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Leadership and Culture

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LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE

by

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Abstract

This study is about the phenomenon of leadership. Existing studies of leadership have failed to address the complex, multidisciplinary, processual, and collective nature of leadership. Attempts to appear scientific have focused on the forms of leadership rather than its universal processes.

Following an analysis of existing theories of leadership viewed from disciplinary frames, the purpose of this study is to propose a new theory of leadership constructed within a cultural frame. The nature of leadership can be understood best when it is defined as a cultural expression containing complex sets of interdependent variables. Insofar as the study presents a cultural theory of leadership, it is informed by anthropology and includes . ethnographies as case studies on leadership, including the works of Barth, Leach, Bailey, and Kracke.

Inasmuch as the case studies serve to instantiate the proposed theory and the study is founded on the possibility of comparison, integration, and generalization, the research methodology utilized is that of grounded theory as outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

The critical properties of both culture and leadership are identified, revealing an isomorphic congruence between the properties of both categories. A comparative analysis between the properties of culture and leadership reveals the coterminous relationship between the two, suggesting

leadership is a cultural expression.

Among the conclusions drawn are the following: (a) the nature of leadership is linked to the nature of culture; (b) leadership is essentially a cultural expression; (c) the universal dimension of leadership can only be defined in terms of process; and (d) leadership can only be studied as a multidisciplinary phenomenon.

Dedicated to my loving parents,
Leonard and Ione,
my first teachers

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is about the phenomenon called leadership. In its broadest sense, the word <u>leadership</u> is a product of the human attribute of cognitive functioning by which we humans organize our reality and experience. Reduced to a more conventional understanding, it is a structural relationship between leaders and followers. The definition of leadership, however, has proved to be very slippery. Appearing daily in our speech and and marketed as a term that everyone understands, <u>leadership</u>, in fact, defies our definitions. Over five thousand studies on leadership illustrate that it is elusive and far more complex that we ever imagined.

<u>Dissecting Leadership</u>

The phenomenon of leadership has been subjected to a wide variety of analytic techniques to decipher its nature. Scholars in many disciplines have applied their finely developed skills of dissection to the point where the problem of leadership has been broken down into all of its smallest possible components. In the act of slicing leadership into all of its little pieces, scholars have assumed that at some point they would finally cut into its

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ultimate essence and before their microscopic lens would be the heart and soul of leadership. By isolating each of the pieces of leadership from its environment, researchers of leadership expected to break this phenomenon down to bite-sized chunks that are tasty, light in calories, and easily digested.

Efforts to appear scientific have led scholars to the packaging of leadership in formulas, such as Hersey & Blanchard's (1972) L=F(1,f,s) in which leadership is a function of the leader, the follower, and other situational variables. The desire to reduce the phenomenon of leadership to a simple formula is further evidenced by nine-by-nine grids (Blake & Mouton, 1964) and quadrants or octants (Fiedler, 1967), all of which are scientific attempts to make leadership clean, neat, linear, and rational, a product perfect for the techonologically oriented society. Such formulas completely ignore a host of factors such as politics, change, human needs, ethics, and culture.

Our scientific lenses and our finely honed skills of dissection have left us no closer to understanding the nature of leadership. The mountains of studies have provided no clear direction and certainly no solid evidence about the nature of leadership. McCall (1976) observed that most research on leadership has reflected "a tendency to hone our understanding of leadership by inadvertently finding out what it is not" (p. 142). Perrow (1979) found that "the research on leadership has left us with the clear view that things are far more complicated and 'contingent'

than we initially believed" (p. 107). Mintzberg (1982b) believed that none of the theories of leadership since the 1960s "has ever touched a central nerve of leadership" (p. 250). Hunt and associates (1988) complained that leadership research in recent years "has become sterile and though rigorous misses the real essence of what leadership is all about" (p. 5). Calas & Smircich (1988) echoed a similar sentiment by stating that in the area of leadership research "there is widespread discontent with the knowledge accumulated, expressed in feelings of stagnation, regret over the unfulfilled promise of social science, and in desires for different paradigms to revitalize the field" (p. 201). The serious student of leadership today must sort through a bewildering melange of research material that is a towering testimony to how slippery and complex the study of leadership really is.

In this study I propose that the nature of leadership can be understood by putting the pieces back together again--the pieces in this case being approaches taken by various disciplines which have tried to define leadership within the narrow perspective of the disciplinary frame. A purely scientific approach to leadership has proved to be a dead-end. There are too many variables that are ignored and too many questions left unanswered. The long and short of it all is that we are currently in a theoretical vacuum in studying the nature of leadership. It is time to take a new direction. While integrating what previous theorists have written in each of the disciplines may be helpful, I believe the time has come for scholars and practitioners to view

leadership from a multidisciplinary approach and to view it as a whole process that is complex and larger than any single discipline can possibly encapsulate.

The Cultural Frame

I propose that the frame of reference which allows us to view leadership from a multidisciplinary approach is a cultural frame. Therefore, in order to decipher the parameters of a cultural frame and in the process define the nature of culture, this endeavor is critically informed by anthropology. I intend to demonstrate that the nature of leadership can be understood best when it is defined as a cultural expression. My purpose therefore in this study is to present a cultural theory of leadership that offers an alternative way of viewing leadership as a whole process containing a complex set of interdependent variables. I will reveal how the study of leadership, when approached through a single disciplinary frame, has resulted in unacceptable definitions of leadership as a single set of variables and will argue that no single variable or set of variables is sufficient to define the nature of leadership. I believe that viewing leadership through a cultural frame permits us to look at the larger picture and dissuades us from dissecting leadership into independent pieces. In order to do this, I devote Chapter Two to defining the nature of culture by identifying its essential and universal properties. By defining the nature of culture, I have a cultural frame in which to propose a definition of the nature of leadership.

Chapter Three reviews the literature on leadership by evaluating approaches to leadership within the disciplinary frames of philosophy, biology, psychology, sociology, organizational theory, political science, corporate culture theory, and anthropology. I attempt to demonstrate that both orthodox and alternative approaches to leadership have lacked certain features important in the definition of leadership as process. The more salient failure common to all approaches is the absence of a multidimensional or multidisciplinary approach to leadership. My analysis illustrates how leadership scholars have limited their approach to leadership within the parameters of their disciplinary frames, causing the study of leadership to be reductionistic rather than holistic. The study also extrapolates those critical elements of each discipline's approach to leadership in order to identify a composite portrait that allows us to view the multidimensional nature of leadership.

Chapter Four presents my cultural theory of leadership. I first identify the critical properties of leadership which emerge as comparable to the same properties of culture identified in Chapter Two. I then define each of these properties of leadership in terms of process rather than form and suggest that such an approach to leadership allows us to define the nature of leadership as universal.

In my endeavor to define leadership, I am assuming that the nature of a phenomenon, such as leadership, can be defined when its critical and essential properties have been identified. I also make a critical distinction between the

process and the forms of leadership insofar as the process of leadership identifies its universal nature whereas the forms of leadership identify its incommensurability. The forms of leadership are highly diverse among cultureS, but the nature or process of leadership when understood in terms of a cultural approach is universal. I am suggesting that previous theories of leadership have failed because they have defined form rather than process. The nature of leadership must be understood in terms of its process rather than its form.

In order to instantiate the proposed theory of leadership as a cultural expression, I present in Chapter Five an analysis of four anthropologists whose enthnographies are focused on leadership in various cultures, thereby providing actual contexts in which the proposed theory of leadership can be grounded. The four enthographers are Fredrik Barth, Edmund Leach, F. G. Bailey, and Waud Kracke. In each case study I identify the critical properties of leadership within the culture being studied and within the model of leadership presented by the enthnographer. The common denominator of the process of leadership as a universal phenomenon emerges in each of the cultures studied, while at the same time the case studies illustrate that the form that leadership takes in each culture is diverse. The relationship between leadership and culture also emerges as one of isomorphic congruence, insofar as both leadership and culture share similar properties, testifying to the contention embedded in the proposed theory that leadership can only be understood as a

cultural expression.

The Science of Process

The presentation of a new theory for understanding the
nature of leadership is premised on the distinction between
process and form. By process, I mean that reality is to be
viewed as becoming rather than being, as ongoing movement
and change rather than solid structure, as a fluid dance of
existence rather than stasis and permanence. The flux of
reality underlying the appearance of fixed phenomenon is the
process of recreation, change, evolution, transformation,
and fluctuations, some of which may strike us as having some
type of order, but most of which belies our efforts at
ordering and systematizing reality.

The philosopher-mathematician Whitehead (1929) described
reality as a flux whose context is the mind, rather than
something tangible "out there." In a linguistic sense,
process identifies life as a verb rather than a noun. An
alternative approach to scientific discovery has been called
the science of chaos and its purpose is to identify the
processes that are the sources of order and patterns of
life. Developed primarily by physicists, chaos is a science
of process rather than state. Gleick (1987), one of its
articulate proponents, wrote of its multidisciplinary
direction: "Chaos breaks across the lines that separate
scientific disciplines. Because it is a science of the
global nature of systems, it has brought together thinkers
from fields that had been widely separated" (p. 5). Chaos
poses problems that defy accepted ways of working in science

and makes claims about the universal behavior of complexity.
Gleick wrote that the first choas theorists "had a taste for
randomness and complexity, for jagged edges and sudden leaps
. . . . They feel they are turning back a trend in science
toward reductionism, the analysis of system in terms of
their constituent parts: quarks, chromosomes, or neurons.
They believe they are looking for the whole" (p. 5).

The assumptions about reality that underlie the science
of chaos were also put forth earlier by Kuhn's (1962)
notions of how scientists work and how revolutions occur.
He challenged the traditional view that science progresses
only by the accretion of knowledge, each discovery adding to
the last, and that new theories emerge when new experimental
facts require them. Kuhn deflated the view of science as an
orderly process of asking questions and finding their
answers. He viewed normal science as the carrying out of
modified versions of experiments that have been carried out
many times before. Theorists laid a brick here and a brick
there in shaping the wall of theory, all according to the
orthodox paradigm for natural science. But then there are
revolutions in theory that occur when people stray outside
the normal bounds of their disciplinary specialties, when
the limits of a paradigm have been reached and questions
still remain unanswered. At that point, there is a paradigm
shift, a revolution in viewing reality. Kuhn challenged the
illusion that science progresses gradually, building step by
step on previous knowledge.

Kuhn and other theorists who have adapted the science
of chaos argue that revolutions do not come piecemeal. One

account of nature replaces another. Old problems are seen in a new light and other problems are recognized for the first time. The notion of process accommodates this way of thinking, it makes room for arbitrariness, randomness, disharmony, and disorder.

The science of process, or chaos, has also been articulated persuasively by Prigogine and Stengers (1984). Prigogine won the Nobel Prize in 1977 for his work on the thermodynamics of nonequilibrium systems. In Prigoginian terms, all systems contain subsystems, which are continuing in a state of flux and a single fluctuation or a combination of them may become so powerful that preexisting organizations are shattered. At this revolutionary moment, a system can disintegrate into chaos or leap to a new, more differentiated, higher level of order or organization, which Prigogine and Stengers have labelled a "dissipative structure." In nonequilibrium conditions, very small perturbations or fluctuations can be amplified into gigantic, structure-breaking waves that cause revolutionary change processes. Paradigm shifts, technological upheavals, economic crashs, and scientific revolutions are frequently the result of small fluctuations. Prigogine and Stengers have proposed another dimension to the science of chaos and the notion of process by proposing a theory of change implied in the idea of dissipative structures. When fluctuations force an existing system into a nonequilibrium condition and threaten its structure, such a system reaches a critical moment when it is inherently impossible to determine in advance the next state of the system. Chance

plays a part in this drama, nudging what remains of the system down a new path of development. And once that path is chosen from among many possibilities, determinism takes over again until the next fluctuation threatens the equilibrium. Underlying the notion of process is the presence of fluctuations and dissiplative structures in all systems, including systems of structure, organization, and thought. Reality is embedded in a flow of time that is reshaping the world around us every moment.

Process points to a general interest in nonequilibrium situations, in evolving systems, reflecting a sense that humanity exists in transition. Process is a language of dynamics, of transformation, of interactive relationships in transition from one point to another. It is this understanding of reality as process that is the premise on which a new theory of leadership can be developed. I am in search of the process of leadership in order to define its universal nature. In a similar fashion, I am also seeking the same in defining culture and in isolating the properties of both culture and leadership. I have identified the nature of each as a processual reality.

Among the conclusions I intend to draw from this study are the following: (a) the nature of leadership is inextricably linked with the nature of culture; (b) leadership is essentially a cultural expression; (c) the nature of leadership is defined in terms of process rather than content; (d) the study of leadership can only be accomplished within a multidisciplinary frame and a single disciplinary approach to leadership is unacceptable.

Grounded Theory

This study is a quest for theoretical explanation, founded on the possibilities of comparison, integration, and generalization, and referenced by case studies drawn from the methodology of ethnography. Thus, the endeavor is both theoretical and methodological in its implications and is critically informed by anthropological theories and ethnographies. Identification of the nature of leadership by defining its critical processes or properties will be achieved by following the research methodology of grounded theory as outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Insofar as this study is generating new theory rather than verifying existent theories, the method of grounded theory is appropriate. Accordingly, a comparative analysis of existing theories in both leadership and culture has been utilized to develop the properties of both categories. The resulting properties of culture and leadership have been integrated and from that integration emerges a cultural theory of leadership. Furthermore, the grounding of theory has been achieved by the four case studies in Chapter Five. The properties of culture and leadership that have been integrated are compared to the theories of culture and leadership presented by each of the enthnographers. Such a comparative analysis will reveal the coterminous relationship between culture and leadership and instantiates the theory that leadership is essentially a cultural expression.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROPERTIES OF CULTURE

Introduction

Three things are necessary for the salvation
of man: to know what he ought to believe;
to know what he ought to desire; and to know
what he ought to do.

Thomas Aquinas (1273/1968, p. 103)

After two hours of gathering logs one morning, the
group approached the next task, splitting and
smoothing them, with despondency. Julio and Denis
showed a sense of dependence on Jovenil by consulting
him on every detail of the procedure, such as whether
a stick they had chosen for a brace was suitable, to
which he grunted somewhat annoyed assent. As Jovenil
and Francisco set to planing their logs, Maha'gi and
Denis settled down by a tree and bit into mangoes they
had brought along for a snack. When Julio too went
over to join them, Jovenil finally responded to the
mood by sitting down to join them himself, giving his
sanction to the impromput mango break by exclaiming,
"Let's eat mangoes!" Francisco alone stuck doggedly
to this work. When Jovenil finished his mango and got
up, the rest followed him, one by one, back to work.
From that point on, they worked with a will, finishing
up with a lively competition.

Waud Kracke (1978, p. 96)

Both Aquinas, a theologian, and Kracke, an

anthropologist, have touched upon the concept of culture.

But what can be gleaned from their statements that

identifies the nature of culture? Is culture simply

believing, desiring, and doing? Or is it knowing how to

motivate individuals to get a job done? The relationship

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between chopping logs, eating mangoes, and culture is not one that is easily identified. Where do feelings such as despondency, annoyance, dogged stubborness, and lively willingness fit? Since there is no recorded usage of the word in Aquinas's time and since Jovenil and Francisco had no comparable word in their native language, why is the word culture so important to us today? Is it something we need, and, if it is, then why do we need it?

The Ambiguity of Culture

Our word culture derives in a roundabout way from the past participle of the Latin verb colere, to cultivate, and draws some of its meaning from this association with the tilling of the soil, somewhat appropos to Jovenil and his workers. Curiously, it was also associated with tending to worship in some of its earliest recorded usage (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971), more in accord with Aquinas. Cultivation of the soil, however, seems to have been the major significance of the medieval French and English forms from which our present usage derives. For example, cultura meant a plowed field in Middle English. In later times, culture took on a more specific sense, indicating a process of progressive refinement and breeding in the domestication of some particular crop, or even the incremental result of such a process. Thus, we speak of agriculture, apiculture, the culture of the vine, or of a bacterial culture.

As the word culture became popularized, it drew upon the terminology of crop breeding and improvement to create an

domestication of a person. One may speak of a cultivated person as someone who has culture, or who has developed interests and accomplishments along approved lines, or through training, education, and breeding of the personality. The cultivation of the individual came to be associated with the ideal of human perfection. This is echoed in Matthew Arnold's <u>Culture</u> <u>and</u> <u>Anarchy</u> (1869): "Culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world" (p. 124).

Other meanings of culture have been traced by Williams (1963), but this study focuses exclusively on the anthropological usage of culture, constituting a further metaphorization of this essentially elitist and aristocratic sense. It amounts to an abstract extension of the notion of human refinement and domestication of the individual to the collective, so that we can speak of culture as humanity's general control, refinement, and improvment of itself, rather than one person's conspicuousness in this respect.

Culture as dealt with by the anthropologist, however, should not be readily equated with the popular sense of culture as special refinement, just as the notion of civilization cannot be fully equated with the word <u>civilized</u>. Anthropology is devoted to the study of humans as cultural beings and its central theoretical concept is culture. As to the relation between society and culture, the two are treated quite separately by anthropologists. The distinction between society and culture also identifies

how humans and animals are distinct from each other. According to Kroeber (1923a), there is no culture on the subhuman level, while societies do exist among animals. In one sense, wrote Kroeber, humans are "animals plus a culture" (p. 8). While no other discipline takes culture in general as its central object of analysis, what I discovered is a distinct ambiguity among anthropologists about its several associations and meanings.

Some anthropologists think it most fruitful to define culture as beliefs, ideas, and values. Others are interested in patterns of behavior and the rules by which such patterns are classified. Still others believe that tools, dwellings, weapons, artwork and other physical objects are the keys components. Excellent summaries of the theories of culture have been provided by Kaplan (1971), Keesing (1974), and Ortner (1984).

Purpose

My purpose in this chapter is to synthesize the multiple definitions of culture into the essential or elemental properties that constitute the nature of culture, or that describe its critical processes. Isolating the essential properties of culture will identify what is universally present in all cultures. If properties of culture can be identified, they must also be pancultural. This study does not presume to make conclusions about the truth or untruth of any given theory. The nine properties of culture identified in this study had not been formulated prior to the exploration and interpretive synthesis of the theories,

but rather the properties emerged as a result of such investigation. It will be readily apparent that all the properties overlap with one another, but it should also be evident that the identification of each of the properties as distinct processes is both necessary and useful.

The Range of Definitions

Tylor, one of the most influential of nineteenth-century anthropologists, began his Primitive Culture (1871) with a definition of culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (p. 1). For Tylor, culture included just about everything. A further example of this theoretical confusion is illustrated in Kluckhohn's Mirror for Man (1949) in which culture is defined as (a) the total way of life of a people, (b) a way of thinking, feeling, and believing, (c) the social legacy the individual acquires from his or her group, (d) an abstraction from behavior, (e) a theory on the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a group of people in fact behave, (f) a storehouse of pooled learning, (g) a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems, (h) learned behavior, (i) a mechanism for the normative regulation of behavior, (j) a set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment and to other people, and (k) a precipitate of history.

Amidst this conceptual sweep of definitions, there are the two extremes which are also obscure. One the one hand, culture may be viewed as an ultimate, self-contained, super

reality with a will and design of its own, an idea first developed by Kroeber (1917) in an article titled "The Superorganic." According to this approach, culture has a group nature and is independent from individuals who become passive agents, subject to the inculcation of culture. In effect, groups are culture carriers (Swartz & Jordan, 1980) and must transmit culture from generation to generation. On the other hand, some anthropologists emphasize the individual actor who may know what the culture calls for in the way of expected behavior, but behaves otherwise. Accordingly, the study of culture may become a study of deviant behavior, rather than commonly shared behavior.

In the middle of these two extremes is the more moderate position regarding culture as a key determinant of human behavior but not as one that works automatically or without change. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) identified over one hundred definitions of culture, and thirty five years later, the concept still lacks rigorous specificity--perhaps because there are still too many definitions.

Within this arena of ambiguity, this study begins its struggle with anthropology's multiple definitions of culture and seeks to extrapolate the essential properties of culture that identify the universal nature of culture while recognizing it's diverse or relative forms. This task is ambitious insofar as most anthropologists understand anthropology as the study of the differences among cultures rather than the similarities. This researcher does not underestimate the value of understanding differences while searching for common denominators which identify basic

properties of the category we call culture. The present study will also reflect a challenge in recent years to narrow the concept of culture "so that it includes less and reveals more" (Keesing, 1974, p. 73). Geertz (1973) submitted we need to cut the concept of culture down to size into a theoretically more powerful concept. Therefore, from the multiple definitions of culture, I will extrapolate those basic properties or descriptors that constitute the universal nature of culture at any period in time. From such a synthesis of the definitions of culture certain key components will emerge which will enable us to tackle the larger task of defining the nature of leadership.

Culture as Bio-Basic

Anthropology has been identified as both a social science and a biological science. It is a social science insofar as it studies social arrangements, group and individual behavior, and social change. It is a biological science in its concern with complex biological processes and how these processes affect behavior and attitudes, with the change in species over time, or evolution, and with human physical variation. Anthropologists begin with the human species' membership in the animal kingdom, primates, in fact. A key question is what distinguishes the human species from the nonhuman species. Anthropologists need a concept to express how the human species is other than a

mere animal, and culture, as opposed to nature, was developed to serve this purpose (Leach, 1982). Accordingly, culture had to assimilate the basic, biological needs of the human being as a member of the animal kingdom.

Nature versus Culture

A traditional view of the relation between the biological and the cultural human was that the biological was completed before the cultural began. This argument states that the physical being evolved first, then the cultural development got under way. Nature was separated from culture. Current thinking challenges this view. Geertz (1973) argued that there is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture and that humanity apart from culture would be what he called "unworkable monstrosities" with few useful instincts, fewer sentiments, and no intellect, something he referred to as a mental basket case. He concluded that humans are unfinished animals who complete or finish themselves through culture. Culture works hand in hand with nature to create distinctive human beings and all behavior is the result of the interaction between culture and nature. Anthropologists are virtually unanimous in considering culture to be an essentially human phenomenon (Kroeber, 1948; White, 1959; Zucherman, 1932). Although chimpanzees can learn to use an arbitrary symbol and although we can no longer exclusively define humans as tool-using primates (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980), only humans have developed the complexity of language and resourcefulness that is characteristic of culture.

Culture & Biological Needs

Culture, therefore, has a bio-basic property which exists to facilitate the development of the human being and which serves to provide a context to respond to the basic, biological needs of people. People are marked by selected biological traits which are dependent upon a culture-context for use and development. Some of these traits include speech apparatus and vocal communication, manipulative skills, consciously planned sexual activity, mental association, and the development of the neocortex (Chomsky, 1968; Lasker & Tyzzer, 1982). The longer period of adulthood in humans, allowing for greater accumulation of new knowledge as well as more time to instruct the young, is favored in a culture environment. Permanent pair bonding between male and female and the development of the family unit are also nurtured in a culture context. Added to these physiological needs are the basics of food, clothing, shelter, and various forms of social cohesion, and there is ample evidence to suggest that a key property of culture is its ability to meet many of the bio-basic needs of people.

A founding father of modern social anthropology, Malinowski (1922, 1945) considered culture the instrumental realization of biological necessities, an approach that he identified as functionalism. In brief, Malinowski believed that primary or basic needs of human beings are met by cultural responses which give rise to secondary, derived needs or cultural imperatives. Such imperatives broadly determine the structure of human organized behavior, that

is, institutions. He listed four instrumental imperatives as responses to instrumental needs: economics, social control, education, and political organization. These in turn are underwritten or reinforced by symbolic and integrative needs as well as systems of thought and faith. Hence, culture is essentially an instrumental apparatus by which people are better able to cope with specific problems that face them in their environment in the course of the satisfaction of basic needs.

Murdock (1945) claimed that "culture always, and necessarily, satisfies basic biological needs and secondary needs derived therefrom" (p. 83). He called this feature the "gratifying characteristic of culture" and he added the notion of human habits as an example of such gratifying characterists which culture allows to persist since they bring satisfaction. Such habits, when widely practised, frequently become customs.

Hall (1966, 1976) developed the idea of extensions which was his label for the adaptive and evolutionary biological developments that permitted man to solve problems in a gratifying way. Language development is one example. Hall posited that the study of humanity is the study of its extensions and included within his understanding of extensions were the mechanical developments that people created since they represented mental agility. To illustrate, Hall would claim that the computer is an extension of such mental agility. Earlier, Hall (1959) argued culture's bio-basic nature included territoriality, aggression, and sex roles.

Genetics

Levi-Strauss (1985) took up the issue of genetics and claimed that culture consolidates and spreads the traits of manual dexterity, sociability, symbolic thought, and the ability to vocalize and communicate, all of which are biological in origin. He argued that each culture selects genetic aptitudes, which have a reciprocal influence on the culture that originally contributed to reinforcing them. Levi-Strauss devoted considerable attention to genetics and race, pointing out that the horror of racism will be repeated over and over again until we better understand the intimacy between culture and biology. "Once we have driven out the old demons of racist ideology or at least proved that it cannot claim any scientific basis whatsoever, the road is clear for a positive collaboration between geneticists and anthropologists to investigate how and in what way the distribution maps of biological and cultural phenomena shed light on one another" (p. 20).

The whole undertaking on the relationship between culture and biology sets itself within the framework of evolution, treated in this study as the next key component or property of culture, and of sociobiology and its concentration on genetics. Briefly, sociobiology is a reassertion that behavior, like morphology, evolves through the process of natural selection (Wilson, 1975, 1978). Many anthropologists have reacted negatively to the tenets of sociobiology (for instance, Sahlins, 1976), especially the suggestion that human behavior has a genetic basis--a view

they see as inconsistent with the more anthropologically based idea that behavior is essentially learned. There is probably a healthy middle ground that identifies the sources of behavior as both culture and nature.

Sociobiology

The individual who is considered among the fathers of sociobiology is Edward Wilson whose <u>Sociobiology</u> (1975) and <u>On Human Nature</u> (1978) have launched a new and controversial understanding between the social sciences and biology. He reacted against the notion that human behavior is purely culturally determined. "The question of interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent" (1978, p. 19). Wilson invited his readers to consider four elemental categories of behavior as aggression, sex, altruism and religion. He argued that each of these are genetically present at birth and can predispose individual behavior in certain directions, though he was quick to admit that cultural variables interact in such a manner as to create behavior that is a product of both biological and cultural stimulants. Wilson's sociobiological approach will surface frequently in this study since his theories have important implications for understanding leadership as well as culture.

Fox (1971), an anthropologist and pioneer in sociobiology, expressed his hypothesis about the biological influence on behavior rather strongly. Suppose, he conjectured, that we performed the cruel experiment linked

in legend to the Pharaoh Psammetichus and King James IV of
Scotland, who were said to have reared children by remote
control, in total social isolation from their elders. Would
the children learn to speak to one another?

I do not doubt that they "could" speak and that,
theoretically, given time, they or their offspring would
invest and develop a language despite their never having
been taught one. Furthermore, this language, although
totally different from any known to us, would be
analyzable to linguists on the same basis as other
languages and translatable into all known languages.
But I would push this further. If our new Adam and Eve
could survive and breed--still in total isolation from
any cultural influences--then eventually they would
produce a society which would have laws about property,
rules about incest and marriage, customs of taboo and
avoidance, methods of settling disputes with a minimum
of bloodshed, beliefs about the supernatural and
practices related to it, a system of social status and
methods of indicating it, inititation ceremonies for
young men, courtship practices including the adornment
of females, system of symbolic body adornment generally,
certain activities and associations set aside for men
from which women were excluded, gambling of some kind, a
tool- and weapon-making industry, myths and legends,
dancing, adultery, and various doses of homicide,
suicide, homosexuality, schizophrenia, psychosis and
neuroses, and various practitioners to take advantage of
or cure these, depending on how they are viewed. (pp.

