Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism

Walter W. Heiser
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* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1968, University of Michigan; J.D. 1971 University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1978 Harvard University. Special thanks to Brett Broge for his research assistance.
I. INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 1999, plaintiffs Thomas Sutherland and his family filed a multi-count complaint against defendants Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security alleging that the defendants were responsible for plaintiff Sutherland’s kidnapping, detention, and torture by the Hizbollah terrorist group in Lebanon. On June 25, 2001, after entry of default, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia awarded the plaintiffs $53,040,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000,000 in punitive damages. In the conclusion of its opinion, the District Court observed: “today’s holding is not a foreign policy edict; rather it is an edict on the rule of law. It is an edict that reaffirms the unflinching principle that those who intentionally harm United States nationals will be held accountable for that harm in United States courts.”

This article discusses the rules of procedural law that authorize United States courts to enter civil judgments against international terrorists and the foreign states that sponsor them. Somewhat surprisingly, these rules do not make such judgments difficult to obtain. As the Sutherland case

illustrates, plaintiffs have already recovered substantial money judgments against terrorist defendants. Not surprisingly, the real difficulties are encountered when plaintiffs seek to enforce such judgments.

Private parties have successfully utilized civil litigation as a means of neutralizing domestic hate groups. The question now is whether they can achieve similar success with respect to international terrorists. Success in this context is measured by two basic goals: compensating victims of international terrorism, and deterring future wrongful acts on the part of international terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. This article attempts to provide some assessment of whether the rules of domestic and international procedural law permit private parties to accomplish these goals.

There has been a considerable amount of civil litigation involving international terrorism, even before the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Nearly all these cases have resulted in default judgments. As a consequence, few appeals have been taken and many of the procedural issues have not been addressed by appellate courts. This article therefore begins with discussion of the three components that determine the validity of a default judgment within the United States courts: personal jurisdiction, service of process, and subject matter jurisdiction. Other issues discussed include venue and forum non conveniens, choice-of-law and jurisdiction to prescribe, the Act of State Doctrine, and judgments and enforcement of judgments. This Article concludes with some suggestions for the courts, the Congress, and the Executive branch that may provide victims of international terrorism with more effective means of redress through civil litigation.

There are three sets of factual variables that significantly affect the analysis of these procedural issues. One is whether the defendant committed the harmful act and caused injury to the plaintiff within the territory of the United States or outside the territory of the United States. The second is whether the defendant is a private party or a foreign sovereign entity. The third is whether the defendant's assets, potentially available to satisfy a civil judgment, are located within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or are located outside United States territory. Each of these factual variations raise distinct, yet related, issues as to the proper application of the rules of procedural law. The analysis below addresses these issues in the context of each of these factual variations.
II. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING A VALID JUDGMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

1. Private Party Defendants

a. Due Process Limitations, Generally

Personal jurisdiction has both a statutory and a constitutional component. First, a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be authorized by a long-arm statute or rule. Second, even if so authorized, the exercise of jurisdiction must also be consistent with the Due Process Clause. As explained in the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, the Due Process Clause requires, as a prerequisite to a binding judgment, that a nonresident defendant have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The main focus of this “minimum contacts” analysis is whether the defendant has purposefully conducted activities in the forum state. This “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into court solely as a result of attenuated contacts with the forum state, or of the unilateral activity of the plaintiff or some third party. The rationale for this

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2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. *Id.* at 316.
4. As the Supreme Court first explained in *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and repeated in subsequent decisions, “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *Id.* at 253.
5. See, e.g., *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated state court assertions of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who have not themselves engaged in purposeful conduct directed at residents in the forum state. See, e.g., *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.*, 444 U.S. at 295-99 (holding that Oklahoma court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over several defendants, including New York car dealer and eastcoast distributor, in products liability action violated the Due Process Clause because these defendants did not conduct any purposeful activities in the forum state, such as marketing or selling cars to Oklahoma residents, even though allegedly defective car caused injury to plaintiffs in Oklahoma); *Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court*, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987) (plurality opinion) (ruling that a component manufacturer’s knowledge that the final product will be sold in the forum state by ultimate manufacturer was insufficient and that some additional conduct by the component manufacturer itself, such as marketing or advertising, must be directed at the forum state); *Kulko v. Superior Court*, 436 U.S. 84, 94-95 (1978) (holding that a California court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant father in child support action violated the Due Process Clause because the
requirement is to provide the defendant with fair warning as to what conduct will and will not subject it to suit in the forum state.6

The nature of the minimum contacts inquiry varies with the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and cause of action. When a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit “arising out of or related to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the state is said to be exercising “specific jurisdiction.”7 But when a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the state is said to be exercising “general jurisdiction” over the defendant.8 In a general jurisdiction case, because the cause of action has no relationship to the forum state, a court may assert personal jurisdiction consistent with due process only if a nonresident defendant’s forum activities are “continuous and systematic.”9 By contrast, in a specific jurisdiction case there is some nexus between the cause of action and the forum, therefore due process requires a lessor quantum of contacts by the defendant. Indeed, a single contact, such as a tortuous act committed by a nonresident defendant in the forum state, may be sufficient where it directly gives rise to the cause of action.10

There is a second level of constitutional analysis with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Once a court has examined the defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state, these contacts
defendant’s passive acquiescence in his children’s move to California did not mean he had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protection of California’s laws).

6. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (observing that when a nonresident defendant purposefully conducts activities within the forum state “it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there.”).
8. Id. at 414 n.9. The type of general jurisdiction referred to here is based on a nonresident defendant’s activities in the forum state that are unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Another type of general jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as “transient” or “tag-service” jurisdiction, based solely on service of process on the defendant while physically present within the forum state, has been unanimously approved by the Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
10. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (observing that even a single or occasional acts committed within the forum state can confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission). However, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment against a nonresident defendant with whom the state has “no contacts, ties, or relations.” Id. at 319
must be evaluated in light of other factors to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is "reasonable." These factors were identified by the Supreme Court in *Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court* as follows:

A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." The Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what these "reasonableness" factors mean or as to how they are to be weighed with respect to each other and with respect to the "minimum contacts" analysis. The Court relied on these factors to divest the court of jurisdiction in *Asahi*, but has also explained that these factors may "serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."

Although roundly criticized for increasing unpredictability, the Supreme Court's adoption of the "reasonableness" factors as a second level of due process analysis is significant for international litigation. Some of these factors promote a cautious approach to the extension of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. For example, the "burden on the defendant" factor, as applied by the Supreme Court in *Asahi*,

13. Id. at 113.
14. See Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 927 (2000) (explaining that the "reasonableness" inquiry requires a court to make an "unguided, fact-specific, ad hoc determination as to the propriety of personal jurisdiction in each case, regardless of whether the minimum contacts requirement has been satisfied.").
16. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 14, at 925-27 (reviewing authorities that criticize the subjective nature of the reasonableness inquiry and concluding that the absence of meaningful standards permits a court to justify any "reasonableness" conclusion it desires); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't Know Its Asahi From Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 887-88 & 891-95 (1990) (criticizing the complexity and uncertainty of the ad hoc balancing required by the reasonableness test); Russell J. Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55, 62-63 (1988) (discussing the uncertainty of balancing fairness considerations against minimum contacts); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 76-78 (1990) (criticizing *Asahi*'s use of the reasonableness factors as further muddying the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction).
17. The *Asahi* court explicitly cautioned that "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field." *Asahi*, 480 U.S. at 115.
suggests that foreign defendants may have an even greater level of due process protection than that accorded domestic defendants with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{18}

However, some of the other reasonableness factors may actually encourage courts to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Unlike the "minimum contacts" test, which is only concerned with protecting the rights of defendants,\textsuperscript{19} the "reasonableness" factors are designed to accommodate additional interests, such as those of plaintiffs and of the forum state. These interests would certainly include the plaintiff's interest in seeking compensation for injuries caused by international terrorism, and the forum state's interest in ensuring its residents who are victims of terrorism are appropriately compensated. Moreover, a forum state certainly has a strong interest in deterring future acts of terrorism within its borders. Such interests may be significant factors in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign defendants accused of international terrorism is reasonable, particularly in cases where the sufficiency of the foreign defendants' contacts with the forum is questionable.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{b. Terrorist Acts by Private Parties}

The current due process doctrine of personal jurisdiction, therefore, consists of two components. The first level of analysis is to determine whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contracts" with the forum state; the second is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is "reasonable" based on several factors. As discussed above, foreign defendants are entitled to at least the same level of due process

\textsuperscript{18} Applying this factor in the context of a Taiwanese corporate plaintiff suing a Japanese corporate defendant for indemnity in a California state court, the \textit{Asahi} court remarked: "The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders." \textit{Id.} at 114.

\textsuperscript{19} The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects the defendant's individual liberty interest, preserved by the Due Process Clause, to be free from the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum, unless that defendant has purposeful connections with the forum. See Insurance Corp. of Ire., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Heiser, \textit{supra} note 14, at 930-35.

