A Guide for Foreign Investors to Environmental Laws in the United States

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I. INTRODUCTION

Few legal restrictions inhibit foreign investment in the United States. In fact, American assets have recently been an attractive investment. Japanese investment in United States real estate in 1989 was $14.8 billion, and it was not less than $7 billion in any year from 1985 to 1990. Of total Japanese investment, hotels and resorts accounted for approximately 36% in 1989, with office buildings representing 13%. By the end of 1988, foreign investors held 16.4% of all United States Treasury securities.

American businesses have also been appealing targets for foreign investment. From 1988 to 1991, more than five hundred foreign takeovers and investments in United States firms were reported to the Committee on Foreign Investment. Among these reported acquisitions were takeovers of businesses in aerospace, chemicals, computers, electronics, semiconductors, and telecommunications by companies from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Australia.

In the very recent past, foreign investment has become a source of...
increased political controversy. Opinion polls suggest that approximately 70% of Americans think that Japan has invested too much in the United States. Accordingly, in August, 1991, there were reportedly twenty-four bills to limit foreign investment pending in Congress.

Although efforts to limit the amount or aim of foreign investment in the United States may be increasingly common, they have generally been unsuccessful. In 1988, Congress did approve a provision to require foreign investors who were buying specified amounts of real estate and business interests to register with the federal government. However, proposals to limit the amount of direct foreign investment in the United States, impose higher capital gains taxes on foreign investors, or curtail acquisitions of American firms on national security grounds have been frustrated. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has described foreign investment as a "plus." The Reagan and Bush Administrations have "smiled on foreign investment" and are thought likely to veto anti-free trade legislation.

Thus, the restrictions on foreign investment in the United States, to the extent they exist, appear to be economic ones. One economic factor is of particular recent concern: the cost of complying with American environmental laws and responding to American environmental litigation. This article attempts an introduction, in some detail, to the primary environmental rules and laws of special interest to potential foreign investors in the United States.

II. United States Environmental Laws

For many years, American environmental law was almost exclusively a creature of the common law as developed in each of the several states. In the past twenty years, however, the federal and state governments have also passed a series of statutes designed to protect and to clean up the nation's air, water, and land.

Following is a discussion of the major federal environmental laws of general applicability to investors and businesses in the United

7. Id.
8. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2170(c) (1988), set up the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to review foreign investments that might impair "national security." Since its creation, the committee has blocked only one of the transactions reviewed, an acquisition of a United States airplane parts manufacturer by an arm of the Chinese government. Correll & Nash, Lifelines Abroad, A.F. MAG., Oct. 1991, at 42. That transaction had been attempted shortly after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Id.
12. Id.
States. Reasons are given for their significance. The primary common law bases for liability are first introduced. The article then explains the two major federal statutes governing discharges of pollutants into air and water. Next, the two major federal statutes governing hazardous waste are discussed, with emphasis on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, the law with the greatest and most surprising impact on business transactions. Finally, this section addresses certain specific environmental problems relevant to acquisition of property or a business or operation of a business.

However, this exposition is intended to be no more than an introduction. The importance that American environmental law plays in a decision to invest in the United States obviously depends on a number of factors, all of which cannot possibly be addressed in this format. Certain environmental laws and restrictions directed toward specific problems or industries are not examined. An investment in industries affected by these laws may require much more extensive and specific study. Moreover, because the federal government has generally tried to avoid preempting state statutes more restrictive than their federal counterparts, the potential investor must be aware that any state may have environmental laws and restrictions

13. See infra text accompanying notes 22-45.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 46-77.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 78-256.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 96-256.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 257-90.
20. A state law is expressly preempted when a federal statute or regulation explicitly provides that federal control will be exclusive. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Nelson Young, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-94 (2d ed. 1983). Even when federal law does not expressly preempt state legislation, implied preemption may be found in any of three alternative circumstances: (1) when the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that Congress has left no room for the states to supplement the federal scheme; (2) when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress' purposes and objectives of federal law; or (3) when compliance with both federal and state law is impossible. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).

A state law may be saved from preemption by a saving proviso contained in a federal
which are more restrictive than the federal statutes addressed below. Accordingly, no promise is made here to identify or explain each of the numerous twists, turns, and traps a foreign investor may encounter when confronting United States environmental law.

A. Common Law Enforcement of Environmental Interests

State common law is the original tool of environmental law enforcement. The traditional causes of action, discussed below, include nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability. The remedies provided by the common law include injunctive and monetary relief. The possibility of punitive damages, amounts awarded in excess of actual damages, also exists in cases of wanton behavior. Although common law develops in the individual state court systems, most common law torts vary little from state to state.

Nuisance is a primary common law cause of action for environmental torts. Nuisance is defined as “tortious conduct which produces unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another’s land.” Nuisances are either private or public. A private nuisance disturbs the property rights of particular persons. A public nuisance is an interference with the property rights of the community at large. Private parties are generally prevented from suing on a public nuisance. The common law of nuisance has provided a basis for actions to abate or recover damages for odors emanating from industrial facilities, contamination of neighboring groundwater, and the pollution of neighboring landowners’ soil. It is no defense that the nuisance was carried on in accordance with a permit statute. For example, CERCLA explicitly allows states to impose additional liability requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).


23. To recover damages for a private nuisance, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land, that some substantial interference has occurred of the kind intended, and that the interference was unreasonable. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (5th ed. 1984).

24. Id. § 90. A public nuisance is an act or omission “which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all.” Id. (quoting J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105 (1890)). A public nuisance might be a hog pen, the storage of explosives, gambling houses, or unlicensed prize fights. Id. § 90, n.19.

25. See generally id. § 86. A private party is generally not permitted to bring actions to abate a public nuisance unless it causes or threatens special damage to him or her apart from that to the general public. Then the private party can bring suit only to the extent necessary to protect his or her own interests. Id. §§ 89, 90.


27. See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum Corp., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982).
because a permit does not confer a license to harm the property of another.  

A second common law cause of action, trespass, is closely related to nuisance. Rather than the interference with the use and enjoyment of land that marks nuisance, trespass is an invasion of the exclusive possession of another's land. However, trespass requires a showing neither of damage to the land nor of intent. Generally if a trespass claim is successful, liability is found in nuisance as well.

A third liability theory, negligence, is the breach of a legal duty owed to another which causes damages to the non-breaching party. The legal duty may be conclusively mandated by a statute or rule defining a code of conduct. The duty may vary according to the defendant's knowledge of the activity's inherent danger. Accordingly, persons failing to exercise reasonable care in the handling or disposal of hazardous substances, or failing to meet the requirements imposed by laws governing them, may be liable to injured plaintiffs in negligence.

The common law negligence doctrine recognizes a duty to warn of danger. If a defendant knows about a hazardous product or condition and has no reason to believe that those who will come into contact with that product or condition will know of that danger, he or

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29. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 88B.
30. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 87. "The difference is that between walking across his lawn and establishing a bawdy house next door; between felling a tree across his boundary line and keeping him awake at night with the noise of a rolling mill." Id.
33. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). Liability may be imposed even though the harm was not intentional. To establish breach of a duty owed, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that the defendant failed to meet the standard of care of a "reasonable person." W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 32.
34. If the statute or rule is designed to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is part, and the harm that has occurred is the type meant to be prevented, a majority of courts hold that breach of duty owed is conclusively established under the doctrine of "negligence per se." W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 36.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The Restatement provides generally that a supplier of a product to be used by a third party may be liable if the supplier:
   (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition.
she must exercise reasonable care to warn them of such danger. Thus, unreasonable failure to warn can result in negligence liability. A fourth common law cause of action which applies to environmental torts is strict liability. It is imposed on a defendant without regard to the defendant's fault. There are narrowly construed areas of activity to which strict liability applies. Strict liability may be imposed when "abnormally dangerous conduct" results in injury to others.