278-279)

Two decades earlier than Fox (1971), the seeds of sociobiology were being planted by La Barre (1954) who was also in quest of an integration between the social sciences and biology. Besides language and sex, La Barre identified the "functional togetherness of individuals as the essence of human nature" (p. 109). The family is the most striking example of the human need for togetherness.

Feelings & Emotions

Izard (1980) has noted with approval a somewhat radical thought of Susanne Langer's (1967) to the effect that "the human being's departure from the normal patterns of animal mentality is a vast and special evolution of feeling in the hominid stock" (1967, p. xvi, emphasis in original). Izard also claimed that "the experiential component of emotion is a quality of consciousness or feeling, and at this level the emotion state is invariant across cultures" (p. 222). D'Andrade (1981) has similarly remarked that there is a "strong positive correlation phylogenetically between intelligence and emotionality"(p. 190). D'Andrade was suggesting that feelings and emotions are aspects of cognition. "Feelings and emotions tell us how the world is, in a very vivid way, typically increase the activation of various schemas for action and evaluation, while still permitting delay so that planning, goal sequencing, reappraisal, and other complex procedures can occur" (p. 191). The feeling of hunger, for example, is a constant reminder to an individual, telling him/her something about a

basic need and what the individual must decide cognitively to do about it.

Pyramiding on both Izard (1980) and D'Andrade (1981), Levy's (1984) study of Tahitian feelings proposed a "sequence in which a primary knowing activates an 'emotional feeling,' which leads to the mobilization of a secondary kind of knowing . . . . I am suggesting that the emotional feeling serves to <u>mobilize</u> culture . . . both as an internalized system of representation in response to the problems produced by the feeling and as the responses of others to the manifestations of the feelings" (p. 227, emphasis in original). Since the emotional structure activates the internalized components of culture, there is a conterminous relationship between culture and personality, a subject to be addressed later.

Self-Awareness

In a similar vein, though dating much earlier, Hallowell (1955) laid the foundation for cognitive anthropology by his understanding of the role of self-awareness in individuals as culturally constituted. Hallowell argued that a psychological perspective is created or constituted for individuals by cultures and within this psychological framework, individuals developed a sense of self-awareness. Hallowell believed that ontogenetic development of self-awareness was universally characteristic of all cultures, even though the content of that self-awareness varies among cultures. He submitted that through self-awareness, "it must be possible for the individual to

react to himself as an empirical object, to identify himself
and refer to himself in contradistinction to other selves
and things, to represent himself to himself, to appraise
himself, and so on" (p. 82). Self-awareness was also
crucial "to the discrimination and learning of the multiple
roles which are required of the individual in human
societies" (p. 83). Furthermore, without self-awareness,
individuals could not experience "other-than-self" and,
once again, culture plays an important role in organizing
the structuring of the world of objects other than self.
Cultures serve to constitute a behavioral environment for
the individual "that bears an intimate relation to the kind
of being he knows himself to be and it is in this behavioral
environment that he is motivated to act" (pp. 85-86).
Hallowell's notion of the behavioral environment was not
merely an objective, physical environment, but one which is
perceived in interaction with the subjective experience of
the individual, thus constituting the behavioral side of his
definition. It is this behavioral environment that is
responsible for satisfying the needs of the individual.
Hallowell has made a major contribution not only to
anthropology, but to psychology as well, and was one of the
first, along with Kardiner (1939, 1945) and Malinowski
(1944), to press the claim that culture made a difference in
the structure of personality.

The Psychic Unity of Humankind

In refusing to concede that personality can ever be
completely reducible to culture, or that personality is

culture writ small, Spiro, one of Hallowell's (1955) more ardent admirers and interpreters, has recently sparked the culture versus nature debate with his <u>Culture</u> <u>and</u> <u>Human</u> <u>Nature</u> (1987). Spiro supported a theory of human nature grounded in individual needs and argued that such needs enforce a notion of the psychic unity of humankind. His postulation that cognitive orientations and dispositions are culturally invariant and stem from panhuman biological and cultural constants identifies the scope of the subfield of cognitive anthropology. The need to receive and express love, feelings of rivalry toward those who seek love from the same love objects, hostility toward those who would deprive them of these objects, and competition are some of the pancultural constants in human nature. Spiro agreed with the Freudian model according to which personality consists of three differentiated, but interrelated structures: an impulse system, or id; a cognitive-perceptual system, or ego; and a normative-prescriptive system, or superego. According to this model, Spiro submitted that social behavior is "the end product of a chain of interacting psychological events, including impulse (id), cultural and personal values (superego), confict between them, and defense against conflict (ego), which only then eventuates in behavior" (p. 28).

Furthermore, Spiro believed that the "transcultural characteristics of a generic human mind" also account for "human feelings and the ways in which they work" (p. 45). Spiro distinguished between a generic cultural determinism

and a particularistic determinism. His generic approach postulated that "the deep structural similarities in cultures comprise a set of universal culture patterns, which, in interaction with a common biological heritage and common features of social interaction, create a generic human mind" (p. 46). Thus, despite surface differences, humans share a common mind that works in accordance with the same principles. Spiro drew upon the works of Chomsky (1968) and Levi-Strauss (1963, 1976) as the most notable proponents of the psychic unity thesis. It should be noted that other anthropologists take quite the opposite view. Shweder (1984), for example, advanced the notion of culture frames which can only be documented as irreconcilable differences between cultures since "there are no standards worthy of universal respect dictating what to think or how to act" (p. 47). As the debate continues, Spiro will undoubtedly press his claim that "human social systems are rooted in man's biological nature" (1987, p. 111).

Summary

Culture's bio-basic property means that human beings need culture to both develop and finish many of their biological features as well as provide the context in which people can exercise and fulfill biological needs, including language, sex, socilization, aggression, altruism, manipulative skills, power, mental development, symbolic thought, territoriality, and religion. More than any creature, human beings depend on both biological adaptations and cultural adaptations to enable their survival.

Gratification or satisfaction of biological needs is one of culture's primary purposes. Without culture interfacing with biology and our environment, the human species would be lost (Campbell, 1988). But just how biological templates are transformed and elaborated into cultural patterns is still not clear.

Culture as Adaptive & Evolutionary

Physical anthropologists consider culture's bio-basic property their turf, but they also focus on adaptation and evolution. No doubt, there is a direct link between the bio-basic property of culture and the issue of change. However, there are important distinctions between the above discussion of the bio-basic property of culture and the ability of any culture to change. From the standpoint of cultural theory, major developments have come from the evolutionary and ecological approaches to culture as an adaptive system. This discussion will treat adaptation and evolution separately in order to distinguish between them and understand their unique roles in relation to culture.

Adaptation

Cultures change. How that change occurs will remain a subject of debate for some time to come, but the notion of adaptation has been useful as a partial answer. Simply stated, adaptation is the process of modification to suit

new conditions. A common example is climatic changes. In
Ortner's (1984) review of anthropological theories in the
sixties, she discussed the emergence of a cultural ecology
which explains adaptation in terms of the system-maintaining
functions of societies. Thus, she explained that the Maring
kaido ritual prevented the degradation of the natural
environment (Rappaport, 1967), the Kwakiutl potlatch
maintained a balance of food distribution over tribal
segments (Piddocke, 1969), and the sacredness of the cow in
India protected a vital link in the agricultural food chain
(Harris, 1966). She concluded, "In these studies, the
interest has shifted from how the environment stimulates (or
prevents) the development of social and cultural forms to
the question of the ways in which social and cultural forms
function to maintain an existing relationship with the
environment" (p. 133).

Cultures have had to adapt to wide ranges of such
changes, and for many cultures, the adaptation required is
seasonal. Murdock (1945) believed that culture is adaptive,
adjusting to the geographic environment, social environment
of neighboring peoples, and to the biological and
psychological demands of the human organism. "As life
conditions change, traditional forms cease to provide a
margin of satisfaction and are eliminated; new needs arise
or are perceived, and new cultural adjustments are made to
them" (p. 84).

Adaptation to new environments was a creative process
which Steward (1953, 1955) called cultural ecology. He
identified three fundamental procedures of cultural ecology:

(a) analyzing the interrelationship of exploitative or productive technology and environment, (b) analyzing the behavior patterns involved in the exploitation of a particular area by means of a particular technology, and (c) ascertaining the extent to which the behavior patterns entailed in exploiting the environment affect other aspects of culture (1955, pp. 40-41). His Marxian approach to adaptation tended to discredit the genetic potential for adaptation as he took a different approach to adaptation than do the biological ecologists.

Steward (1953) recognized that there was a tendency to consider cultural evolution as an extension of, or analogous to, biological evolution. But cultural evolution, argued Steward, is an extension of biological evolution only in a chronological sense. "The nature of the evolutionary schemes and of the developmental processes differs profoundly in biology and in culture. In biological evolution it is assumed that all forms are genetically related and that their development is essentially divergent . . . . In cultural evolution, on the other hand, it is assumed that patterns are genetically unrelated and yet pass through parallel and historically independent sequences, while divergent trends, such as those caused by distinctive local environments, are attributed only secondary importance" (p. 313). And while both biological and cultural evolution involve increasing complexity, the process of cultural evolution is an additive and accumulative one, whereas the process of organic evolution is a substitutive one. Childe (1951), Kroeber (1948) and White (1959) echoed

much the same distinction.

Kessing's Theories of Culture (1974) traced some of the major developments in thinking on cultures as adaptive systems and suggested there was agreement on some broad assumptions: (a) Cultures are systems of socially transmitted behavior patterns that serve to relate human communities to their ecological settings. Influencing cultural adaptation were technologies, economic and political organizations, religious beliefs, and settlement patterns. (b) Cultural change is primarily a process of adaptation similar to natural selection. (c) Technology, subsistence economy, and elements of social organization directly tied to production are the most adaptively central realms of culture (pp. 75-76). Kessing's approach was similar to that of Steward (1955) and Harris (1979), whose cultural materialist views held that all peculiarities of culture can be explained by reference to local variations in people's adaptation to the physical environment.

Sahlin's (1964) study on cultural ecology used the biologist's term of specialization and explained how overspecialization may have led to the fall of certain cultures. He believed that a culture that was too accomplished or too well adapted was biased in a narrowly defined direction in relation to its environment. When this happens, a culture becomes less adaptable and its specialization subtracts from its potential for alternative responses and change. Thus, advanced cultures create the circumstances of their own eclipse.

Kuper (1977) argued that adaptation is adjustment to

physical environments, institutional arrangements, and to the social process by which an individual acquires habits and mental characteristics that fit him/her to participate in the activities of his/her culture.

One of the earliest studies on the adaptation of Plains Indians was done by Benedict (1934). She illustrated the enormous range and diversity that is to be found among cultures. In contrasting the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the Indians of the Great Plains, she noted that the dominant tendency in Pueblo culture could be characterized as Apollonian, whereas the neighboring Plains Indians were Dionysian. By this she meant there was a marked distrust of individualism in the Apollonian Pueblos whereas individual initiative and charisma were common among the Dionysian Indians of the Plains. Benedict believed that once a culture evolved certain dominant values, such as self-effacement among the Pueblos or individualism among the Plains Indians, all the institutions of that culture adapted to these primary values. Hunting patterns, diet, weather, geography, and defense needs were all crucial elements in creating the primary value system. In one sense, adaptation came into play prior to the development of primary value systems, and after they had developed.

La Barre (1954) opined that as the earliest human species developed into larger social aggregates, an adaptive mechansim was necessary to facilitate this process. He wrote, "This adaptive mechanism is culture. Culture is the non-bodily and non-genetic contriving of bonds of agreement that enable this animal to function as human" (p. 211).

With a slightly different twist, La Barre also argued that "culture is man's adaptation to his humanity" (p. 213). La Barre meant that human nature needed disciplining and shaping in order to survive. Culture served that parental need.

Evolution

While adaptation is the process of modification to suit new conditions, evolution means a systemic and continuous change over time. Like biologists, anthropologists use the concept of evolution to describe changes in social systems and cultures from one another (Steward, 1955; White, 1959). This approach is the basis of cultural relativism which compares cultures based upon differences rather than similarities.

Other anthropologists have made their mark on the discussion of culture's evolutionary nature. Geertz (1968) conducted a study of changing agricultural patterns in Indonesia, focusing on the impact of the Dutch mercantile system. In brief, his studies suggested that there can be no general evolutionary advance without the presence of cumulative specific evolutions. Such specific evolutions can lead to what Geertz called involution or a tendency for a culture to dig itself in, becoming more resistent to change.

Fox (1979) applied the idea of evolution to the mind and argued that culture is the result of the development of rules, concepts, and classification. Accordingly, group categories and definitions are a result of the evolution of

the mind. His classification of the environment and the regulation of social systems can be summarized as follows: (a) the idea of rules, (b) the ideas of relationship and identity, (c) the concept of part and whole, (d) the concept of class and subclass, (e) the notions of hierarchy and reciprocity, (f) the idea of sameness and opposition, (g) the ideas of time and space, (h) the idea of causation, and (i) the notion of dimensionality. He used this system of classification to identify the evolution of cultures.

Sahlins (1976) developed the idea of general evolution which posits that cultural evolution has yielded progressively higher levels of organization and that systems exhibit greater complexity and all-around adaptability. He further suggested that specific evolution has taken place which means that systems have adapted to specific environments. Thus, there was in Sahlins, a coming together of both unilinear and multilinear theories.

Progress & Evolution

Implicit in Sahlins' theory was the notion of progress. Anthropologists, like biologists, distinguish between evolution and the related--but by no means identical--ideas of change and progress. Evolution implies systematic change with time due to the continuous effects of one or more evolutionary forces, biologically defined as natural selection, mutation, drift, or migration. Change does not have any underlying single theory about its processes, and progress implies a value judgement, suggesting that cultures are improving or getting better. The concept of cultural

progress and unilinear evolution led to a descriptive cultural relativism prevalent amongst Victorian anthropologists who believed that Western cultures were more advanced than primitive cultures, a notion labelled as ethnocentrism. While certain anthropologists, such as Mead (1964), did call evolution a process of directional cultural change, it is not my intent to assume either position is correct, but simply to identify the presence of evolution as a critical property of culture.

Addressing the evolutionary adaptive function of cultural religious systems, Dobzhansky (1965) subscribed to the evolutionary vision of Chardin (1959) who was a Christian mystic as well as a scientist. Although Chardin's theories on evolutionism have been scorned by many scientists as lacking in empirical evidence, his synthesis of science, metaphysics, and theology offered in Dobzhansky's opinion an important contribution to the discussion of evolution and progress. Chardin believed that all of evolutionary history was a directional process. Both Chardin and Dobzhansky argued that paleontology provides the evidence to suppport the view that biological evolution does have a discernible overall trend or direction. This process is not an accident, claimed Chardin, but an enterprise in which humans are the spearhead of evolution because they are the product of evolution insofar as they become conscious of their role in the process of evolution. Chardin advanced the notion that humans are moving toward higher states to be achieved by struggle. He argued that humans are being directed toward a higher life or superlife and individuals

play an important role by their choosing to contribute toward the achievement of a higher level of existence.

A curious twist to this notion of progress came from Goldman (1967) who also suggested that evolution can be applied to cultures as well as biological species. He also argued that cultural evolution is progressive in the sense that there is a growth in complexity, but in his study of Polynesian cultural evolution, he discovered that such growth in complexity resulted in "stronger political controls, more exploitative relationships, more violence, more conflict, and greater general insecurity" (p. 394). This form of evolutionary development challenges Chardin's notion of the superlife.

Parsons (1969) identifed stages in the evolution of cultures. "An evolutionary perspective implies both a criterion of evolutionary direction and an evolutionary scheme of stages" (p. 29). He formulated the directional factor as an increase in a culture's generalized adaptive capacity which he labelled adaptive upgrading. "Adaptive upgrading is the process by which more generalized resources are made available to social units, so that their functioning can be freed from some of the restrictions of previous conditions" (p. 56). His stages of evolutionary levels are primitive, intermediate, and modern. For the transition from primitive to intermediate society, the focal development is in language. In the transition from intermediate to modern, it is in the "institutionalized codes of normative order internal to the societal structure and centers in the legal system" (p. 30). As cultures

become more complex, the "value-pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to provide the basis of social stability" (p. 56). Parsons concluded by arguing that cultures must necessarily develop or progress and evolve if they are to survive.

Ideological changes also necessitate an adaptive response on the part of cultures. On the other hand, cultures change through evolution, a systemic and continuous change over time. Culture as evolutionary means that a social process is dynamic, never in a state of stasis. Though not identical to biological evolution, culture has its own forms of evolution creating a process of continuous change over time. Humans and their cultures are on a journey of change; whether this change is progressive or simply change with no direction remains an issue of debate.

Summary

Cultures change and develop. On the one hand, they change by adapting to multiple factors, including climate and geography, social environment, neighboring peoples, technology, biological and psychological demands, and economic or political factors. Adaptation is the process of modification to suite new environmental conditions. The science of cultural ecology studies such climatic, social, biological, and psychological changes. Ideological changes also necessitate an adaptive response on the part of cultures. In addition to adaptation, cultures change through the process of evolution, a systemic and continuous change over time. Culture as evolutionary means that a

social process is dynamic, never in a state of stasis.
Though not identical to biological evolution, cultural
evolution is also a developmental change over time. Human
beings and cultures are on a journey of change; whether this
change is progressive or simply change with no direction
remains unresolved.

Culture as Resourceful

Adaptation and evolution are frequently interpreted in
the context of what anthropologists call utilitarianism, but
which I will identify as resourcefulness. From the
beginning of anthropology there have been those who have
attempted to make sense out of cultural forms by
demonstrating that there is some practical utility to the
customs, beliefs, and behavior patterns of the people in any
culture. This utilitarian approach would suggest that
adaptation occurs because of functional needs. Toolmaking
is the most common example of this property. Although we
now know that chimpanzees can also make and use simple
tools, they do not begin to approximate the sophisticated
level of toolmaking demonstrated by humans.

Interaction & Choice

The ability of any people to adapt to their environment
by their resourceful utilization of new technology and

advanced economic processes is the focus of economic anthropology. Cohen (1974) identified economic processes as the interactions between people and the relatively scarce resources available to them. He further distinguished economic processes from economic relationships by identifying the latter as the interactions between people and other people in the course of the economic process. Economic processes may include production, exchange, distribution of goods, and technology, but these processes are invariably linked to interaction and choice.

Firth (1951, 1967) was among the first to apply economic theory explicitly to the study of anthropology. "The basic concept of economics is the allocation of scarce, available resources between realizable human wants, with the recognition that alternatives are possible in each sphere" (p. 125). Firth realized that economics implied the processes of choice and decision making. "However defined, economics thus deals with the implications of human choice, with the results of decisions" (p. 125). Firth followed Malinowski (1945) in recognizing that exchange and transactional relations are fundamental in all human societies. Firth also evaluated cultural growth by distinguishing between primitive, peasant, and industrial economies (see Frankenberg, 1967).

Functionalism

Firth built his constructs on the work of Malinowski (1945) who proposed that culture has a practical-organic utility which identifies people's ability to cope with

problems through utilizing the material, human, and
spiritual apparatus and structures of culture. Malinowski
has been called the leader of the functionalist school which
expresses a ideological movement away from evolutionism by
arguing that cultures develop by establishing customs or
social institutions that functionally respond to needs. To
a significant extent, functionalism assumes that things are
what they do. Structure provides the framework in which
functions are exercised. Changes in social structure are
thus likely to be accompanied by changes in the function of
component institutions. Similarly, when the functions of
institutions alter radically, we may expect to see
corresponding structural changes. Culture, for Malinowski,
is an organism of which each constituent part exists to
contribute to the wellbeing of the whole.

In his study on functionalism, Kuper (1983) suggested
that things "hang together" in Malinowski's (1922b)
monographs on the Trobrianders because in accomplishing any
task the Trobriander mobilized practical knowledge and
techniques, magical aids and rituals, social relationships
and the mechanism of reciprocity. As alluded to earlier,
Malinowski's theory of needs and institutions postulated
that culture exists to satsify needs, either biological needs
or derived needs, and each need gives rise to an
instititution which is made up of various layers.
Maintaining such institutions requires the resources of
knowledge, organization, skills, tools, materials, and even
other institutions.

One cannot ignore Radcliffe-Brown's writings (1940,

1952) while discussing Malinowski since these works are considered by modern social anthropologists to be among their founding documents. With the introduction of the word structure by Radcliffe-Brown, the structuralist-functionalist school of anthropology emerged. For Radcliffe-Brown, structure emphasized that social life must be founded upon an orderly, organized basis, a determinate framework of positions, roles, and expectations which remains constant over considerable periods of time. It is only within and in relation to this structure that institutions have functions to fulfill. Their primary purpose is a conservative one of helping to sustain and maintain the existing order of things. Thus for the structural-functionalist, the ends (social solidarity) always justify the means.

Durkheim & Totemism

Any discussion on functionalism, however, would be incomplete without mention of its true father, Durkheim (1915), who, as a socialist, saw the rise of economic specialization in cultures as leading to the development of new and improved kinds of social cohesion, which he was to label organic solidarity. Organic solidarity contrasted to the more primitive form of social cohesion created by tribal beliefs and kinship systems, called mechanical solidarity. As a socialist, Durkheim separated himself from the Marxists by emphasizing the primacy of social institutions as the functionally linking components of the composite social organism, rather than the economic resources and their

control as the linking components which characterized
Marxism. Durkheim enables us to see how different social
structures, rather than systems of production, generate
distinctive patterns of belief. Whatever their ultimate
truth or falsity, beliefs and ideologies could thus be
subjected to exactly the same kind of functional analysis as
other social phenomena. As pointed out by Lukes (1975),
Durkheim anticipated Wittgenstein (1958) by almost half a
century in showing how concepts are socially generated
collective representations.

Durkheim's (1915) notion of totemism and
Radcliffe-Brown's (1922, 1952) preoccupation with totemism
in his Andaman study illustrate culture's resourcefulness.
Totemism, broadly defined, is an aspect of the way in which
people conceive of the relationship between the social and
the natural worlds (Kuper, 1984). Durkheim had argued that
certain groups are the object of sentiments of attachment.
These sentiments must be collectively expressed in ritual
and symbolism if they are to be maintained, and one commmon
way of symbolizing a social group was by referencing it to
natural species. Radcliffe-Brown wanted to know why natural
species are selected as totems. His answer was that species
important to the livelihood of the group are given ritual
value. Thus, he defined totemism as a resource, or
"mechanism by which a system of social solidarities is
established between people and nature" (1952, p. 131).
Totemism was not only a mode of symbolizing social groups,
it was also a way of domesticating nature. Parallels
similar to this can be drawn between other social systems,

such as kinship and marriage, and the biological or relationship needs of people. Accordingly, in the functionalist mode, we can say that through its social systems and institutions, a culture is resourceful in responding to human needs.

Cultural Materialsim

On a more ideological plane, Harris (1979) developed the notion of cultural materialism which updated the Marxian perspective of economic utilitarianism. He suggested that the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life, a form of economic determinism. He further maintained that any sociocultural system contains an infrastructure, a structure, and a superstructure. The focus of cultural materialism, Harris submitted, is on the infrastucture which he defined as the principal interface between culture and nature, or the boundary across which the ecological, chemical, and physical restraints to which human action is subjected interact with the principal sociocultural practices aimed at overcoming or modifying those restraints. Harris argued against those who give the mental superstructure strategic priority in defining culture, a position advocated by certain cognitive and structural anthropologists such as D'Andrade (1981), Levi-Strauss (1963), and Spiro (1987). Harris further contended that the "strategic advantage of infrastructural determinism as opposed to structuralism and sociobiology is that the recurrent limited factors are variables that can be

shown to exert their influence in measurably variable ways"
(p. 58).

Environment & Technology

Other anthropologists have also contributed to the
notion that culture is resourceful. Hall (1959) discussed
the economy of a culture in terms of subsistence and
exploitation. Subsistence is that part of a culture's
economy that is concerned with feeding its inhabitants, such
as agriculture, food customs and habits, dietary rules, or
nutritional requirements. Exploitation identifies the need
that people have to exploit their environment in order to
secure clothing, food, weapons, and other technological
resources.

Schneider (1975) approached culture in terms of economic
development which he defined as an increase in productivity
and wealth in general by whatever measure a people wish to
use. Land, labor, and capital are the factors of economic
development. Where labor is relatively short, people put
their economic resources into securing new sources of labor.
When land is short, then people go after land; when capital
is insufficient, they go after new kinds of tools and forms
of barter. His study of the wealthier cattle people of East
Africa demonstrates that their reluctance to move into
European-related economic activities was based not upon
commitment to any cultural heritage, but upon the economic
fact that they would have more to lose by making the shift.

Parsons (1956, 1969) also focused on a culture's
resourcefulness through its technological development. He

defined the economy of a society as that aspect "which functions not just to order technological procedures socially, but more importantly to fit them into the social system and control them in the interests of social units, whether individual or collective" (1969, p. 17). He indicated that the function of allocation is central to an economy. "Resources must be allocated toward the satisfaction of the vast variety of wants present in any society, and opportunities for satisfying wants must be allocated among different categories of the population" (p. 18).

Technoeconomics is the concept that Kaplan (1972) has applied to the combination of technology and economics in understanding cultural theories. Kaplan's definition suggested that techno refers to the technical or material equipment available to a society, while economic stresses the arrangements employed in applying technical equipment and knowledge to the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Thus, the impact of a society's technical equipment on the rest of the cultural system is mediated through a set of socioeconomic arrangements. The underlying assumption of technoeconomic theories of culture is that major shifts or changes in cultures occur because of the impact of technological and economic factors. Such theories border on a technological or economic determinism, in a somewhat similar fashion to Harris's cultural materialism. Heilbroner (1967) suggested that technological determinism occurs only when technology is given more-or-less free rein to develop and to be used

without much regard for the social implications of that development or use.

Some anthropological examples illustrate the impact of technoeconomic change in cultures. The introduction of the horse and the gun in the North American Plains Indian culture created enormous transformations. Oliver's (1962) study of this culture summed it up well: "It was a technological change, the introduction of the horse, that made the historic Plains culture possible. This basic technological change triggered a whole series of cultural modifications" (pp. 67-68). Sharp's (1952) account of the switch from stone to steel axes among the Yir-Yoront, a hunting and gathering tribe of Cape York, Australia, showed how this innovation led to dramatic changes in "the realm of traditional ideas, sentiments and values" and how it proved to be "the root of psychological stress," changing "the character of relations between individual and individual" and among members of the group and those of adjacent peoples (pp. 82-86).

Other studies of the cultural resourefulness of different cultures include Sahlin's (1972) study of hunting economies and how affluence creates leisure time, Benedict's (1968) study on how the family acting as a firm can be used to minimize risks in a developing economy, and Barth's (1963) work on entrepreneurship which links various cultural systems. Linton's (1936) analysis of the Tanala of Madagascar illustrated how the shift from dry rice cultivation to irrigated wet rice cultivation had a profound effect on all aspects of Tanala cutlure. From

"self-contained . . . village with their classless society and strong joined families," reported Linton, the Tanala were transformed into a "kingdom with . . . central authority, settled subjects, rudimentary social classes based on economic differences. . . . The transformation can be traced step by step and at every step we find irrigated rice at the bottom of the change" (p. 353). Turning to more current times, there is little doubt that the computer is having an enormous impact upon many cultures around the world.

