)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of women who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, any form of contraception. It is usually measured for women ages 15-49 who are married or in union (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 118

Immunization BGC (Tuberculosis) Percentage of 1-Year-Old Children (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization rate, BCG is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey for BCG. A child is considered adequately immunized after one dose (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 119

Immunization Measles (Percentage of Children 12 to 23 Months of Age) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization, measles, measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received the measles vaccination before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized against measles after receiving one dose of vaccine (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 120

Immunization HepB3 (Percentage of 1-Year-Old Children) (1999–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization rate, hepatitis B is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received hepatitis B vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized after three doses (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 121

Immunization DPT (Percentage of Children 12–23 Months of Age) (1999–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization, DPT, measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received DPT vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus (DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 122

Immunization Hib3 (Percentage of Children 12–23 Months of Age) (1999–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization, Hib3, measures the percentage of children ages 12–23 months who received Hib3 vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized against Hib3 after receiving three doses of Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccine (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 123

Immunization Polio (Percentage of Children 12 to 23 Months of Age) (1999 –2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Child immunization rate, polio, is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received polio vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately immunized after three doses (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 124

Hospital Beds (Per 1,000 People) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and specialized hospitals and rehabilitation centers. In most cases beds for both acute and chronic care are included (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 125

Physicians Per 1,000 People (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Physicians include generalist and specialist medical practitioners (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 126

Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (Percentage of Current Health Expenditure) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Share of current health expenditures funded from domestic public sources for health. Domestic public sources include domestic revenue as internal transfers and grants, transfers, subsidies to voluntary health insurance beneficiaries, nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISH) or enterprise financing schemes as well as compulsory prepayment and social health insurance contributions. They do not include external resources spent by governments on health (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 127

Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (Percentage of GDP) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of the economy as measured by GDP (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 128

Current Health Expenditure (Percentage of GDP) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Level of current health expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP. Estimates of current health expenditures include healthcare goods and services consumed during each year. This indicator does not include capital health expenditures such as buildings, machinery, IT and stocks of vaccines for emergency or outbreaks (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 129

Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Current expenditures on health per capita in current U.S. dollars. Estimates of current health expenditures include healthcare goods and services consumed during each year (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 130

Current Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Current expenditures on health per capita expressed in international dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP time series based on ICP2011 PPP; World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 131

Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources per capita expressed in international dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP time series based on ICP2011 PPP; World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 132

Domestic Private Health Expenditure (Percentage of Current Health Expenditure) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Share of current health expenditures funded from domestic private sources. Domestic private sources include funds from households, corporations, and nonprofit organizations. Such expenditures can be either prepaid to voluntary health insurance or paid directly to healthcare providers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 133

Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources per capita expressed in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 134

Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (Percentage of General Government Expenditure) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of total public expenditure. It indicates the priority of the government to spend on health from own domestic public resources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 135

Age Dependency Ratio (Percentage of Working Age Population) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 136

Age Dependency Ratio for Young (Percentage of Working Age Population) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Age dependency ratio, young, is the ratio of younger dependents--people younger than 15--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 137

People Practicing Open Defecation (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*People practicing open defecation refers to the percentage of the population defecating in the open, such as in fields, forest, bushes, open bodies of water, on beaches, in other open spaces or disposed of with solid waste (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 138

People Using Basic Drinking Water Services (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The percentage of people using at least basic water services. This indicator encompasses both people using basic water services and those using safely managed water services. Basic drinking water services is defined as drinking water from an improved source, provided collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a round trip. Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, protected springs, and packaged or delivered water (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 139

People Using Basic Sanitation Services (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The percentage of people using at least basic sanitation services, that is, improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other households. This indicator encompasses both people using basic sanitation services and those using safely managed sanitation services. Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines; ventilated improved pit latrines, compositing toilets or pit latrines with slabs (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 140

Access to Electricity (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 141

Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) (2010–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The number of distinct, publicly-trusted TLS/SSL certificates found in the Netcraft Secure Server Survey (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 142

Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) (2010–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *The number of distinct, publicly-trusted TLS/SSL certificates found in the Netcraft Secure Server Survey.