Among the activities affecting the environment which have been held to give rise to strict liability are the contamination of groundwater from an underground tank, leaking of toxic materials from a railway car, and flooding of neighborhood lands by water from a mining operation. Earlier cases imposed strict liability for damages from the storage of inflammable liquids, the accumulation of sewage, and the emission of creosote fumes.

It is important to note that under common law theories, punitive damages may be available in addition to actual or compensatory damages. Large sums may be awarded to tort plaintiffs if a court or jury finds that the defendant's wrongful conduct was willful, grossly negligent, wanton, or otherwise abhorrent. The prospect of sustaining a large punitive damages award gives those whose activities may affect the environment a great incentive for carefulness.

B. Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act, which governs the discharge of pollutants into the air, was one of the first major pieces of environmental legislation passed in the United States. The Act provides comprehensive

or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.


38. Strict liability is imposed on a party apart from either an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without legal justification or a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 75.


40. Id. See Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).


44. See W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 78.


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federal regulation of both stationary and moving sources of air pollution. Both the Act and regulations promulgated under it are extremely complex. Generally, however, investors should be aware that a business facility's air emissions may be restricted, as outlined below, to meet applicable air pollution standards.

The Act imposes three sets of air quality standards. First, the Act prescribes National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for primary and secondary pollutants. Special location-specific restrictions apply in areas where NAAQS are being attained for the prevention of significant air quality deterioration (PSD). In areas where NAAQS are not being attained, called “nonattainment areas,” major new sources or modifications to existing sources must meet strict controls based on “the lowest achievable emission rate[s].” Second, the Act prescribes New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). These NSPS are issued industry by industry, based on application of the “best system of continuous emissions reduction.” Third, the Act sets standards for hazardous air pollutants, which are most strictly regulated.

47. A stationary source is “any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id. § 7411(a)(3).
48. Moving sources, essentially motor vehicles, are governed by Subchapter II of the Clean Air Act. Id. §§ 7521-74.
49. Id. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7410(a)(1).
50. “The arcane knowledge essential to resolve . . . disputes [over appropriate air pollution control measures under the Act] is foreign to non-experts, including judges.” Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1991).
52. Secondary pollutants are those which may affect the public welfare, including aesthetics. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24, 52.21 (1988). PSDs are imposed to prevent newly constructed sources or modifications to sources from causing serious decreases in air quality. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)-(k), 52.24, § 51 App. S (1991). In nonattainment areas, any business proposing source construction or modification must obtain reductions from other sources that will at least offset the additional pollution it will be emitting. Id.
58. Id. § 7412. These standards are set at levels which provide an “ample margin of safety to protect the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (1991), a tougher standard than the NAAQS, which are set at levels providing an “adequate margin of safety.” Id. There are numerous hazardous pollutants, including beryllium, asbestos, mercury, vinyl chloride, benzene, inorganic arsenic, radon from underground mines, and radionuclides. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988).
Enforcement of the Act is generally to be done by the states. The Act authorizes both criminal and civil penalties in the event of the emission of air pollutants not permitted under the statute. Monetary fines, imprisonment, or both may be imposed on "any responsible corporate officer." The Act also authorizes citizen suits, both against emission sources to enforce control requirements and against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce its non-discretionary duties.

A potential investor should consider the effects compliance with the Clean Air Act will have on business operating costs. If investment in an ongoing business is contemplated, these costs may be relatively easy to identify; however, the current degree of compliance should be examined. If planning expansion or new construction, the investor should determine if the site location is in a nonattainment area or has the PSD requirements which might affect the ability or cost of doing so. Thus, location can be very important in determining cost of compliance.

C. Federal Water Pollution and Control Act

The Federal Water Pollution and Control Act of 1972 (Clean Water Act) regulates discharges of pollutants into "navigable waters," defined to include the "waters of the United States." Title III of the Act requires the EPA to set technology-based "effluent limitations" on discharges from "point sources." The EPA has

60. 42 U.S.C §§ 7413(c), 7420 (1988) (civil penalties); id. § 7413(d)(criminal penalties).
61. Id. § 7413(c)(3).
62. Id. § 7604(a).
63. Id. § 7420.
65. The Clean Water Act defines "pollutant" broadly, id. § 1362(6), and includes in its definition "chemical waste" and "industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id.
66. See generally id. § 1251.
68. An "effluent limitation" is "any restriction . . . on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1988).
69. A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including . . . any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14).
issued effluent limitations for a number of pollutants. Discharges of toxic pollutants are regulated under stricter standards. Oil spills and hazardous substance spills are also specially regulated.

Enforcement under the Clean Water Act is primarily effected through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. No discharge into waters is permitted without a NPDES permit. Permitted discharges are overseen by enforcing agencies that periodically review monitoring reports, but the Act also gives private citizens the right to bring civil suit on their own behalf against anyone alleged to be in violation of the Act. Additionally, the EPA has the power to either issue an administrative order or seek an injunction to force compliance with effluent limitation and permit standards. The EPA may also assess civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each day the violation continues.

Like the discharge restrictions of the Clean Air Act, the limitations of the Clean Water Act may impose operating costs on a business beyond those with which a foreign investor may be familiar. It is prudent to identify these costs before making an investment, particularly in a new business venture. An investor should also evaluate whether an existing target business is in compliance with discharge requirements, because failure to comply may subject the business to liability.

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72. Id. § 1321.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988). “Discharge of a pollutant” includes “(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the ocean from any point source other than a vessel.” Id. The scope of the Act is broad enough to cover runoff from parking lots and other open spaces as well. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (1991).
75. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(k)(6), 122.42(a) (1991). The frequency of required reports is governed by the terms of the permit, but must be at least annual. Toxic discharges must be reported within twenty-four hours. Id.
D. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) specifically regulates the generation, storage, transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste. Hazardous waste is certain listed waste or other waste which is ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic. The RCRA requires that any person generating or transporting hazardous waste, or the owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility must apply for a permit and comply with applicable requirements. Generally, a generator may not accumulate hazardous waste onsite for more than ninety days before being considered the operator of a storage facility and thus subject to extensive permitting requirements. All shipments of hazardous waste are tracked from generation to disposal through shipping documents known as "manifests." Certain generators may be qualified as "small quantity generators," for which record keeping requirements may be relaxed.

RCRA requires EPA to establish standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities. These include requirements for financial responsibility for possible releases of hazardous waste. Owners and operators of surface impoundments, landfills, and treatment facilities must maintain insurance coverage of at least $3 million per occurrence.

RCRA provides various enforcement mechanisms. The Act authorizes EPA to assess civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for each violation of the Act. Those receiving criminal penalties are subject

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79. Id.
81. Id. § 261.22.
82. Id. § 261.23.
83. Id. § 261.24.
86. Id. §§ 262(B), 263(B).
87. Id. § 261.5.
88. Id. Generally, a small quantity generator is one which generates no more than one hundred kilograms of hazardous waste in a month. Id.
90. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(b), 265.147(b) (1990) (requiring $3 million coverage for "non-sudden accidental occurrences," $6 million for "sudden accidental occurrences").
to fines of up to $50,000 per day for first convictions as well as imprisonment. EPA can sue to immediately restrain a person contributing to the "imminent and substantial endangerment" resulting from the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste, as those terms are defined by the Act. RCRA also permits private parties to sue to enforce RCRA permits or standards, to enjoin RCRA violators, to seek an order that necessary action be taken by EPA or others, and to seek application of the Act's civil penalties.

E. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

Broadly stated, while RCRA regulates ongoing hazardous waste operations, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) addresses the cleanup of waste from previous activities. CERCLA makes available both public and private money to fund hazardous waste cleanup. CERCLA has spawned an industry of environmental consulting and lawyering. When confounded by various perceived mistakes and omissions in the drafting of CERCLA, judges have regularly interpreted liability expansively.