\textsuperscript{20} See \textit{Flatow} v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign state sponsors of terrorism ensures fair play and substantial justice to American victims of international terrorism and is therefore reasonable).
protections with respect to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by United States courts as are domestic defendants.\footnote{21}{See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (1987) (applying due process limitations to a California court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant Japanese corporation); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1983) (holding that the defendant Colombian corporation lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause). Indeed, foreign defendants may have an even greater level of due process protection than that accorded domestic defendants. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.}

With respect to terrorist acts committed by private defendants within the territory of the United States, such as those directed at the World Trade Center in New York City, the personal jurisdiction question is easily resolved. By intentionally engaging in terrorist acts designed to cause deaths and injuries within New York, these defendants have purposely engaged in wrongful conduct within the forum state. Such purposeful conduct provides both the statutory and the constitutional basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.\footnote{22}{See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (recognizing that the commission of a single act within the forum state, because of its nature and quality, may be sufficient to render the defendant subject to suit in that state); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process where nonresident defendant’s intentional and tortious actions were expressly aimed at, and knowingly caused injury in, the forum state). New York's long-arm statute expressly authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who commits a tortuous act within the state. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2001).}

Indeed, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who purposely caused harm within the forum state is almost a universally accepted basis for personal jurisdiction in tort litigation.\footnote{23}{For example, Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, which governs personal jurisdiction among the member states of the European Community, authorizes personal jurisdiction in tort cases “in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.” Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, Eur. Cmty. Member States, 8 I.L.M. 229, 232 (1969), reprinted as amended in Consolidated and Updated Version of the Brussels Convention of 1968 and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1989 Accession of Spain and Portugal, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1419 (1990).}

If the terrorist act occurs overseas, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a private defendant by a court in the United States presents more difficult issues. The defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state, or with the United States as a whole in cases where national contacts may be considered,\footnote{24}{See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.} to make the assertion of personal jurisdiction fair and reasonable. A foreign individual or group may simply have no contacts with the United States, making the assertion of personal jurisdiction impossible based on any theory of minimum contacts.\footnote{25}{See, e.g., Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91-95 (D. R.I. 2001) (dismissing terrorist claims against various officers of Palestinian
proper jurisdiction, such as consent by general appearance or transient jurisdiction by service of the complaint and summons on the defendant while physically present within the forum state, are possible but unlikely.

One important issue relevant to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is whether the Due Process Clause permits a "national contacts" approach. Under the national contacts test, a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on an aggregation of contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than the defendant's contacts with the State in which the federal court sits. Several courts have construed federal statutes to authorize jurisdiction based on the defendant's national contacts. Moreover, Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1993, also authorizes this approach as to federal claims, although only when there is no state that can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Although the Supreme Court Authority because these individual defendants lacked any contacts with United States whatsoever). But see Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50-52 (2nd Cir. 1991) (indicating that personal jurisdiction over the PLO may be proper based on its continuous and systematic "business" contacts with New York, such as fund raising and proselytizing, unrelated to its activities as a permanent observer at the UN); Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d, at 88-91 (holding personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA based on their continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole).

26. See Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (ruling the delivery of the complaint and summons to general agents for defendants PLO and PA while in the United States provided a basis for personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause).

27. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying national contacts test to uphold personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants with respect to antitrust claims under the Clayton Act); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 132, 139-40 (2nd Cir. 1972) (applying national contacts test to determine personal jurisdiction with respect to claims under Securities Exchange Act); See Transport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala Naval, 989 F.2d 572, 580 (2nd Cir. 1993) (construing the FSIA to authorize personal jurisdiction over defendant Romanian agency based on its contacts with the United States as a whole); Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) to authorize nationwide service of process and national contacts test for personal jurisdiction).

has yet to rule on this issue, the lower federal courts have uniformly endorsed the national contacts approach, including some that have upheld personal jurisdiction over terrorists groups based on their minimum contacts with the United States as a whole.

The national contacts approach permits a United States court to assert general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, based on that defendant's continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole. This issue is very important with respect to defendants who are foreign terrorists organizations, and, as discussed below, may also be relevant with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign defendants who sponsor terrorism. The constitutionality of the national contacts approach appears to be a foregone conclusion.

29. The Supreme Court has twice declined to rule on whether the national contacts approach is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.29; Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987). In a subsequent decision, however, the Court seemed to employ a national contacts test in determining that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Argentina under the FSIA, based on its commercial activity in the United States, was consistent with the Due Process Clause. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (dictum).

30. Nearly every federal circuit has held that when the personal jurisdiction of a federal court is invoked based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide or worldwide service, the applicable forum for minimum contacts purposes is the United States as a whole. See SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (adopting the national contacts test and citing to six other circuits that have held that the national contacts test is constitutionally appropriate); cases cited supra note 27.

31. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25. See also Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89 (concluding that assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO's and PA's based on their fundraising, commercial, and public relations campaigns throughout the United States was consistent with due process); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 21-23 (1998) (upholding personal jurisdiction over Iran and its agencies with respect to claims of state-sponsored terrorism, based on their national contacts with the United States).

32. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Lines, 937 F.2d 44, 50-52 (2nd Cir. 1991) (indicating that personal jurisdiction over the PLO may be proper based on its continuous and systematic “business” contacts with New York, such as fund raising and proselytizing, unrelated to its activities as a permanent observer at the UN); Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 88-91 (holding personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and PA based on their continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole).

33. In addition to its endorsement by nearly all the federal circuits, see supra note 27, the academic literature generally views the national contacts approach as consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when utilized by federal courts in cases involving federal statutes, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter FSIA). E.g., Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 799, 813-24 (1988) (explaining why national contacts approach should determine personal jurisdiction as to foreign defendants); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 124-44 (1983) (discussing why the federal courts should apply the minimum contacts test to foreign defendants based on their contacts with the United States as a whole); Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 402-07 (1982) (arguing that
Court should definitively resolve this issue, and do so in a manner that upholds the constitutionality of the "national contacts" approach where authorized by a federal statute or rule.34

2. Foreign Sovereign Defendants

The exercise of personal jurisdiction by one sovereign over another may be more politically sensitive, but the legal issues are actually less complicated than those encountered when the defendant is a foreign private party. The lower federal courts have had little difficulty in deciding to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign entities alleged to be sponsors of international terrorism.35 The main reason for this is the existence of a comprehensive federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter, "FSIA"),36 that not only removes a foreign country's sovereign immunity when the statutory requirements are satisfied, but also provides an aggressive long-arm statute applicable to acts of state-sponsored terrorism within the United States and abroad.

The FSIA is the exclusive basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign country or its agencies or instrumentalities.37 Under the
FSIA, a foreign state is presumed to be immune from suit, and is in fact immune unless one or more of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the FSIA apply. When the plaintiff presents facts that satisfy one of these statutory exceptions, the FSIA not only removes the foreign sovereign's immunity from suit but also simultaneously provides the court with the basis for both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Although when enacted the FSIA was primarily designed to eliminate the sovereign immunity defense in civil actions against foreign sovereign entities arising out of their commercial activities, two provisions of the FSIA are now directly applicable to litigation involving state-sponsored acts of international terrorism.

a. The FSIA's "Noncommercial Tort" Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA removes immunity in any case "in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment." The lower federal courts have construed this so-called "noncommercial tort" exception to include a "situs" requirement. Not only must the complained of injury have occurred within the territory of the United States, but the alleged tortuous conduct causing the injury also must have taken place in the United States. In addition, pursuant to section 1605(a)(5)(A), the

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the FSIA is the exclusive basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign states).

39. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435 n.3; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Niger., 461 U.S. 480, 483-88 (1983). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994), federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any claim for relief against a foreign state with respect to which the foreign state is "not entitled to immunity . . . under §§ 1605-1607," and § 1330(b) provides personal jurisdiction whenever subject matter jurisdiction exists under subsection (a) and service of process has been made under § 1608 of the FSIA.
41. See, e.g., Olsen ex rel Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must "allege at least one entire tort occurring in the United States" in order to utilize § 1605(a)(5)); In re SEDCO, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding § 1605(a)(5) inapplicable where the alleged tortuous acts all took place in Mexico, even though environmental injury occurred in the United States); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that § 1605(a)(5) does not deny sovereign immunity to Mexico's Secretary of Government for alleged kidnaping because the entire tort must be committed in United States); Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 439-40 (observing in dicta that § 1605(a)(5) covers only torts
noncommercial tort exception does not apply to claims arising out of a foreign state’s performance of a “discretionary function.” Despite this exemption’s lack of precise contours, the courts have had little difficulty in concluding that a foreign state has no discretion to commit, or have one of its officers or agents commit, an illegal act.

Consequently, neither the situs requirement nor the discretionary function exemption would preclude the use of the FSIA’s noncommercial tort exception in a civil action against a foreign country brought by a private party seeking damages for injuries caused by a state-sponsored act of terrorism occurring within the United States. Because the FSIA both removes sovereign immunity and provides the exclusive basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign country, a court has the statutory authority to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant foreign sovereign entity in any action which satisfies the noncommercial tort exception set forth in section 1605(a)(5). The question then is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 1605(a)(5) is consistent with the Constitution.

The extent to which the Due Process Clause protects a foreign sovereign is a matter of some debate. But even assuming that the same

42. Although the FSIA contains no definition of what constitutes a “discretionary function,” the language and legislative history of the FSIA indicate that this exemption corresponds to the discretionary act exception found in the Federal Torts Claim Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6620. See Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1991) (observing that “whether the acts of the foreign state officials are within the discretionary function exception to the FSIA is controlled by principles developed under the Federal Torts Claim Act.”).

43. See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that defendants, Chile and its agents, cannot claim sovereign immunity under the FSIA for their alleged involvement in the bombing deaths of Orlando Letelier and others in Washington D.C., because defendants had no “discretion” within the meaning of § 1605(a)(5)(A) to order or aid in such a political assassination); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990) (holding that defendant Republic of China did not satisfy the discretionary function exemption of § 1605(a)(5)(A) in a wrongful death action alleging defendant’s Director of Intelligence Bureau arranged killing in United States).

44. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
constitutional limitations apply to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns as apply to private individuals, those limitations will be readily satisfied in noncommercial tort litigation under section 1605(a)(5). A foreign sovereign entity whose agents or employees purposefully engaged in injurious conduct within the United States certainly has had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{b. The FSIA’s State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity}

Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 to specifically include provisions designed to hold rogue states accountable for acts of terrorism perpetrated on United States citizens. These state-sponsored terrorism provisions, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996\textsuperscript{46} and codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7), provide an exception to a foreign sovereign’s immunity from suit for actions where money damages are sought against a foreign sovereign “for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act.”\textsuperscript{47} Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act did not authorize a specific cause of action for victims of state-sponsored terrorism, Congress also enacted a separate piece of legislation\textsuperscript{48} which provides a cause of action against a foreign state or its agents for any act which would give a court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7).\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{45} See supra notes 4-6 & 10 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{46} Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 1221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1243 (1996). Section 221(c) of this Act states that it shall apply retroactively to any cause of action arising before its date of enactment. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (applying § 1605(a)(7) to state-sponsored acts of terrorism by Cuba occurring before the effective date of the Act).
\textsuperscript{48} Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172 (1996), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. V 1999). This statute provides that an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism shall be liable to a United States national for money damages for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent while acting in the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency for which jurisdiction is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Id. These damages may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages. Id. This statute also overrides any common law doctrine of head of state immunity. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24-25 (D.D.C. 1998).
\textsuperscript{49} By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note does not expressly authorize a cause of action against the foreign state itself. See supra note 48. However, if an agent’s liability is proved under the statute, the foreign state employing the agent may incur liability.
Three conditions must be met in order to bring suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7). The foreign state must have been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the Secretary of State. In addition, the plaintiff or the victim must be a United States national. And finally, if the actionable conduct of the foreign state occurred within that state’s territory, then the state must be offered an opportunity to arbitrate the claim.

The FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7) therefore differs from the noncommercial tort exception of section 1605(a)(5), in several significant respects. First, section 1605(a)(7) is limited to United States nationals, plaintiffs or victims, who bring an action against one of a small number of foreign countries that the Executive branch has officially designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. Presently, the countries so designated are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Second, and most importantly for jurisdictional purposes, section 1605(a)(7) does not contain a situs requirement. The language and legislative history reveal clear Congressional intent that section 1605(a)(7) should apply extraterritorially. Therefore, section 1605(a)(7) provides the basis for personal jurisdiction over, and removes the sovereign immunity of, foreign sovereign defendants sued for materially supporting acts of terrorism committed in foreign countries.

under the theory of respondeat superior. See Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (entering money judgment against Cuba for terrorist acts committed by Cuban Air Force in shooting down unarmed airplanes thereby killing United States nationals). See also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1426-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding China could be liable for murder of plaintiff’s husband ordered by China’s Director of Defense Intelligence Bureau, under California’s law of respondeat superior, in wrongful death action under noncommercial tort provision of FSIA). But see Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, ___ F. Supp. ___, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6703 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that § 1605 note does not unambiguously create a cause of action against Iran, and therefore does not provide the type of express statutory mandate sufficient to abrogate the Algiers Accords, an international executive agreement).


54. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
In several recent cases, the lower federal courts have relied on section 1605(a)(7) as the sole statutory authority for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign state defendants alleged to have sponsored acts of terrorism occurring, and causing injuries, outside the United States. These courts have also addressed the more complicated issue of whether the assertion of jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with the United States Constitution. This issue is potentially a difficult one because, unlike the noncommercial tort and commercial activity exceptions specified in the FSIA, the state-sponsored terrorism exception requires no nexus between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the territory of the United States. However, although their reasoning may differ, these courts have all concluded that their assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state based solely on section 1605(a)(7) is consistent with the United States Constitution.

In all of these state-sponsored terrorism cases, the courts observe that the process of obtaining personal jurisdiction under the FSIA does not follow the traditional approach outlined by the Supreme Court in International Shoe with respect to defendants who are private parties. More specifically, they suggest that an independent finding of “minimum contacts” may not be constitutionally required for establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant foreign state when jurisdiction arises pursuant to section 1605(a)(7). These courts do seem to recognize that the Constitution may limit Congress’ power to authorize jurisdiction over foreign states whose actions have little connection with the United States, but they find a sufficient nexus with the United States exists by definition under section 1605(a)(7) based upon the victim’s United States nationality. Moreover, in some of


56. E.g., Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 14; Rein, 162 F.3d at 761 (dictum); Flato, 999 F. Supp. at 19-21; Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 52-54.

57. E.g., Rein, 162 F.3d at 761 (observing that the elements of § 1605(a)(7), unlike those of the commercial activities exception in the FSIA, “do not entail any finding of minimum contacts.”); Price, 110 F. Supp. at 14-15 (same).

58. Price, 110 F. Supp. at 14-15; Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8; Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54; Flato, 999 F. Supp. at 21-23. The Flato court observed that “a
these cases, the courts raise the fundamental question of whether a foreign state is even a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.59

Whether, or to what extent, the Due Process Clause protects foreign state defendants is an open question, and an important one in civil litigation alleging claims of international terrorism. There are many cogent arguments that support the view that a foreign state is not entitled the same due process protections as afforded a private person under *International Shoe* and its progeny.60 However, because the Supreme Court has yet to rule squarely on this issue, courts applying section 1605(a)(7) have been hesitant to conclude their constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction solely on this basis.61 As discussed above, several foreign state that sponsors terrorist activities which causes [sic] the death or personal injury of a United States national will invariably have sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy Due Process." 999 F. Supp. at 23. The *Daliberti* court also reasoned that the enactment of § 1605(a)(7) gave state sponsors of terrorism "fair warning," within the meaning of the due process "minimum contacts" analysis, that terrorist acts against United States citizens, no matter where they occur, may subject them to suit in a United States court. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54.


60. For analysis of the specific question of whether foreign states are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, see Lee M. Caplan, *The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective*, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 369 (2001) (arguing that foreign states and their corporations are not ‘persons’ under the Due Process Clause, and that United States courts are not constitutionally compelled to apply the minimum contacts test when determining personal jurisdiction in FSIA cases); Joseph W. Glannon and Jeffery Atik, *Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act*, 87 Geo. L.J. 675, 687-96 (1999) (arguing that foreign states are not “persons” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause). For a general examination of the protections afforded foreign governments under the Constitution, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Foreign States and the Constitution*, 73 Va. L. Rev. 483, 488-89 (1987) (arguing foreign states are not “persons” in the sense that they are entitled to constitutional protections that would permit courts to diminish the plenary power of Congress and the President to establish United States policy toward foreign states).

61. Moreover, in stark contrast to these recent federal district court decisions applying § 1605(a)(7), another line of cases applying the commercial activity exceptions of the FSIA have concluded “each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires...a due process scrutiny of the court’s power to exercise its authority over a particular defendant.” Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2nd Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard); Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (indicating a due process contacts
courts, even those that have endorsed the view that foreign states are not entitled to all the protections of constitutional due process guaranteed to individuals, have nonetheless proceeded under the assumption that the “minimum contacts” test may apply to foreign state defendants.62

If the Due Process Clause does require application of the minimum contacts test in the same manner as applied to private defendants, then the ability of plaintiffs to utilize the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism provisions will be severely restricted with respect to terrorist acts occurring outside the United States. The conclusion reached by some courts—that state-sponsored terrorism causing injury to a United States national overseas supplies the requisite “minimum contacts” with the United States—would not pass constitutional muster. Under the Supreme Court’s traditional minimum contacts analysis, such terrorist acts causing injury or death overseas would not constitute purposeful activities by the defendant directed at the forum state.63 Nor is a foreign country, designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, likely to have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the United States, even assuming a national contacts approach is proper and sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements for general jurisdiction.64 Consequently, the issue of whether and to what extent the Due Process Clause protects foreign state entities, should be settled by the Supreme Court and resolved in a manner that will uphold the exercise of personal jurisdiction over such defendants pursuant to section 1605(a)(7), with respect to claims of state-sponsored terrorism occurring outside the United States.65

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62. See cases cited supra note 58. Even the Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that a foreign state is a “person” for purposes of the Due Process Clause, in finding that a foreign state possessed minimum contacts that would satisfy the constitutional test. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (upholding personal jurisdiction over Argentina pursuant to the commercial activity provisions of the FSIA).

63. See supra notes 4-7 & 10 and accompanying text.

64. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

65. The Supreme Court has already held States of the Union are not “persons” for purposes of the Due Process Clause. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966). As the Flatow court astutely observed when concluding that Iran is not a “person” for purposes of due process analysis, “it would be illogical to grant [personal jurisdiction protection based on due process] to foreign states when it has not been granted to federal, state or local governments of the United States.” Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 19-21. See Giannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 687-95 (reviewing various authorities and concluding that, because foreign states are not “persons,” the Due Process Clause does not constrain the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(7)); Caplan, supra note 60 (same). But see Keith E. Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Are Entitled to Due Process Too: The Amended Sovereign Immunities Act is Unconstitutional, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2000) (arguing that personal jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(7), based solely on a terrorist act overseas that has some
B. Service of Process

1. Service on Private Parties

Service of the complaint and summons on a private party defendant within the United States is a fairly routine matter. Service becomes more complicated, however, when it must be effected on a private party located outside the United States. Many countries view service of process from a United States court directly on a party located within their borders as a violation of their sovereignty and of international law.66 Likewise, another country will not enforce a civil judgment rendered by a United States court unless service was accomplished in a manner consistent with that country’s laws.67 However, if a plaintiff only wants a judgment against a foreign defendant that is considered valid and enforceable within the United States, service of process presents few problems.