Summary

The resourcefulness of a culture, also identified as utilitarianism by some anthropologists and as functionalism by others, may have begun with toolmaking, but in time included a full specturm of economic factors, such as scarce resources, production, distribution, labor, capital, land, and technology, all defined within an arena of human interaction and choice. Prominent in this discussion are the works of Durkheim (1915), Malinowski (1945), and Radcliffe-Brown (1940, 1952), all recognized as the founders of functionalism and the fathers of modern social anthropology. The notion of economic determinism figured prominently in some anthropological theories, including Harris's (1979) cultural materialism and other technoeconomic theories. If cultures are to survive, the utilization and exploitation of new resources is a continual process.

Culture as Political

For some anthropologists, there is, admittedly, little or no distinction between economic and political anthropology since politics also focuses on the utilization of resources. Hall (1979) and Cohen (1974, 1979) are two such anthropologists who consider the distinction between economics and politics very arbitrary since economic relationships are also relations of power. Yet even Hall separated his cultural characteristics of defense, play, and competition from the more economic characteristics of exploitation and territoriality.

Nevertheless, I have chosen to distinguish the political property of culture from the resourceful property in order to enable a more rigorous definition of each. Whereas culture's resourceful side identifies the technological, material, environmental, and labor-intensive factors that can be utilized to meet peoples' needs in any cluture, the political dimension is somewhat less content oriented and more processual in nature (Swartz, 1969). Cohen and Middleton (1967) suggested that political anthropologists have defined the political side of culture in terms of either political functions and actions, or in terms of political groups and roles. The following discussion will address the concept of political in terms of both functions and groups--or in terms of structure and process--and will thereby clarify the distintion between political and economic, while at the same time recognizing, of course,

that the two are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, frequently overlap.

Politics & Public Goal Seeking

For purposes of distinguishing politics from economics, Swartz's (1968) definition of politics is helpful. He identified politics as the events which are involved in the determination and implementation of public goals and/or the differential distribution and use of power within the group or groups concerned with the goals being considered. Goal is the central concept in this definition. Swartz further clarified this definition by indicating that all goalseeking is not political unless it is the seeking of public goals and it usually involves power. His definition assumes that dominance and subordination are not the most important elements in politics, though they may be present. He also rejected the proposition that culture is ideology or that it is an analysis of ideological structures such as Marxism. "There are surely ideologies in cultures, but a view that any culture--let alone all of them--as a whole collection of shared understandings is to be seen as a single ideology beneficial to only one part of the group's membership is quite unwarranted" (1988, p. 9). Swartz further argued that the heart of the political approach to culture is a recognition of the fact that human behavior is goal seeking behavior and politics is the process of converting individual behavior into a quest for public goals.

Politics & Resources

It is significant that Swartz identified resources as
the second component of politics, next to public
goalseeking, since goals cannot be achieved without
resources which includes anything (ideas, relationships,
material objects, symbols, forces, personal qualities,
supernatural beliefs, laws of nature, etc.) that contributes
to goal achievement. What is significant about Swartz's
understanding of resources is that it includes what he also
called the "hidden resources of a culture," an idea not
discussed by economic anthropologists. He argued that
goals are often achieved because of many, hidden
resources that are very often not a conscious part of the
political process.

Support, Legitimacy, & Competition

The other three components of Swartz's (1966a) politics
are support, legitimacy, and competition. Support is
anything that contributes to the formulation and/or
implementation of political ends. Legitimacy is a moral
element insofar as it identifies the relationship between
those holding power and the members of a culture who comply
because they believe that their expectation of wants/demands
or need satisfaction are being met. Competition may involve
a host of techniques, including influence, intrigue,
diplomacy, lobbying, subversion, espionage, etc., to
mobilize political capital. Swartz's (1966b) study of the
Bena tribe of Tanzania offers an excellent ethnography that
illustrates the above five components of the political
process.

Power & Influence

Swartz, and most other anthropologists who have studied the politics of cultures, have relied extensively on Parson's (1969) approach to politics and social structures. Parsons opined that "political structures are concerned with organizing collective action for the attainment of collectively significant goals" (p. 15). Parsons included the concepts of authority, power, influence, and legitimacy in his notion of politics. Authority is the "legitimated right to make certain categories of decisions and bind a collectivity to them" (p. 322). He identified power as "a generalized symbolic medium which circulates much like money, the possession and use of which enables the responsibilities of an office with authority in a collectivity to be more effectivley discharged" (p. 325). Influence is "a generalized medium of social interaction that circulates among social units in the context of persuasion . . . operat[ing] entirely on the intentions of the object of persuasion and through positive channels" (p. 335). Influence relies heavily upon the prestige or reputation of the source of the argument. Legitimacy is a factor that Parsons equated with confidence, or on another occasion, he identified it with a "grounding of a collective system in a consensus" (p. 379). Legitimacy is a process for distinguishing between power as coercion or power as consensus. Power as coercion does not operate legitimately, according to Parson's notion. This became an important distinction to anthropologists in evaluating the presence

and use of power in various cultures.

Politics & Ideology

Although Swartz did not agree that cultures should be understood primarily in terms of ideologies, other anthropologists have argued in favor of this approach. Aronoff (1980) developed a framework of political anthropology that focused on shared meanings which inform political behavior. At stake are definitions of social reality, and therefore the confrontation between alternative definitions of reality inevitably involves conflicts of power. Aronoff was echoing what Geertz (1973) had argued earlier, suggesting that politics is idea-centered and ideas must be carried by powerful social groups in order to have powerful social effects. Ideas must be institutionalized. Their formulation of politics as ideology runs against the grain of Swartz's (1988, 1966a) approach. Aronoff was also echoing Berger and Luckmann (1967) in concluding that culture is a system of socially constructed and shared meanings and that political culture is constituted from those shared meanings, hence, the emphasis on ideology as the focused expression of different shared meanings.

Other anthropologists have picked up on a view that politics is essentially ideology. Cohen's (1974) two-dimensional man and Davis' (1980) two-dimensional politics both view politics as a two-dimensional process that includes instrumental action and symbolic meaning. Cohen (1979) defined power as an abstraction referring to relations of domination and subordination and called the

political man a symbolist man because power relations are objectified and expressed by means of symbolic forms and action. Davis' study of the caste system in rural West Bengal essentially echoes the same premises about political culture.

Blustain (1980) also studied the caste systems of northcentral Nepal and concluded that ideologies are embedded within--not independent of--power relationships, and that different power relationships will result in the invocation of different ideologies.

In the same geographical area, Bertocci (1980) used the term power domains to describe the factionalism of Samaj leaders and followers in a rural Bangladesh community. He identified a model of social solidarity rooted in an Islamic world view, further equating political structures with ideological structures.

Politics & Economics

Harris' Cultural Materialism (1979) had a great impact on both economic and political anthropology. He acknowledged his debt to Marx in formulating the determining influence of production and other material processes on political culture. Harris identified poverty, underdevelopment, imperialism, the population explosion, minorities, ethnic and class conflict, taxation, private property, pollution, the military-industrial complex, crime, unemployment and war as consequences of intersecting and contradictory sectors of belief, will and power. Suffice it to say that Marxist approaches in anthropology are extensive

and can be seen in the works of numerous scholars in both
economic and political anthropology. O'Laughlin (1975)
commented extensively on Marx's influence, and many of his
conclusions are persuasive but to expound upon them goes
beyond the scope of this discussion.

Political Relationships In Equilibrium

While not all anthropologists agree on the definition of
politics, most concur in their inclusion of power and most
identify that power within the context of relationships. In
1940 three anthropologists were establishing the frontiers
of political anthropology: Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes
(1940), and Radcliffe-Brown (1940). During that year each
came out with major contributions to anthropology which
shaped its future for years to come. Radcliffe-Brown
defined political organization as "the maintenance or
establishment of social order, within a territorial
framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority
through the use, or possibility of use, of physical force"
(1940, p. 14). Also in 1940 Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's
African Political Systems, Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer and
The Political System of the Anuak dealt with societies
lacking centralized government in what was then the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. These three studies explored aspects
of segmentary political systems and analyzed the
person-to-person relationships of kinship within such
societies. Political relationships were conceptualized in
terms of the lineage idiom. Every tribe had a dominant clan
and the clan was segmented into smaller patrilineal units.

What is important about this framework is that relationships, expressed in the idiom of lineage and clan affiliation, were based upon a segmentary lineage system and the segments operated only in opposition to other like segments. If a man in one village killed a man in another, the two villages would mobilize to settle the debt. If a man in one of these villages killed a man in another district, the two villages would unite with other villages in their district against the villages of the other district. Evans-Pritchard termed these processes of division and coalition fission and fusion. He wrote, "Fission and fusion in political groups are two aspects of the same segmentary principle, and the Nuer tribe and its divisions are to be understood as an equilibrium between these two contradictory, yet complementary, tendencies" (1940, p. 85). Alternatively, the structure could be understood as a balance of power at every level of organization.

The notion of equilibrium in the political system was reinforced by opposed tendencies towards fission and fusion. A tribal segment was a political group only in relation to other segments of the same kind, and they jointly formed a tribe only in relation to other tribes which formed part of the same political system.

The notion of equilibrium was later challenged by Barth (1959), Leach (1964), Swartz (1968), and Bailey (1969). Suffice it to say that all believed the notion of equilibrium was not adequate to describe political systems because it did not offer a model that incorporated

competition, change, historical flux, and the manipulation
of variables. They further argued that real societies can
never be in equilibrium because structures can be radically
changed or even go out of business. Swartz (1969) proposed
a processual approach to political anthropology and to the
notion of equilibrium, believing that political systems do
not ever finish coming into being and in identifying the
spatial and temporal extensions of the political process.
All argued for a more fluid approach to understanding the
nature of political processes and structures.

Politics & Kin

The study of kinship systems, particularly by Fortes
(1950) and Evans-Pritchard (1951), had a great impact on the
concept of political systems by analyzing the interaction of
familial and political relationships, giving to the concept
of politics a structural grounding in concrete social
situations. Following on the heels of Fortes' and
Evan-Pritchard' works were Gluckman (1958, 1963) and Leach
(1964), both of whom focused on relationships and social
dramas to present an analysis of political processes.
Briefly, Gluckman's position was that social equilibrium
emerges through the balancing of oppositions in a
dialectical process. He argued that social groups have an
inherent tendency to segment and then to become bound
together by cross-cutting alliances, conflicts in sets of
relationships being absorbed and redressed in the
countervailing relations.

Leach (1964) discovered that the political systems in

Highland Burma were not systems in equilibrium, a notion
which Leach labelled an idealized abstraction. Beneath the
artifice of equilibrium lies the reality of individuals and
groups in pursuit of power. In this continual competition
the actors make a series of choices which collectively may
alter the structure of their society. Leach argued that
people do not always act according to custom, and the
reality of the political and social situation is identified
by the many who act in order to maximize satisfactions.
Leach's (1982) politics were defined as the power-loaded
relationships between individuals and other individuals.
Leach's political anthropology will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter Five.

Other important studies which continued the effort of
defining the concept of politics include Asad (1979),
Easton (1965), and an excellent edited volume by Cohen and
Middleton called <u>Comparative Political Systems</u> (1967), which
focused on politics in preindustrial societies which were
characteristically led by monarchs associated with some
supernatural attributes. Another area of interest to
political anthropologists is the relationships between
symbols and politics. Landsman (1985), Sperber (1975), and
Turner (1975) have made important studies on the
manipulation of symbols to achieve political ends.

Summary

Although definitions of the political differ, there are
critical points of agreement in defining culture's political
property. All are concerned with power and its use, all

identify the focus of power in relationships and kinship
systems, all affirm the presence of conflict and
competition, and all essentially view politics as both
structure and process subject to change and restructuring.
Some political anthropologists equate politics and economics
but I have separated the two, believing politics is more
equated with power relationships and economics more
appropriately defined in reference to resources.

Culture as Group Development

Kinship is the basis of understanding culture as group
development. But kinship by itself does not treat the full
scope of group development within cultures. Traditionally,
kinship has been defined by the social anthropologists in
terms of certain concrete elements such as relations of
blood and marriage, or in terms of some set of functional
prerequisites to which those concrete elements are crucial.
As early as 1871, Morgan dealt with kinship in terms of
relations of consanguinity and affinity. Somewhat later,
Malinowski (1922) defined it in term of how sexual relations
are regulated and how the family is formed.

Blood & Marriage

It might be argued that to identify kinship systems
merely as group development is an oversimplification. I
tend to agree--the notion of group development does not do

full justice to the complexity of kinship systems. In this
study, however, no purpose is served by detailing the
labyrinthine complexity of many kinship systems which are
frequently intertwined with political organization and
religion. The purpose of this study is to identify the key
properties of culture and kinship is primarily an expression
of the function of any culture to create a social structure
that filfills group need. Traditionally understood, kinship
is not the only social structure that promotes group
development, but it certainly is the primary one. After all,
social anthropology's primary units of reference are
societies, that is, distinct and relatively autonomous
communities whose members develop mutual, social relations
that are embedded in, and expressed through, the medium of a
common culture (Lewis, 1987). Thus, while kinship systems
are a major factor in this discussion, the primary emphasis
is on social relations and social interaction as expressed
through group development.

Nationality & Religion

When individuals are related by blood, they are called
kin, but when related by marriage, the term used to describe
the relationship is affine. A mother is kin, a
mother-in-law is an affine. However, many anthropologists
have argued that kinship should be applied beyond the
traditional usages of blood and marriage. Schneider (1977)
extended the meaning of kinship in American culture to
include nationality and religion. An American could
therefore describe kin as anyone who is Italian and Roman

Catholic, or Norwegian and Lutheran, and so on. Included in this approach to kinship is a code of conduct which identifies kinship groups as people who think and behave in patterned ways.

Named Relationships

Leach (1982) also extended kinship to refer to a wide pattern of named relationships which link together the individual members of a social system in a network. The fact that a particular group is named makes it possible to contrast one kind of relationship with another. For example, members of a particular street gang in Los Angeles believe in and behave according to a code of conduct that is strikingly different from members of a Los Angeles Rotary Club. Leach suggested that the naming of relationships marks the beginning of moral sanctions. Kin are therefore those with whom we adopt a special style of informal communication which, in turn, is adopted toward members of the named family who are treated in this specially favored way even though they do not all live together in one household or in one clan. Leach further claimed that a sociological kinship may include many thousands of individuals who are involved in common economic, political, legal, or religious relationships.

Spiritual Kinship

In his study of Balinese culture, Geertz (1973) discovered a kinship terminology which defined individuals in a primarily taxonomic idiom as occupants of regions in a

social field, in contrast to partners in social interaction. This layering of individuals depicts more the spiritual relations among coexisting generations and not the location of successive generations in an unrepeating historical process. A spiritual kinship could therefore transcend spacial and temporal location. Other selected illustrations might include certain forms of ancestor worship and beliefs in spirits and ghosts. It could also include members of a certain religion.

Collective Consciousness

A discussion on group development wouldn't be complete without mention of Durkheim's (1915) ideas on kinship. He identified two forms of kinship, the first he called "mechanical solidarity" which is the principle of hierarchical segmentation and identifies the kinship into which one is born or marries. But Durkheim also proposed that a social system is first and foremost a moral system based upon a collective consciousness which is the sum of the moral milieus that surround an individual in a given culture and compel the individual to conform to these customary ways of thinking and acting. An "organic solidarity" is created by this collective consciousness. Durkheim was among the very first to suggest that ideas form the moral kinship of a society, and many anthropologists have since elaborated on this very theme (D'Andrade 1984; Frake, 1962; Goodenough, 1971; LeVine 1984; Metzger & Williams, 1963; Spradley, 1970).

Durkheim (1915) provided Levi-Strauss (1963, 1976) with

a model of society built up of like or unlike segments, which must be integrated to create mechanical or organic solidarity. Levi-Strauss argued that the principle of reciprocity is the key to understanding kinship systems, for traditionally a kinship system is a mode of organizing the exchange of women in marriage. The precondition of such a system was a rule banning incest. In this sense, the incest taboo was the beginning of culture. Levi-Strauss was interested in getting behind the flux of behavior to the unconscious generating structure. He sought to uncover the universal principles of human mentality and kinship systems were above all a way to approach this goal, just as languages were to be for Chomsky (1968). Levi-Strauss (1985) later decided that the study of kinship might not be the royal road to understanding human mental universals.

Kinship of Language & Attitude

Building on Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, Levi-Strauss (1963) insisted that a kinship system include two quite different orders of reality. The first is a system of terminology and it includes various kinds of family relations. The second, and to him the more important, definition of kinship is a system of attitudes which are psychological and social in nature and which are invariably linked with language and ideas. His studies of the Wik Munkan of Australia discovered two types of attitudes. First, the diffuse, uncrystallized, and noninstitutionalized attitudes, which he considered as the reflection or transposition of the terminology on the

psychological level; and second, along with, or in addition to, the preceding ones, those attitudes which are stylized, prescribed, and sanctioned by taboos or privileges and expressed through fixed ritual. Levi-Strauss here owed a debt to Radcliffe-Brown (1924) whose study of the maternal uncle in South Africa was the first attempt to include attitudes in kinship structures. Levi-Strauss also acknowledged that it was Radcliffe-Brown who first suggested that social life was first and foremost based not upon the toolmaker as earlier anthropologists believed, but upon the group. Ultimately, Levi-Strauss believed that the kinship system is a language and that all relationships, like language, have codes, grammatical forms, structure, and grammars of symbolic communication. Levi-Strauss has been criticized by many anthropologists, including Leach (1970), for failing to understand the fundamental difference between a concern to establish facts which are true about the human mind and the nature of social organization.

La Barre (1954), whose sociobiological orientation came up in the discussion on culture as bio-basic, has suggested that the "functional togetherness of individuals is the essence of human nature" (p. 109). He added that the main biological meaning of human nature is "the togetherness of individuals" (p. 106). La Barre's notion of the naturalness of the group reinforces the kinship structure as a necessary element in all cultures.

Summary

Culture is commonly understood in terms of kinship

systems that identify a wide range of groupings of individuals, including the small family unit and larger groups created by common beliefs, named relationships, attitudes, or ethnicity. However the kinship system is defined, the concept of group is a critical component of culture, and along with tool making, may identify the very beginnings of culture. Culture as group development identifies the functional togetherness of a people that has also been labelled as a component of human nature.

Culture as a Structural Web of Meaning

Tylor's (1871) definition of culture as a complex whole, including knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs, and habits, provided succeeding anthropologists much to dissect. Inherent in Tylor's definition is the assumption that culture is a relationship between many parts to form a whole. These parts are what anthropologists label structures, a word Kroeber (1948) cynically suggested added nothing to the vocabulary of anthropology "except to provoke a degree of pleasant puzzlement" (p. 325). He preferred the word form over structure, but its meaning remained the same, that content needs form or structure for its expression. Culture has a nature that becomes expressed through structure.

Structuralism

The word <u>structure</u> has evolved into a subset of anthropology called structuralism which seeks to identify the process of how structures are related or linked to one another. In anthropology, structuralism started with Radcliffe-Brown's (1924) and Malinowski's (1922) functionalism, described earlier. In studying the function and interdependence of social institutions, both were asking why and how humans cooperate to form a functional social system. Malinowski's answer to this question was essentially individual self-interest. Radcliffe- Brown believed the answer had to do with the need for distinctive systems of belief and ceremonial practice for the purpose of communal expression and survival. In his view, an institution's function was similar to the role of the heart in relation to the rest of the organism. A structural web was formed because of the necessity of many parts to create a functioning whole. Culture is therefore essentially a pattern of interrelations among its consitituent parts. Geertz's (1973) hermeneutic approach viewed culture as an ensemble of texts or webs of significance to denote this interrelationship.

The most noted structural anthropologist is Levi-Strauss (1963, 1976) who devoted much of his study to the process of relationships. His concept of order is particularly important:

> Thus anthropology considers the whole social fabric
> as a network of different types of order. The kinship
> system provides a way to order individuals according to
> certain rules; social organization is another way of

ordering individual and groups; social stratifications, whether economic or political, provide us with a third type; and all these orders can themselves be ordered by showing the kind of relationships which exist among them, that they interact with one another on both the synchronic and diachronic levels. (1963, p. 312)

Levi-Strauss was interested in how the mind imposes form upon content. The conscious and unconscious processes of the mind are central to his approach to anthropology. He wanted to understand the basic social and mental processes of which cultural institutions are the concrete external projections or manifestations. Rather than the nature of the phenomena of institutions themselves, he considered the relations among phenomena crucial to an understanding of culture. Thus, the major aspects of culture become language, kinship, social organization, magic, religion, and art. His structural analysis is rather complicated, but it is important to understanding his view of the primacy of relations, or processes, over entities, and of his search for constant relationships at relatively abstract levels. For Levi-Strauss, culture was more a matter of meanings than of facts.

The Grammar of Culture

Levi-Strauss argued that the seemingly bewildering variety of social and culture phenomena could be rendered intelligible by demonstrating the shared relationships of these phenomena to a few simple underlying principles. Ortner (1984) sums up his quest for a universal grammar of

culture:

> [Levi-Strauss] sought the ways in which units of
> cultural discourse are created (by the principle of
> binary oppostion), and the rules according to which the
> units (pairs of opposed terms) are arranged and combined
> to produce the actual cultural productions (myths,
> marriage rules, totemic clan arrangements, and the like)
> that anthropologists record. Cultures are primarily
> systems of classification, as well as the sets of
> institutional and intellectual productions built upon
> those systems of classification and performing further
> operations upon them. One of the most important
> secondary operations of culture in relation to its own
> taxonomies is precisely to mediate or reconcile the
> oppositions which are the bases of those taxonomies in
> the first place. (p. 135)

Ortner believed that the enduring contribution of
Levi-Strauss's structuralism was "in the perception that
luxuriant variety, even apparent randomness, may have a
deeper unity and systematicity, derived from the operation
of a small number of underlying principles" (p. 136). From
the point of view of this writer, Geertz's (1973) web aptly
fits Levi-Strauss's structuralism, for it is complex,
creative, finely wrought, and entrapping.

World Views

Anthropologists have used concepts like contexting
(Hall, 1976), integration (Boas, 1910; Murdock, 1945),
classification (Fox, 1979), and horizons (Morelli, 1984) to

denote the method individuals use to find a personal place and meaning in the structural web of society. Goodenough (1970) viewed culture as a set of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, and acting, all of which point to culture as a meaning-making system for individuals. In other words, cultures provide a world view, though ironically, the view is quite provincial.

Leach (1982) argued that it is important to see society as a network of person-to-person relationships, echoing Radcliffe-Brown (1924) who believed that the core of social anthropology was the study of society as a structure of person-to-person relationships. Leach went a little further in his view by introducing the concept of cosmologies which are the creation of the human imagination and which serve as bridges between the constructed images of other world and the lives experience of this world. Religious cosmologies are good examples of how cultures deal with other worlds and the present life.

Structural Determinism

The Marxists contribute to structuralism as well. Harris (1979) viewed culture as layers of infrastructures and superstructures. The latter are the symbolic, religious, and philosophic orders; the infrastructure is the principal interface between culture and nature, the boundary across which the ecological, the chemical, and the physical restraints to which human action is subject interact with the principal sociocultural practices aimed at overcoming or modifying those restraints. Cultural materialists,

therefore, believe in infrastructural determinism.

Systems of Shared Meaning

A central component to this structural web of culture includes systems of meanings that structures represent or manifest. These systems of meanings are shared by most, though not by all, members of a culture. Anthropology is indebted to Kant (1871/1966) who studied the role that form plays in the processes of thought. Symbolic forms were important in Kant's philosophy which postulates that culture is the purpose of nature. It is human nature, according to Kant, to create meaning in life and culture is the structural form given to this meaning.

Kant's philosophy was given an anthropological twist by Durkheim (1915) who viewed culture as a moral structure expressing the collective consiousness of its people. Durkheim argued that social institutions generate patterns of belief and systems of meaning. These institutions then become the collective representations of the collective conscience. Durkheim purported that the meanings and ideas expressed in the collective conscience are exterior and superior to any given individual and are endowed with a coercive force over individual thought and behavior. "The collective consciousness can furnish the mind with the molds which are applicable to the totality of things and which make it possible to think of them" (1915, p. 444).

Levi-Strauss (1963, 1985) used the idea that culture is a shared system of meanings to argue that classifying societies as primitive was unjustified because their meaning

systems, although different from modern societies, were just as sophisticated, and occasionally, even more complex.

Cognition & Meaning

Spiro (1961) argued that much socially required behavior comes to be inherently motivating and meaningful for individuals, most often because it directly satisfies some culturally defined need (what Spiro called intrinsic cultural motivation) or sometimes also because it realizes some strongly held culture norm or value (internalized cultural motivation, in Spiro's terms). D'Andrade (1984) echoed this same notion by summarizing that "through the process of socialization individuals come to find achieving culturally prescribed goals and following culturally directives to be motivationally satisfying, and to find not achieving culturally prescribed goals and not following cultural directives to be anxiety producing" (p. 98). Both Spiro and D'Andrade are presenting a cognitive view of cultural meaning. Cognitive anthropologists wish to know how cultural knowledge is organized. They are pursuing the questions of what one needs to know in order to behave as a functioning member of one's society (Quinn & Holland, 1987). This school of anthropology came to stand for a new view of culture as shared knowledge and how such shared knowledge creates shared meaning systems.

D'Andrade (1984) defined culture as "learned systems of meaning, communicated by means of natural language and other symbol systems, having representational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating cultural

entities and particular senses of reality" (p. 116). He
believed that through these systems of meaning, groups of
people adapt to their environment and "create social
institutions such as family, market, nation, and so on,
which constitute structure. Analytically, cultural meaning
systems can be treated as a very large diversified pool of
knowledge, or partially shared clusters of norms, or as
intersubjectively shared, symbolically created realities"
(p. 116). D'Andrade explained that the representational
function of meaning is illustrated in music, art, and
ritual; the directive function of meaning is experienced as
a need or obligation to do something, such as conforming to
cultural norms; and the affective function of meaning
arouses emotions or feelings and evokes cognitive responses.

Goodenough (1957) was one of the first to identify
cultures as systems of knowledge. Culture, he wrote, "is
the form of things that people have in mind, their models
for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting" (p.
167). Other anthropologists who have explored culture's
cognitive codes include Metzger & Williams (1963), Spradley
(1970), Tyler (1969), and Wallace (1965). Their discussions
range from the notion that all cultures share a common
cognitive mapping system to the cognitive variability that
may exist among cultures or even within a single culture.
Tyler (1960) wrote, "It is highly unlikely that the members
of a culture ever see their culture as this kind of unitary
phenomenon. Each individual member may have a unique,
unitary model of his culture, but is not necessarily
cognizant of all the unique unitary models held by other

members of his culture" (p. 5, emphasis in original).
D'Andrade (1984, 1987) has proposed that cognitive
approaches could help in identifying a psychic unity that is
pancultural. The problem, according to D'Andrade (1987),
lies in testing what "has a ring of plausibility but seems
completely untestable" (p. 146).

LeVine (1984) expounded on a view of culture as an
inherited system of ideas that structures the subjective
experiences of individuals. Accordingly, cultural meanings
are received meanings organized into systematic codes that
vary in the extent to which they enter cultural
consciousness or can be verbalized by the native.