Liability under CERCLA is the most dangerous and surprising type of environmental liability, and it can be an expensive ailment. The EPA had identified 33,834 sites as potentially hazardous as of December 31, 1990. Although 1,126 of these sites have been listed on the EPA's National Priority List of contaminated sites, only

92. Id. § 6928(d).
93. Id. § 6973.
94. See id. §§ 6934, 6972-73.
95. Id. § 6972(a)(1).
97. Id. Congress made significant changes to CERCLA in the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-400, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Courts and practitioners sometimes refer to SARA's provisions separately. However, because it is not important for the purposes of this article to distinguish between the original CERCLA provisions and those of SARA, this article refers only to CERCLA.
99. For a discussion of the liability of private entities under CERCLA, see infra text accompanying notes 103-256.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction").
sixty-three sites have been cleaned up. The EPA estimates the average cleanup cost of a site to be $30 million; as much as $750 million may need to be spent to comply with CERCLA's standards.

1. Scope of CERCLA Liability

The broad scope of CERCLA liability makes it especially significant to potential investors. CERCLA liability attaches in the event of an actual or threatened "release" of a "hazardous substance" into the environment. There is no minimum standard for a release. Any traceable amount of a hazardous substance is sufficient to support liability. This refusal to recognize a de minimus exception greatly increases the likelihood that a legally significant release will occur.

Liability imposed by CERCLA is strict, without regard to fault, knowledge, or intent. Under a strict liability standard, causation is not at issue. Instead, a party need only be within one of CERCLA's defined categories of potentially responsible parties to be liable. These broad categories include past and current owners or operators of facilities at which a release has occurred, those who arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at the place of

102. Id.
104. Id. Just six years before, the average cleanup cost was estimated to be $12 million. 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1395 (Dec. 21, 1984).
105. "Release" is broadly defined to include a spilling, leaking, dumping, or "disposing" into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). "Disposal" has been construed to include the migration or leaking of waste from its initial location. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 200 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
110. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
release, and those who transported the hazardous substances to the place of release. If either an investor or the business invested in falls within one of the enumerated categories of liable parties, the investor may be liable for at least some portion of the cleanup costs.

The liability of any responsible party is joint and several. Courts have recognized that "if there are distinct harms that are capable of division, then liability should be apportioned according to the contribution of each defendant." However, unless a defendant can meet the burden of showing a reasonable basis for apportionment, any one responsible party may be held liable for all cleanup costs incurred. An investor can thus be liable for the entire cost of cleanup if other responsible parties cannot be located or are not solvent. This puts particular pressure on the deep pocket investor to avoid liability under CERCLA.

CERCLA provides that either government or private parties may bring actions to recover cleanup costs. Because any potentially responsible party may thus seek contribution from any other party who may be liable under section 9607(a), the harsh results of joint and several liability are somewhat mitigated. CERCLA also implicitly recognizes the validity of indemnification agreements among

113. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
115. Under joint and several, or "entire" liability, "a defendant might be liable for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though the defendant's act concurred or combined with that of another wrongdoer to produce the result..." W. Keeton, supra note 23, § 47.
119. Joint and several liability has been described as EPA's "atom bomb." N. Y. Times, June 16, 1991, § 3, at 1.
120. Under § 9606, the EPA may order a responsible party to take action in certain cases in which the EPA determines that an actual or threatened release poses an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1989). Alternatively, the EPA can perform cleanup work itself and then seek reimbursement from responsible parties in a cost recovery action. Id. §§ 9604, 9607(a)(4)(A).
121. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
private parties. However, these agreements do not shield any potentially liable party from suits by the government.

The broad scope of CERCLA makes it virtually impossible to contest liability under the EPA cleanup orders. Courts cannot hear a pre-enforcement challenge to the specifics of a government-ordered cleanup. Moreover, the EPA can assess stiff fines against parties refusing to comply with its cleanup orders. Once a responsible party acting pursuant to a cleanup order incurs costs, it may only recover those costs to the extent it can demonstrate that the EPA's selection of the response action ordered was illegal or "arbitrary and capricious."

Finally, liability is retroactive. The fact that CERCLA imposes liability on parties for acts occurring prior to the enactment of CERCLA has not been held to violate due process. Thus, companies are liable for response costs associated with releases occurring before 1980, when CERCLA was enacted.

2. Statutorily Responsible Parties

The effect of CERCLA depends largely on the construction of the descriptions of four categories of responsible parties. Generally, responsible parties are the current and past owners or operators of facilities from which a hazardous substance has been released, those who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at such facilities,

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124. Id.
125. Id. § 9606(a).
126. See id. § 9613(h) (codifying pre-SARA case law). Prior to 1986, courts either did not view an EPA order as a final action or held that a cost recovery action under CERCLA was an adequate remedy in court for review. See, e.g., Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 388-92 (8th Cir. 1987); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.H. 1985).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3) (1989). For example, the EPA is authorized to fine violators $25,000 for each day the violation or failure to comply with an abatement order continues. Id. Additionally, a person who "fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of [the EPA]" may be liable for punitive damages in an amount equal to three times the EPA's costs. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
128. Id. § 9606(b)(2)(D).
and those who transported the hazardous substances to such facilities.\textsuperscript{131} An understanding of the operation of CERCLA begins with an understanding of the individuals and entities that may be deemed responsible parties.

The current "owner or operator of a vessel or a facility . . . from which there is a release"\textsuperscript{132} is one of the explicitly liable parties under CERCLA.\textsuperscript{133} The Act defines an "owner or operator" to be: "in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment."\textsuperscript{134}

The ramifications of owner/operator liability can be staggering for purchasers of American real estate or businesses. Pursuant to strict liability principles,\textsuperscript{135} the current owner or operator of a facility is liable even if it never released hazardous wastes there and even if no hazardous waste was released there during the period of current ownership or operation.\textsuperscript{136} Section 9607(a) "does not require that the present owner contribute to the release, but merely that [the party] is the present owner of the facility where there has been a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance."\textsuperscript{137} Accordingly, anyone buying contaminated property is a responsible party under CERCLA and is thus potentially liable for the full cost of cleanup. This is true even if the property is leased to a third party.\textsuperscript{138}

The second category of liable party under CERCLA is the owner or operator at the time of disposal.\textsuperscript{139} On the face of the statute, those who owned or operated the facility between the disposal and the current ownership or operation would not be responsible parties.

\textsuperscript{131} 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
\textsuperscript{132} Id. § 9607(a)(1).
\textsuperscript{133} Id.
\textsuperscript{134} Id. § 9601(20)(A) (1989). "Facility" is defined to include any area where a hazardous substance is stored, disposed of, or spilled. Id. § 9601(9).
\textsuperscript{135} See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\textsuperscript{139} 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1989). "Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of" is potentially liable. Id.
However, some courts have broadly construed the term "disposal" to apply to the continuous, ongoing migration or leaching of hazardous substances. Thereby those courts have found every owner or operator of contaminated property between the owner or operator at the time of disposal and the current owner or operator to be liable for a release.

The third set of liable parties under CERCLA are those who "arranged for" disposal or treatment of hazardous substances. Arrangers liable under CERCLA have typically been generators of hazardous substances. Liability attaches whether or not the arranger generated the hazardous substances. No ownership or physical possession of the hazardous substances is required to establish arranger liability. However, courts have generally refused to find arranger liability in limited instances when the defendant sold a useful product containing hazardous substances, and the product was later disposed of.

Potential investors should be cognizant of the possibility that they can be liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs incurred at a site other than one they own if hazardous substances they arranged to dispose of are released into the environment. This off site liability is particularly vexing because the arranger lacks control over the circumstances leading to the release. Because CERCLA liability is strict, the fact that the arranger may have taken precautions to

140. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1991). An arranger is: "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances." Id.
143. Practitioners often use only the term "generator" to refer to this category of liable parties. However, this article uses the term "arranger" because the scope of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988) is not limited to those who generate hazardous substances. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (attaching liability to any party making "the crucial decision how [the hazardous waste] would be disposed of or treated, and by whom").
146. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990) (no liability for sale of transformers which leaked PCBs 40 years later); but see New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (sale of transformer oil to a dragstrip for dust control not a sale of a useful product, but intended to be a disposal).
148. See supra text accompanying note 109.
see that the disposal was safe and legal will not be a defense to liability. While an arranger can seek contribution from the wrongdoers, those entities may be bankrupt or dissolved. CERCLA's joint and several liability can make the relatively blameless arranger the source of substantial cleanup funds.