As with personal jurisdiction, service of process on foreign nationals is subject to two basic limitations. First, the manner of service must be authorized by a statute or court rule and, second, must also comply with the Due Process Clause.68 Under that Clause, foreign nationals are assured of either personal or substituted service that provides “notice

effect within the United States, violates the Due Process Clause under the minimum contacts test).

66. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 836 (observing that in some countries service of process is viewed as a sovereign act and that any attempt to do so directly from a United States court may be deemed a violation of that country’s sovereignty and subject to sanction); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 774-79 (Kluwer 3rd ed. 1996) (surveying various authorities which illustrate that many nations object to foreign service of process within their territory on local nationals as a violation of their sovereignty).

67. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 836 (explaining that use of a service method not accepted in a foreign country will mean that any United States judgment that is forthcoming may not be enforced in that country); Gary B. Born & Andrew N. Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Personal Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in International Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221, 239 (1993) (noting that a country whose laws were violated by service of United States process might well not enforce a resulting United States judgment); RONALD A. BRAND, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 26-27 (ABA 1992) (observing that judgments from United States courts often will be denied recognition and enforcement abroad unless service is through a method recognized in the enforcing country).

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprize interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.\textsuperscript{69} With one major exception, so long as these two domestic law requirements are satisfied, service of process will be considered valid by courts within the United States even though the manner of service conflicts with another nation's laws or violates international law.\textsuperscript{70} The major exception is the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (hereinafter, the "Hague Service Convention").\textsuperscript{71} The Hague Service Convention is a multilateral treaty that provides procedures for the service of process on defendants living in foreign countries. The Convention provides relatively simple and certain, although somewhat costly and time-consuming, means by which to serve process on foreign nationals located in another signatory country.\textsuperscript{72} The scope of the Convention is extremely broad,
applying to civil or commercial matters "where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." The Supreme Court has interpreted the Convention as mandatory and exclusive in all cases to which it applies and, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, as therefore preempting inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in such cases. However, the Convention does not define the circumstances in which there is "occasion to transmit" a complaint "for service abroad." This definition is provided by reference to the internal law of the forum state.

According to the Supreme Court, the Hague Service Convention does not apply where service of process on a foreign defendant can be completed within the United States without the necessity of transmittal of documents for service abroad. If service on a foreign defendant is fully accomplished within the United States, then such service does not implicate the Convention. Consequently, for example, if a state statute authorizes service on a foreign defendant by delivery of the complaint and summons to the defendant's domestic agent within the United States, there is no need to resort to the Convention's mechanisms for service abroad. This type of substituted service has been successfully employed where a foreign group sued for supporting terrorist acts, has an agent—an official spokesperson or fund-raiser for that group—who is served within the United States. Of course, unless somehow immune abroad." Id. at 363 (art. 10(a)). Although there is some authority otherwise, the majority view of this provision is that it does not authorize service of the complaint and summons, as opposed to subsequent documents, directly by mail. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases and holding that use of Article 10(a) is limited to sending subsequent documents after service of process has been properly obtained by other means); Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (same).

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75. Id. at 701-05.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 706-08. In Schlunk, the Supreme Court held that the Hague Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a foreign corporation by serving domestic subsidiary which, under Illinois state law, is the foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service of process. According to the Court, "[w]here service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications." Id. at 707.
78. See, e.g., Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87-91 (D.R.I. 2001) (holding delivery of complaint and summons on managing or general agent of defendants PLO and PA within the United States constituted valid service of process); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 52-54 (2nd Cir.) (holding
from service of process, personal service of a complaint and summons upon an individual defendant while physically present within the United States always constitutes proper service.

Another method of effecting proper service on a private party defendant located abroad is by publication, at least in cases where the whereabouts of the foreign defendant cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence. Because such service is accomplished within the United States, service by publication does not implicate the Hague Service Convention. Moreover, by its terms, the Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the person to be served is not known. Service by publication may therefore be an expedient method of service where foreign defendants, such as individuals and groups accused of terrorist acts, are in hiding.

The Hague Service Convention applies only when a court in one signatory country seeks to serve process abroad on a defendant located in another signatory country. As of 2002, the United States and thirty-five other countries have ratified or acceded to the Hague Service Convention, including most of our trading partners in Europe and Asia, as well as Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan. Service abroad on a foreign

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80. Rule 4(e)(2), F.R.C.P., specifically authorizes personal service of a summons and complaint upon an individual physically present within a judicial district of the United States. Pursuant to Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), such personal service also comports with the requirements of due process for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246-47.


82. See People v. Mendocino County Assessor's Parcel, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 53 (Ct. App. 1997) (upholding service by publication on defendant, a resident of Spain, whose whereabouts are unknown, and holding Hague Service Convention inapplicable); Kott v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 219-21 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that service of process by publication in California does not implicate the Hague Service Convention, but also finding such service invalid because plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence to learn defendant's address in Canada prior to seeking court permission to serve by publication, as required by California law).

83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 note (Conventions), 28 U.S.C.A. app. (West 2001). The United States and many of its trading partners in Central and South America have signed
defendant not located in another signatory country is more problematic and less certain. Due to the absence of any treaty obligation, a court in a nonsignatory country is under no duty to assist a United States court to effect service of process. The traditional method of attempting service in such circumstances is by a letter rogatory or letter of request.

A letter rogatory, in this context, is simply a letter from a court in the United States to one in another country, normally delivered through diplomatic channels, which requests assistance in effecting service of process upon someone located within that country’s borders. The main problem with such use of letters rogatory is that the receiving court is under no obligation to comply with the request. Requests for assistance in serving process addressed to a court in a country unfriendly to the United States will most likely be ignored. Even when addressed to a court in a friendly country, such requests may be greeted with indifference and delay. Consequently, when a defendant resides in a nonsignatory country, there often is no effective and efficient means of serving process abroad. In such circumstances, service must be accomplished via substitute or constructive service within the United States or in any other manner that satisfies domestic requirements for proper service.


84. For more in-depth discussion of the use of letters rogatory in the context of service of process, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DePaul Bus. L. J. 169, 228-29 (2000); Gary N. Horlick, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 Int’l Law 637, 640-42 (1980) (discussing the practical disadvantages of service abroad pursuant to letters rogatory, including cumbersome procedures, delay, and noncompliance, but noting that some countries permit no other form of service from foreign courts); Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015, 1019-25 (1965) (discussing the mechanics of service abroad pursuant to letters rogatory, either through diplomatic channels or addressed directly to a foreign tribunal).

85. See authorities cited supra note 84.

86. See discussion supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
2. Service on Foreign States

Compared to service on foreign private parties, service on foreign sovereign entities is relatively straightforward. The FSIA contains uniform, exclusive service rules applicable in both federal and state courts.\(^7\) Section 1608(a) sets forth a list of four alternative methods by which service shall be made upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state, with specified preferences for the order in which these alternatives must be attempted.\(^8\) First, service should be made in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or, second, in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents.\(^9\) If neither of these first two options are available, then section 1608(a)(3) authorizes service by mail requiring a signed receipt addressed to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.

Finally, if service by mail under section 1608(a)(3) cannot be made within 30 days, section 1608(a)(4) authorizes the clerk of the court to mail copies of the complaint and summons and a notice of suit, with translations, to the U.S. Secretary of State for transmittal of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state. So long as the Department of State properly transmits these papers as instructed and confirms this transmittal with the court, service pursuant to section 1608(a)(4) poses few problems.\(^9\) Indeed, in several recent cases, plaintiffs alleging state-sponsored terrorism have successfully utilized section 1608(a)(4) to accomplish service of process upon foreign state defendants.\(^9\)

\(^7\) Federal Rule 4(j)(1) provides that “service upon a foreign state or a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof shall be effected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (j)(1).

\(^8\) Section 1608(b) contains a somewhat different set of hierarchical alternatives applicable to service on an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(1)-(3) (1994).

\(^9\) Service under § 1608(a)(4) is deemed to have been made as of the date of transmittal indicated in the certified copy of the diplomatic note. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(1) (1994).
assuming that the same Due Process Clause protections apply to foreign states as apply to private parties, the manner of service authorized by the FSIA would certainly constitute notice "reasonably calculated" to notify foreign sovereign defendants.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Venue, and Forum Non Conveniens

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A victim of terrorism who wishes to bring suit in U.S. District Court should have little difficulty in finding statutory authority for federal subject matter jurisdiction. If the plaintiff is a citizen of a State and the defendants are citizens of a foreign country, the district court will have alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a)(2) as to state law claims, and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 as to federal claims.92

In addition to general federal question jurisdiction, several special statutes authorize the district courts to hear federal claims against foreign defendants who have allegedly committed terrorist acts. The Antiterrorism Act of 1991, for example, provides that any United States national injured in his person or property by reason of an act of international terrorism may sue in federal district court for recovery of threefold the damages sustained.93 The district court may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims arising from the same terrorist conduct, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367.94

With respect to claims of terrorism against foreign sovereign entities, the FSIA provides the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. As

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discussed previously, when one of the specified exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the FSIA simultaneously confers both subject matter and personal jurisdiction upon the federal district courts. The FSIA does not preclude state courts from hearing claims against foreign sovereigns. However, the FSIA does encourage a foreign state defendant to remove to federal court in order to avoid a jury trial.