The Social Construction of Reality

Besides the cognitive approach, other anthropologists
have joined in affirming culture as a structural web of
shared meanings. Sahlins (1976) contended that people live
according to a meaningful scheme of their own devising, but
influenced by the context around them. Gans (1985)
discussed the universal structures of human culture,
claiming the three structures most significant in providing
meaning were the sacred, the ethical, and the esthetic.
Berger and Luckmann (1967) submitted that the world requires
legitimation, or ways by which it can be explained and
justified. They called the highest level of legitimation
the symbolic universes because these provide frames of
reference to make human experience meaningful. Geertz
echoed this same idea by maintaining that culture is the
"fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret

their experiences and guide their action" (1967, p. 233).

Similarly, Aronoff (1980) pressed for a concept of culture as a socially constructed structure of meanings.

There are anthropologists, called ethnoscientists, who view culture as a cognitive or ideational system consisting primarily of structures of organized knowledge required for people to act meaningfully and appropriately (Frake, 1962; Goodenough, 1971; Metzger & Williams, 1963; Spradley, 1970). In like manner, Schneider (1976), building on Berger & Luckmann (1967), objected to definitions of culture that did not focus on meaning and called for definitions that understood culture as the vehicle by which people construct reality. Hall (1977) promoted the idea that today cultures actually screen individuals from information overload and assist individuals in selectively choosing systems of meaning that are most useful for the individual. He further argued that in the modern world, people are inundated with distortions, misinformation, and omissions of information that culture helps to correct.

Religions, ritual systems, and myths are key factors in meaning-making processes of culture. Birket-Smith (1965) discussed the inner and outer conditions of culture and avowed that the inner conditions are spiritual in nature whereas the outer conditions are the social and geographical surroundings. Bird (1976) postulated that the European culture of the Middle Ages was focused primarily on a theological ideal shaped by Augustinian and Thomastic theologies. He suggested that the other two major ideals of intellectual culture were the literary-humanistic ideal of

antiquity, and the scientific ideal of the modern world. Such ideals shape the meaning-systems of an individual's world view.

Summary

Culture as a structural web of shared meaning identifies the multilayered systems or structures of things, ideas, social relations, and institutions, all of which are processually interdependent, much like a web. Both form and process are important in understanding the relationships between structures and how they influence and shape people's attitudes, ideas, and beliefs. The structural web of culture is inherently a meaning-making process enabling citizens of a culture to share meaning structures and create a social cohesion through their shared meanings, as well as give purpose to their existence.

Culture as Linguistic & Symbolic

Shared meanings need tools for expression and communication. Language and symbols are the principal tools people use to express and communicate systems of meanings in their culture. Although linguistics and symbols take different forms between and within cultures, they are treated in this study as a single property since language is a primarily a form of symbolization. But given their

different structures, each merits separate treatment.

Language

Boaz (1911/1966, 1938/1965) was among the first of the anthropologists to emphasize the relationship between language and culture. He argued that the formation of a culture, as a process of rendering experience meaningful, necessarily proceeds on the formulation of ideas, beliefs, and customs in the form of language. This idea was reinforced by the linguist Sapir (1931) who demonstrated that beneath the explicit surface of culture, there lies a whole other world which portrays an entirely different view of human nature that may be radically different than what the culture may superficially suggest. He purported that language defines experience for people by reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience.

Malinowski (1922) took the functionalist approach to language, emphasizing the dependence of the meaning of each word upon practical experience and the structure of each utterance upon the momentary situation in which it is spoken. This analysis was more applicable to early cultures where behavior was more directly linked to language. He considered primitive language to be a mode of action and behavior rather than merely an instrument.

Structuralism Linguistics & Semiotics

While linguists and anthropologists had their own paths

to follow in the early twentieth century, structuralism became the link between the two disciplines. With the publication of Saussure's <u>Cours</u> <u>de</u> <u>linguistique</u> <u>generale</u> (1916/1966), structural linguistics made its debut in the linguistic world. It was also Saussure who called the scientific study of linguistics semiology which focused on the meaning of signs within behavior. Symbols and signs are singularly designed to communicate. Semiotics identifies the principles or rules by which signification occurs and signification refers to the processes by which events, words, behaviors, and objects carry meaning for the members of a given culture (Barley, 1983). Semiotics is the study of how communication is possible and generally focuses on language since it is the most important sign system of human society.

Troubetzkoy (1923) and Saussure (1916/1966) are credited as the founders of structural linguistics which shifted the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the study of the unconscious infrastructure. Phonemics and phonetics (Durbin, 1972; Pike, 1967), metaphor and metonomy (Barley, 1983; Jakobson & Halle, 1956), diachronic and synchronic (Levi-Strauss, 1963), parole and langue (Levi-Strauss, 1963; Saussure, 1966), and synechdoche and irony (Manning, 1979) became the important concepts in structural linguistics. The authors referenced here and other structuralists such as Barthes (1967), a French literary critic, Foucault (1966), a French psychologist and philospher, and Saussure (1966) saw culture and language developing hand in hand. Levi-Strauss (1963) summed up their philosophy by avering that culture

and language are products of activities which are basically similar and both are processes taking place within the mind in a comparable manner. All contended that language, like culture, is a collective construct and is virtually not possible outside the context of culture.

Semiotic Anthropology

Anthropologists have contributed most to the identification of the nature of culture as essentially semiotic. Geertz (1973) called culture an assemblage of texts that need interpretation. His semiotic approach to culture served to aid people in gaining access to the conceptual world in such a manner that conversation and communication may occur. Schneider (1976) endorsed Geertz's semiotic definition of culture, maintaining that through language we define both our conceptual and our behavioral world.

Leach (1982) claimed language was one of the key ingredients by which we distinguish between human and nonhuman. "We are human beings, not because we have souls but because we are able to conceive of the possibility that we might have souls" (p. 108). Language is the singular device that enables people to formulate metaphysical concepts and to recognize, at a conscious level, the binary oppositions which are basic to the structure of ordered thought. Leach further contended that human culture could not have been invented by a society of deaf mutes, though one wonders if deaf mutes would agree.

According to Berger & Luckmann (1967), language not only

reflects reality, it creates reality. Language objectifies the world and translates our experience into a cohesive order. Conversation is the critical actualization of our world. In conversation the objectification of language becomes objects of conversation.

Chomsky (1968) went a step further than the others by proposing that although children have to learn the meanings of individual words from their elders, they seem to know how to string words together so as to distinguish sense from nonsense long before that have acquired any substantial vocabulary. He explained this phenomenon by advancing the notion that humans are innately endowed with a basic structure of language. Chomsky thereby entered the culture/nature debate by postulating that the basic structure of language is genetically present at birth, but needs culture to develop (see also Carmichael, 1964, and Lenneberg, 1964).

In their research on language in several societies, including American, Bolivian, Kaluli (Papua New Guinea), Malagasy, and Western Somoan, Ochs and Scheiffelin (1984) identified the following two processes:

1. The process of acquiring language is deeply affected by the process of becoming a competent member of a society.

2. The process of becoming a competent member of society is realized to a large extent through language, by acquiring knowledge of its functions, social distribution, and interpretations in and across socially defined situation, i.e., through exchanges of language in particular social situations.

Perception & Interpretation

Two concepts inseparably linked to semiotics and language are perception and interpretation. According to Goodenough (1957), one of the early pioneers of cognitive anthropology, culture is the form of things that people have in their minds, "their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them" (p. 167). Accordingly, culture is identified as inferred ideational codes lying behind the realm of observable events and the task of anthropologists is one of hermeneutic archaeology (Keesing, 1987).

The issue of culture as an interpretive quest leads to the question of how well do native actors read their own texts. The answer may have appeared in Poole's (1982) study of the Bimin-Kuskusmin of Papua New Guinea who likened the meanings of their elaborate rituals to a nut that is layered like an onion. All socialized Bimin-Kuskusmin understand the outermost layers, but the layers of meaning that lie beneath are accessible only to men who pass through the progressive stages of cult initiation. At each stage new layers of symbolism are revealed. Only a few men in each generation understand the deepest layers of meaning. According to Keesing (1987), this view of knowledge and meaning in a tiny population points to an important limitation in the notion of cultures as texts. To borrow a term from Marxism, cultures as ideological or semiotic tend to celestialize rules and roles or renders them cosmic and beyond question. Many anthropologists point to cultures that consign women to lifelong jural minority under male

control and assume that this practice is ordained in the eternal nature of the cosmos and the rules of the ancestors. In such cultures, questions about the morality of such practices are never raised.

Perception also plays a major role in the semiotic nature of cultures. Hallowell's (1955) study of the Saulteaux, a North American Indian tribe, focuses on the ordering of space and the perception of the substantial or spatial world. He distinguished between literal perception which is concerned with the world of colors, textures, surfaces, edges, slopes, shapes, and interspace, and schematic perception which is the perception of the world of useful and significant things to which we ordinarily attend. Hallowell argued that while schematic perception is biologically rooted, its ability to function is culturally based. Literal perception is a function of the culture in which the individual has been raised.

Hallowell applied his ideas of perception to self-awareness. He argued that perception does not present the human being with a picture of an objective world which is simply waiting to be perceived, unaffected by experience. Perception is influenced by the behavioral environment of the individual, and that behavioral environment is characterized by the interaction of both objective reality and subjective experience.

> For the world of human awareness is mediated by various
> symbolic devices which, through the learning and
> experience of individuals, establish the concepts,
> discriminations, classificatory patterns, and attitudes

by means of which perceptual experience is personally
integrated. In this way assumptions about the nature of
the universe become, as it were, a priori constituents
in the perceptual process itself. Language, of course,
plays a major role both in terms of its structural
characteristics as well as of the potentialities
inherent in narrative discourse (myths, tales,
anecdotes) for the symbolic presentation of events. (p.
84)

Thus, Hallowell believed that the role of language in
object-orientation is as vital as in self-orientation and
perception is an interaction of both orientations.

Around the same time as Hallowell was developing his
theory of the culturally constituted behavioral environment,
Lee (1950) explained perception as a cultural lens. She was
interested in the codification of reality and with the
nonlineal apprehension of reality among the people of the
Trobriand Islands. Her assumption was that a member of a
given society not only codifies experienced reality through
the use of the specific language and other patterned
behavior characteristics of culture, but that the individual
actually grasps reality as it is presented to him/her in
this code.

Directly related to perception is the famous Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, named after Edward Sapir (1923) and Benjamin Lee
Whorf (1956). The hypothesis states that culture is
completely relative so that any given experience can be
assigned any meaning by different cultures, or that any
symbol is purely arbitrary so that anything can be made to

stand for something else. Applying this hypothesis to his study of colors and cultures, Sahlins (1976) illustrated that colors are perceived as having different meanings in different cultures, and concluded that the objectivity of objects is itself a cultural determination, dependent on the assignment of significance to certain differences, while others are ignored.

The popularized work by Berger & Luckmann (1967) advanced the notion that the reality of everyday life is a reality that is subjectively perceived, originating in people's thoughts and actions and thereafter called real. Earlier, Goffman (1959) proposed similar ideas about our construction of reality, using the dramaturgical metaphor as the framework in which people perform in the manner of actors before an audience. The audience's perception of a legitmate reality will depend, in part, on how good the performance is. How good the performance is will depend, in part, on how strongly the actor believes in the reality of his/her role, or, how authentic the actor perceives the reality of his/her role to be. Bailey (1977) advanced this concept to another level in his view of culture and leadership as front and back stage dramas with a wide variety of theatrical masks as character options.

Given the relatively recent interest in theories that equate the perception, interpretation, and even creation of reality with language, it is a curious footnote to this discussion that Jewish and Christian world views have long subscribed to a world reality that was created by language--"In the beginning, God said...." (Genesis 1:1) and

again in New Testament theology, "In the beginning was the word" (John 1:1).

Symbols

Semiotics, language, interpretation, and perception lead into an understanding of culture as symbolic. Symbolism is hardly the unique turf of anthropologists. In fact, it was a relatively late discovery, with symbolic anthropology not surfacing until the middle to late 1960s (Ortner, 1984). Linguistics, literary criticism, psychoanalysis, and sociology had their own relatively sophisticated theories about symbols, their meanings and use in social environments, long before anthropologists developed their interest.

The word symbol derives from Greek roots which combine the idea of sign, "in the sense of a mark, token, insignia, means of identification, with that of a throwing and putting together" (Pondy, 1983, p. 4). A symbol is a sign which denotes something much greater than itself, and which calls for the association of certain conscious or unconscious ideas, in order for it to be endowed with its full meaning and significance. "A sign achieves the status of a symbol when it is interpreted, not in terms of strict resemblance with what it signified, but when other patterns of suggestion and meaning are 'thrown upon' or 'put together' with the sign to interpret it as part of a much wider symbolic whole . . . . [Symbols] are significations which embody and represent some wider pattern of meaning" (Pondy, p. 5). Symbols are more subjective than signs and are

invested with a subjective meaning. While all signs are not symbols, all symbols are signs. A sign may have no subjective meaning at all. For example, heavy dark clouds may be a sign of rain, but they may also symbolize the presence of the rain god.

Symbols characterize every culture. They are universally present. This is most obvious in the religious life of a culture. Wherever humans invest their world with patterns of meaning and significance, symbols are present to convey the meaning. An egg may symbolize new birth, anniversaries symbolize the meaning of relationships, a flag symbolizes nationality, or a dream in many cultures symbolizes more than its intrinsic content. Cultures universally rely on symbols to communicate meaning.

Durkheim (1915) was among the first to identify the function of symbols in cultures. He argued that the religious beliefs and rituals of the Australian aborigines were most profitably viewed not in terms of the professed beliefs of the natives, but as a wordless language of symbolical acts that, taken together, expressed important truths about their society. It has been a challenge for future anthropologists to decode the symbols of cultures and determine the messages those symbols were conveying.

Influenced primarily by Durkheim (1915), Turner (1967, 1975) is one of anthropology's most ardent spokesman for a Marxian approach to symbolism. Stressing that society is not one of solidarity and harmonious integration of parts, but rather one of conflict and contradiction, Turner viewed symbols as operators in the social process, things that,

when put together in certain arrangements in certain contexts, produce social transformations. His study (1967) of symbols in Ndembu curing, initiation, and hunting rituals investigated the way in which symbols move actors from one status to another, resolve social contradictions, and wed actors to the categories and norms of their society. His later study of symbols (1975) focused on symbols in three types of social processes: political, ritual, and therapeutic. He claimed that symbols are triggers of social action. Certain dominant symbols, such as religious symbols, gain significance over time, but political symbols change frequently and are manipulated to fit the cultural need. He believed that symbols, religious and political in particular, function to influence and control people. Turner credited much of his thinking to Cohen (1974), Firth (1973), and Gluckman (1958, 1963), each of whom also considered symbols as primary instruments of knowledge and control.

Cohen (1974) expounded upon symbols as fundamental mechanisms for the development of selfhood and for dealing with many of the metaphysical issues of life and death, good and evil, misery and happiness, and fortune and misfortune. He advanced the notion that individuals must be two-dimensional--"political man is also symbolist man" (p. xi).

According to Ortner (1984), there are two major variants or trends in symbolic anthropology, the first expressed by Turner (1967, 1975) and the second by Geertz (1962, 1972, 1973). Geertz argued that culture is not something locked

inside people's heads, such as may be implied in Durkheim's (1915) notion of collective consciousness, but rather is embodied in public symbols through which individuals communicate their world view, values, and attitudes to one another. Geertz (1972) was particularly interested in the ethos side of culture and in his study of Balinese culture, he tried to identify, through the culture's symbols, the cognitive ordering principles and the manner in which the Balinese way of chopping up time stamps their sense of self, social relations, and conduct with a particularly distinctive flavor, an ethos (Ortner, 1984). Geertz further advanced the idea that the evolution of culture can be measured by its increasing reliance upon systems of significant symbols, especially those in language, art, myth, and ritual, in order to orient its members, communicate, and offer self-control. The use of symbols over time is one illustration of Geertz's conviction that people are completing or finishing themselves through culture. Geertz (1984) is one of the more ardent proponents of cultural relativism, believing that it is the anthroplogist's task to unearth cultural differences, not its similarities.

Other anthropologists figure prominently in the debate over cultural symbols. Geertz (1973) attributed many of his ideas to Parsons (1949, 1951) who tried to understand the internal logic of systems of symbols and who defined culture as "the transmitted and created content and pattern of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts

produced through behavior" (Kroeber & Parsons, 1958, p. 538).

Schneider (1976) picked up on Parson's ideas and stressed that the object of a theory of culture is to contribute to an understanding of social action, because culture as a system of symbols and meanings had a role in determining that action. Schneider was concerned that anthropologists had not extended the study of cultural symbols beyond religion, ritual, myth, magic, and occassionally art. He argued that social institutions such as property, death, exchange of goods, the exchange of women, and kinship should also be examined for their symbolic meaning. He further believed that culture as a system of symbols and meanings provide integration for a culture and articulate a society's culturalogic.

Symbols in Psychodynamic Theory & Freud

Symbols also bear upon the cognitive dimensions of psychodynamic theory. Recalling earlier discussions on the universality of emotions and feelings (Izard, 1980), the idea that feelings have something to do with the encounter of the world as represented cognitively has been articulated in psychodynamic theory by Devereux (1979), who argued that only the emotional-laden symbolic processing of percepts gives the infinite number of pieces of the perceived world some kind of integrated unity. "Symbolization helps to hold man's segmental capacities together and fosters a broader direct involvement with the situation" (p. 28).

This discussion on symbols would be incomplete without

at least a passing reference to Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). His understanding of symbols in the unconscious mind and in dreams was often discussed in the context of displacement by which one symbol is replaced with another symbol. Freud's work had much influence on many anthropologists, particularly Malinowski (1922) and Mead (1934), both of whom relied on the symbolism of sexuality and the Oedipal complex as first proposed by Freud. Malinowski (1927) argued that the matrilineal society of the Trobriand Island produced a psychological complex quite different from Freud's Oedipus complex. This conclusion was widely accepted as the proof of the cultural relativity of human nature and the ethnocentric bias of Freudian theory.

Accepted, that is, until Spiro published his Oedipus in the Trobriands (1982) which challenged Malinowski's argument. Through a reanalysis of Malinowski's own data, Spiro demonstrated that the Oedipus complex is present in the Trobriands and concluded that there is evidence to suggest the hypothesis that the Oedipus complex is universal. Furthermore, it was Spiro's conviction that symbols have both conscious as well as unconscious meanings and the Oedipus complex can be discovered only insofar as it represents unconscious symbolic formations. "Hence, much of the evidence that is presented in support of the Trobriand Oedipal hypothesis consists of a wide range of cultural beliefs and social forms together with their putative unconscious symbolic meanings" (p. xi).

Collective Symbols & Myths

Other anthropologists have made significant contributions to the relationship between culture and symbols. White (1959) focused on distinguishing between signs and symbols, maintaining that while signs are things or events whose meaning is inherent in their physical form, symbols are things or events whose meanings are arbitrarily bestowed upon them by their collective users. The significance of this distinction lies in the fact that while the behavior of all higher animals other than the human primate is typically sign behavior, humans are the only animal capable of performing both sign and symboling behavior. Human language is the most prominent form of symboling behavior. He also argued that because people can symbolically represent the world to themselves, they are capable of transcending their own sensory experiences. They can talk about places they have never seen, events in which they have not participated, and they can speculate about the past, dream about the future, and invent entities that do not exist. This enables people to adapt to and exploit the world around them.

A culture's collective use of symbols is directly linked to its myths. I can only touch the surface of the relationships between myths and symbols. Symbols appear prominently in a culture's myths and provide the primary structure for both the creation and transmission of myths. Symbols frequently achieve their most elaborate and compelling public currency in myths and the sacred tales in which people invest their lives with cosmic grandeur. Myths form a type of dream-thinking of a people (Harrison, 1903),

just as a dream is the myth of an individual.

It was Malinowski (1922, 1926) who taught us to regard myths pragmatically as charters legitimating and justifying contemporary events, the past continually reinterpreted to validate the present (Lewis, 1985). The symbols in recurring myths serve as concrete anchors for a culture's contemporary realities; they also serve to mediate between conflicting cultural rules and principles. Malinowski illustrated this by showing how certain Trobriand myths explain and resolve disputes over land between locally resident people of low status and pushy, high status intruders.

The dreams and fantasies of the low status Trobrianders are reflected in their myths and symbols. In his ethnography of the Kula, Malinowski (1922) recorded a northern Massim myth about a crippled and scabrous hero who voyages in search of a fabulous magic flute. After many adventures, he secures it and returns rejuvenated and beautiful. The chief virtually cedes his position to the transformed hero, telling all the women of the village to marry him. Their jealous menfolk try to kill him, but he is invincible and succeeds in winning all the best Kula valuables. Finally, he curses his rivals and departs to live in exile. The flute is a symbol of personal charisma and the power to woo others under his spell. The hero himself is a symbol of the natural aristocrat beneath the skin of every lowly Trobriander. All cultures have similar myths and symbols within the myths that are the language of their collective dreams, fantasies, and and consciousness.

Berger and Luckmann (1967) wrote of institutional order through what they called symbolic universes which provide frames of reference in which behavior is ordered and made meaningful. Building on Berger and Luckmann, Aronoff (1980) interpreted culture as a socially constructed and shared structure of meanings. Aronoff also argued that symbols are the primary building blocks out of which all cultural forms are constructed. Along the same vein of thought, Vareene (1984) called culture the structuring of symbolic creativity.

Personal Symbols

An important contribution to this discussion has come from Obeyesekere (1981) who drew upon Freud's theory of unconscious motivation in suggesting that certain cultural symbols are articulated through individual experience and operate simultaneously on the levels of culture and personality. By focusing on the long locks of matted hair of Hindu-Buddhist religious devotees, Obeyesekere illustrated how individuals personalize public symbols and reconstruct the symbols so as to express the psychic conflicts of the individual. Personal symbols become a special class of cultural symbols by becoming embedded in the personal psychology and experience of individuals. The personal symbol thereby mediates between personality and culture. Obeyesekere also offered the useful concept of psychogentic symbols that influence myths and rituals:

> I argue that psychological symbols can be broken down into a minimum of two types: personal symbols where

deep motivation is involved, and psychogenetic symbols where deep motivation does not occur. Psychogenetic symbols <u>originate</u> in the unconscious or are derived from the dream repertoire; but the origin of the symbols must be analytically separated from its ongoing operational significance. This is often the case in myths and rituals: symbols originating from unconscious sources are used to give expression to meanings that have nothing to do with their origin. (pp. 13-14)

Building on Obeyesekere's notion of personal symbols, Poole (1987) explored the construction and deployment of personal symbols by a five year old boy among the Bimin-Kuskusmin of the remote West Sepik interior of Papua New Guinea. As Poole pointed out, both he and Obeyesekere were instantiating a claim made by Sapir (1932) who noted that, "The true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals, and, on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions" (p. 236).

In his studies of the Sepik region of New Guinea, Tuzin (1972, 1977) evaluated the symbolism of yams and water in the Arapesh people. Somewhat similar to the above discussion on Obeyesekere's (1981) and Poole's (1987) notions of personal symbols, Tuzin concluded that water and yams, along with other culturally standarized symbols, resonate with individual private emotions that, in the case of these two symbols, are respectively existential and sexual. What is equally significant, however, is that all individuals in a

given culture do not subscribe to these symbols in the same way and to the same degree. So, on the one hand, cultural symbols are not totally idiosyncratic, but, on the other, "it is not likely that all of these [symbols] could be found together in a single Arapesh individual" (p. 235). Levels of symbolic meaning interact between individuals and the culture in a "mutually reinforcing way and this dynamism contributes to the persistence of the symbolic complex over time" (p. 230). The meaning that is linked to the symbols of water and yams, or the meaning that they signify, has a relation to some more abstract idea that approximates to the status of cultural meaning systems. To say that water has an existential or apocalyptic meaning is a mechanism for objectifying a cultural meaning system dating back to an earlier period in the culture's history. Yet, the precise manner in which individuals carry out the act of signification, or the act of linking the public symbols with personal experience, will vary within a culture so that certain symbols will have more meaning for some individuals than for others.

Other anthropologists who have made recent contributions to the study of symbolism include Jackson (1975) who discussed the importance of visual symbolism in controlling eating patterns in the cultures of the South American lowlands; Blu (1967) who studied the symbols of matriliny and paternity as blood and appearance in the Trobriand Islands; Dumont (1970) who identified the issues of inequality in cultures through symbols linked with caste, racism, and stratification; Sahlins (1977) who studied the symbolic

meaning of colors; and Polanyi (1977) who examined the symbolism and semantics of money uses.

Criticisms

Recent criticism of symbolic anthropology questions the framework within which interpretations of symbols are placed. Theories that take social formations as cultural texts to be read may lead to reckless or clumsy interpretations and may disguise other problems, such as the treatment of culture as asymmetrically distributed knowledge (Keesing, 1987). Sperber (1974) has shown that it is illusory to look for the meaning of symbols. He agrued that symbols are not cryptological messages to be decoded but puzzles to be figured out and may admit of more than one interpretation. Still other criticisms suggest that symbolic anthropology lacks a systematic sociology, is underdeveloped in its sense of the politics of culture, and lacks curiosity concerning the production and maintenance of symbolic systems (Ortner, 1984).

Summary

There is strong support among anthropologists to identify language and symbols as properties of the category of culture. Semiotics is understood primarily as the language of a culture and includes interpretation and perception as well as symbols as the nonlinguistic signs that lend themselves to a highly hermeneutic quest. Both linguistics and symbols function to create and communicate structures of reality, to direct and order behavior, and to

serve as primary frames of reference in people's world views, self-understandings, and meaning systems.

Culture as Ethical

In an essay enititled "Moral Virture" in The Nicomachaen Ethics (1941), Aristotle said, "Excellence, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual excellence owes its birth and growth to instruction, and so requires time and experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom" (p. 146). Aquinas, in Summa Theologica (1974) said, "For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous . . .while they are vicious for others." And finally, Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1959), offered the following:

> He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named or rule of virtue to be thought on which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others. (pp. 121-122)

Absolutism versus Relativism

Postulating upon the relationship between culture and ethics is just short of opening a Pandora's box. The above quotes from two philosophers and a theologian suggest that the issue of culture and ethics has been around for a long time. While philosophers may argue persuasively that there is a universal ethic that can apply to any culture at any time (Bloom, 1987), such absolutism has never set well with many anthropologists, who, some will argue, are engaged in a discipline designed to identify differences in cultures, ethical or otherwise, rather than similarities. In discussing the nature of culture, anthropologists unanimously agree that ethics and moral values are indeed an intrinsic part of every culture, even if no two cultures have an identical ethical frame of reference. Frequently ethics and morals are treated as synonomous, but I identify ethics as concept and morals as structure. In other words, culture has an ethical framework which is manifested in moral behavior.

Apart from generally agreeing that ethics separates Homo sapiens from the rest of the animal kingdom, anthropologists have addressed the ethics of cultures through three lenses. The first is ethical relativism, a key component of cultural relativism; the second is ethnocentrism; and the third is cultural progress, briefly alluded to in the earlier discussion on adaptation and evolution. The issue of ethical relativism is the larger and, perhaps, more important issue and offers the backdrop against which enthnocentrism and cultural progress can be examined.