Figure 143

Internet Users Total (Percentage of Population) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 144

Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Fixed broadband subscriptions refer to fixed subscriptions to high-speed access to the public Internet (a TCP/IP connection), at downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. This includes cable modem, DSL, fiber-to-the-home/building, other fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions, satellite broadband and terrestrial fixed wireless broadband. This total is measured irrespective of the method of payment. It excludes subscriptions that have access to data communications (including the Internet) via mobile-cellular networks. It should include fixed WiMAX and any other fixed wireless technologies. It includes both residential subscriptions and subscriptions for organizations (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 145

Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. Important to note that this downward trend is common worldwide, especially among rich nations. Most nations are leaving behind fixed telephone subscriptions for cell phone and internet subscriptions.

*Fixed telephone subscriptions refers to the sum of active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel equivalents and fixed public payphones (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 146

Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e., that have been used during the last 3 months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and telemetry services (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 147

Electric Power Consumption (kWh Per Capita) (1980–2014)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 148

Agricultural Land (Percentage of Land Area) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent pastures. Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. Land under permanent crops is land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for long periods and need not be replanted after each harvest, such as cocoa, coffee, and rubber. This category includes land under flowering shrubs, fruit trees, nut trees, and vines, but excludes land under trees grown for wood or timber. Permanent pasture is land used for 5 or more years for forage, including natural and cultivated crops (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 149

Arable Land (Percentage of Land Area) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 150

Education Index From 1990 to 2019



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region

*Education index is an average of mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children), both expressed as an index obtained by scaling with the corresponding maxima (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).

Figure 151

Mean Years of Schooling (1990–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).

Figure 152

Literacy Rate Adult Total (Percentage of People Ages 15 and Above) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 153

School Enrollment Ratio Primary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 154

School Enrollment Ratio Secondary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 155

School Enrollment Ratio Tertiary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 156

Persistence to Last Grade of Primary Total (Percentage of Cohort) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Persistence to last grade of primary is the percentage of children enrolled in the first grade of primary school who eventually reach the last grade of primary education. The estimate is based on the reconstructed cohort method (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 157

Primary Completion Rate (Percentage of Relevant Age Group) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Primary completion rate, or gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, is the number of new entrants (enrollments minus repeaters) in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, divided by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of primary education. Data limitations preclude adjusting for students who drop out during the final year of primary education (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 158

Pupil-Teacher Ratio Primary (Percentage of Cohort) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the average number of pupils per teacher in primary school (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 159

School Enrollment Primary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in primary education is the ratio of girls to boys enrolled at primary level in public and private schools (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 160

School Enrollment Secondary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in secondary education is the ratio of girls to boys enrolled at secondary level in public and private schools (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 161

School Enrollment Tertiary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education is the ratio of women to men enrolled at tertiary level in public and private schools (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 162

Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60KG Bags) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Green coffee beans are unroasted coffee beans. Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October (Colombia), April (Indonesia) or July (Brazil), as examples. Coffee marketing year for nonproducer countries begins in October (U.S. Department of Agriculture, n.d.).

Figure 163

Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60KG Bags) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

*Green coffee beans are unroasted coffee beans. Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins either in October (Colombia), April (Indonesia) or July (Brazil), as examples. Coffee marketing year for nonproducer countries begins in October (U.S. Department of Agriculture, n.d.).

Figure 164

Worldwide Coffee Average Closing Price (U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. Coffee prices are not country specific. Though premium prices do exist based on coffee quality.

*The price shown is in U.S. Dollars per pound. Arabica coffee it is the world benchmark for coffee futures contracts that trade on the Inter-Continental Exchange (ICE). Arabica accounts for 75% of the world's production and is mostly cultivated in Brazil (40% of the world's total supply) and Colombia. Robusta account for the remaining 25% and is mostly produced in Vietnam (15% of global supply) and Indonesia (Macrotrends, n.d.).

Figure 165

Worldwide Coffee Price (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. Coffee prices are not country specific. Though premium prices do exist based on coffee quality.

*The price shown is in U.S. Dollars per pound. Annual percentage change based of year close figures. Arabica coffee it is the world benchmark for coffee futures contracts that trade on the Inter-Continental Exchange (ICE). Arabica accounts for 75% of the world's production and is mostly cultivated in Brazil (40% of the world's total supply) and Colombia. Robusta account for the remaining 25% and is mostly produced in Vietnam (15% of global supply) and Indonesia (Macrotrends, n.d.).