Transporters are the fourth category of party explicitly liable under section 9607 of CERCLA. Transporters are parties who accept hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities. If response costs are later incurred by a release of the hazardous substance, the transporter becomes a liable party. Perhaps because the statutory definition is very clear, there has been no reported litigation over the scope of transporter liability.

3. Judge-Made “Controller” Liability

CERCLA's identification of responsible parties, while far from plain, makes owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters liable for response costs. Through expansive interpretations of the definitions of owner, operator, and arranger, however, CERCLA liability has been imposed on parties not explicitly listed in the statute, including parent corporations; corporate stockholders, directors, and officers; and employees with control over disposal decisions. Even lenders may be liable by virtue of their perceived control over waste

150. Id.
151. E.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (liability against parent corporation who could have controlled conduct of 100% owned subsidiary). But see FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987) (parent ownership of all stock, common board of directors, some common officers, and lease from parent to subsidiary found insufficient to hold former parent liable as agent).
152. E.g., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding three corporate officers liable under CERCLA because they were responsible for the day to day operations of the disposal facility); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (93% shareholder and president potentially liable under CERCLA because of close involvement with day to day operations at site); United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (majority shareholders and officers held liable under CERCLA because they actively participated in management of facility); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owning stockholder who managed the corporation held liable under CERCLA and New York law without piercing the corporate veil).
153. E.g., United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 742-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (plant supervisor who had “actual control” over generator company’s hazardous substances “possessed” such substances for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).
disposal activities.\textsuperscript{154}

It is particularly important that potential investors be aware that general principles of limited corporate liability have not shielded individuals from CERCLA liability. In finding such liability, courts have not necessarily “pierced the corporate veil”\textsuperscript{155} of limited liability. Rather, courts have deemed the accused individual or corporate shareholders, and corporate employees, to be directly liable as owners or operators within the meaning of CERCLA’s statutory definitions.\textsuperscript{156} These decisions have almost always focused on the party’s degree of control over the handling or disposal of a company’s hazardous substances.

A seminal decision finding such direct individual liability is \textit{New York v. Shore Realty Corp.}\textsuperscript{157} One of the defendants was Donald LeoGrande, a Shore Realty stockholder and officer.\textsuperscript{158} In evaluating CERCLA’s definition of “owner or operator,” the court concentrated on the phrase “owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at [the] facility.”\textsuperscript{159} The court interpreted this language to mean that an owning stockholder who manages a corporation, such as LeoGrande, is liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator. Furthermore, the court suggested that active management may not be necessary to trigger liability: “[I]n any event, LeoGrande is \textit{in charge} of the operation of the facility in question, and as such is an ‘operator’ within the meaning of CERCLA.”\textsuperscript{160}

Many courts, embracing the “in charge” aspect of \textit{Shore Realty}, have held that an individual or entity may be liable for response costs incurred by a corporation solely by virtue of mere capacity to control, whatever the level of control actually exercised.\textsuperscript{161} Various factors have led courts to conclude that an entity or individual has the capacity to control a facility. For example, in \textit{United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.},\textsuperscript{162} the Eighth Circuit court of appeals held the president of the N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{155} See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{156} United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989). “There is, of course, no basis, under CERCLA, to distinguish between the liability of an individual stockholder who actively participates in the management of a corporation and a corporate stockholder which so participates. Both individuals and corporations are included within the definition of ‘person’ under [42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)].” \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{157} 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
\item \textsuperscript{158} \textit{Id. at} 1052.
\item \textsuperscript{159} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{160} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{162} 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
\end{itemize}
(NEPACCO) liable as a "contributor" under RCRA. Although he was a major stockholder, he had no knowledge of a plan to dispose of hazardous waste, and he was not present at the plant during the period of waste disposal. The court claimed to use an analysis of personal liability similar to the analysis it would apply under CERCLA. The court then held that, although the president was "not personally involved in the actual decision to transport and dispose of the hazardous substances," he in fact was "in charge of and directly responsible for all of NEPACCO's operations, . . . and he had the ultimate authority to control the disposal of NEPACCO's hazardous substances."

Another decision finding owner liability for a shareholder based on actual participation in management is United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. Through a merger, Kayser-Roth became the sole shareholder of Stamina Mills, a textile manufacturer that had been operating for fourteen years prior to the merger. Stamina Mills dissolved in 1977. In the mid-1980s, the EPA brought suit against Kayser-Roth to recover cleanup costs incurred in remediating groundwater contamination at the Stamina Mills property. Kayser-Roth attempted to escape liability by arguing that it had never been the owner or operator of the Stamina Mills plant.

The court found Kayser-Roth to be an operator because Kayser-Roth exercised control over Stamina Mills. Persuasive evidence of Kayser-Roth's control included its authority over money and budgets, its requirement that government environmental inquiries be forwarded to it, its power to disapprove real estate transaction, and the placement of Kayser-Roth personnel in almost all executive positions. Other courts have considered additional factors to find capacity to control.

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163. Id. at 745-46 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1986)).
164. Id. at 745.
165. Id. at 744.
166. Id.
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id. at 17.
170. Id. at 21.
171. Id.
Not all courts have viewed CERCLA liability so broadly. However, the reliance of many courts on capacity to control can impose very broad liability and thus should be of concern to potential investors. While most courts following the capacity to control test have also cited and relied upon facts demonstrating actual control, numerous courts have expressed the view that liability depends only upon capacity to control. Under these cases, foreign parent corporations may be liable for the CERCLA transgressions of their United States subsidiaries merely through the normal involvement of a parent in a subsidiary. Deep pocket parent corporations, as well as individual employees and stockholders, should be aware of this potential for liability.

4. Indirect Liability of Shareholders: Piercing the Corporate Veil

In the cases discussed above, courts interpreted the section 9607(a) categories to include individuals or entities related to the offending corporate conduct. In other cases, courts have held corporate stockholders liable for CERCLA response costs, not because those stockholders were owners, operators or arrangers, but because the tests were met for piercing the common law protection of the "corporate veil." Generally a stockholder, whether a corporation or individual stockholder, is not responsible for the liabilities of the corporation in

1204; United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1544; (4) benefit from the waste disposal practices in effect, Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1204; (5) presence or indicia of ownership, id.; (6) whether the corporation is closely held, Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Ill. 1990); N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 726; and (7) whether the individual holds the position of officer or director, Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1543-44.

A closely held corporation is one in which the shares are held by a single shareholder or closely knit group of shareholders. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 257 (3d ed. 1983). A closely held corporation offers the limited liability of a corporation while retaining some of the internal management attributes of an individual proprietorship or partnership. Id.

173. E.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). The court held that James, the parent corporation of a party's predecessor company, was not directly liable as an "owner or operator" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) because "CERCLA does not define 'owners' or 'operators' as including the parent company of offending wholly-owned subsidiaries." Id. at 82-83. “[If] Congress [had] wanted to extend the [CERCLA] liability to parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free to do so.” Id. at 83.


which it owns stock. Liability is limited to the assets of the corporation. However, in certain circumstances, courts are willing to disregard the corporate form, or pierce the corporation veil, for purposes of assessing liability. Then they will treat assets of the shareholders of the corporation as though they were the assets of the corporation itself.\textsuperscript{177}

Typically, the courts will pierce the corporate veil in two limited situations: (1) when the corporation and its stockholders share such a unity of interest that, by all objective measures, they do not exist as separate entities, and (2) when an inequitable result would follow if the acts giving rise to liability are treated as those of the corporation.\textsuperscript{178} Corporate veil piercing also applies between parent corporations and their subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{179} In the area of environmental tort liability, the "federal common law [of corporate veil piercing] borrows heavily from state law."\textsuperscript{180}