Although most of the jurisdictional determinations are straightforward, one interesting issue has been raised regarding the constitutionality of federal subject matter jurisdiction under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of the FSIA. In a recent case, a foreign state defendant, Libya, entered an appearance and argued that by allowing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction to depend on the State Department’s determinations of whether particular foreign states are sponsors of terrorism, section 1605(a)(7) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court rejected this argument on the ground that there was no delegation of power. Because Libya was already on the list of state sponsors of terrorism when section 1605(a)(7) was passed by Congress, no decision whatsoever by the Secretary of State was needed to create jurisdiction as to Libya. However, the court noted the issue of delegation might be presented if another foreign sovereign—one not identified as a state sponsor of terrorism when section 1605(a)(7) was passed—was placed on the list by the State Department and, on being sued in federal court, interposed the defense that Libya raised. Even as to this hypothetical, the court indicated that such delegation by Congress would be constitutionally sound.

95. See authorities cited supra notes 36-39. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994), federal district courts are provided with subject matter jurisdiction if a foreign state is “not entitled to immunity... under §§ 1605-1607.” In cases where the plaintiff alleges only state law claims, § 1330(a) is authorized by Article III’s “minimal diversity” requirement where at least one of the plaintiffs is a citizen of a State, and by Article III’s “arising under” jurisdiction where all of the parties are foreign. See Verlinden v. Central Bank of Niger., 461 U.S. 480, 481 (1983).

96. See In re Estate of Weinstein, 712 N.Y.S. 2d 300, 302 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2000) (holding that, because a state court has jurisdiction to hear FSIA claims, New York state court has jurisdiction to grant limited letters of administration where sole asset of estate is cause of action against Syria pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) of FSIA).


98. Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 763-64 (2nd Cir. 1998). This same issue was raised by defendant, Iraq, in another case where jurisdiction was based on § 1605(a)(7). Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49-52 (D.D.C. 2000).

99. Rein, 162 F.3d at 764.

100. Id. The Rein court also noted that this federal subject matter jurisdiction issue might also arise if a state on the list when § 1605(a)(7) was enacted is later dropped from the list, in which case a plaintiff could raise the argument of unduly delegated authority. Id.

101. Rein, 162 F.3d at 763-64 (dictum). Relying on an old Supreme Court case,
2. Venue

The venue restrictions for civil actions against foreign defendants in federal court are insignificant. With respect to private parties generally, the Alien Venue Statute provides that "[a]n alien may be sued in any district." More specifically with respect to treble damage actions brought under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, venue is proper in "any district where any plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an agent." The FSIA provides somewhat more limited choices of venue where the defendant is a foreign sovereign entity, but these include any district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or in which an agency or instrumentality is doing business, or in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or its political subdivision.

3. Forum Non Conveniens

The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a trial court to dismiss a case where an alternative forum is available in another country that is fair to the parties and substantially more convenient for them or the courts. In commercial tort litigation, this is an important tool for defendants who wish to remove a products liability action from a court in the United States to one in a foreign country whose substantive and procedural laws, including the lack of jury trial and punitive damages, are far more favorable to the defendant. However, for a variety of

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Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), and one of its own recent precedents, Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 1997), the Rein court opined that such delegation by Congress to the Secretary of State would be constitutionally permissible. Id. The Daliberti court followed Rein's reasoning and concluded there was no separation of powers violation when Congress vested jurisdiction in the federal courts over a class of sovereigns identified as terrorist states and delegated that determination to the Secretary of State. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 50-52.


106. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (upholding dismissal of products liability action against defendants, two U.S. manufacturers, on grounds that Scotland was a more convenient forum, even though a Scottish court would not provide a jury trial and would apply liability and damages law less favorable to
reasons, foreign defendants will not likely find this doctrine as helpful in actions seeking damages for acts of international terrorism.

Under the federal common law doctrine, which is similar to the approach utilized in most state courts, there is a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, particularly where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum. The defendant must first demonstrate that an adequate alternative forum exists, and then that considerations of convenience and judicial efficiency strongly favor litigating the claim in the alternative forum. In general, the threshold requirement is usually satisfied if the defendant shows that an alternative forum provides some redress for the type of claims alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and that the defendant is amenable to suit in the alternative forum. The possibility of an unfavorable change in the substantive or procedural law is ordinarily not a relevant consideration, unless the remedy provided by the alternative forum is "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." If a suitable alternative forum exists, then the defendant must demonstrate that the balance of various relevant private and public interest factors strongly favor dismissal. The trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a forum non conveniens motion based on its consideration of these relevant factors.

A trial court is unlikely to grant a forum non conveniens dismissal where the plaintiff, a victim of terrorism abroad, is a resident of the United States and the alternative forum is located in a country overtly hostile to the United States. If the terrorist acts occurred in the United

plaintiffs); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal of mass tort class action even though Indian legal system has limited pre-trial discovery, back log of tort cases, less developed tort law, and no right to jury trial).

107. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56 (recognizing that there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, but holding that a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference than the choice of a resident); Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991) (same); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1984) (same).

108. Iragorri v. International Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000); Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 99 (D.R.I. 2001); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17-19. But see Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d at 248-51 (observing that the availability of another suitable forum is a most important factor, but not a prerequisite for applying forum non conveniens).

109. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.

110. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 19.

111. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (identifying an illustrative list of considerations relevant to the private and public interests); Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 15-18; Piper, 454 U.S. at 241, 257-61; Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 756-64, 819 P.2d at 22-27 (applying various private and public interest factors); Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d at 249-50 (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal where no substantial nexus between New York and Iran's cause of action against its former ruler).

112. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17; Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d at 247.
States, dismissal is unlikely even if the traditional private and public interest factors are considered in the same manner as in commercial tort litigation. Under traditional forum non conveniens analysis, one of the relevant public interest factors is the forum state's interest in deterring wrongful conduct by the defendant in the forum state. If the court emphasizes this interest, a likely scenario in an action involving terrorism, the motion will most certainly be denied. This interest would likely outweigh all other private and public interest in an action against foreign defendants alleged to have engaged in terrorist acts within the forum state.

Different considerations apply when the plaintiff's action seeks treble damages under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. section 2333, for injuries caused by international terrorism. This Act limits the circumstances under which the district court can entertain a forum non conveniens motion in such an action. One such statutory limitation is that the district court shall not dismiss "unless the foreign court offers a remedy which is substantially the same as the one available in the courts of the United States." This prerequisite would seem to preclude dismissal where the substantive law or the law of damages applicable in the alternative forum is substantially less favorable to the plaintiff than that applied in the district court; a likely scenario in most cases seeking treble damages under the Act for international terrorism. Consequently, the inclusion of a claim under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 would so reduce the prospects of a forum non conveniens dismissal as to render the motion almost meaningless.

D. Choice-of-Law, Jurisdiction to Prescribe, and the Act of State Doctrine

1. Choice-of-Law

Claims based on terrorist acts occurring overseas may involve choice-of-law issues. The facts of Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority illustrate how such issues may arise. Yaron Ungar, a United States citizen, and his wife were killed in Israel by the terrorist group Hamas.

113. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 260-61; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 22-23 (considering whether California's interest in deterring wrongful conduct justified retention of plaintiffs' actions in a California court).
The Ungars' estate and children subsequently filed an action in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island against the Palestine Liberation Organization and other nonsovereign foreign defendants, seeking damages under state tort law and the federal Antiterrorism Act of 1991. In ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court correctly recognized that it must determine whether the substantive law of Rhode Island or of Israel governed the state law tort claims. As required by the *Erie* doctrine, the district court then applied Rhode Island's choice-of-law doctrine, an "interest-weighing" approach, and determined that Israeli law governed the tort claims alleged in the complaint. 116 Although the result may be different under other state doctrines and factual circumstances, such choice-of-law determinations are necessary in international terrorism litigation whenever state law claims are alleged against private parties. 117

A somewhat similar determination may be necessary under the FSIA when terrorism claims are alleged against sovereign entities. The FSIA does not contain any federal standards of substantive liability. Instead, under section 1606 of the FSIA, a foreign state not entitled to immunity "shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 118 There is a split of authority as to whether state or federal choice-of-law doctrine determines the relevant substantive law under section 1606, and as to the nature of the substantive law so chosen.

Cases that have considered choice-of-law issues in the context of the FSIA's commercial activities exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity have applied state rules of decision, including state choice-of-law doctrine. 119 However, cases brought pursuant to the state-sponsored

116. Id. at 98-99.

117. Of course, no such choice-of-law determination is necessary when the cause of action is based on federal laws, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note or the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. § 2333. See Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97 (construing § 2333 and § 2331 to determine whether plaintiffs stated claims against PLO for terrorist acts occurring in Israel); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1010-19 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (construing § 2333 and related federal statutes to determine whether plaintiff properly stated a claim against various defendants for providing material support to Hamas for acts of terrorism in Israel).


terrorism provisions of section 1605(a)(7) have adopted a different approach. These cases have applied federal common law, to both the determination of liability and of appropriate damages, after a federal choice-of-law analysis. The justification for this application of federal law common law is not always made clear. However, one district court reasoned that when Congress created jurisdiction and a cause of action for personal injury resulting from state-sponsored terrorism, including its own statute of limitations, it intended the courts to develop national standards to promote uniform determinations of liability of foreign states for such terrorist acts. This court interpreted the jurisdictional amendments to the FSIA contained in section 1605(a)(7) and the related cause of action against foreign states created by section 1605(a) note in para materia. This reasoning lead the court to employ interstitial federal common law to determine substantive issues regarding claims of state-sponsored terrorism where it might otherwise have relied upon state law.