Figure 166

Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) (1980–2016)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Food production index covers food crops that are considered edible and contain nutrients. Coffee and tea are excluded because, although edible, they have no nutritive value (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 167

Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) (1980–2016)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Food production index covers food crops that are considered edible and contain nutrients. Coffee and tea are excluded because, although edible, they have no nutritive value (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 168

Manufacturing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual growth rate for manufacturing value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 169

Manufacturing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual growth rate for manufacturing value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 170

Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are expressed constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 171

Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are expressed constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 172

Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 173

Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 174

Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 175

Industry (Including Construction) Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 176

Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual growth rate for industrial value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 177

Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual growth rate for industrial value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 178

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual growth rate for agricultural value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 179

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Annuals Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual growth rate for agricultural value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 180

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 181

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 182

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 183

International Tourism Receipts (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*International tourism receipts are expenditures by international inbound visitors, including payments to national carriers for international transport. These receipts include any other prepayment made for goods or services received in the destination country. They also may include receipts from same-day visitors, except when these are important enough to justify separate classification. For some countries they do not include receipts for passenger transport items. Data are in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 184

International Tourism Receipts (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *International tourism receipts are expenditures by international inbound visitors, including payments to national carriers for international transport. These receipts include any other prepayment made for goods or services received in the destination country. They also may include receipts from same-day visitors, except when these are important enough to justify separate classification. For some countries they do not include receipts for passenger transport items. Data are in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 185

International Tourism Number of Arrivals (1980–2019)

Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*International inbound tourists (overnight visitors) are the number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, but outside their usual environment, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited. When data on number of tourists are not available, the number of visitors, which includes tourists, same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members, is shown instead. Sources and collection methods for arrivals differ across countries. In some cases, data are from border statistics (police, immigration, and the like) and supplemented by border surveys. In other cases, data are from tourism accommodation establishments. For some countries number of arrivals is limited to arrivals by air and for others to arrivals

staying in hotels. Some countries include arrivals of nationals residing abroad while others do not. Caution should thus be used in comparing arrivals across countries. Data on inbound tourists refer to the number of arrivals, not to the number of people traveling. Thus, a person who makes several trips to a country during a given period is counted each time as a new arrival (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 186

International Tourism Number of Arrivals (1980–2019)

Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *International inbound tourists (overnight visitors) are the number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, but outside their usual environment, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited. When data on number of tourists are not available, the number of visitors, which includes tourists, same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members, is shown instead. Sources and collection methods for arrivals differ across countries. In some cases, data are from border statistics (police, immigration, and the like) and supplemented by border surveys. In other cases, data are from tourism accommodation establishments. For some countries, number of arrivals is limited to arrivals by air and for others to arrivals staying in hotels. Some countries include arrivals of nationals residing abroad while others do not. Caution

should thus be used in comparing arrivals across countries. Data on inbound tourists refer to the number of arrivals, not to the number of people traveling. Thus, a person who makes several trips to a country during a given period is counted each time as a new arrival (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 187

Female Labor Force Participation Rate (Percentage of Female Population Over 15 Years of Age) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 188

Domestic Credit Provided by the Financial Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 189

Domestic Credit Provided by the Financial Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Mexico.

*Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 190

Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 191

Domestic Credit to Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 192

Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 193

Economic Fitness Metric (Legacy) (1995–2015)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the score the better a country is doing.

*Economic Fitness (EF) is both a measure of a country's diversification and ability to produce complex goods on a globally competitive basis. Countries with the highest levels of EF have capabilities to produce a diverse portfolio of products, ability to upgrade into ever-increasing complex goods, tend to have more predictable long-term growth, and to attain good competitive position relative to other countries. Countries with low EF levels tend to suffer from poverty, low capabilities, less predictable growth, low value-addition, and trouble upgrading and diversifying faster than other countries. The comparison of the Fitness to the GDP reveals hidden information for the development and the growth of the countries (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 194

Economic Fitness Ranking (Legacy) (1995–2015)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing. For this variable, the lower the rank the better a country is doing.