The potentially severe consequences of veil piercing for a foreign corporation are demonstrated in \textit{United States v. Arkwright, Inc.}\textsuperscript{181} In \textit{Arkwright}, the defendant foreign parent corporation moved for summary judgment of a CERCLA claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{182} Although there was an admitted absence of minimum contacts between the defendant parent corporation and the forum...
state of New Hampshire, the court found that the parent corporation, OCE Van Der Grinten N.V. (OCE), was nevertheless subject to jurisdiction. The court disregarded corporate separateness between Arkwright and OCE because: (1) OCE owned 100% of Arkwright's stock; (2) Arkwright's capital and operating budget were subject to OCE's approval; (3) OCE performed internal audits of Arkwright; (4) OCE guaranteed Arkwright's lines of credit; and (5) any significant financial decisions made by Arkwright required approval by the OCE directors who sat on Arkwright's board.\textsuperscript{183}

In contrast to judicial willingness to impose direct liability, other courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil. The Fifth Circuit, for example, refused to pierce the corporate veil in \textit{Joslyn Mfg. v. T.L. James & Co.},\textsuperscript{184} stating that "veil piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used as a \textit{sham} to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability."\textsuperscript{186} Accordingly, when the district court had run through its laundry list of veil piercing factors and found that the facts did not justify piercing the corporate veil, and when the facts did not support any finding that the subsidiary was a "bogus shell"\textsuperscript{186} for the parent to hide behind, no veil piercing was allowed.\textsuperscript{187}

In \textit{New York v. Shore Realty Corp.},\textsuperscript{188} the Second Circuit upheld the corporate form even when it found the corporation's managing stockholder directly liable as an owner or operator.\textsuperscript{189} The court stated that:

\begin{quote}

Both the New York Court of Appeals and this court have been quite insistent that the corporate form will not be disregarded unless the opposing party shows that the corporate form is being used fraudulently or as a means of carrying on business for personal rather than corporate ends. The State's claim has not at this stage risen to that level.\textsuperscript{190}
\end{quote}

As a practical matter, corporate veil piercing is unlikely even in the context of expansive liability for environmental cleanup. Investors who incorporate to protect their personal assets are careful to

\begin{footnotes}
\item 183. \textit{Arkwright}, 697 F. Supp. at 1139.
\item 184. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), \textit{cert. denied}, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
\item 185. \textit{Id.} at 83 (emphasis in original).
\item 186. \textit{Id.} at 84.
\item 187. \textit{Id.} In \textit{Joslyn}, Lincoln Creosoting Co. was incorporated in 1935 under an arrangement whereby T.L. James & Co. would put up the initial capital in exchange for the stock of the company. Lincoln ran a creosoting operation from which it discharged chemicals until it was sold to Joslyn in 1950. Joslyn operated the plant until Koppers bought it in 1969. In the action before the fifth circuit, Joslyn asserted a right to sue James as an owner or operator of the plant by virtue of its stock ownership in Lincoln. \textit{Id.}
\item 188. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
\item 189. \textit{Id.} at 1052. \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 157-60.
\item 190. \textit{Shore Realty}, 759 F.2d at 1032 (citation omitted).
\end{footnotes}
observe corporate formalities. Courts are generally reluctant to disregard the function served by the corporate form of promoting business enterprises and fulfilling business expectations.

5. Liability of Acquiring Companies in Mergers and Acquisitions

When two companies merge through typical state law procedures, the surviving corporation retains the obligations of the merged entities. Accordingly, if a corporate investor acquires a company through merger, the surviving corporation will retain the environmental liabilities of the acquired corporation, whether those liabilities were acquired by contract, operation of common law, or statute.

The purchaser of a corporation’s assets is generally treated differently. An investor who purchases assets traditionally does not assume the seller’s liabilities. However, four exceptions to this rule apply when: (1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the seller’s liability; (2) the transaction amounts to a de facto merger of the purchaser and seller; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability.

The first and fourth exceptions are relatively simple and require little discussion. The parties to an asset purchase are free to allocate their respective rights and obligations among themselves and the courts will respect such agreements. However, when there is actual evidence of fraud, courts will not permit wrongdoers to hide behind an asset purchase to avoid liability.

The other two exceptions are more complex. The transaction will be considered a de facto merger when the following elements exist: (a) continuation of the management, personnel, physical locations, assets, or general business operation of the seller; (b) continuity of shareholders resulting from the purchaser paying for the acquired

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191. 15 W. FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7121 (1983). Virtually all United States jurisdictions recognize that:

In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in existence, the latter corporation is liable for the debts, contracts and torts of the former, at least to the extent of the property and assets received, and this liability is often expressly imposed by statute.


193. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 191, § 7330.

194. Id.
assets with shares of its own stock; (c) cessation of the seller corporation’s original business operations accompanied by liquidation and dissolution as soon as practicably possible; and (d) assumption by the purchasing corporation of the seller’s obligations which would ordinarily be necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the seller’s normal business operations.196

In *Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.*,196 the Ninth Circuit refused to find a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a *de facto* merger because the continuity of shareholders element was not present. The consideration paid by the acquiring corporation was a combination of cash, a promissory note, and payment of some debts. However, no stock of the acquiring company or its parent was exchanged as part of the sale.197 There were common shareholders, but they had bought their stock on the open market, and no former shareholder owned more than two-and-one-half percent of the new company.198 The court affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant.199

When applying the exception for business enterprise continuation, courts consider several factors: (a) continuity of employees, supervisory personnel, and physical location; (b) production of the same product with the same name; (c) continuity of general business operations; and (d) purchaser holding itself out as a continuation of the seller.200

The court in *Louisiana Pacific* considered the exception for business enterprise continuation as well as the *de facto* merger exception when deciding liability under CERCLA. The court stated that the continuing business exception would not be operative if the new corporation did not have notice of the old corporation’s CERCLA liability or if the business which generated the waste had not continued.201

However, other states recognize more expansive continuation liability for product line successors.202 Under this doctrine, a court may impose liability on the successor corporation for injuries caused by a

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196. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
197. *Id.* at 1265.
198. *Id.*
199. *Id.* at 1262.
200. *Id.* at 1265 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985)); Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979)).
201. *Id.* at 1265-66.
202. E.g., Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (holding successor corporation liable when it acquired a manufacturing business and continued the manufacture of its line of products); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (holding that when the successor corporation acquired a manufacturing business and continued the output of its line of products, the successor corporation was liable for defects in products manufactured by the predecessor business).
defective product manufactured by the predecessor corporation. The EPA policy argues that the product line exception applies to CERCLA actions if the successor corporation acquires the assets of the predecessor corporation and substantially continues those business operations. This is particularly dangerous in the CERCLA context: buying the assets of a corporation and continuing to produce the same product could conceivably subject the new owner to any liability of the predecessor business.

More than one exception to the traditional rule against liability for the successor corporation can work in conjunction. In the *Acushnet River* case, the district court found a *de facto* merger when Aerovox, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of RTE Corp., purchased the assets of Belleville Industries in exchange for RTE stock. Aerovox continued to manufacture the same products as Belleville had and sold them under the same name Belleville had used. The Belleville president, vice president, and treasurer all assumed the same positions at Aerovox and became Aerovox directors. Aerovox used the same banking institutions, the same insurance company, the same physical facilities and operated with the same employees. Belleville dissolved shortly after the transaction. The court found continuity of enterprise and held that Aerovox clearly assumed all of the obligations of Belleville necessary to carry on its business operations uninterrupted. Despite a question of whether there was continuity of shareholders, the court held that a *de facto* merger had taken place and that such continuity was only one factor to be considered.

Such a broad construction of the *de facto* merger exception is not alone. A recent decision that rejected successor liability in a private cost recovery action, *Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.*, was overruled by the Sixth Circuit. The lower court had reasoned that because CERCLA did not mention successor corporations, but did

205. *Id.* at 1012.
206. *Id.* at 1015-16.
207. *Id.* at 1016.
208. *Id.* at 1017-19.
209. *Id.* at 1018.
mention limited liability to the four section 9607(a) categories. The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of the term "corporation," one of the "persons" liable under CERCLA, included the successor corporation resulting from a merger. The court found its broad interpretation to be consistent with the legislative intent of CERCLA to promote swift and effective response to hazardous waste sites and to charge the cost of cleanup to those responsible for the hazardous conditions.