These uses of federal common law do appear appropriate for section 1605 note claims heard pursuant to section 1605(a)(7), even though clearly not appropriate for state law claims heard pursuant to the FSIA's commercial activity exceptions to immunity from suit. The jurisprudence evolving from the federal district courts endorses this approach when determining liability and damages against state sponsors of terrorism. Unless a case proceeds to the merits by way of a contested trial, the appellate courts may have little opportunity to weigh in on the propriety of using federal common law, as opposed to state law, as the choice-of-
law doctrine and the rule of decision with respect to claims alleging state-sponsored terrorism under the FSIA.

2. Jurisdiction to Prescribe

A different type of choice-of-law inquiry, sometimes referred to as jurisdiction to prescribe, is required when the plaintiff alleges that conduct which occurred outside the territory of the United States is prescribed by a federal statute. Whether such extraterritorial application of United States law is appropriate is largely a matter of statutory construction. Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact laws applicable beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. However, a long-standing canon of statutory construction provides that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This general presumption can be overridden only by a clear expression of Congress that extraterritorial application of a federal statute is intended.

The prescriptive jurisdiction issue is relevant to federal claims alleged against private parties under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. section 2333; and against sovereign entities for state-sponsored terrorism under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7). The language of the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, and the language and legislative history of section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA, reveal Congress’ clear intent that both federal statutes apply to extraterritorial conduct. Therefore, these federal statutes properly

125. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-61 (1991) (observing that the parties must concede “that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and observing that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld Congress’ power to make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries where United States interests are affected).

126. See Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 248.

127. Id.


129. Although the language of the 1996 state-sponsored terrorism amendments to the FSIA is not as explicit as that of the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, it indirectly indicates extraterritorial intent. Section 1605(a)(7)(B)(i), which requires the plaintiff to offer the foreign state an opportunity to arbitrate the claim “if the act occurred in the foreign state,” would be superfluous if Congress did not intend for § 1605(a)(7) to apply to extraterritorial conduct. Moreover, the legislative history demonstrates a clear Congressional intent that § 1605(a)(7) applies to extraterritorial conduct and an express purpose to effect the conduct of terrorists outside the United States, in order to promote
apply to terrorist conduct occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

3. The Act of State Doctrine

The Act of State Doctrine generally precludes United States courts from reviewing the validity of official action by a foreign state performed within its own territory.\textsuperscript{130} The doctrine is a substantive rule of decision created by federal common law, and is therefore applicable in both federal and state courts.\textsuperscript{131} Although its precise contours are unclear, for a variety of reasons this doctrine should not play a significant role in litigation alleging state-sponsored terrorism.\textsuperscript{132} One reason is that the doctrine has a situs requirement which makes its protections inapplicable unless the official action came to complete fruition within the foreign state.\textsuperscript{133} Therefore, the act of state defense may not apply to terrorist acts sponsored by foreign sovereigns, ordered and committed within the United States or a third country.\textsuperscript{134}
Even in cases where the complained of terrorist acts occurred within the foreign state's territory, such acts may not invoke the Act of State Doctrine. Several lower federal courts have concluded that such terrorist acts simply do not constitute valid "acts of state" within the meaning of the doctrine. Others have reasoned that the doctrine is inconsistent with, and therefore superceded by, the state-sponsored terrorism exceptions to immunity from suit explicitly authorized by the FSIA. This reasoning seems fundamentally sound. Because the Act of State Doctrine is a creature of federal common law designed to prevent courts from interfering with the foreign affairs powers of the President and the Congress, it should not prohibit Congress and the Executive from authorizing the courts to vindicate such powers. Moreover, if the Act of State Doctrine exists solely as a rule of federal common law and not as a constitutional limitation on judicial powers, Congress certainly has the power to override the doctrine in the FSIA, as it has in other statutes.


137. According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine is rooted in the "domestic separation of powers, reflecting 'the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder' the conduct of foreign affairs." W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).

138. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 55. But see International Ass’n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (holding the FSIA does not supercede Act of State Doctrine in cases brought under FSIA’s commercial activities exceptions to immunity from suit); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1432 (ruling the FSIA’s noncommercial tort exception does not supercede the Act of State Doctrine because that doctrine addresses different concerns than sovereign immunity).

139. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing that judicial confirmation and
III. PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

A. Judgments

1. Default Judgments

Nearly all the cases commenced in the United States courts against defendants accused of international terrorism have proceeded to the merits by way of default. As a consequence, few appeals have been taken and the federal circuit courts have not addressed many of the procedural issues discussed in this Article. However, the federal district courts have entered default judgments accompanied by detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law, often after evidentiary hearings that resemble non-jury trials, albeit one-sided trials. This procedure is...
required by the FSIA when the defaulting defendant is a foreign sovereign entity, and is essential to the legitimacy and perceived fairness of any domestic judicial decision in the international arena.

2. Civil Remedies

The full range of traditional civil remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages, are available to plaintiffs who are victims of international terrorism committed by private parties. In addition, the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 authorizes recovery of treble damages, costs and attorney fees, for any United States national injured by an act of international terrorism. The range is only slightly more limited when the defendant is a foreign sovereign entity. The FSIA generally provides that a foreign sovereign shall be liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” In addition, the FSIA specifically permits plaintiffs suing under the state-sponsored terrorism provision in section 1605(a)(7) to recover money damages which may include “economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering.” However, the current version of the FSIA exempts a foreign state from liability for punitive damages, although not the “agency or instrumentality” by which that state commits acts of terrorism. Pursuant to these FSIA provisions, courts have awarded plaintiffs hundreds of millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages in international terrorism cases against foreign sovereign

introduced 160 exhibits in support of default judgment under FSIA, including transcripts of sworn testimony in related criminal proceedings).

142. The FSIA requires that a default against a foreign state, or a political subdivision or agency or instrumentality thereof, be entered only after the plaintiff “establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994).

143. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000). Section 2333 does not apply to a foreign state or agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or agency thereof. 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2000).

144. However, the provisional remedy of prejudgment attachment is much more limited with respect to assets of a foreign state as opposed to those of a private party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1994) (authorizing prejudgment attachment of property of a foreign state used for commercial activity within the United States only if the foreign state explicitly waived its immunity from such attachment).


147. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V 1999), as amended by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(f)(2), 114 Stat. 1543 (2000) (repealing recent amendments to § 1606 that had permitted punitive damages against a foreign state in actions under § 1605(a)(7)). The FSIA defines an “agency or instrumentality” to include a separate legal entity which is an organ of, or any entity a majority of whose stock or other ownership interest is owned by, a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
B. Enforcement of Judgments

1. Enforcement Within the United States

Enforcement of a money judgment rendered in one State of the United States against a private party in another State poses few procedural problems. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a valid and final judgment of one state must be recognized in all other states. Of course, enforcement of a money judgment in any state is subject to an overriding practical limitation—the defendant may not have any assets.

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149. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 1.

within the jurisdiction that can be reached to satisfy the judgment. This practical limitation likely constitutes an insurmountable barrier to collection of money judgments against private individuals who have committed acts of international terrorism. As to terrorist organizations, the prospects for enforcement may not be as bleak. For example, if the organization raises funds or owns property within the United States, such assets may be attached to satisfy the judgment.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, because a civil judgment typically remains effective for several years, the plaintiff can seek to enforce it whenever the organization obtains assets in the future.

Enforcement of a money judgment against a foreign sovereign is governed by the FSIA and related federal statutes. Property of a foreign state entity within the United States is immune from attachment and execution unless one of the FSIA’s exceptions provide otherwise.\textsuperscript{152} Where the judgment is based on the commercial activity or noncommercial tort exceptions of the FSIA, the property subject to execution is rather limited. A judgment creditor is permitted to execute on property of a foreign state “used for a commercial activity in the United States” only if the property was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.\textsuperscript{153} If the judgment is pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of section 1605(a)(7), however, such commercial property of a foreign state is not immune from execution regardless of whether the property was involved with the act upon which the claim is based.\textsuperscript{154} However, the property must be that of the defendant foreign state and not that of a separate and distinct juridical entity.\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{itemize}
\item[151.] See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (describing the fundraising activities of the terrorist organization Hamas in North America and Western Europe). The Executive branch has authority to freeze all assets subject to United States jurisdiction of any organization designated a “foreign terrorist organization” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (2000). See Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 n.2. Moreover, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 2333, domestic organizations that raise funds within the United States and knowingly provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations may be civilly liable for aiding and abetting terrorism. Id. at 1014-21.
\item[155.] E.g., Alejandro v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding Cuban telecommunications company is a juridical entity separate from the Cuban government and therefore reversing district court’s order which had permitted plaintiffs to collect portion of their money judgments against Cuba, obtained under § 1605(a)(7), by garnishing certain debts owed to this telecommunications company); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1984) (concluding that, under the FSIA, the separate juridical existence of the Chilean National Airline makes its assets immune from execution to satisfy a judgment against Chile). See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (recognizing
\end{itemize}
The FSIA is somewhat less restrictive with respect to enforcement of judgments against an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States. If the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune under an FSIA exception, then the judgment creditor may execute on any property of the agency or instrumentality in the United States regardless of whether the property was involved in the act upon which the claim is based. Recognizing these limitations may preclude any effective remedy for judgment creditors who are victims of state-sponsored terrorism, Congress amended the FSIA in 1998 to make additional property subject to execution in cases where the judgment is based on the state-sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7). This included certain frozen assets of foreign states and properties used for diplomatic purposes that were previously immune from execution. However, pursuant to the express authority to do so contained in section 1610(f)(3), the President waived the attachment provisions related to blocked property of terrorist states. Moreover, section 1611 of the FSIA continues to exempt from execution currency reserve accounts of a foreign state on deposit within the United States under the FSIA that “government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such” but concluding the presumption of separateness was overcome as to Cuban Foreign Trade Bank and Cuba).