*Economic Fitness Ranking (1 = high, 149 = low). Economic Fitness (EF) is both a measure of a country's diversification and ability to produce complex goods on a globally competitive basis. Countries with the highest levels of EF have capabilities to produce a diverse portfolio of products, ability to upgrade into ever-increasing complex goods, tend to have more predictable long-term growth, and to attain good competitive position relative to other countries. Countries with low EF levels tend to suffer from poverty, low capabilities, less predictable growth, low value-addition, and trouble upgrading and diversifying faster than other countries. The starting data is the COMTRADE list of products exported by

each country. This data defines a bipartite network of countries and products, or goods and services. A suitably designed mathematical algorithm applied to this network leads to the Economic Fitness of all countries and the Complexity of all products. The comparison of the Fitness to the GDP reveals hidden information for the development and the growth of the countries (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 195

Exports of Goods and Services (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 196

Exports of Goods and Services (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 197

Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 198

Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. *Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 199

Employment in Agriculture as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The agriculture sector consists of activities in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, in accordance with division 1 (ISIC 2) or categories A-B (ISIC 3) or category A (ISIC 4; World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 200

Employment in Industry as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The industry sector consists of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water), in accordance with divisions 2-5 (ISIC 2) or categories C-F (ISIC 3) or categories B-F (ISIC 4; World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 201

Employment in Services as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The services sector consists of wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services, in accordance with divisions 6-9 (ISIC 2) or categories G-Q (ISIC 3) or categories G-U (ISIC 4; World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 202

Unemployment Total (Percentage of Total Labor Force; National Estimate) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 203

Unemployment Total (Percentage of Total Labor Force) (ILO Estimate) (1980–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 204

GINI Coefficient (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households in an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 205

GINI Coefficient (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households in an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 206

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 207

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 208

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 209

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 210

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $5.50 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 211

Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $5.50 a day at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 212

Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1981–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $1.90 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 213

Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $1.90 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 214

Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1981–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty gap at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $3.20 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 215

Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty gap at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $3.20 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 216

Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Poverty gap at $5.50 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $5.50 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 217

Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.

*Poverty gap at $5.50 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty line $5.50 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 218

Income Share Held by Lowest 20% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 219

Income Share Held by the Second Lowest 20% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 220

Income Share Held by the Third Lowest 20% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 221

Income Share Held by the Fourth Lowest 20% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 222

Income Share Held by the Highest 20% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 223

Income Share Held by the Lowest 10% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 224

Income Share Held by the Lowest 10% (1986–2018)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 225

Ease of Doing Business Score (2010–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*The ease of doing business score helps assess the absolute level of regulatory performance over time. It captures the gap of each economy from the best regulatory performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the *Doing Business* sample since 2005. One can both see the gap between a particular economy's performance and the best performance at any point in time and assess the absolute change in the economy's regulatory environment over time as measured by *Doing Business*. An economy's ease of doing business score is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest and 100 represents the best performance. For example, an ease of doing business score of 75 in *Doing Business 2019* means an economy was 25 percentage points away from the best regulatory

performance constructed across all economies and across time. A score of 80 in *Doing Business 2020* would indicate the economy is improving (World Bank, 2020).

Figure 226

Ease of Starting a Business Score (2010–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.

*This topic measures the number of procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital requirement for a small- to medium-size limited liability company to start up and formally operate in each economy's largest business city. To make the data comparable across 190 economies, *Doing Business* uses a standardized business that is 100% domestically owned, has a start-up capital equivalent to 10 times the income per capita, engages in general industrial or commercial activities and employs between 10 and 50 people 1 month after the commencement of operations, all of whom are domestic nationals. The starting a business indicator consider two cases of local limited liability companies that are identical in all aspects, except that one company is owned by five married women and the other by five married men. The overall score for starting a business is the average of the scores obtained for each of the component indicators (World Bank, 2020).

Figure 227

Control of Corruption: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 228

Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 229

Government Effectiveness: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 230

Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 231

Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 232

Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 233

Regulatory Quality: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 234

Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 235

Rule of Law: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 236

Rule of Law: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 237

Voice and Accountability: Estimate (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing.

*Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 238

Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank (1996–2019)



Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country is doing.

*Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 239

U.S. GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change (1980–2019)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA GDP growth was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all countries and region.

*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 240

U.S. GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA GDP per capita growth was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all countries and region.

*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, n.d.-a).

Figure 241

U.S. Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA inflation was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all countries and region.

*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country's average level of prices based on the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the percentage change in the average CPI (IMF, 2020).

Figure 242

U.S. Unemployment Rate (Percentage of Total Labor Force) (1980–2019)



Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. U.S. unemployment rate was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all countries and region.

*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country (IMF, 2020).