6. Liability of Dissolved Corporations

Another illustration of the expanse of CERCLA liability is that even dissolved corporations may be liable for response costs. In United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., the court ruled that state capacity statutes were preempted by federal law to the extent they shielded a corporation otherwise liable under CERCLA. The court stated that "if the effect of a state capacity statute is to limit the liability of a party Congress meant to hold liable for cleanup costs, Congress intended CERCLA to preempt it." The reach of the holding in Sharon Steel is questionable. There the dissolving corporation had not completed distributing its assets. It is difficult to understand how a court can impose liability on a company with no remaining assets. Some of the difficulties in imposing liability on a dead company are that it has no legal capacity to be sued and is not amenable to service of process. Moreover, a corporation is an artificial person created solely by state law; if it no longer exists under state law, there is nothing left to sue.

Other courts have disagreed with the rationale in Sharon Steel. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that state law will be used to determine whether an entity has "capacity to be sued." This was the

212. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
213. 922 F.2d at 1244.
214. Id. at 1247.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1244.
217. Id. at 1247.
219. Id. at 1498.
220. Id. ("Here, the funeral is still going on.")
221. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (holding that a dissolved corporation was "dead and buried," id. at 646, and not liable for costs related to cleanup, although its successor may be).
222. 16A W. FLETCHER, supra note 191, § 8142.
223. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 172, § 78.
224. Levins Metal Corp. v. Parr Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
same result reached by the Eighth Circuit in its *N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.* decision.  

7. Limitations on and Defenses to Liability

a. Explicit Statutory Defenses

CERCLA provides few defenses to liability. The only explicit defenses to liability require demonstrating that a release resulted from an act of God, an act of war, or solely from an act of a third party. The third party defense applies to any act or omission of a third party which results in the actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance. It does not apply when the third party is an employee or agent of either the defendant or a party with whom the defendant has a "contractual relationship." A contractual relationship can be based on land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession. Thus, the defendant who purchased property from an entity which was solely responsible for a release on the property is not protected from liability.

b. Innocent Landowner Protections

However, CERCLA does provide a defense for "innocent" purchasers of land through its definition of "contractual relationship." This defense is available if: (1) the defendant acquired the property from which the hazardous substance was released after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance; and (2) the defendant can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(a) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had "no reason to know" after all appropriate inquiry consistent with good commercial practices that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility;
(b) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by

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225. 810 F.2d 726, 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
227. *Id.* § 9607(b)(2).
228. *Id.* § 9607(b)(3).
229. *Id.*
escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation; OR
(c) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest; AND
(d) The defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or consequences.\textsuperscript{233}

It is difficult to qualify for “innocence” under CERCLA. The concepts a nongovernmental defendant must use to demonstrate compliance, “no reason to know,” “all appropriate inquiry” under the circumstances, and “due care” remain undefined.\textsuperscript{234} Nevertheless, some courts have held purchasers to be qualified for innocent landowner protection.\textsuperscript{235}

c. Security Interest Protection

CERCLA explicitly exempts creditors from its “owner and operator” definition.\textsuperscript{236} The provision was intended to prevent lenders or other creditors having ownership interests such as mortgages or deeds of trust from incurring liability.\textsuperscript{237} However, the few courts addressing this issue have interpreted the exemption narrowly, leading to extensive and expensive CERCLA liability for lenders.\textsuperscript{238}

In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,\textsuperscript{239} the court held that a mortgage lender with a security interest in contaminated property became liable as an owner under CERCLA when it acquired the property at the foreclosure sale.\textsuperscript{240} Once the lender had

\textsuperscript{233} Id. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).
\textsuperscript{234} Id.
\textsuperscript{235} E.g., United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989). In the Pacific Hide case, the defendants had received shares in Pacific Hide as a gift from their father, the business' founder. Id. at 1345. The United States sued to recoup cleanup costs incurred at a recycling yard contaminated with PCBs that was owned by Pacific Hide. Id. at 1343. The court found that the defendants, who had virtually no involvement with the business, had no reason to know of the release of PCBs. Id. at 1348-49. The court further held that the defendants had made “all appropriate inquiry” required to qualify for the innocent landowner defense, even though they had made no inquiry at all. Id. Because the presence of PCBs was not obvious and the defendants had no specialized knowledge or experience about PCBs or hazardous waste, their failure to inspect was reasonable. Thus, they were not liable as owners or operators. Id.

\textsuperscript{236} 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). Exempted is any person “who, without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility.” Id.


\textsuperscript{238} The director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s division of liquidations has stated that more than four hundred properties seized by it contain hazardous waste or asbestos, and that the liability associated with the materials could significantly increase the cost of the savings and loan bailout. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at D1, col. 5.

\textsuperscript{239} 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)

\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 575. The bank then held record title for four years before its motion for
taken title, there was no security interest left to protect. The bank thus became an owner and was liable for response costs under CERCLA.\textsuperscript{241} Other courts have reached this result on similar facts.\textsuperscript{242}

However, in \textit{United States v. Mirabile},\textsuperscript{243} another district court held that a foreclosing lender which did not participate in the day-to-day operations or waste disposal activities of the property would not lose the protection of the secured lender exemption. The exemption applied so long as the lender's participation was no more extensive than merely monitoring the borrower's financial affairs, even if the lender held title to the property for a short time. Although the court did enumerate specific activities that would preclude a finding that the lender was merely protecting its security interest,\textsuperscript{244} the difficulty inherent in determining the permitted level of lender participation and monitoring ought to be of great concern to any lender.

In fact, in \textit{United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.},\textsuperscript{245} the Eleventh Circuit interpreted lender liability much more broadly than did the court in \textit{Mirabile}.\textsuperscript{246} Fleet Factors Corp. became a lender when it advanced operating funds to Swainsboro Print Works against the assignment of Swainsboro's accounts receivable.\textsuperscript{247} As collateral for the advances, Fleet Factors also obtained a security interest in Swainsboro's textile facility. After Swainsboro filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, Fleet advanced no more funds but continued to collect on the accounts receivable already assigned to it. Later, Fleet foreclosed on its security interest.\textsuperscript{248} The EPA inspected the facility and found 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing hazardous substances and asbestos on the property. Fleet subsequently incurred $400,000 in cleanup costs.\textsuperscript{249}

Although the court in \textit{Fleet Factors} believed that it had settled on a middle ground between the position of the government and the

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\item \textsuperscript{241} See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). In \textit{Guidice}, the mortgagee bank held title for eight months. The court held that the security interest exemption did not apply during the time. "When a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable [under CERCLA] to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been." \textit{Id.} at 563.
\item \textsuperscript{242} \textit{Id.} at 1558.
\item \textsuperscript{243} \textit{Id.} at 1555.
\item \textsuperscript{244} \textit{Id.} at 1552.
\item \textsuperscript{245} \textit{Id.} at 1553.
\item \textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id.} at 1557.
\item \textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.} at 1550 (11th Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
\item \textsuperscript{248} \textit{Id.} at 1558.
\item \textsuperscript{249} \textit{Id.} at 1558.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
lender, the court’s position was in fact extreme. The court rejected as too permissive the Mirabile rule that “[m]ere financial ability to control waste disposal practices . . . [is not] sufficient for the imposition of liability.” Instead, the court adopted an expansive capacity to control test by which a “secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.” However, the court indicated that a lender could, without subjecting itself to liability, monitor any aspect of a debtor’s business and become involved in occasional and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest.

Thus, in Fleet Factors, the lender was not held liable when it advanced funds to Swainsboro against the assignment of Swainsboro’s accounts receivable, paid and arranged for security deposits for utility service, and informed the debtor that it would not advance any more money. However, Fleet Factors the lender did become liable when it later required the debtor:

to seek its approval before shipping its goods to customers, established the price for excess inventory, dictated when and to whom the finished goods should be shipped, determined when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office administrator at the site, received and processed employment and tax forms, controlled access to the facilities, and contracted . . . to dispose of the fixtures and equipment.