156. The FSIA defines an “agency or instrumentality” to include a separate legal entity which is an organ of, or any entity a majority of whose stock or other ownership interest is owned by, a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (Supp. V 1999). This provision also applies to such property of an agency or instrumentality where the judgment is based on the state-sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2).
158. For an excellent summary of these various FSIA amendments expanding the exceptions to immunity from attachment and execution, as well as the difficulties encountered by the plaintiffs seeking to enforce their judgments in the Flotow and Alejandro lawsuits that preceded these amendments, see Comment, Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims: The Evolution and Application of the Antiterrorism Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 213 (2000).
and certain military property.\textsuperscript{161}

Congress subsequently revisited these enforcement restrictions, and again amended the FSIA by enacting the Justice for Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, to provide new options for payment of some money judgment directly from the United States Treasury Department.\textsuperscript{162} Under this compensation scheme, certain plaintiffs who obtained judgments against Iran or Cuba (but not one of the other designated terrorist states) under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of section 1605(a)(7) have the option of receiving payments in the amount of 100 percent or 110 percent of the compensatory damages awarded in the judgment.\textsuperscript{163} In order to obtain 100 percent, the judgment creditor must agree to relinquish all claims and rights to compensatory damages under the judgment.\textsuperscript{164} To obtain 110 percent, the judgment creditor must also relinquish all rights and claims to punitive damages awarded by the court.\textsuperscript{165} This compensation scheme remains in effect today, and has resulted in payments to judgment creditors of Iran and Cuba in amounts that now apparently total over $250 million.\textsuperscript{166}

Funding for these payments, as to judgments against Cuba, is to be secured from liquidation of certain blocked assets of the Cuban government and of certain judicially sanctioned entities.\textsuperscript{167} As to judgments against Iran, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to make payments from rental proceeds of Iranian diplomatic and consular properties located in the United States, and from amounts obtained through liquidation of certain frozen assets.\textsuperscript{168} With respect to some sources of these payments, the United States is subrogated, to the extent of the payments, to all rights of the person paid against the debtor foreign state.\textsuperscript{169} And specifically as to Iran, the Act provides that the President shall not release any blocked assets to Iran “until such subrogated claims have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.”\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, the Act expresses the “sense of the Congress” that the President “should not normalize relations between the United States

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\item \textsuperscript{161} 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (Supp. 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{162} This amendment to the FSIA is part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1542-43 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{163} Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 2002(a).
\item \textsuperscript{164} Id. at § 2002(a)(2)(B).
\item \textsuperscript{165} Id. at § 2002(a)(2)(C).
\item \textsuperscript{166} See Bill Miller, \textit{Terrorism Victims Set Precedent, U.S. to Pay Damages, Collect from Iran}, \textit{WASH POST}, Oct. 22, 2000, at A1.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 2002(b)(1).
\item \textsuperscript{168} § 2002(b)(2).
\item \textsuperscript{169} § 2002(c).
\item \textsuperscript{170} Id.
\end{itemize}
and Iran until the claims subrogated have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States."\textsuperscript{171} Needless to say, these statutory limitations on rapprochement with Iran are viewed by some as unnecessary interference with the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy.\textsuperscript{172}

2. Enforcement Outside the United States

There is no international Full Faith and Credit Clause. Absent a treaty, a country is under no obligation to recognize or enforce judgments rendered by the courts of other countries.\textsuperscript{173} At present, the United States is not a signatory to any treaty that would require another country to recognize and enforce our civil judgments.\textsuperscript{174} Each country is therefore free to apply whatever standards it wishes when asked, as a matter of “comity,” to recognize and enforce a United States judgment. Countries hostile to the United States, such as those identified as state sponsors of terrorism, may flatly refuse to recognize any judgments rendered by our courts.\textsuperscript{175} But even countries generally friendly to the United States may, and likely will, decline to enforce our money judgments where those judgments are based on notions of service of

\textsuperscript{171.} § 2002(d).
\textsuperscript{172.} \textit{See} \textit{Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims}, supra note 158, at 239-43 (discussing concerns regarding FSIA’s conditioning normalization of relations with terrorist states on recovery of payments made to judgment creditors).
\textsuperscript{173.} \textit{Hilton v. Guyot}, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). \textit{See} Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 846-49 (surveying authorities and observing that enforcement of foreign judgments commonly proceeds from notions of comity as a matter of respect for the sovereign power of the rendering state).
\textsuperscript{175.} Of course, even an overtly hostile country’s leadership may change over time, or at least be willing to compensate victims of terrorism allegedly sponsored by that country. \textit{See}, e.g., Warren P. Strobel, \textit{Frozen for Years, U.S.-Libyan Relations May Be Nearing a Thaw}, \textit{Milwaukee J. SENT.}, March 3, 2002, at A12 (discussing Libya’s indication that it may pay billions of dollars in compensation to the families of those who died in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland); Andrew Buncombe, \textit{Libya to Pay Damages for Lockerbie}, \textit{Independent} (London), Jan. 20, 2002, at 14 (discussing secret deal being finalized by Libya, Britain and United States under which Libya would compensate victims of Pan Am 103 bombing); Barbara Crossette, \textit{$2.6 Million Awarded to Families in Letelier Case}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Jan. 13, 1992, at A11 (describing proposed payments by Chile of $2.6 million to United States, pursuant to an arbitration award, for the families of Letelier and Moffat as compensation for state-sponsored assassinations).
process or personal jurisdiction inconsistent with their views on these procedural requirements.  

A judgment rendered by a court in the United States will not be recognized in another country unless service of process was accomplished in accordance with the laws of the country where recognition is sought. Failure to comply with the Hague Service Convention where deemed applicable by another signatory country, for example, will likely mean that a resulting judgment will be unenforceable in that country, even though the judgment is valid within the United States court system.  

This is particularly true with respect to default judgments, which are subject to several specific rules under the Hague Service Convention. Consequently, a plaintiff who anticipates enforcement of a judgment in another signatory country would be ill-advised to avoid the Convention’s procedures by substituted or constructive service within the United States, under circumstances where the other country views the Convention’s requirements applicable. 

Even where a United States judgment is based on procedural standards consistent with those of the foreign country, that country may decline to recognize the judgment based on its notions of public policy. For example, most countries do not permit their courts to award punitive damages or treble damages in civil actions, and may therefore refuse to enforce any United States judgment that includes such damages.

176. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 844-54 (surveying cases and authorities); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 114-16 (1999) (explaining that most other countries will not respect United States judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction, such as general jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic contacts); Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 133-36 (analyzing Brussels Convention and concluding that European countries do not accept personal jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic business contacts with forum). See also authorities cited supra note 67.

177. See supra notes 67 & 72-75 and accompanying text.  

178. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention, the United States has declared that no default judgment shall be given unless the complaint and summons was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in the Convention and service was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend; or, if no certificate of service has been received from the relevant Central Authority, a period of at least six months has elapsed since the date of the transmission and every reasonable attempt has been made to obtain a certificate of service. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. app. (West 2001) (Declarations of the United States).

179. Referring to the near universality of this public policy exception, Professor Lowenfeld observed “it is generally accepted that the law of recognition of judgments, whether expressed in statute, treaty, judicial decision, or even a Restatement, must leave some safety valve for violation of public policy or ordre public.” Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the Von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (1994).

180. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments
Also, most countries follow more stringent rules regarding sovereign immunity than those applicable in our courts, and may decline to recognize any United States judgment against a sovereign entity under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of the FSIA. A foreign country asked to enforce a United States judgment need not have a rational reason for its refusal, or any reason at all for that matter. A country may simply decline to recognize a money judgment rendered by a United States court against an international terrorist because that country views such inaction as politically expedient.

IV. CONCLUSION

There are several practical and legal obstacles to the effective use of civil litigation as a means of deterring, and compensating victims of, international terrorism. The practical problems may be insurmountable. The threat of a civil judgment obviously will not deter individuals who are willing to commit suicide in order to achieve terrorist goals. A civil judgment against a foreign state who sponsors such terrorist acts may be more effective, but only if that state considers rapprochement with the United States as a desirable goal. Despite these obvious practical obstacles, there is little reason why the rules of procedural law should add unnecessary barriers to obtaining and enforcing a civil judgment against international terrorists.

A. The Supreme Court Should Resolve the Personal Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law Issues Relevant to Litigation Involving International Terrorism

With respect to personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court should consider and resolve two important issues. One is whether the “national contacts” approach to minimum contacts is consistent with the Due

Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 167, 181-84 (1998) (discussing statutes and decisions from several countries that have refused, on grounds of public policy, to enforce punitive damages portions of judgments from United States courts); Dellapenna, supra note 84, at 241 (observing that foreign courts generally will not enforce United States judgments for punitive damages); Lowenfeld, supra note 179, at 293 (same).

181. See Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 700-03 (discussing the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism provisions, observing that no other nation would similarly subject foreign states to such suits by private parties, and concluding that other countries will refuse to enforce such judgments on public policy grounds).
Process Clause. The second is whether a foreign country is a “person” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and, if so, the extent to which the traditional “minimum contacts” test applies to foreign sovereign entities. These issues are unlikely to come before any appellate court in the context of international terrorism because nearly all those cases are resolved by default judgments, and therefore are not appealed by defendants. However, the Supreme Court can resolve these issues in the context of traditional commercial litigation, under the FSIA or otherwise. Because any ruling on these two due process issues will have ramifications beyond cases involving international terrorism, the Supreme Court probably should resolve them in the context of more traditional litigation, such as an action against a foreign sovereign entity brought pursuant to the commercial activity provisions of the FSIA or an action against a foreign private party pursuant to a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of process. Regardless of how raised, each of these issues deserves a more definitive resolution than currently exists in any context. The Supreme Court should decide these issues in a manner that upholds the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism provisions in section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.