Ethical Relativism

Ethical relativism refers to the notion that ethical standards, or a code of morality, that can be applied in judging good and bad, or right and wrong, are relative to the cultural background of the person making the judgement. It is a doctrine stating that since the moral rightness and wrongness of behavior varies from culture to culture, there are no absolute moral standards binding on all people at all times. It is the very opposite of absolutism which argues for a set of moral principles, an ethical standard, that is universal. Geertz (1984) commented that it has not been anthropological theory that has attacked absolutism, but rather anthropological data.

There is a history to anthropology's approach to ethical relativism that is worth tracing. The earliest form was called descriptive relativism, a product of Victorian thinking which professed a notion of progress based on biological evolution and formulated a cultural moral hierarchy, with, of course, Victorian culture at the top. Descriptive relativism reinforced the concept of ethnocentrism by which individuals form judgments about cultures different from their own. In Victorian times, it was a form of cultural chauvinism. It was developed along with the unilineal theory of evolution by which all cultures must go through developmental stages toward an advanced, more mature culture.

The reaction to descriptive relativism came in the form of what was called normative ethical relativism, first

proclaimed by Boas (1911/1966, 1938/1965) and later advanced by Margaret Mead (1934) and Herskovits (1948, 1951, 1958). Many others have since sided with these three who argued that because all ethical standards are culturally constituted, there are no available transcultural standards by which different cultures might be judged on a scale of merit or worth. Their call for tolerance was a challenge to the ethnocentric theories of variability. They further rejected the unilineal theory of evolution and any notion of moral progress within or across cultures.

On a somewhat different level, though still in reaction against descriptive relativism, Malinowski (1922, 1926, 1945) and Radcliffe-Brown (1924, 1940, 1952) formulated a functional ethical relativism which defined morality by expediency. They argued that any conceivable behavior may, in the appropriate historical or ethnological circumstances, take its turn in fulfilling the function of social expediency. They further suggested that social function contained a criterion that could be used as a cross-cultural standard for evaluating the morality of institutions, thus separating themselves from the normative relativists who did not favor a cross-cultural standard of any sort. With his socialist background, Harris (1971, 1979) joined the functional relativists by arguing that ecological adaptation, not stability, is the functional role of institutions and when they performed this role well, they were acting in the best moral interests of the culture.

More recently, there are two theories of ethical relativism that are competing for front-and-center stage.

Both have developed out of the discomfort many
anthropologists have had with normative or functional
relativism because both theories could condone any form of
behavior and allow for societies to be run by a power
wielding tyrant, as long as such behavior was exercised
efficiently, e.g. Hitler. The first of these two competing
theories is called hermeneutic ethical relativism and is a
take off from the impact and enormous popularity of Geertz
(1973) and Turner (1967, 1975) and their symbolic
anthropology. Their position takes a maximal view of
cultural diversity and argues that cultures are
incommensurable. The only way an ethical standard could be
applied across cultures is to identify categories of
commonality among cultures. Geertz and others argued that
there is no way we can know or identify these universal
characteristics. In one sense, they are restating many of
the premises of normative relativism, but they rely more on
an epistomological frame of reference using interpretation
rather than explanation as the methodology. As an
interpretive approach, there was room for judgment.

In quite the opposite direction, there are some
anthropologists, most notably Kluckhohn (1961, 1973),
Levi-Strauss (1976, 1985), Redfield (1953, 1873), and Spiro
(1987) who have argued in favor of what could be called a
universal ethical relativism which professes an ethic that
has both a relative and a universal dimension. While
supporting the basic premise of cultural diversity, they
also believe there are certain common denominators that are
cross-cultural and that can be extracted from the range of

variation that all cultures manifest. They argue that we
cannot tolerate absolutely every form of behavior, even if
it is accepted in its manifest culture and that, based upon
selected common denominators, there is room for judgment.
Both Spiro and Levi-Strauss have argued that while content
is not everywhere the same, the working of the human mind
is. They have advanced the idea that there are certain
cognitive, psychological, and biological characteristics of
humans that are universal. Spiro joined with the
sociobiologist Wilson in alleging that there is a universal
human nature and once we can identify its key components, a
universal ethic can be built around those basic categories
of what is universal in human nature. He said, "I believe
that there are standards 'worthy of universal respect' by
which cultural frames can be evaluated" (1987, p. 55).

Spiro relied on Freud's definition of human nature as
composed of id, ego, and superego and suggested this
classification could still be utilized in defining the
pancultural constants of human nature. In Oedipus in the
Trobriands (1982), he pressed the claim that Freud's Oedipus
complex is one of those constants that spans the human race.
Other constants include people's common biological
features, especially their prolonged infantile dependency as
well as needs of aggression, anger, and competition.
Levi-Strauss (1963, 1976) has argued that incest and the
cognitive act of binary opposition are universal
characteristics of human beings. Others who have argued in
support of a universal ethic include Brandt (1954a), Childe
(1951), Flugel (1945), Fortes (1949), Frankel-Brunswik

(1954), Fromm (1944), Kolb (1953), Linton (1952), Maslow (1954), Murdock (1945a), Roheim (1950), Steward (1955), and White (1943).

While notions of a universal ethics remain theoretical, Spiro (1965) has provided empirical evidence in his comparison of Rorschach responses in eleven societies. His tests suggest there is "an overall tendency toward homogeneity of responses regardless of culture. This finding gives some comfort and support to those workers who are concerned principally with the psychic unity of mankind thesis, indicating as it does that such unity does in fact exist" (p. 310).

The idea of ethical relativism in anthropology has had a complicated history. From an overwhelming confidence in the notion fortified by findings about the variability of moral values from culture to culture to an equally firm conviction that ethical relativism has been a big mistake, the debate is still being waged. Implicit in this debate is the nature versus nurture issue. The relationship of culture to human nature will be addressed further in the conclusion to this chapter, but suffice it to say it plays the primary role in the argument for a universal ethical relativism. Future research by sociobiologists and geneticists will offer more data upon which to accept or reject the underlying assumptions of this relationship.

Ethnocentrism and Progress

It is now apparent that the issues of ethnocentrism and cultural progress are linked with the issue of ethical

relativism. The concept of ethnocentricism has essentially been addressed in the above discussion, but it is worth picking up on some of Levi-Strauss's thoughts on this issue since it is present in much of his writings, particularly The Savage Mind (1966) and The Raw and the Cooked (1969), and, most recently, The Jealous Potter (1988). He argued that the human species lost a substantive part of its identity when people started removing themselves from nature and setting themselves up in an absolute reign over nature. He called it a crime when humans adopted the belief in their lasting superiority over nature and other peoples. He attacked those who relegate certain cultures to the lowly perception of primitive or barbarian and said: "The barbarian is first of all the person who believes in barbarism" (1976, p. 330).

Anthropologists generally do not subscribe to a notion of progress. They are sensitive to its close affinity to the descriptive relativism of the Victorians. But a few have ventured some ideas on the possibility of progress and their perspectives are worth reviewing. Levi-Strauss answered the question of whether there is progress with a yes and no.

> [Progress] means two thing: First, that "progress" is neither necessary nor continuous; it proceeds by leaps and bounds, or as the biologists would say, by mutations. Secondly, these leaps and bounds do not always go in the same direction; they go together as changes in orientation, a little like a chess knight that can always avail itself of several progressions but

never in the same direction. Humanity in progress
hardly resembles a man climbing a flight of stairs, with
each of his movements adding a new step to all those he
has passed. It is rather like a player whose luck is
resting on several dice and who, each time he throws,
sees them scattered on the table, with a variety of
combinations. What one wins on one throw is always
liable to be lost on another. It is only from time to
time that history is cumulative--in other words, that
the numbers can be added up to form a favorable
combination. (1976, pp. 337-338)

The cultural materialists argued in favor of progress
but its criteria was defined as intensification, or the
investment of more soil, water, minerals, or energy per unit
of time or area. Harris believed "there is an intelligible
process that governs the maintenance of common cultural
forms, initiates changes, and determines their
transformations along parallel or divergent paths" (1977, p.
4).

Kroeber (1948), who defined culture as the superorganic,
offered three criteria for measuring culture's progress:
(a) the atrophy of magic based on psychopathology, (b) the
decline of infantile obsession with the outstanding
physiological events of human life, and (c) the persistent
tendency of technology and science to grow accumulatively.
These are "the ways," he said, "in which progress may
legitimately be considered a property or an attribute of
culture" (p. 304).

More recently, Gans (1985) defined ethical acts as those

that are specifically intended to preserve communal
presence. He expressed great optimism about the progress of
society, based upon a Christian teleology:

> The end of the Judeo-Christian evolution occurred
> precisely when the Judaic ethical tradition was
> transformed by the early Christian in a universal
> abstract morality. It is our contention that the
> subsequent "regression" to an institutionalized
> Christianity was not in fact a regression at all but a
> new stage in the evolution of the ethical, in which the
> worldly realizations of this ideal morality became an
> explicitly ethical--that is, social--goal. And we
> further contend that modern consumer society, far from a
> monstrous materialist aberration, is the highest level
> yet attained of this very same realization. . . . On the
> highest level of ethical evolution, the entire society
> would function according to the morality of universal
> reciprocity announced in the Gospels. (p. 49)

Gans developed his notion of an ethical culture by
tracing the growth of a culture in three stages, starting at
ostensive, moving to imperative, and ending at declarative.
An ostensive culture he defined as one in which signs are
realized only in the presence of their referents. The
ethical community at this stage is limited to ritual without
the existence of laws or interdictions. The ostensive
culture becomes an imperative culture when it is capable of
using imagination to create an objective reality that may
otherwise be lacking. The declarative culture occurs at the
moment in which language can express an objective truth.

Language becomes the sign of the mature culture. Gans'
theory lacks clarity and grounding, and it is questionable
whether anthropologists would give much credence to Gan's
approach, but it does offer a perspective on the issue of
progress.

We may recall the earlier discussion of Dobzhansky
(1965) who subscribed to the evolutionary vision of Chardin
(1959) who proposed a directional process in evolutionary
history that was progressive. Chardin's notion of a
superlife toward which the human race is moving has not
receiving much support from other anthropologists, but
Chardin's theories have been very popular among the general
populace.

Geertz (1973) believed in a cumulative progress of
humanity and claimed culture was the vehicle by which people
finish and complete their humanity. He identified some
examples of how culture has contributed to the finishing
process: increased tool use, changing anatomy of the hand
with an expanded thumb, and greater reliance on symbolically
mediated programs for producing artifacts, organizing social
life, or expressing emotions. Geertz argued that humanity
was quite literally creating itself.

Implicit in the cultural ecologists' concern with
cultural adjustments to the physical environment is the
notion of progress. From this perspective, cultures are
viewed in terms of a progressive adaptation over time and
are therefore associated with cultural evolution. Societies
are ranked by a scale of development (Fried, 1967; Service,
1971). In this schemata, Western societies come out on top

of any number of non-Western cultures, but cutural ecologists argue that it is not assumed that a hierarchy represents improvement.

Sahlins (1960) distinguished between specific evolution and general evolution. Specific evolution does not rank cultures in a hierarchy because it recognizes that individual cultures can be judged only by how well each has adapted to its unique environment based upon its own needs. But when it comes to general evolution, he indicated that "we are not relativists at all, for we rank societies as higher and lower; we are noting cultural progress" (p. 27). The criteria for progress included (a) amount of energy harnessed, (b) level of integration and degrees of complexity, and (c) all-round adaptability. Sahlins summarized: "General cultural evolution is passage from less to greater energy transformation, lower to higher levels of integration, and less to greater all-round adaptability" (p. 38). It should be added that Sahlins did not suggest that progress necessarily implied betterment, improvement, or higher levels of existence at a moral or even psychological level. Thus, even though the notion of progress continued, it lost much of its earlier moral punch.

Even the cultural evolutionist White (1959, 1975) had a change of view from his earlier optimistic idea that cultural evolution meant increasing security and material prosperity to his later opinion that culture does not serve the interests of humankind at all, for it is oriented toward its own perpetuation. He suggested that a culture that is

highly stable and viable may be miserable to live in.

The single criteria for progress that seems to enjoy a consensus of agreement across cultures is the desrie for material prosperity (Arensberg & Neihoff, 1971). Thus, the single interest that maintains the notion of progress is that of economic development. This standard of well-being is manifest in the work of Bodley (1975) who argued that while cultures seek material prosperity, the outsider development schemes among nonindustrial people are wrong because the changes such schemes incur worsen the peoples' material well-being, and do not improve it. Current thinking suggests that while Western society may not be home-sweet-home for everyone, it has the moral obligation to help improve the material conditions of non-Western peoples (Hatch, 1983).

Given the scant material that anthropology has produced in favor of notions of moral progress, and the volumes of material against any notion of progress, it is fair to conclude that mainstream anthropology does not take center stage as a defender of human progress. It isn't that anthropologists necessarily deny progress could happen, they simply have not identified the categories or criteria by which such progress would be measured. One might add, however, that should the concept of universal ethical relativism become more systematically defined with specific categories that form the human constant, or the universal human nature, then one might conceive of a notion of progress formulated around this universal ethic.

Summary

Ethics is certainly one of culture's key descriptors or categories. While anthropologists agree that all cultures have an ethic and standards for moral behavior, they do not proclaim a universal ethic. Ethical relativism has been the focus for most anthropologists and the debate continues between a hermeneutic or normative ethical relativism versus a universal ethical relativism. The issues of ethnocentrism and progress remain on the edges of the ethical debate with few anthropologists subscribing to any notion of cultural progress. If, however, research instantiates the notion of a psychic unity of humankind, then a universal ethical relativism may provide the criteria on which a limited notion of progress could be advanced.

Culture as Generative

If culture and nature were synonomous, then culture would be instinctual and its preservation would not be very threatened. However, culture is learned by individuals over time--a process called enculturation--and it must therefore be taught to its inheritors. The learning process is both conscious and unconscious. The hunting and survival lore that an Eskimo father teaches his son is not knowledge that the father has himself discovered on his own, but is a body of techniques and practices acquired from many previous generations of Eskimo hunters. The same applies to

technology, language, philosophy, values, beliefs, social behavior and etiquette, and many other products of a cultural heritage for which the individual becomes a temporary receptacle, ready in turn to pass them on to the next generation, with the possibility of only slight modifications.

Learning

The generative property of culture identifies the methods or means by which a society generates, reproduces, or transmits its culture to the members of that society. Learning is a key ingredient and is the primary vehicle by which culture is inherited. The maintenance and survival of human social life demands that forms of social interaction, methods of social cooperation, techniques of conflict resolution, and other behavioral functions be learned.

Durkheim (1938) identified the generative side of culture when he said, "It becomes immediately evident that all education is a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling, and acting which he could not have arrived at spontaneously" (p. 5). Based on Durkheim's work, Barrett (1984) defined culture as "the body of learned beliefs, traditions, and guides for behavior that are shared among members of any human society" (p. 54).

Schneider (1976) also defined culture as patterns of learned behavior and added that there are two fundamental functions of culture. The first he called the regnant function which meant that culture places disparate parts of the social system into a meaningful whole, and the second

function he called generative, which he defined as culture's way of dealing with alteration, changes, innovations, and even losses. "Social life is meaningful; new meanings are established with reference to old meanings, and grow out of them and must be made, in some degree, congruent with them; and exchange, whenever and wherever it occurs, must be articulated with the existing system of meanings" (p. 205).

Mead (1964) discussed how a child becomes a part of its culture, whether that culture is New York City or New Guinea. "In its broadest sense, education is the cultural process, the way in which each newborn human infant, born with a potentiality for learning greater than that of any other mammal, is transformed into a full member of a specific human society, sharing with the other members a specific human culture" (p. 162).

Two of Murdock's (1945a) fundamental characteristics of culture include learning and inculcation. He believed that culture is not instinctive, or innate, or transmitted biologically, but is composed of habits acquired by experience. These habits were learned by humans through repeated inculcation by parents. "Inculcation involves not only the imparting of techniques and knowledge but also the disciplining of the child's animal impulses to adjust him to social life" (p. 81).

Numerous other anthropologists agree that culture has a generative component. Hall (1959) called learning a primary message system and suggested that culture is simply learned and shared behavior. He added that people in various cultures learn to learn differently, and that how one learns

is also culturally determined as is what one learns. In one sense, humans are born with a _tabula_ _rasa,_ and the learning process fills the mind in such a way that the habits and behavioral patterns are later experienced as though they were innate. Those anthropologists whose definition of culture is essentially semiotic (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Kluckhohn, 1962; Kuper, 1977; Levi-Strauss, 1963, 1976, and others) would agree that culture must include a generative property as a fundamental part of the semiotic process, if not its very foundation. As summarized by D'Andrade (1984), culture consists of "learned systems of meaning, communicated by natural language and other symbol systems" (p. 116).

The relationship of learning systems and culture has surfaced in works by Bellah and associates (1985), Bloom (1987), and Hirsch (1987), none of whom are anthropologists, but all of whom have persuasively argued that our understanding and acquisition of our cultural heritage are the primary products of our educational system. Bloom and Hirsch have criticized the American educational systems for giving such curricula as humanities a low priority and point to the impact such decisions have on how American students assimilate moral, behavioral, and ideational patterns. Bellah and his associates were interested in the question of how Americans preserve or create a morally coherent life. They identified a culture of separation marked by the pursuit of individuation and retreat from commitment and community. They also attacked the current American university system for its failure to enable students "to acquire some general sense of the world and their place in it" (p. 279). The current

trend "to think of education as a cafeteria in which one acquires discrete bodies of information or useful skills . . . [is] symptomatic of our cultural fracture than of its cure" (p. 279). They further lament, "Dialogue is reduced to clipped sentences. No one talks long enough to express anything complex. Depth of feeling, if it exists at all, has to be expressed in a word or a glance" (p. 280). Bellah, Bloom, and Hirsch are all convinced that when education becomes an instrument for individual careerism, it cannot provide personal meaning or a sense of the cultural ethos.

The generative property of culture identified by anthropologists, and the challenges that Bellah, Bloom, and Hirsch have raised, are captured in a passage at the end of Wordsworth's The Prelude (1985):

What we have loved,

Others will love, and we will teach them how.

The Learning Process

There is a general consensus among anthropologists that culture includes a generative component. Debate, however, centers around the question: How do human societies get their members to behave in conformity with cultural norms and behavioral expectations? This question has been addressed by Spiro (1987) in an essay entitled "Social Systems, Personality, and Functional Analysis" and he offered an illuminating and useful response. Both an anthropologist and a psychoanalyst, Spiro is interested in human motivation which consists primarily of needs and drives. He explored the manner in which social systems satisfy personality needs

and thereby fulfill the functional requirements of the
society, recognizing that humans are highly plastic and
malleable and what an individual must learn in order to
participate in the social system of the society is not
necessarily identical with what that individual can learn.
How then does society cause an individual to learn what is
functionally necessary for the culture to be maintained and
generated, and concomitantly direct an individual away from
the habits and behavior patterns that may harm or destroy the
culture, such as those raised by Bellah (1985), Bloom (1987),
and Hirsch (1987)?

It is interesting that the answer to this question
returns the discussion to the bio-basic property of culture
and the biological basis of human need. Undergirded by a
Freudian approach to anthropology, Spiro believed that human
social systems are rooted in people's biological nature, that
these social systems may be viewed as functional requirements
of human life, and that the psychobiological needs of humans
are the foundation upon which social systems are constructed.
There are three sets of needs: biological, group or social,
and emotional which develop the interaction between
biological and social needs. He cited Malinowski (1944) who
viewed a social system as an instrumental apparatus for the
satisfaction of human needs. Spiro's functionalist approach
basically believed that social systems function to meet basic
human needs, biological, social and emotional.

But just as social systems function to meet human needs,
so human behavior must be adapted and shaped to maintain the
social systems. There is something like a chicken and egg

paradox here, but Spiro would argue that human need is ultimately the bottom line and when social systems weaken in their instrumental capacity to meet human need, then they must change.

The concept of role is important in Spiro's answer to the question of how behavior is conformed to cultural norms. Role behavior, a subclass of learned behavior, can be created and reinforced by the model of reward and punishment. In this model, called by Spiro the ontogenetic model, a drive, or felt tension or discomfort, is present in an infant but it has no goal, no cathected object, and is therefore open to direction. When the drive is gratified, homeostasis is restored. When this happens enough times, the drive-reducing object becomes a goal. The attainment of the goal is rewarding, i.e., drive-reducing. It is the assumption in this model that every drive must be reduced, either directly or indirectly. Likewise, a drive-reducing behavior, if it is not acceptable, can be punished and thereby discouraged. Two simple controls for reward and punishment in most societies are shame and praise. "By stipulating that only a limited, out of a potentially large, number of objects or events may serve as goals for drives, and by prohibiting all others, the cultural heritage insists that if a drive is to be gratified at all, it must be gratified by means of these stipulated prescribed or sanctioned goals" (p. 121). Spiro gives the examples of a New Guinea headhunter who must bring home a head to gratify his prestige drive, but an Ifaluk must not; and while an American can eat roast beef to gratify hunger, an Hindu must not. Since these rewards and

punishments are extrinsic to the performance of a role, and since they are administered by persons other than the actor, they are labelled extrinsic cultural motivation or extrinsic social control.

But since no social system can compel a person to conform, according to Spiro, it can only motivate the person to do so. Spiro also identified another form of motivation called intrinsic cultural motivation. He explained this by citing Fromm (1944): "In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them 'want' to act in the way they 'have' to act as members of the society . . .They have to 'desire' what objectively is 'necessary' for them to do" (p. 381). Spiro also drew upon the child-training and socialization studies of Erikson (1963) and Whiting and Child (1953) to explain that culturally stipulated goals are transformed into personally-cathected goals by the conversion of drive-reduction to need-satisfaction. A Hindu not only refuses to eat beef because it has been prohibited, but because it is not desired; eating beef may even be disgusting to the Hindu. Thus, cultural imperatives become personal desires, satisfying personality needs as well as a social system's functional needs. Spiro used service in the armed forces as an example of a social system and personality need being met.

But motives do not disappear simply because they are prohibited. Incompatibility between internalized cultural norms and personal desire leads to inner conflict which must be handled in some way by the social system or the system may

begin to come apart. Spiro used the example of aggression which is an innate feature of the human personality, but which is difficult for social systems to accommodate. His example of Sioux social life is worth quoting to illustrate how this paradox can be handled.

> Like most societies, the cultural heritage of the Sioux
> prohibited physical aggression against the in-group.
> However, only one of the three dimensions of this motive
> was prohibited. Neither the drive itself (hostility)
> nor the means of its reduction (physical aggression),
> but only its object (the in-group), was prohibited. It
> was assumed, then, that the specific dimension of
> physical aggression against "fellows" was repressed,
> i.e., rendered unconscious. But by displacing hostility
> from the in- to the out-groups, this motive could now be
> expressed. This motive, one may suggest, sought
> satisfaction in, and was therefore important in the
> motivation of, Sioux warfare. In addition to their
> motives of prestige and protection, Sioux war parties
> were also motivated by aggression. In satisfying this
> motive, the warrior role served a latent personal
> function (integration), as well as its manifest personal
> and social functions. (p. 129)

Spiro's analysis of the relationship between culture and personality offered a perspective not only on how social systems influence the development and structuring of personality, but also how personality can affect the functioning of social systems, for social systems must also conform to the basic needs and drives of the personality.

This reciprocal relationship between culture and personality has been explored at length by earlier anthropologists and sociologists, including Benedict (1934), DuBois (1944), Hippler & DeVos (1954), Inkles & Levinson (1968), Kardiner (1939, 1945), LeVine (1973), Mead (1928), and Whiting & Child (1953). Again it should be noted that Malinowski (1944) and Kardiner (1945) are credited with being among the first to make a case for the effect of culture in terms of real difference on the human personality (Schwartz, 1988, p. 7).

The final method of control of role behavior is what Spiro called internalized cultural motivation which focuses on the superego of the individual and can be accomplished by satisfying superego needs by creating moral anxiety, also expressed as guilt/shame. The creation of moral anxiety can be stimulated by the largely unconscious, as well as conscious, expectation of punishment. Transgression of behavioral expectations creates an expectation of punishment, another term for moral anxiety. Anxiety can be reduced by refraining from transgression. Hence, the anxiety serves as a motive for conformity. Spiro suggested that moral anxiety arises out of the universal need for love. Through the giving or withdrawal of love by parents, for example, the child learns what is good and bad behavior. Withdrawal of love is equal to punishment by those whose love the child so strongly desires. The mere intention to transgress leads to the anticipation of punishment, or moral anxiety. The child, Spiro expounded, has developed a superego, or conscience. Guilt may occur when a

transgression has been committed, even if it was not witnessed by others, and punishment is expected or occurs. It is a response to an act of transgression. Shame may occur in the anticipation of punishment only after others have witnessed the transgression and it causes higher levels of moral anxiety than would happen with guilt. Certain cultures, such as the Japanese culture, are more prone to use shame, rather than guilt, to control behavior.

Spiro's Freudian approach to the learning process is a major contribution to an understanding of the generative property of culture. While many psychologists and anthropologists have delegated Freud's contributions to history, Spiro continues to place Freud's theories in the forefront of his own approaches to the understanding of culture and personality.

Barth's Generative Model

Barth (1966) has made a major contribution to understanding culture as generative in his generative model of social organization. Barth focused on the process of change in a culture and how different forms result as a consequence of change. His generative model explained social change as a process of generating new forms that respond to developing needs. He argued that cultures are processes of creating new social forms though a shifting of values. Culture generates its own growth and adaptive processes by creating new social forms and systems that strengthen a culture's ability to survive.

> I wish to explore the extent to which patterns of social
> form can be explained if we assume that they are the
> cumulative result of a numer of separate choices and
> decisions made by people acting vis-a-vis one another.
> In other words, that the patterns are generated through
> processes of interation and in their form reflect the
> constraints and incentives under which people act. (p.
> 2)

He instantiated his theory in his discussion of leadership
among the Swat Pathans. When Barth reconsidered his
generative models in his later writing, Process and Form in
Social Life (1981), he reacted against understanding his
generative models as transactional and opted for the notion
of process to more precisely explain his view of
generativity. He defined process as "a generalizable set of
linked events which keep recurring, the necessary
interconnections of which, and the consequences of which,
can be clearly described" (p. 78). Barth believed that the
concept of processes "provide the key conceptualizations for
depicting how aggregation comes about, and explaining
aggregate form" (p. 80). Barth's understanding of process
is important not only as it identifies the generative
property of culture, but is most useful in defining all the
properties of culture as processes, and later, in defining
the nature of leadership as a process.

Schwartz's Distributive Model

Schwartz's (1988) idea of a distributive model of
culture also makes an important contribution to the

generative property of culture. In his model, the learning process occurs as individuals internalize the experiences informed and interpreted by the culture and in interaction with other enculturated adults. These internalized experiences are "simultaneously cognitive-affective-evaluative mappings or representations of experience derived from the events of the life-history-thus-far" (p. 9). Individuals internalize these experiences differently than other individuals and thus create unique personalities. Through the internalization of experience which is initially shaped by culture, the individual becomes a learning template for others with whom s/he has relationships. Individuals are both shaped by their culture and become vehicles for the passing of culture to others. In this sense individuals both distribute and generate their culture. Schwartz's distributive model is another approach to describing the distribution of culture among members of a society.