A disturbing aspect of the decisions in Fleet Factors and Mirabile is the difficulty in determining what participation is permitted. In neither case did the involvement giving rise to liability have an actual relationship to the handling or disposal of hazardous waste. As a practical matter, any lender making a significant loan will attain some oversight of the borrower’s business and may thereby gain “capacity to influence the [borrower’s] treatment of hazardous waste,” which could subject it to Fleet Factors liability. None of the decisions provides much comfort for lenders worried about hazardous waste liabilities.

250. Id. at 1558.
252. Id. at 1558.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1559.
255. Id.
256. See also In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 673 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there must be some actual management of a plant before a secured creditor can be liable, but declining to rule otherwise on control).

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F. Special Problems

1. Underground Storage Tanks

In July, 1991, the EPA revised technical rules governing most underground petroleum storage tanks. These rules require that all existing tanks be replaced or upgraded to meet federal restrictions, including corrosion protection and spill and overflow protection. In addition, tank owners and operators need to employ some method of detecting releases.

The EPA has also adopted rules requiring tank owners and operators to demonstrate some form of "financial responsibility." Most facilities will be required to purchase insurance, unless they can self-insure in the amount of $500,000 or more per incident.

These rules are of concern to any investor who is considering starting or purchasing either a business which uses underground storage tanks or real estate on which such tanks are located. The cost of doing business may be significantly increased by these monitoring and financial responsibility requirements.

2. Asbestos

The presence of asbestos is a significant obstacle to the sale, leasing, and operation of buildings. Asbestos was routinely used in construction from the 1880s until the 1970s. The physical and chemical characteristics of asbestos fibers pose a significant health risk when in the air. Asbestos-containing material (ACM) is found in three forms: sprayed or troweled on ceilings and walls; in insulation around hot or cold pipes, ducts, and boilers; and in other products such as ceiling tiles and floorboards. However, as long as the ACM is in good condition, not "friable" and not disturbed, it probably does not pose a health risk.

OSHA contains no requirement that commercial buildings be

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258. Id. § 280.21.
259. Id. § 280.40. The release detection compliance is phased in over five years. Id.
260. Id. §§ 280.90, 280.93.
261. Id. § 280.95.
262. Id. § 280.93.
265. "Friable" asbestos is that which can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure. Id. § 1.
tested for ACM. However, building owners should not ignore known risks. An owner or lessor of a building with friable asbestos can be in breach of the common law duty to warn.\textsuperscript{268}

Finally, even if the ACM is currently not a threat, a potential investor must consider the effect of ACM regulations on the cost of any planned demolition or renovation.\textsuperscript{267} Any demolition of a building containing ACM requires advance notice to the EPA. Moreover, anyone doing demolition or renovation must both apply wet removal techniques and avoid any visible dust emissions during the removal, transport, and disposal of ACM.\textsuperscript{268}

3. \textit{State and Federal Disclosure Requirements}

Under CERCLA, any person in charge of a facility is required to notify the National Response Center as soon as he or she has knowledge of an unauthorized release of a hazardous substance in an amount greater than or equal to the reportable quantity for that substance.\textsuperscript{269} Reportable quantities are determined by EPA for many hazardous substances.\textsuperscript{270} CERCLA also contains provisions which require the formation of emergency planning systems at facilities within each state for the event of unauthorized releases of hazardous substances.\textsuperscript{271}

States may also have their own notification requirements. For example, the California Water Code requires any person who discharges certain hazardous substances into “waters of the state”\textsuperscript{272} to notify the Office of Emergency Services or appropriate Regional Water Quality Control Board as soon as the person has knowledge of the discharge or possible discharge, so long as notification is possible and will not impede remediation efforts.\textsuperscript{273} California statutes also require disclosure of information about asbestos in buildings.\textsuperscript{274} Any owner, lessee, sublessee, or agent of an owner of a public or commercial building built prior to 1979 must notify his or her employees, lessees, and co-owners of every known location of asbestos-containing

\textsuperscript{266} See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
\textsuperscript{268} Id. § 61.145.
\textsuperscript{269} 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1986).
\textsuperscript{270} 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1991). A reportable quantity is set between one pound and five thousand pounds, depending on the toxicity of the substance. The reportable quantity is measured over a twenty-four hour period. Id.
\textsuperscript{271} Id. § 300.200.
\textsuperscript{272} CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(e) (1991) defines “Waters of the state” to mean “any water, surface or underground, including saline waters, within the boundaries of the state.”
\textsuperscript{273} Id. § 13271.
construction material. The notification standard is extremely low and may be below detection levels. Oddly, the requirement does not apply only to friable ACM and it is triggered by knowledge. However, the statute imposes no requirement of an asbestos survey.

Other states have requirements that contamination or disposal uses be disclosed to buyers prior to transfer. As a practical matter, these laws assure that contamination becomes part of the negotiation process of any acquisition or investment. Moreover, they encourage the remediation of that contamination.

OSHA contains Hazard Communication Standards applicable to manufacturing employees. Each manufacturing employer is required to establish a written comprehensive hazard communication program for its employees which explains health effects of workplace chemicals and employee training. The hazard determination for each chemical is placed on a "material safety data sheet," which must also be provided to all other manufacturing employers to which the chemical is provided.

4. Restrictions on Transfer of Contaminated Properties

Investors should consider whether the state in which they propose to invest may impose restrictions on transfer of contaminated properties. An example of such a restriction is New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA). Under ECRA, any transfer of ownership of industrial land must be approved by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Transfer of ownership which is subject to such approval includes statutory mergers, certain leases, and certain sales of assets. Prior to any transfer, an owner must submit either a "negative declaration," assuring that there is no need for cleanup of hazardous substances at the site, or a

275. Id. §§ 25915, 25915.2(a), 25915.5(a). Asbestos-containing construction material is that "which contains more than one percent asbestos by weight." Id. § 25919.


278. Id. § 1910.1200(e).

279. Id. § 1910.1200(g).

280. Id. § 1910.1000.


282. Id. § 13:1K-8(g).

283. Id. (defining negative declaration as a "written declaration . . . that there has been no discharge of hazardous substances of wastes on the site, or that such discharge has been cleaned up.")

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remediation plan and financial assurance that such plan can and will be completed. Penalties for failure to comply include damages and civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day.

5. Lien Laws

CERCLA imposes a lien on property owned by the responsible party and subject to or affected by cleanup actions. It can be imposed for the amount of all costs and damages for which the party is liable to the United States. The lien arises at the later of the time the EPA first incurs cleanup costs or the time the responsible party is first notified in writing of potential liability. Generally, however, the lien is subject to state law priority rules. Many states have similar lien laws.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO POTENTIAL INVESTORS

The cost of complying with environmental regulation in the United States is a significant consideration for potential foreign investors. While the costs imposed on any particular business cannot be identified without a specific investigation of the business and applicable regulations, there are two general ways whereby investors can minimize these costs. First, the investor can conduct a pre-investment investigation of the target business or real estate to identify known environmental risks and expected costs. Second, the investor can, through careful contract negotiation and drafting, apportion unknown risks so as to reduce future liability for environmental liability and risks.

A. Pre-Investment Investigation

With rare exceptions, it is advisable to investigate the environmental condition of any target business or real estate in which the party may wish to invest. Particularly under CERCLA’s scheme of strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability, the cost of remediating environmental contamination can dwarf the value of a business or real estate acquisition. An environmental assessment, or environmental “audit,” should help inform the investor of the true value of the

284. *Id.*
285. *Id.* §§ 13:1K-13(a)-(c).
287. *Id.*
288. *Id.* § 9607(1)(2).
289. *Id.* § 9607(1)(3).
291. See *supra* notes 109-30 and accompanying text.