Some of the other unresolved issues discussed above, such as the propriety of the use of federal common law to supply the rules of decision under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of the FSIA and the proper reach of the Act of State Doctrine, also deserve attention by appellate courts, and perhaps even by the Supreme Court. The most significant issues, of course, have to do with enforcement of judgments. Most of those issues cannot be resolved by the courts because they are not questions of statutory or constitutional construction. They are political issues, and sensitive ones at that, and as such require action by Congress and by the Executive on both the domestic and the international fronts.

B. The United States Should Attempt to Negotiate a Multinational Treaty Focusing on Personal Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments as to Tort Actions

The United States is currently involved in an attempt to negotiate a multilateral treaty on personal jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in international civil litigation, through the Hague Conference on Private

182. If the Court is unwilling to rule directly on these Due Process Clause issues, it should at least clarify how “reasonableness” factors into the context of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants alleged to have committed acts of international terrorism. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
Because of fundamental disagreements over appropriate bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the prospects for a successful comprehensive treaty are doubtful. However, most, if not all countries do agree on a proper basis for personal jurisdiction in intentional tort cases: the courts of a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose intentional and wrongful acts were committed, and directly caused injury or death, within that state. A multilateral treaty that incorporates this universal rule of personal jurisdiction, and requires other signatory countries to recognize and enforce tort judgments obtained through use of this jurisdictional rule, would be an improvement over the current discretionary approach to enforcement of foreign judgments. This could be accomplished through the current Hague Conference negotiations, or through a less comprehensive multilateral treaty concerned only with intentional tort actions.

A multilateral treaty that covers intentional tort actions would mean a
victim of international terrorism within the United States who obtains a
valid civil judgment here would have the authority to enforce that
judgment in another signatory country, where the defendant perhaps has
reachable assets. The prospects for agreement on the terms of such a
limited treaty would seem to be much better than those for a more
comprehensive treaty, such as the proposed Hague Convention on
International Jurisdiction.

Of course, even though there may be agreement on the fundamental
issue of personal jurisdiction in tort actions, additional obstacles to a
successful treaty still remain. One is that such a multilateral treaty
would likely only apply to actions against private parties unless carefully
crafted to protect the sovereign immunity of foreign state entities when
enforcement is sought in a third-party country. Another is that other
countries are unlikely to agree to enforcement of punitive damages
awards. Even if a proposed treaty did not require recognition of
punitive damages judgments, many countries view compensatory
damages awarded by United States courts as excessive. However, the
current Hague Conference negotiations suggest that these obstacles may
be overcome if the United States is willing to compromise in these
areas. Of course, practical problems will still remain, such as inability
to identify and locate assets in foreign countries because they are

187. See Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 700-03 (discussing the difficulties
encountered when enforcing an FSIA-based judgment in a third-party foreign country);
Dellapenna, supra note 84, at 286-87 (observing that in attempting to enforce a judgment
against a foreign state outside the United States, the judgment creditor will encounter all
the usual difficulties in executing judgments abroad plus restrictions on the execution
of judgments against foreign states under the law of the country where enforcement is
sought).

188. See Lowenfeld, supra note 179, at 293 (advising that the United States should
be prepared to agree expressly that punitive damages be excluded from a recognition and
enforcement treaty, providing that a judgment awarding both punitive and compensatory
damages could be upheld as to compensatory elements); Patrick J. Borchers, A Few
(same). See also authorities cited supra note 180.

189. See Borchers, supra note 188, at 162-64 (observing the propensity of the
United States legal system to award tort damages considerably in excess of those usually
awarded in other systems is the source of much concern in the Hague negotiations);
Weintraub, supra note 180, at 203-04 (1998) (advising that the problem of punitive,
multiple, and excessive damages can be dealt with under a general public policy
exception to enforcement, which any judgments convention will undoubtedly include).

190. The Preliminary Draft of the proposed Hague Convention on Personal
Jurisdiction provides that recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if
“recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of
the State addressed.” Preliminary Draft, supra note 183, art. 28(1)(f). As to damages,
Article 33(1) of the Preliminary Draft provides that “in so far as a judgment awards non-
compensatory, including exemplary or punitive damages, it shall be recognized at least
to the extent that similar or comparable damages could have been awarded in the State
addressed.” Preliminary Draft, supra note 183, art. 33(1).
protected from disclosure by bank secrecy laws, or, more fundamentally, because they are secreted by the judgment debtors. Moreover, countries sympathetic to certain terrorist causes, likely the same countries in which terrorist judgment debtors’ assets are located, may simply decline to sign any multilateral treaty on enforcement of judgments.

C. Congress and the President Should Develop a Comprehensive Program of Compensation for Victims of International Terrorism

On November 28, 2001, Congress enacted legislation which requires the President to submit, by the time of submission of the budget for fiscal year 2003, a legislative proposal to establish “a comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States victims of international terrorism (or relatives of deceased United States victims of international terrorism) that occurred or occurs on or after November 1, 1979.”191 This is a wise approach. It permits the Executive Branch to develop a program that reflects both foreign policy concerns as well as the domestic goals of compensation and deterrence. Hopefully, the resulting legislation will produce a coordinated, straightforward scheme of compensation for victims of international terrorism.

One proposal Congress and the Executive might consider would be a hybrid combination of the statutory scheme currently in effect to compensate victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran or Cuba under the most recent amendments to the FSIA, and of the recently enacted program to compensate victims of the September 11 terrorist acts. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 establishes a program, administered by a Special Master, to provide compensation to any individual or relatives of deceased individual who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.192 An individual may file a claim for compensation

191. Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(a), 115 Stat. 748 (2001). Congress also directed that “the legislative proposal shall include, among other things, which types of events should be covered; which categories of individuals should be covered by a compensation program; ... the establishment of a Special Master to administer the program, the categories of injuries for which there should be compensation; ... and identifiable sources of funds including assets of any state sponsor of terrorism to make payments under the program.” Id. at § 626(b).

with the Special Master and, upon a determination of eligibility, will receive payments based on the compensation plan established by the Special Master.\textsuperscript{193} The amount of the compensation is based on the claimant’s extent of harm, including economic and noneconomic losses, but cannot include punitive damages.\textsuperscript{194} Upon submission of a claim, the claimant waives the right to file a civil action for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, except an action to recover collateral source obligations.\textsuperscript{195} The United States has the right of subrogation with respect to any claim paid by the United States under this compensation program.\textsuperscript{196}

Payments pursuant to this compensation program for victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks are the obligation of the federal government.\textsuperscript{197} The President and Congress should consider whether to extend this funding approach to all victims of international terrorism. For example, Congress could amend the FSIA to obligate the federal government to compensate plaintiffs who have obtained money judgments against any foreign sovereign entities, not only those whose property has been previously blocked, for injuries caused by their state-sponsored terrorism. The compensation and subrogation scheme could be the similar to the one currently in effect for payment of such judgments against Cuba and Iran under Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA).\textsuperscript{198} For example, the United States could pay the entire amount (or whatever portion of the amount is fiscally appropriate) of the compensatory damages portion of the judgment, and in return obtain an assignment of the judgment creditor’s right to the remaining damages, such as treble and punitive damages. As in the VTVPA, the judgment creditor would agree to relinquish all claims and rights to further damages, and the United States would be subrogated to the rights of the judgment creditor against the debtor foreign state.\textsuperscript{199} However, unlike the VTVPA, the President would be urged, but not be required, to recoup these amounts as a prerequisite to releasing blocked assets or normalizing relations with the debtor foreign state. This approach would remove two of the major concerns regarding the VTVPA.\textsuperscript{200} The President’s foreign policy activities would not be

\textsuperscript{193} 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at §§ 405-07.
\textsuperscript{194} 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at §§ 402, 405(b).
\textsuperscript{196} 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at § 409.
\textsuperscript{197} 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at § 406(b) & (c).
\textsuperscript{198} See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{199} A similar approach could also be enacted to compensate judgment creditors of non-sovereign terrorist groups designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by the Executive branch pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a) (2000).
\textsuperscript{200} For a good discussion of these concerns regarding the FSIA’s state-sponsored
constrained by a recoupment precondition to normalization of relations with terrorist nations; and the assets of the United States overseas would likely not be subject to attachment and execution in retaliatory judgments obtained in foreign courts.

Such a proposal would assure that victims of international terrorism are compensated and would authorize the federal government to pursue reimbursement or other appropriate political action on their behalf, and would do so with minimal interference with the Executive branch's conduct of United States foreign policy. Any such comprehensive program would be an improvement over the scheme currently in effect which, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, relies on piecemeal civil litigation and a hodge-podge of rules regarding enforcement of judgments.

terrorism provisions, such as the possible seizure of United States assets abroad in execution of retaliatory judgments obtained under foreign laws and, more generally, the undermining of the Executive's authority in the area of foreign policy, see Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims, supra note 158, at 236-43 (explaining why the Executive Branch has opposed enforcement of some of the state-sponsored terrorism amendments); Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 701-06 (suggesting that the presence of state-sponsored terrorism lawsuits may interfere with the Executive's conduct of United States foreign policy).