Summary

Culture relies on education and methods of creating conformity in individuals in order to maintain and generate the culture. While anthropologists would generally agree that culture has a generative component, few have identified how human societies get their members to behave in conformity with cultural norms. Thus, Spiro (1987), in building on Freudian theory as well as many other culture and personality studies, offers an answer to this question, based on his conviction that human social systems are rooted

in basic, universal biological needs, returning this discussion full circle to culture's bio-basic property. Barth's (1966) notion of culture's generativity addresses change and how cultures generate new forms based on changing values and needs. Finally, Schwartz's (1988) distributive model offers another approach to understanding how cultural processes are distributed among members of a society.

Conclusion

Form & Process

The search for the elusive nature of culture has resulted in the emergence of nine properties of culture that identify its universal nature. An a priori assumption is that the notion of universal properties of culture does not suggest that cultures are exclusively homogeneous. The properties of culture discussed above have been defined primarily in terms of processes rather than in terms of the forms that such properties may take. Bearing in mind Barth's (1981) definition of process as a "generalizable set of linked events which keep recurring, the necessary interconnections of which, and the consequences of which, can be clearly described" (p. 78), the properties of culture create the foundation on which to propose the universal nature of culture, while also accounting for the diversity and heterogeneity of cultures. By identifying what is

common among cultures, viz., their properties, I have left room for understanding how cultures differ not only interculturally, but also intraculturally. The properties of culture, therefore, are the processes by which cultures have a universal nature. Yet within each of the properties there can exist a variety of forms that account for the diversity among cultures.

A Definition of Culture

Recognizing, then, the heterogenous forms of cultures within their common homogeneous properties, I suggest a definition of culture as an adaptive, evolutionary, and ethical process through which people form groups that create socially shared meaningful structures by utilizing social, political, linguistic, symbolic and learning resources to meet human needs. This definition of culture identifies each of the nine properties upon which I have expounded in this chapter.

While all properties are not necessarily shared equally in the same distributive form, all are commonly present in every culture. Each property will be appropriated by individual cultures as well as by individuals within a culture in a relatively variant manner. The properties identified in this study can be used to identify what is universal among cultures as well as what is variant between cultures. Properties, understood also as processes, identify what is universal among cultures.

The Universal Properties of Culture

I have proposed that culture can best be defined by identifying its elemental properties that are universally present in all cultures. The nine properties that have been isolated are in effect culture's common denominators, its constants, its invariant points of reference. By suggesting a universal dimension to the nature of culture, I have departed from the mainstream position of most anthropologists who have been reluctant to endorse any theory of culture which attempts to universalize the properties of culture.

A few anthropologists, however, have proposed theories of culture that are pancultural. The earliest was Wissler (1923) who contended that every social system had three subsystems: kinship, political and economic. He referred to these subsystems as the universal patterns of culture.

Kluckhohn (1953) traced the history of anthropologists who tried to identify universal categories of culture. He concluded that "biological, psychological, and sociosituational universals afford the possibility of comparison of cultures in terms which are not ethnocentric" (p. 517). Most of the focus was on the biological and/or psychological constants such as sex, the Oedipal complex, language, and aggression. He concluded that since most anthropologists have been interested in the differences among cultures rather than similarities, there is much research left to do. That conclusion, of course, was written in 1953.

Around the same time, Hallowell (1955) argued that "all human cultures must provide the individual with basic orientations that are among the necessary conditions for the development, reinforcement, and effective functioning of self-awareness" (p. 91). The basic orientations that are universally present in all cultures included self-orientation, object orientation, spaciotemporal orientation, motivational orientation, and normative orientation. Hallowell believed that these are the central functions of all cultures that are necessary for self-awareness to emerge.

More recently, LeVine (1984) identified four properties of culture in his article entitled "Properties of Culture": (a) the collective nature of culture which he defined as a "consensus in a community . . . related to the importance of communication" (p. 68) which included language and symbols; (b) the organized nature of culture which focused on customs, beliefs, norms, values, and social action; (c) the multiplexity of culture which included rules, shared meanings, ideologies, and cognitive processes; and (d) the variability of culture across human populations.

Leach (1982) raised the issue of cultural universals and argued that if there were any invariable constants, they would have to be natural, or a part of our genetic endowment. He identified three possible universals as (a) language, (b) technological resourcefulness, and (c) human abhorence of complexity.

Culture versus Nature

Leach raised the issue of culture versus nature, a debate among anthropologists that dates back to Tylor (1871). For many anthropologists, the very concept of culture substantiated a definitive refutation of the notion of a universal human nature (Spiro, 1987). Many would further argue that personality is essentially reducible to culture. This argument would continue that since human personality and behavior are culturally determined, and since cultures vary enormously, the only universal that could be identified about human nature is that it is malleable; it is culture's clay to be shaped as any culture desires. Many of the culture-and-personality studies referenced in the discussion on generativity took a reverse position from psychoanalysis and concluded that since personality characteristics and configurations were isomorphic with the variety of cultural characteristics and patterns observed by anthropologists, the notion of a pancultural human nature was viewed as highly unlikely. If this is the case, then, in a word, "personality is the culture writ small" (Spiro, 1987, p. 16).

Likewise, one could read my definition of culture as composed of the nine universal properties and reach one of two conclusions: (1) that culture precludes human nature, or (2) that culture and personality are synonymous. But for the sake of debate, it is worth reminding ourselves that each property discussed in this study has parts of what many scholars have defined traditionally as human nature.

Bearing in mind Leach's notion that if there were any
cultural universals, they would have to be natural, a brief
review of the properties of culture discussed in this study
from a human nature lens may be helpful in understanding the
complexity and the subtlety of the culture/nature debate.
In other words, perhaps a case for Leach's idea can be made.

The bio-basic property of culture, our Artemis self,
makes certain assumptions about human biological needs that
must be met, including food, shelter, protection, love,
aggression, sex, territoriality, language, feelings and
emotion, self-awareness, and socialization. The adaptive
and evolutionary property of culture is modeled on the
assumption that organic or biological evolution does indeed
occur and that the human personality is subject to genetic
changes over time and is innately endowed with some adaptive
capacity. The resourceful/utilitarian property, our
Promethean self, makes some assumptions about human manual
dexterity and mental ability to interface social problems
with coping resources, and about our ability to exploit
resources for the sake of survival and comfort. Culture as
political, our Achillean self, is centered on relations of
power and power vis-a-vis aggression and the fulfillment of
needs may be genotypical as well as phenotypical. Group
development, our Dionysian self, assumes a basic human need
for socialization, for a collective consciousness, in order
to complete or finish the developmental or maturing process.
A structural web of meaning, our Sisyphean self, intones
assumptions about an innate need for feelings, emotions,

spirituality, existentialism, hope, or journey of salvation expressed in the religious/ritual structures of cultures. Culture's semiotic and symbolic property, our Aeschylean side, assumes certain innate cognitive structures of language and symbolic thought. Culture's ethical property, our Oedipal side, may make assumptions about innate censors and motivators in the brain that affect our ethical premises, as, for example, our struggle with human rights, and our altruism. Culture's generative property, our Cupid side, touches selected assumptions about the human instinct for survival, for growth, for maturity, and possibly for immortality.

An interesting alternative to the culture versus nature debate, therefore; is to argue that culture is nature, or is conterminous with nature. Both Kroeber (1948) and White (1959) insisted that culture is a part of nature in terms of the evolutionary process. More recently Aberle (1987), drawing upon Brooks and Wiley's Evolution as Entropy (1986), argued that the biological view of evolution that Brooks and Wiley presented is relevant for anthropology not because culture is an organism, but because it is a system of information. "Culture is a part of nature . . . . Like life, it faces two ways: toward the entropy of information systems and toward thermodynamic entropy" (p. 554). These two kinds of entropy are linked by symbols. He added, "In cosmic, biological and cultural systems we deal with dissipative systems that are far from equilibrium and that are constrained by historical conditions--in the case of

cultural systems, by existing culture. Thus there are analogies between culture and life that unite them with other constellations of matter, information, and energy in the universe" (p. 554, emphasis in original). Aberle goes on to compare biological and cultural evolution in the areas of reproduction, innovation, and natural selection. His primary interest is to assert that historical reconstruction in ethnology is essential to the development of anthropology as a science and his comparison between cultural and biological evolution is part of this larger argument. It is mentioned here only to suggest that while it may be too great a cognitive leap for most anthropologists to agree that culture is nature, the idea is certainly worth additional exploration and could offer valuable information on which to construct the invariable constants of both culture and human nature. The conterminous relationship between culture and nature is like the paradox of the chicken and egg, as suggested in Sahlin's (1976) comment: "Before there can be natural selection, there is cultural selection: of the relevant natural facts" (p. 208).

The culture/nature debate obviously isn't over, and much research is needed. But we are left with a sense that the nine properties of culture may offer some overtones of panhuman biological constants as well. The biologists' search for a universal human nature has not been the purpose of this study and it is well beyond the scope of this writer's ability to even undertake such a study. By the same token, my definition of culture should not lead the

reader to conclude that the human individual is purely a cultural animal or that culture and personality are completely isomorphic. What this definition does offer is the need for scholars to continue our search for the common denominators of humanity, for the constants that identify the basic unity of our human species. If we can identify those constants, the implications that such a pancultural unity could have on our current world problems of peace, hunger, poverty, nuclear conflict, and a host of other issues are enormous.

Culture & Personality

If culture and personality are not isomorphic, as stated above, then what is the relationship between culture and personality within the context of the properties of culture proposed in this study? Ever since Malinowski (1922, 1944) and Kardiner (1939, 1945) pressed the claim that culture makes for real differences in human experience and personality, anthropologists have joined forces with psychologists in studying many of the variables that overlap the two disciplines, including ideational, cognitive, symbolic, linguistic, affective, and motivational spheres. A number of anthropologists and sociologists have expounded on the relationship between culture and personality, including Berger & Lambert (1954), DeVos & Hippler (1954), Inkles & Levinson (1954), LeVine (1973), Spiro (1987), and Whiting & Child (1953). There are many interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary variations among the mulitple theories

that have been proposed to deal with this relationship.

One major contribution is that of Schwartz (1978, 1988) who proposed that personality is the distributive locus of culture. Such a view is both useful in identifying the relationship between culture and personality and in supporting a theory of the nature of personality as composed of the same properties as the nature of culture. It is not the purpose of this study to explore in any depth the nature of personality, but what may be surfacing is the possibility that the structure of personality is directly linked to the properties of culture in such a manner that personality may be composed of the very same properties. Schwartz's notion of the idioverse serves to illuminate this possibility.

Schwartz defined culture in this manner: "Culture is not confined to the structure of commonality but includes all of the internalized derivatives of experience distributed among the members of a population, organized in each individual as constituting the personality of that individual . . . . [Culture] is populated with individuals who to a large extent process culturally informed experience in interaction with differentially enculturated adults, organizing and creating [the individual's] own version of culture employing a culture-acquisitional system amounting to its whole personality" (1988, p. 9). He added that his model is a unified model "in which culture and personality are seen as derivatives from the same stream of experience, differentially internalized by individuals in interaction with specifically enculturated others" (p. 10).

Schwartz's distributive model of culture identifies the individual as s/he internalizes the cultural constructs, and the totality of these constructs forms the individual's idioverse. He defined the idioverse as "the individual's 'portion' of his culture" (1976, p. 425). The cultural constructs are formations that are manipulated, combined, and transformed by the individual in his or her cognitive mapping pattern to create, not a modal personality, but a unique individual. Therefore, within a given culture, there is a social structure of commonality shared by all individuals while at the same time each individual's personality structure is unique. Consequently, the notion of idioverse is useful because it defines both what is common and what is unique in personality stucture. Some constructs that comprise personality will be totally unique to the individual while others will be shared or held in common with other individuals in the culture. Schwartz clarified this notion by suggesting that "the personality of the individual takes part in a hierarchy of commonalities, ranging from the unique to the universal" (1976, p. 430). In this sense, a "set of personalities constitutes the distributive locus of a culture" and "a personality is the individual's version and portion of his culture" (1976, p. 432).

Pyramiding on Schwartz's notions of the idioverse and his distributive model of culture, I would propose that the properties of culture identified in this study are also the properties that constitute the structure of personality,

recognizing that personality and culture are not isomorphic, but that they are conterminous. This theory has implications on a wide range of subjects, but for the overall purpose of this study, it has ramifications for the nature of leadership insofar as leadership can be identified as a cultural process. As will be argued, leadership is a collective relationship between leaders and followers, and the argument that personality is a derivative of culture lends strong support to a theory that identifies the essential nature of leadership as cultural. I conclude that a definition of culture that is universal, based upon the pancultural properties proposed in this study, can be directly linked to a comparable definition of personality. By interrelating the concepts of culture and personality, a greater understanding of our behavioral environment can be achieved.

The central focus of this chapter has been to arrive at a theory of culture that defines its universal nature. To that end, I have relied on the theories of culture offered by anthropologists whose study of human beings and human society is particularly concerned with culture and its variations. Anthropology is still a young discipline, but the contributions of anthropologists toward understanding culture as the foundation of human life are on the cutting edge of scholarly thought today. This study has provided a highly condensed summary of some very sophisticated and extensive research and, in that regard, has not done justice to the scholarship of any single anthropologist. But

through the synthesis of anthropological theories of culture, a new theory of culture has emerged that is both innovative and useful. The remainder of this study will apply this theory of culture to the concept of leadership.

CHAPTER 3

LEADERSHIP THEORIES

> It is no light matter to make up one's mind
> about anything, even about sea-otters, and
> once made up it is even harder to abandon
> the position. When a hypothesis is deeply
> accepted it becomes a growth which only a
> kind of surgery can amputate.
>
> John Steinbeck (1962, p. 101)

Hunting the Heffalump

The search for the source of leadership has much in common with hunting the Heffalump (Milne, 1926, 1928). The Heffalump is a large and highly respected animal. It has been hunted by many individuals using various ingenious trapping devices, but no one so far has succeeded in capturing it. Those who claim they have seen it offer a mythical description of its great size, but none have agreed on its particular features and description. Not having explored its current habitat with sufficient care, some hunters have used as bait their own favorite dishes and have then tried to persuade people that what they caught was indeed a Heffalump. However, few are convinced, and the search goes on.

In this chapter, I will review the major theoretical constructs that have been designed for trapping the phenomenon of leadership. Bearing in mind that there are

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over 5,000 studies on leadership, I can only highlight those more salient studies and theories within various disciplinary frames. Following a summary and evaluation of selected theories, some conclusions will be tendered on the success so far in hunting the Heffalump.

Leadership Studies: A Matrioska Doll

The word leadership is not unlike many of our other conceptual definitions of reality--it is a product of the universal human attribute of cognitive functioning by which people organize their reality and interpret their experience. It is also a culturally constituted expression that has been subjected to as many understandings as there are individuals defining it. A notion of leadership relativism has evolved over time and today we are baffled by as many definitions of leadership as there are of culture. Bass's (1981) updated edition of Stogdill's Handbook on Leadership has shown that all the studies on leadership and all data, even when pulled together, are still contradictory, ambiguous, and narrow, suggesting that major surgery may be needed for the study of leadership. The current level of frustration by leadership scholars was revealed by McCall and Lombardo (1978) when they wrote, "Improvement in our understanding of leadership apparently does not lie in pursuing existing trends or in attempting to integrate existing research. Conceptually and methodologically, leadership research has bogged down" (p. 151). This same concern was echoed by a colleague of Mintzberg (1982b) who, after attending a leadership symposia

series, concluded, "The whole thing is like a Russian matrioska doll--doubtful studies enveloping doubtful studies enveloping studies that were banal, superficial, and uninteresting in the first place" (p. 245). Calas and Smircich (1988) wrote that current leadership studies are in a state of stagnation, occuring, in part, because leadership has been studied "in isolation from the discursive practices which are present and possible at any given time in a culture" (p. 203). Mintzberg (1982b), too, expressed his disappointment both over theories prior to and since the 1960s: "And what has changed since the 1960s? Every theory that has since come into vogue. . . has for me fallen with a dull thud. None that I can think of has ever touched a central nerve of leadership-- approached its essence. Even the old ones endure" (p. 250).

Leadership Relativism

Mintzberg's comment raises a further problem, one which we encountered in our previous discussion on the properties of culture. There is a lack of interest, and even less research, in defining what is universal about the nature or essence of leadership. Maccoby (1981) wrote, "There can be no single eternal model of successful leadership. Leaders and those led differ in different cultures and historical periods" (p. 14). If Maccoby is correct in assuming there is no universal, cross-cultural model of leadership, then the task of defining leadership is not only monumental, it may even be futile. We are left with accepting the popularized notions of leadership from culture to culture

and from time to time.

In this study I wish to argue that Maccoby is not
correct in his assumption of the relativism of the nature of
leadership, that it is possible to identify a universal
nature of leadership just as I have identified a universal
nature of culture. While most leadership scholars would
agree that leadership is a universal phenomenon, none have
agreed on its universal nature. Much of the frustration
that we see today in leadership studies is a result of
tunnel vision. We have failed to understand leadership
because we have not identified the essential properties or
constants that are the critical criteria for evaluating the
presence of leadership in any culture. It is no wonder we
are confused. Everyone is shooting from the hip!

Leaders & Leadership

Two related problems are evidenced in the studies on
leadership. The first is that the words _leader_ and
leadership have fallen subject to such generic usage that
anyone placed in a position of authority or dominance is
labelled a leader. There is very little precision in our
identification of those we call leaders. Secondly, we
mistakenly mix form with process by equating a leader with
leadership. It is true that we normally identify the
structure of leadership as composed of leaders and
followers. But it is a mistake to assume that where there
are those we casually call leaders, there is also
leadership. Two thousand years ago, the historian Polybius
(ca. 204-120 B.C.) identified the same problem when he wrote

in <u>The</u> <u>Histories</u> (1977), "We must by no means apply the title of kingship, without scrutiny, to every monarchy, but must reserve it for one agreed to by willing subjects and ruled by good judgement rather than by terror and violence" (p. 214).

We too must apply a more rigorous precision to our notion of leaders and leadership. A leader is merely one piece of the structural form that leadership may take, but it is also true that leadership may occur among followers without the identification of any single individual as the leader. In such cases, followers act collectively as the leader (Eidheim, 1968). My concern in this study is identifying the process of leadership. I am less interested in expounding upon who leaders are as individuals than in identifying the nature of leadership. While leaders are structural factors, the process of leadership is not a thing. To casually equate a leader with the process of leadership is a misrepresentation of leadership just as equating a single politician with the process of statesmanship is a misrepresentation of politics. Likewise, postulating definitions of leadership by examining a single leader is unacceptable. Leadership takes many forms, as I will illustrate, and a multitude of diverse leaders are possible in the leadership process. Groups can also act as the leader. No single individual can possibly encapusulate leadership. There are many types and categories of individuals who have been labelled leaders, and it is likely such labelling will continue to be done, but the label of leader does not guarantee the presence of leadership. My

interest in leaders exists only insofar as it illuminates our understanding of leadership.

Furthermore, I wish to give more precision to what kind of concept leadership should be. Too many scholars have studied diverse social phenomena in the name of leadership. Consequently, studies of leadership identify many variables that may have nothing to do with leadership at all. Greater rigor in the definition of leadership is needed.

Purpose & Objectives

Thus, the overall purpose of this study is to identify those critical properties of leadership that are universal and that define the essence of leadership cross-culturally. In order to isolate those properties of leadership that are universal, I will first review existing leadership theories in such a manner as to determine whether or not complete surgery is needed. It is important to make some determination about the value of existing theories and to isolate, if possible, those salient characteristics that emerge in the larger quest for understanding the nature of leadership. Such investigation may contribute to identifying those properties of leadership that are universal. While individual theories of leadership have not touched the central nerve of leadership, perhaps the collective theoretical contributions or themes that can be extrapolated from these studies through an interdisciplinary approach can be useful in identifying the universal properties of leadership.

In this chapter, therefore, I have four objectives. The

first is to review the various theories and approaches to leadership, not merely as isolated theories, but within a disciplinary frame. Theories will be reviewed within the disciplinary frames of philosophy, biology, psychology, sociology, political science, organizational science, and anthropology.

Second, I will summarize the degree to which leadership theories within a given discipline have included, as either underlying assumptions or as a salient frame of reference, the properties of culture as they have been defined in the previous chapter. Briefly, those properties are bio-basic, adaptive and evolutionary, resourceful, political, group development, structural web of meaning, linguistic and symbolic, ethical, and generative. This comparative analysis will be useful in formulating a common ground on which to construct a new theory of leadership.

Third, while the review is not a chronological presentation of the history of leadership studies, it is my intent to suggest that leadership studies, when viewed as a whole, reveal an emerging pattern that is directing the leadership enterprise toward the theory that is proposed in chapter four.

My final objective is to identify and isolate the collective theme or themes that emerge from each discipline and its various theories of leadership. Although no single theory may have captured the Heffalump, an overview of the discipline's composite attempt may provide a telescopic view that is useful in identifying the more salient properties of leadership. I begin with the philosophers.

Philosophical   Approaches   to   Leadership

> Tendance of human herds by enforced control is the
> tyrant's art; tendance freely accepted by herds of
> free bipeds we call statemanship.
>
> Plato, The Republic (1956, p. 73)

Philosophers were the earliest contributors to
leadership studies. From Plato's philosopher-king to
Machiavelli's prince, from Hobbes's sovereign to Neitzche's
superman, philosophy has characterized leadership as
authority legitimated by tradition, religious sanction and
moral order, rights of succession, and procedures, but not
by mandate of the people (Grob, 1984).

Plato: Leader as Philosopher-King

Writing in the fourth century B.C., Plato based the
authority of the leader on the philosopher-king's inherent
knowledge of the one Truth. What distinguished this ideal
leader from his followers was the possession of wisdom which
informed both the principles of government and the
principles of human conduct in general. "Until...political
greatness and wisdom meet in one," Plato exclaimed in his
Republic (1956), "and those commoner natures who pursue
either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand
aside, cities will never have rest from their evils--no, nor
the human race, as I believe....(p. 431). Plato also
posited that the leader must not only know truth, he must
also know the essense of justice in order to realize the
state as the embodiment of absolute justice for all citizens

of the Republic. Thus the need for the king who is also philosopher.

In the _Statesman_, Plato articulated seven types of constitutions, each of which implies some concept of leadership. His notion of leadership is best equated with his identification of statesmanship. He called the ideal statesman, or leader, a weaver who skillfully combines the contributory arts of other social roles into the philosopher-king role of ruling the state justly. His notion of the integrative function of statesmanship, or leadership, continues to provide an important clue in the definition of leadership, as we shall see later. Plato, in his notion of statemenship, also differentiated leadership from coercive domination. He wrote in 362 B.C., "Tendance of human herds by enforced control is the tyrant's art; tendance freely accepted by herds of free bipeds we call statesmanship" (1956, p. 73).

Plato's dialogues also revealed to us the Socratic model in which the exercise of humility and the love of wisdom are the marks of a philosopher. Socrates posited leadership as a moral activity that demanded of leaders and followers a willingness to open themselves to critique--"the unexamined life is not worth living." He believed it was possible to discover what is authentically human and thereby identify those patterns of human behavior which were not authentic, and therefore unethical. In the philosophy of Socrates, therefore, an arena was created for interpreting the relationship between leadership and ethics, and, furthermore, for arguing that leadership was an ethical mandate.

Machiavelli & Hobbes

Whereas Plato's philosophy is based on a distinction between the real and the ideal world, a dichotomy that surfaces frequently in leadership studies, the Renaissance philsopher Machiavelli (1532/1950) and the seventeenth-century thinker Hobbes (1654/1946) desired to base their approaches to philosophy on how human beings do, in fact, behave. Machiavelli's complex characterization of the prince stimulated a host of images of leadership for centuries following. For Machiavelli's prince, the sole end was power and the leader was one who succeeds at the game of power, no matter what the cost. Followers were nothing more than pawns.

In Hobbes' Leviathan, published in 1654, a curious twist in the concept of authority appeared. Here the sovereign emerged by the consent of followers, but because followers have corrupt, bellicose natures, they sacrifice their authority to the sovereign who can then compel the followers to behave according to what he interpreted to be their true self-interests. "For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength. . .that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all" (1946, p. 112).

For Machiavelli, ethical principles were subordinated to the struggle for power; for Hobbes, humans were ruled by self-serving passions and the definition of leadership was to subdue human nature and its warlike passions. For both these philosophers, as well as for Plato, the leader embodied the will of the people, not only symbolically, but genuinely, and thereby could justify calling his personal

desires and wishes the will of the people. Even before
Neitzche, philosophers had created a superman in the image
of the leader.

Paige (1977) briefly explored images of philosophical
leadership outside Western thought, such as the Confucian
image of leadership by moral example, the Taoist image of
leadership by nonleadership, and Islamic images of
leadership combining religious and secular law. They are
significant insofar as they link leadership with cultural
values and they are worthy of additional exploration, but
will not be reviewed further in this study.

Reformation & Post Reformation Leadership

The concept of authority was undermined in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sparked by the
Reformation of the sixteenth century and fueled by new
doctrines proclaiming the rights of individuals against
rulers. The Reformation threw down a challenge to the
political and religious order by proclaiming Luther's
doctrine of the priesthood of all believers and the right of
every individual to read and interpret Scriptures, a major
first step toward the currently salient issue of human
rights.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, liberty,
equality, fraternity, even the pursuit of happiness, became
the keynote words characterizing the citizenry's call for a
new doctrine of authority. In response, constitutions were
adopted to safeguard the people and their rights. Courts,
legislative chambers, assemblies, and local governments
created doctrines of due process, protection of property,

and judicial review. In the United States of America, under a new consititution, authority was derived from the people, but popular participation was thwarted by an elaborate bureaucratic system of federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Even with a system of restraints on those called leaders, no new doctrine of leadership emerged and, while the old doctrine of power wielding was no longer acceptable, in the end, with the absence of a doctrine of leadership based on followership, "authority was never turned on its head" (Burns, 1978, p. 25). It was an intellectual failure.

However, the Reformation and its followers made a deep mark on the ethical issue of individual rights, from the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers to the other rights mentioned above. Leadership and individual rights were now members of the same family. The dialogue that Socrates first called for was slowly becoming a reality. The very essence of that dialogue consisted of a mutual offering of perspectives which not only allowed followers to move into leadership roles but to chose one leader over another. Following the Reformation, the leadership game had new rules, and, with an emerging sense of "power to the people," the role of followers was beginning to surface as a critical part of the nature of leadership. The philosophical and ethical overtones of this age had monumental implications for the future of leadership and the world.

Locke & Kant: Individualism & Democracy

In seventeenth-century England, a radical philosophical

defense of individual rights emerged that can be linked
to both an emerging political and social change in
world-views and to the philosopher Locke (1959/1690) whose
elevation of individualism contributed to the notion that
society and government exist only for the purpose of the
helping and developing the individual and not to use and
abuse that same individual. The individual is prior to
society, claimed Locke, and the dignity and autonomy of the
individual must be served by society and its instititutions.
Although Locke did not specifically address the notion of
leadership, his philosophy had obvious ramifications for the
relationship between those in authority and those who have
been subservient to such authority. According to Locke,
society is necessary because of the prior existence of
property, the protection of which is the reason individuals
establish society. Society, in turn, arises from a contract
that individuals enter into only in order to advance their
self-interests and development.

Such notions of individualism challenged traditional
structures of aristocracies, oligarchies, and the divine
rights of kings. The social structures of society that
maintained a system of masters and servants were also
threatened. The French Revolution led the philosopher Kant
(1966/1871) to predict that republics would spring up
throughout Europe, and that an international order would
arise based upon a democracy without slavery and without
exploitation, and pledged to peace. Every individual, after
all, was to be helped by government and not enslaved.
"Every man is to be respected as an absolute end in himself;
and it is a crime against the dignity that belongs to him as

a human being, to use him as a mere means for some external purpose" (p. 76). Prerogatives of birth and class and hereditary privilege were rejected in favor of a new order of democracy and liberty.