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contemplated acquisition. It should identify any existing claims and contamination, and it should assess the risk of future liability that might arise. The information provided by the audit is the best protection against unanticipated environmental liability.

A pre-acquisition environmental investigation can identify two potential types of problems. First, in any purchase of real estate, including purchases of businesses owning real estate, a competent assessment will identify existing environmental problems associated with the land. An experienced environmental consultant should review applicable public records for evidence of past environmental problems. The consultant should also inspect the site and may take samples of soil and groundwater to determine whether any contamination is actually present. If the real estate is owned by an operating business, the consultant should discuss the site with past or present employees, in particular to determine whether there has been any on-site waste disposal. Finally, the consultant should determine whether the real estate to be purchased is threatened by pollutants on adjoining properties; under CERCLA, a current property owner can be liable for the cleanup costs associated with pollution of his or her property, even if the pollution is caused by contamination from another site.292

Knowing whether real estate to be acquired is contaminated confers two primary benefits on an investor. First, as a practical matter, it gives a potential investor certainty in gauging the value of the contemplated investment. If the assessment determines that the property is not contaminated, the buyer is assured that the investment will not be overwhelmed by cleanup costs. If there is contamination, the buyer can demand that the risks and expected costs of the contamination be addressed in negotiation of the transaction. Second, a complete due diligence investigation provides a legal benefit. If the property is clean, the results of the investigation are evidence that at the time the investor acquired the property, he did not know and had "no reason to know," after all appropriate inquiry consistent with good commercial practices, that any hazardous substance was disposed of on, in, or at the property. These showings are required to establish the "innocent owner" defense to liability under CERCLA.293

The second line of inquiry in an environmental assessment, with respect to acquisition of an ongoing business, is the adequacy of

292. See supra note 136-38 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
compliance with operative environmental laws and regulations. An assessment should consider whether all permits and licenses required to carry on the activities of the business have been obtained and are current. It should identify whether the business has received notice of any alleged violations of environmental laws from any government or private claimant. The consultant should review public and company records to gauge past regulatory compliance and safety practices. The consultant should also inspect the business premises and interview current and former employees to determine whether there are past or present problems.

The primary benefit of inquiring into the environmental conduct of an ongoing business is to determine whether the business has incurred, is incurring, or is likely to incur significant environmental compliance costs. For instance, if the consultant determines that air or water discharge requirements are not being met, it may estimate what the cost consequences of remedying the noncompliance, voluntarily or involuntarily, will be. In addition, the business' past conduct may affect costs of compliance in the future. As a practical matter, regulatory agencies may look more charitably upon an infrequent miscue of a generally law-abiding company than another transgression in a history of corporate noncompliance.

A business' noncompliance with environmental operational rules will generally not threaten the catastrophic liability posed by CERCLA real estate cleanups. There is one major exception to this general rule, however. An environmental audit gauging compliance should pay attention to the method and location of past and present waste disposal; as generator of the waste, and the party who arranged for its disposal, the business may be strictly liable for all or a portion of the cleanup of hazardous substance releases at the business' waste disposal sites, if hazardous substances are released there.\(^{294}\) Therefore, an audit should determine as accurately as possible whether the business has disposed of its waste in full compliance with the law and at safe, preferably RCRA-permitted, disposal sites. RCRA-permitted disposal sites are subject to strict safety requirements, and their operators must provide financial assurance that proper closure of the site will be effected.\(^{295}\)

B. Allocation of Risks Among Contracting Parties

The discovery of environmental problems will give the parties the opportunity to negotiate the allocation of the cost of any remedy.

\(^{294}\) See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
\(^{295}\) See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
Most often, known risks can be used to adjust the price of the transactions. The parties can also agree who will conduct or fund the required remedies.

Contract negotiations are especially important in allocating unknown risks. In rare cases, the parties will negotiate that the property or business to be purchased will be taken "as is," allocating all risks to the purchaser. More frequently, the parties will negotiate an agreement in which the seller will bear some of the risk.

Negotiations over risk allocation are typically based on the notion that it is fair for an investor to be defended or indemnified by a seller for environmental liabilities which the investor had no role in creating. Most often the agreement will incorporate a provision by which the seller agrees to indemnify, or defend, or both indemnify and defend the buyer against environmental liabilities the kind or magnitude of which are unknown at the time of contracting. A contractual duty to indemnify can be triggered by a number of events, including the receipt by the buyer of third party or governmental claims for cleanup costs, the future discovery of contaminants from the past business of the seller, or the breach of representations or warranties made by the seller concerning the condition or compliance of the business.

Sellers are typically unwilling to indemnify buyers against every possible future environmental liability. Therefore, it is common for the parties to allocate unknown risks based on the truth of sellers' representations and warranties. As part of a purchase and sale agreement, the seller may make a series of representations of fact about the asset or business being conveyed, including its environmental condition. If any representation proves to be false, the agreement usually confers a right of indemnity on the buyer to recover the costs or damages associated with the incorrect representation. A seller may warrant to a condition of which he or she is unsure as a way of assuming the risk that it may be false.

When negotiating environmental representations and warranties, an investor should seek disclosure of any pending claims against the business or property being acquired. The buyer should seek a representation that a business being acquired is in compliance with applicable laws and permits and that there are no leaking underground storage tanks, friable asbestos, or PCBs on the property. The investor should also seek assurance that any hazardous waste generated by the business has been properly disposed of lawfully and at a facility where it is unlikely to generate CERCLA liability. In particular,
the buyer should seek assurance that there has been no intentional waste disposal on-site.

Since the seller may have to pay money in the event a representation is false, sellers often seek to limit representations and warranties to the best of their knowledge. For example, the seller may offer to warrant only that he or she does not know of any improper disposal of waste. This may be appropriate for the sale of raw land or a long-standing company with which the warranting party has little experience. However, the investor should resist knowledge limitations because it is more difficult to gauge subjective knowledge than objective fact. Such limitations may be particularly unacceptable when the warranting party is the only reasonable source of the information.

A seller may also attempt to restrict representations according to materiality, so that every minor noncompliance is not an occasion to refund money to the buyer. For example, the seller may represent and warrant that the company is in “material compliance” with applicable environmental laws. However, the concept of materiality is not easily defined in practice. A far more practical way to address the concept of materiality is to negotiate a deductible figure, called a “skip,” “basket” or “bucket,” before which no recovery is allowed. For example, if a sale contract provides for a $500,000 bucket, no recovery would be allowed for the first $500,000 in environmental claims or damages suffered by the buyer.

Finally, a seller may seek caps, in time and/or money, on its exposure for future liability. The parties may agree to limit the length of time after an acquisition in which a claim can be brought by providing an expiration date for representations and warranties. The buyer’s ability to recover for breaches of the seller’s promises lasts only as long as the representations and warranties survive. Parties also frequently agree to a limit on the total dollar amount of the seller’s remaining environmental liability.

Even if the investor secures the protection of indemnification based on adequate representations and warranties, he or she should be aware that an indemnification is only as good as the indemnitor’s pocket is deep. A buyer who is not dealing with a known deep-pocket seller should closely examine financial statements of the indemnitor. If the financial information does not provide assurance that the indemnitor’s promise to pay is reliable, the investor may seek other or additional assurances that the seller can perform. One option is to demand that part of the purchase price or investment be held for some period of time in escrow in order to fund future problems. However, escrows are extremely troublesome to negotiate because it is difficult for parties to agree on the length of time the escrow should last and the circumstances under which deductions can be
made. Therefore, significant escrows are almost never feasible, except in rare instances of a discrete environmental problem which can be remedied in a short period of time, where the end point of the remedy can be easily identified.

IV. CONCLUSION

The environmental laws that may affect a decision to invest in the United States are numerous and perplexing. These laws impose two types of costs. Laws such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act impose costs of compliance which may significantly increase the cost of operating a business. Common law claims and CERCLA are the source of more sudden shocks to investors, who may be ambushed with strict liability for the cost of expensive cleanups. Accordingly, it is vital that an investor take whatever steps are available to identify and guard against environmental liability through pre-investment and contractual risk allocation.