Thus, the voices of Locke and Kant symbolized and articulated a new order. The nature of the relationship between rulers and the citizens could not longer be defined on the basis of the old order. But no important theory on leadership emerged apart from what we can infer from the philosophers of this great period in history.

Rousseau and Equality

Chronologically situated between Locke and Kant, Rousseau (1959-1969) has been called the putative father of many disciplines, including child psychology, anthropology, education, ethology, and political philosophy. As one of the first truly interdisciplinary thinkers, Rousseau saw the relevance of all of these disciplines to the larger matter of society's moral sickness. He saw how society shaped individuals and much of Rousseau's thought is a reflection on the meaning of community and equality within social systems. For much of the following discussion, I am indebted to Shklar's (1978) and Schwartz's (1978.) interpretations of Rousseau's philosophy.

Rousseau chose to speak for and as one of the poor and this has earned him the title of the philsosopher of human misery. He took a new view of the moral order of society by looking at it from the bottom up. He saw a world composed of masters and servants and in this world equality was nonexistent. If society is to be moral, then individuals

must have the power to make choices. Servanthood, as well as forms of slavery, robbed individuals of their moral personality. Rousseau argued that justice is not possible without equality. Rousseau was perhaps the original populist and his sense of pity for the people did much to create bonds of solidarity between the servant masses. In his identification with the dispossessed, Rousseau was called by Shklar (1978) the "Homer of the losers" (p. 24).

One can only infer from Rousseau's philosophy certain implications for leadership. Certainly his notion of equality has influenced the relationship between citizens and those who would rule over them. In fact, the citizens may be a fitting term for Rousseau's followers and his legislators would equate somewhat with leaders. Rousseau recognized the need for leader/legislators for he did not believe the populace was intellectually capable of ruling itself. He envisioned a social contract in which the citizenry would be socialized to remain patriotic and achieve personal and social integration by identifying directly with those who create and maintain social polity. While affirming in theory the notion of equality, Rousseau had a rather low opinion of the social and political capacities of most people. He did not support the notion of individuals or groups governing themselves since that would lead to tyranny. He favored the presence of legislators who embodied the will and moral needs of the people whose common ideals and common interests were represented in the legislators.

Rousseau's philosophy continues to influence social and political thought and structures throughout the world today.

He advanced a powerful tool in his notion of equality. His view of the world order from the bottom up gave an entirely new perspective on the needs and will of the common people that must be respected by leaders. His notion of a social contract that recognized the rights of the citizenry was a major step forward in casting followers as major players in what Rousseau identified as the moral drama of social and political life.

Nietzsche's Leader as Superman

Nietzsche's (1969/1883) superman was a leader by dint of his inherent ability to transcend what was understood as the common nature of humanity: "I teach you the superman. Man is something that should be overcome. . . . What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal" (1969, pp. 41-44). Nietzsche's leader was to radically transform society by creating new values to replace the old ones. Values were important to Neitzche, but they were the values of the superman, not the common man. The ethical, religious, and political order had to be turned on its head, a total transformation was the mandate of the leader. Furthermore, Nietzsche's superman/leader was to not only transform social values and organization, he was also to overcome basic human needs. A super race was the goal of Neitzche's leader.

Nietzsche's impact on leadership was, in part, the result of his revolutionizing ethics by asking new questions. Good and evil could no longer be taken for granted, as Nietzsche believed his predecessors had done. Common moral valuations needed questioning, and ethics,

"instead of being a matter of inconsequential rationalizations, becomes a critique of culture, a vivesection of modern man" (Kaufmann, 1960, p. 209). Predating anthropology, Nietzsche asked the same questions anthropologists asked much later. How does our prevalent morality compare with other moralities? And what can be said about ethics in general? What Nietzsche discovered about morality had wide implications for leadership: "I discovered two basic types [of morality] and one basic difference. There is master morality and slave morality" (cited in Kauffmann, 1960, p. 210, emphasis in original). Nietzsche went on to to explain that values originated with those who were the ruling group and that group's determination of what is good became equated with what was noble, and that which is bad become equated with that which was contemptible, or the group that does not rule, frequently slaves. Thus, morality becomes for the ruling group a form of self-glorification. Slave morality grows out of that which is from the outside, that which is different, that which is not noble. He believed that in all cultures both moralities were present and accounted for those who ruled and those who were oppressed. The will to power, according to Nietzsche, was a universal drive, enjoyed by those who ruled, and sought after by those oppressed.

The Twentieth Century

Philosophically, the twentieth century has inherited concepts of leadership that are rooted in the above theories in which authority is merely power wielding, designed to

meet the leader's needs and not the followers' wants, understood as those base emotions that are self-serving and which, as a result, must be subdued and overcome. Furthermore, the twentieth century has inherited a notion of leadership that is embodied in a single individual rather than in the relationship between leaders and followers. For Machiavelli, the needs and moral considerations of followers must be subordinated to the mechanics of a struggle for power (Grob, 1984). For Nietzsche, ethics and values were to be revolutionized, but morality would be developed within the context of the ruling group and those oppressed, to the self-aggrandizement of those who were the masters, the supermen.

If, however, an underlying assumption in the philosophic approach to leadership is that the leader's vocation at its root is philosophic, then leadership is challenged by the Socratic model, revealed to us by Plato's dialogues, which posited that leadership is a moral activity and as such, demanded of leaders and followers a willingness to open themselves to critique, providing, in effect, the first critical model of leadership.

Philosophic Approaches to Leadership & Culture

Philosophers have given us two diametrically opposed perspectives on leadership. The one is based on power wielding and legitimates tyranny; the other defies tyranny, seeking wisdom as its legitimacy and identifying an ethical leadership that responds to genuine human need and to a moral order that makes life worth living. It is this latter approach to leadership that incorporates the bio-basic,

ethical, and generative properties of culture. The
Machiavellian approach views leadership only from a
political lens. Neitzche's framework takes into account the
adaptive and evolutionary nature of culture with his concept
of transformation, but his approach is revolutonary rather
than adaptive. He also raised the issue of ethical
relativism, challenging absolutism and pointing to the
development of a morality based on a cultural context.
Hobbes gave lip service to group development and
followership, but his concept only ends by justifying
tyranny. With the possible exception of the Socratic model,
leadership is synonymous with authority and with the person
holding the position of authority. Locke and Kant planted
the seeds of human rights by elevating the place of the
individual in the moral order and by challenging the social
structures that abused the dignity and rights of
individuals. Rousseau introduced the notion of equality by
viewing the moral order from the bottom up, reshaping the
relationships between leaders and followers.

From the cultural perspective the notion of leadership
broadened modestly during the Reformation and later. The
most important addition was an inclusion of the needs and
rights of the group, the followers. Traditional forms of
authority and legitimacy were questioned and those who held
positions of authority could no longer count on their
earlier assumptions about their right to rule. In addition,
the people began to assume a sense of power and saw
themselves as players in the political process. The old
structural web of meaning was being turned on its head as
people rebelled against the system and initiated the process

of reformulating their own structures of meaning.
Revolution was in the air and the equilibrium and harmony
that had, on the surface, characterized cultures for
centuries was experiencing disequilibrium and disharmony.
Those who were called leaders were compelled by these
changes to adapt and shift their conceptual and structural
base. A new age had begun and the leadership of the
Reformation and Post-Reformation theologians and
philosophers had brought it about. Unfortunately, as Burns
(1978) pointed out, no new theory of leadership emerged out
of this era and, as a consequence, many of the important
historical events that occurred and that could have
influenced a new leadership theory, were left outside the
intellectual scope of leadership. The ideas and the data
were there, but no individual converted them into a theory.

Summary

From Plato and Socrates to our current time, philosophy
has tied leadership to concepts of justice, equality,
statesmanship, power, a moral order, individual rights, and
passion. Philosophy was the first discipline to identify
leadership as a process involving a host of interacting
variables that do, in fact, appear in many different forms
among cultures. The underlying assumption was that
leadership was essentially a philosophical quest and that
there was a moral dimension to the leadership process which
cannot be ignored. It was precisely this moral dimension
that was frequently ignored by leadership theorists.

Biological-Determinism Approaches to Leadership

> I submit that, when developing the study of political
> institutions, anthropologists will have to pay more
> and more attention to the idea of "natural
> leadership."

Claude Levi-Strauss (1967, p. 62)

It is not surprising that the early modern theories of
leadership reflected a philosophical approach that
underscored the role of the individual in a position of
authority. As inheritors of the intellectual heritage of
Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzche, as well as the
philosophical tradition of individualism, leadership
theories in more recent times developed out of a biological
determinism model, what Levi-Strauss called natural
leadership, a notion that there is a leading class born for
leadership. The problem with labelling these theories as
biological is the implicit suggestion that biologists are
proposing the theories and that is not the case. However, I
choose to list such approaches as biological because the
theories are based on biological assumptions about human
behavior. Furthermore, I believe that much of the current
research in biology and sociobiology on human nature does make
a significant contribution to understanding the nature of
leadership. For purposes in this chapter, however, I do not
assume the theories presented are by biologists, but, by the
same token, the precepts within the two major theories

presented below are based on assumptions about the genetic and biological makeup of human beings, even if the assumptions are without evidence.

Great Man Theory

The great man theory of leadership remains strong in the beliefs of many people today. It posits that leaders are born, not made. By this theory, leadership is a naturally endowed ability; it is neither learned nor created. The theory, over the many years of its popularity, has essentially operated on the assumption that great men are the makers and shapers of history and that significant social change can be traced back to the highly visible individuals who played front-and-center in the social drama we call history. Although great women have surfaced throughout history as leaders (Joan of Arc, Katherine the Great, Indira Ghandi, etc.), the great man theory is essentially a masculine and elitist model of leadership.

Carlyle's (1841) essay on heroes tended to reinforce the notion of the leader as a great person endowed with unique qualities that could overpower the masses. To William James (1880), the major changes in society were due to great men. Certain of these great men have taken on mythic proportions, and our current world scene still cries out for the heroes and demigods to rescue our faltering world. We still hold forth our political celebrities as the great men who will solve today's problems (see, for example, Borgatta, Bales, & Couch, 1963). Our current imagery of masculine domination

continues to feed us the Rambos, the John Waynes, and the warriors who are our modern saviors. Jennings (1960) presented a comprehensive survey and analysis of the great man theory of leadership.

The great man theory of leadership has caused us to focus on individual leaders rather than on the relationship between leaders and followers. The drama of leadership, as it is interpreted to us through history, is enacted by well-known individuals whom we have labelled leaders. History is personalized and dramatized though the stories of these great men but the drama associated with leadership, when interpreted according to the great man theory, gives it an appeal that Tannenbaum (1968) has suggested may be deceptive. Historians need to reevaluate how history is played out in light of the problems with the great man theory. Our view of leadership and of history is blurred when we are forced to look at the world only through the eyes of solitary male leaders apart from their followers. While great men make for great drama, they do not, by themselves, identify great leadership. To extract the single leader, whether he is a great man or not, from the multiple variables that have shaped him, including followers and his culture, and somehow come up with a formula for leadership is unacceptable. As the anthropologist White (1949) has commented on this theory, "No one can be a great actor without a place, a stage, and an audience. . . . A Great Man is but the neural medium through which an important synthesis of culture elements takes place" (p.

280). We must challenge the popular notion that leadership is occurring just because someone is labelled a leader. The great man theory of leadership, though challenged by scholars, remains as popular today as it has ever been. This theory is simply being translated by today's theorists into more marketable labels.

Traits Theories

A cousin of the great man theory is the traits theory which proposes that leaders have various combinations of selective traits, genetic gifts delivered to a very select few. It states that certain clusters of characteristics differentiate leaders from followers. An underlying assumption is that an effective leader in one situation can be effective in any situation because the leader has the "right stuff." As stated by Bogardus (1934), "Leadership includes dominant personality traits of one person and receptive personality traits of many persons" (p. 3). If the leader is endowed with superior qualities, then it should be possible to identify these traits. Even today, we find this theory still popular, especially if we listen to the public opinion polls. The traits theory operated on the premise that those who lead are different from those who follow. In the early part of this century, researchers employed personality tests in their quest for the key leadership traits. Measures of dominance, social sensitivity, moodiness, masculinity, physical appearance, and many others were used. Bingham (1927), Kilbourne

(1935), Tead (1924) and others defined the leader as a person who possessed the greatest number of desirable traits of personality and character.

In 1948, Stogdill (reprinted in Bass, 1981) reviewed over 120 such trait studies in an attempt to discern a reliable and coherent pattern. His conclusion was that no such pattern existed, and he further concluded that traits alone do not identify leaders. It is safe to assume that traits are present in leaders, and that some of those traits may, in fact, be useful to leaders. But given our cultural diversity, it is equally safe to assume that an appropriate trait in one culture may be very inappropriate in another. For example, in an academic community, high intelligence may promote a person into a leadership role, but in a small rural community, such a trait may be a deterrent to leadership. Furthermore, trait studies of leadership have identified so many traits (Bass, 1981) that it is inconceivable to imagine any single leader having any more that a handful of the hundreds that such studies have shown to be possible. Now that it is more fashionable to include followers when discussing leaders, a recent article by Kelley (1988) applied the traits theory to followers and concluded that the traits of a good follower are the same as the traits of a good leader. Such a study is truly an example of leadership studies progressively stepping backwards.

Traits theory remains popular with leadership theorists. House and Baetz (1979) linked traits with leadership and

more recently, House (1988) wrote, "It is my opinion that currently traits are alive and well" (p. 249) and he went on to explain why. Dachler (1988) responded to House's latest defense: "It is astounding the degree to which the review of 'true' leadership traits in House's chapter is a description, nearly a caricature, of the dominating, competitive, aggressive, manipulating, and achievement-driven male. The 'problem' of women as leaders, for example, is then a problem because male traits as predictors of effective leadership are so unquestionably accepted as the objective 'God-given' reality" (p. 264).

In an age of genetic engineering, one is hard pressed to find any biologists who give credence to either the great man or traits theories. No evidence has been found for the existence of universal character traits that define the essential and distinguising qualities of leadership (Tannenbaum, 1968). Since the truth of the assumptions behind both theories of leadership has never been demonstrated, it is a sad commentary on our time that such leadership concepts are still popularized and believed. But perhaps when we realize that Western societies in particular have embedded people with the values of individualism, reinforced by philosophies of capitalism, Protestantism (Weber, 1958), and personal achievement (McClellan, 1961), it is not surprising that we continue to hunger for and celebrate heros and perfect people with all the right traits and call them leaders. The study of personality traits is one more example of diverse social phenomena being studied

in the name of leadership.

Summary

Leadership scholars today give no credence to either the great man or the traits theories, even though they remain popular. Apart from being male dominated, elitist, and without any supporting data from biology, the great man and the trait theories of leadership say nothing about followers. One is even led to believe that followers are not needed. Consequently, one cannot help but conclude such approaches to leadership represent a return to the ethics, or lack thereof, of Machiavelli. And apart from being highly political, neither theory lends itself toward any level of comparative analysis with the properties of culture. However, as I will discuss later, the biological approaches do raise the issue of the relationship between human nature and leadership, as scholars continue to struggle with the question of how much influence genetics and innate characteristics of human nature may have on leadership behavior. While I reject the great man and trait theories as valid approaches to understanding the nature of leadership, the idea that there may be an involuntary biological process that influences leader and follower initiatives and responses deserves further investigation. To suggest, however, that biology is the primary determinant in leadership behavior would only lead to a definition of leadership that would offer no distinction between the human and nonhuman species since a variety of animals could

likewise be characterized as displaying leadership behavior in their biologically determined patterns of dominance and submission (Paige, 1977). Biology can contribute much to our understanding of the nature of leadership, but only if we realize that there is far more to leadership than a pecking order.

Psychological Approaches to Leadership

> The leader himself need love no one else, he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent.
>
> Sigmund Freud (1921, p. 122)

The failure of the great man theory and the traits approach, combined with the growing interest in human behavior, group dynamics, the developmental and adpative characteristics of personality, and other psychological factors led leadership researchers to study the relationship between personality and society. The interest in biology continued in many psychological approaches to leadership because psychologists were among the first to raise the issue of which factor had the greatest influence on behavior, culture or nature.

Charismatic Leadership

Although a sociologist, Weber (1947, 1952) was among the first to propose an intellectually powerful and

popular psychological approach in his development of charismatic leadership. Weber's contributions included an analysis of bureaucratic organizations, an analysis of forms of authority, and an analysis of the impact of bureaucratic forms. He codified three sources of authority. The first was traditional, stemming from customs, traditions, and inherited social norms. The second source he identified was rational-legal authority, based on laws and contracts between parties. Bureaucracy is founded primarily on this source of authority.

The third source of authority for Weber was charisma which was linked directly to his notion of leadership. The word charisma is of Greek origin and means gift. Adapted from Calvin's notion of charisma, Weber adapted it to a political context to describe a basis of belief in the legitimacy of a system in which an individual, containing charisma, can command obedience. He defined charisma as "the probability that certain specific commands from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1947, p. 324). Weber took belief in legitimacy as one of five explanations for subordinates' obedience to superiors; the others he identified as custom, affectual ties, material calculation of advantage, and ideal motives. While the idea of charismatic leadership represented only one aspect of the larger concept of political leadership implied in Weber's writings, it was the one that has had the largest impact on current notions of leadership.

Charismatic leadership implied on the part of followers a devotion to the sanctity, heroism, or

exemplary character of an individual called a leader. Thus, charismatic leadership involved both a leader quality and a follower response. In many cultures, charisma seemed to confer an extralegal title to leaders by virtue of something specially inherent in the leader. In essence, charismatic leadership meant gifted leadership, and Weber identified it as a personal attribute of a leader which set him apart from ordinary men who then treated him as superhuman. The follower was expected to look upon the charismatic leader as a sanctified hero.

Kohut (1976) set forth a typology of charismatic and messianic personalities, with the former identified with what he called the grandiose self and the latter with the idealized super-ego. Kohut proposed that in discovering or creating his own political and personal identity, the charismatic leader was also forging a political identity for his followers by shaping them into a group, however amorphous the group was in actual structure. This explains why the charismatic leader appeals to previously unpolitical people and brings them into the political arena. A Robespierre draws to him the sans-culottes; a Hitler, the nonvoting, lower middle class German; a Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese peasants. Kohut also suggested that such charismatic individuals must be counted among the narcissistic personality disorders and usually the charismatic leader can also exploit narcissistic injury, as in the case of Germany whose national grandiose self or prestige has been injured after World War I.

Wilner (1968) characterized the intense emotional

quality of charismatic followership in terms of devotion, awe, reverence, and blind faith as contrasted with the more common followership feelings toward a leader of affection, admiration, respect, and trust. We still hear of charismatic leadership as if it were something divinely ordained. In the theory of charismatic leadership as proposed by Weber, there was a return to traces of Neitzche's superman.

Zaleznik (1974) contrasted charismatic leaders with consensus leaders. His analysis suggested that the charismatic leader meets a father-figure need in the followers whereas the consensus leader meets a brother or peer imagery need. The range of emotions elicited in the leader-followers relationship was further expressed by Zaleznik (1982):

> One often hears leaders referred to in adjectives rich in emotional content. Leaders attract strong feelings of identity and difference, or of love and hate. Human relations in leader-dominated structures often appear turbulent, intense, and at times even disorganized. Such an atmosphere intensifies individual motivation and often produces unanticipated results. (p. 132)

Stark (1977) correlated the psychology of charismatic leaders to intuitional empathy, transcendence-striving, and inner-creation in contrast to leaders who are more inferential and disciplined in their thinking and patterns of behavior.

House's (1977) charismatic theory is similar to the trait theory in that it proposes the existence of a stable set of personal qualities that have a profound and

extraordinary effect on followers. Accordingly, he listed charismatic qualities as dominance, self-confidence, need for influence, and a strong conviction in the moral righteousness of one's beliefs. House believed that charisma is more widely distributed than previous theories suggested. It is not limited to world-class leaders, but occurs at all organizational levels. House's work has had a dominant influence in the arena of literature on this subject since he first proposed it. Others who have constructed theories of charismatic leadership since 1977 have built on House's model (see, for example, Boal & Bryson, 1988).

Bailey (1988) has identified what he called the "dark side of leadership," a quality that he argued is not the same as charisma but is relatively close. It is a notion he called numenification which is "the adoption of a style intended to create or enhance charisma" (p. 91). Leaders utilize this strategy when the followers' anxieties rise to a peak wherein they fall into a state of questioning dependency. Followers, in other words, have a failure-of-nerve, rendering them stiltified, apathetic and willing to endow mystical powers upon the leader who will now rescue them from their state of failed ego. Numenification is a process of mythical incarnation (Lacouture, 1970) or magification in which disillusioned followers create a redeeming savior out of the leader. Lacouture's study of charismatic leadership in third world countries is constructed around this notion of numenification. This happens because of a relationship between leadership and culture.

We have learned, over and over again, that all the demagogic appetites latch on to forms of charismatic leadership to legitimize and flatter themselves. It justifies leaders and excuses followers, becoming nothing more than a formula for extremism and immoderation. Hitler was the mad, horrible parody of the charismatic leader--the demagogue--identified by Weber.

While the notion of charisma is in tension with the notion of the leader as someone close to the people and not all that different from them, there is little doubt that this theory is still given much credence today, especially in the political arena. Political campaigns are won and lost based upon what many pollsters identify as the candidate's charisma. But the underlying assumption that charismatic candidates have something to do with leadership must be challenged by a demythologizing of leadership. Along with the great man and traits theories, charismatic leadership is constructed out of myth and illusion. When such myths and illusions are a salient feature of certain cultures, they render the process of demythologizing all the more challenging (see, for example, Bord, 1975; Nicholson, 1973; Ntalaja, 1974; and Sylla, 1982). Although I and others would like to shatter the illusion of charismatic leadership for all time and for all places, the fact remains that for many cultures, the presence of charismatic leaders may be so embedded in the geography of their cultural myths that it cannot be removed without tearing the very fabric of the culture.

From Freud to the Present

Other psychological theories of leadership continued the argument over whether leaders were born or made, were natured or nurtured. My purpose will be served by a very brief summary of some of these approaches.

On the psychological front, Freudians tied leadership to Oedipal conditioning and the law of the father (Freud, 1921, 1922, 1930; Roheim, 1943); authoritarianism studies suggested those individuals predisposed to authoritarian behavior are products of particular forms of socialization and may be drawn to the authoritarian leader-type (Adorno, et. al., 1950; Fromm, 1941; Greenstein, 1965; Marcuse, 1962; Reich, 1946; Sanford, 1973); object relations theorists argued that individuals identify with an alternative love object (the leader) and transform the leader-followers interactions into subjective regulations and characteristics (Hartmann, 1939; Kernberg, 1976; Lasswell, 1930; Schafer, 1968; Weinstein & Platt, 1973); psychosocial theorists and developmentalists advocate an interaction between the personality and the social and life cycles or stages as instrumental in the creation or motivation of the leader (Adler, 1964; Erikson, 1963; Gilligan, 1982; Gould, 1978; Jung, 1964; Kohlberg, 1963; Levinson, 1978; Maslow, 1954; Mazlish, 1974, 1984; Platt, 1980); the personalty-and-culture theorists identified leadership as a product of socialization and the child training patterns of a culture (Berger & Lambert, 1954; DeVos & Hippler, 1954; Inkles & Levinson, 1968; Kardiner, 1939, 1945; LeVine, 1973; Whiting & Child, 1953); self-psychology theorists postulated that leaders were the products of idealized images of self

(Kohut, 1977; Lichtenstein, 1964; Spiegel, 1959).

For many of these theories, the matter of collective behavior bears upon the notion of leadership. In Chapter Four, I devote more attention to the relationship between leadership and collective behavior.

Leadership & Personality

Most psychological approaches to leadership are interested only in individual leaders and the motivational factors that direct individuals to become leaders. Such psychological theories of leadership try to describe, explain, predict, or evaluate the personalities that leaders have and the wide array of personality variables. The problem that these theorists have confronted in trying to analyze leadership in terms of leader personalities is that personality is an aggregate of biological, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors which make every leader different from other leaders. No two leaders are alike, and therefore leadership had to have something to do with all leaders if this approach was to be useful.

Building on the work of Freud, Redl (1942) introduced the concept of the central person and applied the term leader to that individual whom the followers incorporated into their own individual ego ideal. Redl identified three main categories to explain the relationships between leader and followers: (a) the central person as the object of identification, (b) the central person as the object of drives, and (c) the central person as an ego support. In other words, followers want to become like the leader. Redl also identified ten images depicting the emotional

significance of leaders for groups: patriarchal, sovereign, teacher, tyrant, love object, object of aggression, organizer, seducer, hero, bad example, and good example.

Lasswell (1930, 1948), in his studies on self-esteem, was one of the pioneers in studying the relationship between leadership and personality. Greenstein (1969) has also made a major contribution in this area. Paige (1977) has offered a good summary of some of the hypothesis about the infuence of personality upon leadership theories. Carroll (1984) criticized the psychological approaches to leadership for focusing on personality, especially such factors as masculinity, individualism, and leaders as symbols of supermen.

Psychohistories of Leaders

Still focused on the relationship between personality and leadership, some authors used psychological theories to offer provocative and helpful studies on the formative influences in early lives of great leaders. These psychohistories include such prominent studies as Erickson's (1958, 1969) works on Luther and Ghandi, Davis (1975) on Theodore Roosevelt, Burns (1956, 1978) on F. D. Roosevelt, or Mazlish (1979) on Khomeini. The consistent problem with these studies is that they have slighted the role of followers. Mazlish (1981) himself criticized the psychohistories on two counts. First, leaders were treated more like patients with pathological drives, and second, the leader "was analyzed in more or less a political vacuum, with little attention paid to the public" (p. 216).

If human wants and needs are psychological and biological imperatives, then "we must know more about the hitherto nameless persons who comprise the followers of leaders if we are to develop adequate understanding of the reciprocal relationship" (Burns, 1978, p. 61). Some path-breaking work in psychology and biology is beginning to offer some cumulative data and comparative analysis that enable us to explore the motivations and behavior, the needs and wants, of persons in collectivities and hence to advance new theories about the sources of leadership. Wilson's (1978) work in sociobiology is one example. Certainly Kracke's (1978) suggestion that followership is an emotional relationship may be among the most important new ideas that are helping us better understand followers as a critically important part of the leadership process.

Leadership & Narcissism

In studying individual leaders, de Vries, Kets & Miller (1985) have argued rather persuasively that one critical component of the leader's orientation is the quality and intensity of the person's narcissistic development. They draw upon the works of Freud (1921), Kernberg (1975, 1979), and Kohut (1971) to explain their hypotheses. Freud was the first to suggest that the leader could be absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent and needed no one else. Kernberg stated that "because narcissistic personalities are often driven by intense needs for power and prestige to assume positions of authority and leadership, individuals with such characteristics are found rather frequently in top leadership positions" (1979, p.

33). Kohut, in focusing on leaders as objects of identification, mentioned that "certain types of narcissistically fixated personalities with their apparently absolute self-confidence and certainty lend themselves specifically to this role" (p. 316).

de Vries, Kets & Miller (1985) postulated that narcissism is often the driving force behind the desire to obtain a leadership position. Here is their synoposis of the generic narcissistic personality:

> Narcissists feel they must rely on themselves rather than on others for the gratification of life's needs. They live with the assumption that they cannot reliably depend on anyone's love or loyalty. They pretend to be self-sufficient, but in the depth of their beings they experience a sense of deprivation and emptiness. To cope with these feelings and, perhaps, as a cover for their insecurity, narcissists become preoccupied with establishing their adequacy, power, beauty, status, prestige, and superiority. At the same time, narcissists expect others to accept the high esteem in which they hold themselves, and to cater to their needs. What is striking in the behavior of these people is their interpersonal exploitativeness. Narcissists live under the illusion that they are entitled to be served, that their own wishes take precedence over those of others. They think that they deserve special consideration in life. (p. 588)

de Vries, Kets & Miller emphasized, however, that these characteristics occur with different degrees of intensity and that "a certain dose of narcissism is necessary to

function effectively. We all show signs of narcissistic behavior" (p. 588). They developed three types of narcissim--reactive, self-deceptive, and constructive.

Reactive narcissism is attributed to a failure in early childhood to integrate two spheres of the self that Kohut (1971) identified as the grandiose self and the idealized parental self. A developing sense of inadequacy causes individuals to create for themselves a self-image of specialness. This is a compensatory, reactive refuge against an ever-present feeling of never having been loved by the parent. The reactive leader cares little about hurting and exploiting others in the pursuit of his own advancement. The environment is beneath him and poses no challenges that cannot be met. His grandiosity, exhibitionism, and preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success cause him to undertake extremely bold and daring projects, believing that he cannot possibly fail. But when failure occurs, he never sees himself as being responsible.

Self-deceptive narcissism developed out of a childhood in which individuals were led by one or both parents to believe that they were completely lovable and perfect, regardless of their actions and in spite of any basis in reality. Kohut (1977) called this the overstimulated or overburdened self. Such individuals never learn to moderate their grandiose self-images, and they think they can fulfill many unrealized parental hopes. By imposing their unrealistic hopes upon their children, parents engender delusions and confuse the children about their true abilities, leading eventually to forms of self-deception. The self-deceptive leaders care more about their

subordinates than do their reactive counterparts, and they are not nearly as exploitative. However, they are hypersenstive to criticism, extremely insecure, and have a strong need to be loved, even adored. Self-deceptive leaders are better actors and are more comfortable in roles that create both illusion and deception.

Constructive narcissists do not behave in a reactive or self-deceptive manner, and they do not need to distort reality to deal with life's frustrations, according to de Vries and Miller (1985). In fact, they are capable of generating a sense of positive vitality that derives from confidence about their personal worth. "They are willing to express their wants and to stand behind their actions, irrespective of the reactions of others. When disappointed, they do not act spitefully, but are able to engage in reparative action. That is, they have the patience to wait, to search out the moment when their talents will be needed" (p. 593). While they can be manipulative, they tend to get along with with others because of their insights into relationships. In effect, they represent the healthy side of narcissism. Constructive leaders enjoy being admired, but have a realistic appreciation of their abilities and limitations. Their attitude is one of give and take, and they recognize the competence of others and are therefore more willing to share power. They have a sense of inner direction and self-determination that makes them confident. They inspire others and are able to create a common cause. Their inner directedness, however, can be interpreted as coldness, arrogrance, or intimidation. They are more flexible, more open with ideas, and more creative than their

two counterparts.

This is only a summary of the three types of narcissistic leaders that de Vries and Miller have proposed. Using concepts from psychoanalytic object relations theory, their analysis is most penetrating and highly useful in trying to identify what can be a wide range of complex leader personalities. The notion of narcissism is helpful in identifying the personality needs of individual leaders but less useful in defining follower needs.

Burns & Hierarchical Needs

In his highly acclaimed book, Leadership (1978), Burns built his political theory of leadership, described in more detail later, around a hierarchy of needs and relied upon Maslow's (1954) need theory and Kohlberg's ((1963) stages of moral development to explain the process of leadership. He pointed to the congruence between Maslow's developmental need sequence and Kohlberg's scheme of the motivational aspects of moral development. Maslow's lowest need level--physiological and security needs--were related to Kohlberg's stages of both punishment by others and manipulaton of good and reward by others; Maslow's belongingness needs as apposite to Kohlberg's norm levels of disapproval by others and censure by legitimate authorities; and Maslow's esteem needs as congruent with Kohlberg's norm of community respect and disrespect.

Burns believed that Freud's Oedipal conditioning and early family influences were inadequate to explain the motivation behind leadership. He did believe, however, that genetic and environmental factors act together to produce

personality and the motivations for leadership. Burns
further contended that it is in the transformation of human
wants into needs that leadership first occurs. He drew upon
studies by Horney (1937) and Knutson (1973) to define
leadership as a response to wants and needs of followers.
As lower needs are satisfied, higher needs come into play in
the exercise of leadership. The striving for self-esteem
and self-actualization brings out the potential for
leadership. In the interplay between leaders and followers,
each will be motivated by needs, but needs may shift and
when that occurs, followers may respond to other leaders who
promise to show more concern for their needs. Burns
believed that most leadership theories undermine the role of
learning. Values and moral development are the crucibles
out of which motivation springs. He cited Rokeach (1972):
"Values have a strong motivational component as well as
cognitive, affective, and behavioral components" (p. 160).
Burns was convinced that it is in the "congruence of the
levels of need and other motivations, and of the stages of
moral development, that leadership is animated, politicized,
and enlivened with moral purpose" (p. 73). He concluded by
arguing that there is much research yet to be done by
psychologists in helping us understand the process of
leadership, and he drew upon the culture-and-personality
literature (Greenstein, 1965, 1969) to suggest that there is
much in the research being conducted on cognitive mapping of
the environment and the socialization processes that will
enlighten our understanding of leadership. Burns' work is a
significant turning point in leadership studies for many
reasons, not least among them is his sophisticated

understanding and interpretation of the relationships between psychological processes and leadership.

Leadership as Group Syntality

The relationship between leadership and collective or group behavior will be discussed in more detail later, but Cattell's (1951) notion of leadership as group syntality is worth summarizing. The psychologist Cattell suggested that leadership be measured in terms of group syntality, defined as the performance of the group as a whole. In his view, variation in syntality is associated with change in two other variables: personnel (group membership) and structure (relationships among members). Cattell proposed a subtractive method for measuring leadership: Each member of the group is removed from it in turn and the consequent variations in group output associated with the absence of each member are taken as measures of the relative contribution to leadership of that person. Cattell's theory offered an important contribution inasmuch as it measured leadership in terms of followers and leaders as a group, rather than in terms of leaders only.

Interaction Theory

Gibb (1958, 1968) addressed the psychology of group dynamics in relation to leadership in his interaction theory. Briefly, his theory suggests that leadership is a facet of the larger process of group dynamics and role differentiation within the group. Leadership, he argued, is a function of personal attributes and the social system in dynamic interaction with each other. His theory bordered on

attribution theory, discussed below, by suggesting that leadership is related to the attitudes and needs of the leaders and followers. Gibb was one of the few who clearly identified the nature of leadership as inseparably linked to collective behavior.

Attribution Theory

On a more cognitive or perceptual level, attribution theories of leadership postulate that individuals have personalized theories of leadership and whether or not an individual acts like a leader depends upon whether such leader behavior fits the perceptions individuals have about leadership (Calder, 1977; Eden & Leviathan, 1975; Pfeffer, 1977). In effect, we observe the behavior of leaders and infer the causes of these behaviors to be various personal traits or external constraints. If these causes match the observer's perceptions about what leaders should do, then we call these persons leaders. There is an element of Berger and Luckman's (1967) social construction of reality in attribution theories. "Leadership is seen as a study in how the term is used, when it is used, and assumptions about the development and nature of leadership" (Bass, 1981, p. 36). Attribution theory explains, in part, why we so readily use the label leader to identify anyone who is in an authority position, even when such an individual is not a part of a leadership process.

Psychological Theories of Leadership & Culture

In general, psychological theories compare most favorably to our definition of culture. They are very

focused on the needs and motivations of human behavior; they address the adpative skills that humans utilize to cope with the environment; personality is identified as resourceful; group dynamics is a critical area of interest and research; the human personality's meaning-making systems are an important focus of psychological research; the use of language and symbols is central to the developmental side of personality; and the generative component is identified by psychology's interest in education and maturity. Even the ethical side is addressed in moral behavior and development. Psychology, more than most other disciplines, is successful in identifying a deep structural relationship between culture and leadership.

Summary

This brief treatment of psychological approaches to leadership is somewhat unfair insofar as psychology has been one of the primary contributors to our understanding of leadership. Psychology has illuminated the relationship between leadership and primal needs, motivation, affective responses, group and interaction processes, childhood and environmental-influence factors, maturation, and self-actualization. Most important, psychology has identified leadership as inextricably linked to culture. The factor of emotion in the relationship between leaders and followers is one that needs additional analysis and research. Focusing on only the personality needs of leaders is useful but it is only one segment of the full leadership equation.

Social Approaches to Leadership

'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinkes he hath got
To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.

John Donne (1611/1912, p. 143)

The seventeenth century poet, John Donne, lived in a world where the ties of kinship and village and feudal obligations were loosening, though it took his keen wit and wisdom to perceive the consequences which he described in the above poem.

More recently, a similar lament on the loss of commitment and community in American life has been voiced by Bellah and associates in their celebrated Habits of the Heart (1985). They attributed the rise in individualism to Locke's philosophy of ontological individualism which "comes into existence only through the voluntary contract of individuals trying to maximize their own self-interest" (p. 143). Bellah and his associates called this modern strain of self-interest "utilitarian individualism."

According to this philosophy of individualism, the hero must leave society in order to realize the moral good. Such a hero is a deep and abiding theme in American literature classics like Cooper's The Deerslayer or Twain's Huckleberry Finn, or again in the adventures of the American cowboy. Such myths have influenced our notions of the great man whom we call the leader. But just how removed can any individual be from the influences

and structures of his or her society or culture? The
sociologists look at leadership less through the eyes of
mythic American indivdiualism and more through the lens of
the influence of group dynamics and social structures.

Family

The social sources of leadership begin with the
nuclear family as a tiny political system, which Hobbes
(1654/1946) called a small Leviathan. Whether in the
typical American family of parents and children, or within
the extended kinship systems of many other cultures, a
child first learns need dependency upon the mother and
also a leader-follower type relationship with the father,
though, in some cultures, the mother may be the primary
model for the leader-follower relationship. In his
relationship with the father, however, a male child may
experience a power or competitive relationship evolving
during the formative and adolescent years. The influence
of the father and the mother on a child has great
variation from culture to culture, but such influence is
among the primary factors that shape attitudes and other
cultural expectations, especially those toward leadership
(Erikson, 1963, 1978; Hill,1984; Jennings & Niemi, 1974;
Lidz, 1968).

Related are the studies on authoritarianism and the
relationship between the socialization and family
influence that creates authoritarian individuals and the
functioning of political institutions (Adorno, 1950;

Fromm, 1941; Greenstein, 1965, 1975; Honigmann, 1967;
Marcuse, 1962; Rokeach, 1960; Sanford, 1973; Wallace,
1962; Weinstein & Platt, 1973). These studies concluded
first that politics cannot be separated from personality
just as personality cannot be separated from culture, and
secondly, the role of the family is critical in
contributing toward personality dispositions, such as
authoritarianism.

Social Systems

Besides the family, there are other factors that shape
the individual's ideational and symbolic grasp of
leadership, including the educational system, the
religious and ritual systems, and the political system.
Current forms of government which the individual observes
have an impact. For example, the American child's
enculturation into a hierarchical view of government has a
powerful influence on a person's attitude and
understanding about leadership. Social and economic
factors also pay a crucial role, including status by which
children of lower socie-economic status may be more
deferential toward political leaders than are higher
status peers (Dawson & Prewitt, 1969; Erikson, 1968;
Greenstein, 1965, 1975; Hess & Torney, 1967; LeVine, 1973;
Massey, 1975). Many of the studies done on basic
personality types, national character studies, or modal
personality studies provide strong evidence of the
influence of social systems upon personality (Du Bois,

1944; Hippler & De Vos, 1954; Inkles & Levinson, 1968; Kardiner, 1939, 1945; Kardiner & Preble, 1961).

Role Theory & Self Esteem

Two other social factors that impact leadership attitudes and development include the need for self-esteem and role taking, concepts bordering on psychology. Role theory postulates that each member of a society occupies a status position in the community as well as in various institutions and organizations. In each position, the individual is expected to play a more or less well-defined role. Leadership may be regarded as an aspect of role differentiation. Jennings (1944) observed that "leadership thus appears as a manner of interaction involving behavior by and toward the individual 'lifted' to a leader role by other individuals" (p. 432). Gibb (1958) regarded group leadership as a position emerging from the interaction process itself. Roles are defined in terms of expectations that group members develop in regard to themselves and other members (Sherif & Sherif, 1956). Role taking is the capacity to take the part of others, to be an actor, and to know that others are able to empathize in response (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Role taking may reflect a genuine capacity for empathy--the vital leadership quality of responding to follower needs and wants (Flavell, 1975).

Role expectations are directly linked to concepts of

self-esteem. According to Adler (1964), human beings may strive toward power to overcome and compensate for inevitable childhood feelings of inferiority, impotence, and dependence on adults. Low self-esteem and a sense of inferiority also appealed to Lasswell (1930) who elaborated these notions into his celebrated formula of the political actor displacing private motives onto the public arena and then rationalizing them in the form of public benefits. Needs of achievement, strength, competence, and confidence are also factors in the self-esteem quest (Maslow, 1954; McClelland, 1961). Both self-esteem and role taking may direct an individual into the leadership process, and because they influence behavior, they have multiple ethical implications (Bass 1960; Prewitt, 1965).

Symbolic Interaction

At the same time Weber (1952) was proposing his charismatic leadership, the sociologist Simmel (1950) was postulating the notion of prestige leadership by which authority is conferred on an individual by virtue of that person's outstanding strength and significance in a group such that faith is put in his ability and trust in his actions. Simmel argued that the leader and led have an interactive relationship. Authority, whether by prestige or by position, should not be based on coercion. The leader is conceptualized as the symbolic unity and expression of the group will and in order for the leader

to secure power, he must fulfill the general normative
expectations of the group. Simmel's understanding of
leadership antedated more modern approaches and is
important as an early proponent of understanding the
nature of leadership through the needs of followers (Hunt,
S., 1984).

Two other sociologists who were ahead of their time
and whose work has impacted leadership studies are Cooley
(1909) and Mead (1934). Both viewed the social world as a
human construct intertwined with meaning systems. Society
is above all a relationship between ideas, and both Cooley
and Mead interpreted leadership as a form of symbolic
interaction. Cooley combined biological and romantic
notions of leadership and proposed that the natural leader
arouses the onward instinct of potential followers and
stirs followers to thought and action. The leader taps
unfocused energy in followers and awakens it, thereby
giving the impression of being in charge of a situation.
Leaders, then, are symbols of what people need to believe,
idealizations of followers' need for meaningful symbols
that express human tendencies.

Mead (1934) took a similar direction, but refined the
idea that leaders are key symbols in the interplay between
social action, human need, and imagination by arguing that
the interactions of leaders have meaning only insofar as
the leader plays a role expected by the followers. Mead
postulated a cognitive model of society in which all basic
human needs, biological and psychological, are given form

and direction by social processes. The leader has meaning only when he becomes what Mead called the generalized other, a type of everyman. Language is of prime importance in Mead's model, and the processes of symbolization, perception, and interpretation are also central (Hunt, S., 1984).

Cooley and Mead were well ahead of their time and their ideas have only recently come to the forefront in leadership studies. Their impact has not yet been fully evaluated because it is difficult to place their theories within existing theories of leadership. Suggesting that leadership refers to the construction of reality, symbolization, meaning systems, perception, interpretation, and cognitive schemata certainly challenges the basic assumptions embedded in current theories. A more modern study of the idea that social reality is essentially a cognitive construct has been provided by Berger and Luckmann (1967). The seriousness given to followers and follower needs by Simmel, Cooley, and Mead point to the importance of sociology in the future development of leadership theories.

Leadership and the Collective Consciousness

Durkheim's (1915) contribution to our understanding of social processes as collective consciousness also has a close affinty to what Simmel (1950), Cooley (1909), and Mead (1934) were proposing. Durkheim maintained the primacy of social institutions, which he saw as

functionally linked components of the composite social organism. He enabled us to see how different social structures generate distinctive patterns of belief. These patterns form a collective consciousness which create a social cohesion and shape behavioral patterns. Attitudes about leadership and expectations of leadership behavior were products of this collective consciousness.

Because of Durkheim and his successors, sociologists have a better understanding of the nature of collectivities in social systems than scholars in other disciplines. Other studies focusing on leader/client relationships, groups, and factions (Middleton & Tait, 1958; Cohen & Middleton, 1967; Kilby, 1971) have contributed to a clearer understanding of the leaders/followers dialectic. If they are focused on leadership, sociologists could contribute much to a deeper understanding of the social and collective consciousness that is at the heart of leadership. Furthermore, we have learned from sociology and studies in linguistics that language is both the creator and product of our socially articulated reality. The traditional language of leadership has also been created by and is the product of social reality. If we wish to understand the nature of leadership, it will be necessary to identify and transcend the assumptions behind the customary use of words. Sociology can help us better understand what type of concept leadership should be.

Leadership and Small Groups

A further contribution to the study of leadership and group behavior by Collins and Guetzkow (1964) and Bales (1968) is revealing. As social scientists, they have identified three leadership requirements in small groups. First, there is the need for technical assistance or task leadership, also referred to as an instrumental need. Secondly, there is the need for emotionally satisfying behaviors that contribute to the harmony of the group, a type of social-emotional leadership. Bales called the first taskability, the second likability, and he added a third, powerability, a recognition that one will have more power in a group than others. Other sociologists who have analyzed small group behavior include Berk (1974), Brown & Goldin (1973), Perry & Pugh & Pugh (1978), and especially valuable is the collection of essays by Hare, Borgatta, & Bales (1985).

Social Approaches to Leadership & Culture

There is a positive correlation between sociological approaches to leadership and my definition of the properties of culture. The bio-basic property of culture is present in the focus on child socialization practices, self-esteem and role-taking needs, and family structures. Adaptation and resourcefulness are congruent with the interest in the impact of social institutions on personality dispositions. Social approaches are primarily interested in group dynamics and politics is integral to

the socialization and group processes. Durkheim's (1915) work on the collective conscience is particularly useful in identifying the relationship between leadership and group development. In their study of social systems, the approach by sociologists to leadership is very focused on a structural web of shared meaning, particularly in the study of religious systems. The work of Simmel (1950), Mead (1934), and Cooley (1909) illustrate the relationship between leadership and the semiotic and symbolic side of culture. Finally, social approaches to leadership center on the generative property of culture with many studies on the influence of family and social institutions on learning. On the down side, social approaches to leadership do not demonstrate a strong interest in the ethics of culture though Berger & Luckmann (1967) offer some integration in this area. Since sociology and anthropology are children of the same family, it is not surprising that social approaches to leadership would be well integrated with the properties of culture.

Summary

The primary contribution of the social approaches to leadership includes the relationship between leadership and social structures, institutions, and collective patterns of behavior and consciousness. The social environment and its influence upon the development of peoples are critical variables in the particular form that leadership may take in any given culture. Social

structure is what sociologists analyze and, simply stated, social structure refers to the relations between people and the organization of those relations (Swartz & Jordan, 1980). Social structure provides people with the social relations whereby they may attain goals, identify roles, and participate in group membership. It also provides the form, or dress if you will, of the process of leadership, and that form may vary from culture to culture. Culture, in turn, is distributed by social structure. The nature of the relationship, however, between the social structures of a culture and leadership will be similar among cultures, as I will illustrate later. Social approaches to leadership have not only been useful in identifying the form that leadership may take in any given society, but they have also contributed to our understanding of the relationships between leadership, social structure, and culture.

Organizational Approaches to Leadership

The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master.

Max Weber (1947, p 158)

Most of the theories of leadership discussed in the psychological or social frames are a part of the culture-versus-nature debate. The earliest biologically-

based theories of leadership argued in favor of understanding leadership as a product of human nature. Many of the early psychological and social approaches to leadership came down on the culture side. Still others argued that leadership must be understood as product of both nature and culture. Researchers are still inconclusive about which of the two carries the greater weight.

But many of the early conceptions of leadership did not fit the changing character of societies, and in particular, the changing nature of organizations. The increasing numbers and complexity of organizations in modern industrial societies required large numbers of persons with high levels of technical and administrative expertise to manage the organizations. A demand for expertise was equated with leadership, and those societies or organizations that recruited leaders on the basis of social status or family connections discovered that such criteria were no longer suitable. Achievement replaced ascription as the basis for leadership. Thus began the current industrial equation of management with leadership, a notion that has created confusion about the nature of leadership.

With the emergence of management and organizational theories about leadership the debate over whether leaders are natured or nurtured was part of the shift in emphasis from who leaders are to what they do. Leadership scholars desired to appear to be scientific and spawned a batch of management and organizational theories of leadership that studied leadership by researching styles, skills, task

accomplishments, and assessments of group needs (Cyert & March, 1965; Zalenick & de Vries, 1975). Classical organizational theorists defined leadership in terms of reaching goals and objectives. Leadership was understood as a force that stimulates or motivates an organization and its employees in the accomplishment of its objectives (Davis, 1942).

Organizational theories did make a significant shift in their approach to leadership by conducting studies and evaluations of the needs of employees or workers. The context, however, was exclusively the business and organizational environment and, as such, the equation of employees with followers may not have been appropriate. This made a major difference in understanding leadership primarily because workers were operating under a completely different set of assumptions and expectations than would normally be assigned to followers. Workers and employees were compelled to respond to those individuals labelled leaders within the limits imposed by the heirarchy of the work environment. Employees were expected to follow management decisions and were also expected to think of managers as leaders. Under these expectations, employees could not choose their leaders unless the leaders emerged from within the employee ranks. It is therefore questionable whether organizational theories of leadership can be compared to other theories in which followers have more choice over whom they will follow than employees normally have. The element of choice was identified with

leadership when Schmidt (1933) wrote, "Strictly speaking, the relation of leadership arises only where a group follows an individual from free choice and not under command or coercion and, secondly, not in response to blind drives but on positive and more or less rational ground" (p. 282). Since then most leadership scholars have identified choice as a critical variable in the definition of leadership. The concept of choice is a challenge to organizational theories of leadership insofar as employees do not have a choice of leaders when they are expected to obey the mandates and directives of managers.

Styles of Leadership

Since traits were so difficult to isolate and identify, organizational theorists shifted to searching for behavioral styles to identify leaders. The notion of leadership style was based on varying the techniques for dealing with subordinates. Styles, in a generic manner, focused on management that was either work related or person related. Many theorists seemed to have a notion of autocracy or task relations at one extreme and democracy or personal relations orientation at the other. Among the first investigations of styles was that done by Lewin and associates (1939) who trained graduate research assistance in behaviors indicative of three leadership styles: autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire. Results indicated that the democratic style had somewhat more beneficial results on group process than the other styles.

Other similar studies have been conducted (see Bass, 1981) and a few are worth highlighting here. Fiedler (1967) proposed that leadership was a behavioral act of directing group members in a more task-oriented fashion. In a similar fashion, Luthans (1979) conceived the leader's behavior as a cue to evoke the subordinate's task behavior. Heller & Yukl (1969) described leadership as choosing between centralized decision making or participative decision making, a tension which formed the basis of Yukl's (1971) later theory of leadership and for the subsequent studies of Vroom and Yetton (1973) who developed five possible decision styles that range from leader-only decisions to group-only decisions with variations of these in between. Styles approaches became the basis on which Hersey & Blanchard (1984) developed their notion of situational leadership, discussed below. Cohen and March (1972) identified leadership as the management of organized anarchy in an arena of ambiguity. Something similar has more recently been suggested by Peters (1987) in his notion of leadership thriving on chaos.

In the 1950s, a number of independent researchers used rating scales, interviews, and observations to identify the behaviors in which leaders engaged (Bales & Slater, 1945; Kahn & Katz, 1953; Stogdill, 1957). Results were inconclusive since the relationship between leader-structuring behavior and group productivity revealed very few consistent patterns. During both the traits and styles eras, researchers were seeking to identify the best

traits and the single best style of leadership and failed. In the styles approach to leadership, Lowin (1968) uncovered both methodological and theoretical problems. The effectiveness of various styles was found to be contingent upon a host of subordinate personalities and situational characteristics. Results were disappointing when no single style emerged as universally best across all situations and environments (Chemers, 1984). Pondy (1978) believed that the concept of leadership style connoted "superficiality of action, without either sincerity of intent or substantive meaning" (p. 88). He drew a contrast between surface structure and deep structure, and suggested that leadership styles were, at best, poorly developed surface structures. Leadership styles do not have the popularity in current scholarship they once did, but there are still many practitioners and a few current authors (Kouzes & Posner, 1988) who still hold fast to the notion that the right style connotes leadership.

Situational & Contingency Models

The current popularity of equating styles with leadership is evidenced by two theories, contingency and situational. The first was proposed by Fiedler (1967) and the second was developed by Hersey & Blanchard (1982). Both theories suggested that a leader or manager--no distinction is made--adapts a style to fit varying situations. The most effective style will depend upon the characteristics of the situation. If, for example, an employee has a low level of

professional maturity, then the manager must be more task oriented with this particular employee. If, on the other hand, the employee exhibits a higher level of maturity, then the manager can allow the employee more freedom in decision making responsibilities. According to this approach, the answer to leadership was fitting the right person into the organizational condition. When the right person is not available, then the condition should be changed to match the leader. This notion is developed in Fiedler's, Chemers' and Maher's (1976) "leader match concept". Hosking and Schriesheim (1978) have challenged the validity of this model. Like the earlier styles theories, both situational and contingency models are focused on doing whatever is necessary to upgrade employee productivity, to achieve goals, and to maximize outcomes for the benefit of the organization, and not for the benefit of the employees (Hunt, S., 1984).

Path-Goal Theory & Theory X, Theory Y

During the 1970s--again as a take-off of styles theory--the path-goal theory was popularized by House and Mitchell (1967), who postulated that leaders arouse subordinates to perform and achieve satisfaction from the job to be done. Leaders clarify the goals of their subordinates as well as the paths to those goals. They enhance satisfaction with work itself and provide valued extrinsic rewards contingent upon the subordinate's performance. Yukl (1971) proposed something similar in his two-stage model by suggesting that

subordinate's motivation and skills can be improved by the leader's consideration and by decision centralization. Bass (1981) and Jago (1982) reported mixed results after researching the path-goal theory.

A few years ealier, McGregor (1966) proposed two types of organizational leadership--Theory X and Theory Y. The former, based on the assumption that people are passive and resistant to organizational needs, attempts to direct and motivate people to fit these needs. Theory Y, based on the assumption that people already possess motivation and desire for responsibility, attempts to arrange organizational conditions in such manner as to make possible fulfillment of their needs while directing their efforts toward achieving organizational objectives.

Other Models

Four other models that should be considered briefly include the Vroom/Yetton approach, reinforcement theory, exchange theory, and multiple influence model of leadership. The Vroom/Yetton (1973) approach is a combination of contingency and styles theories. Their model presents leaders with a decision tree to help them make the best deicisons under certain circumstances. They identify five possible decision styles that range from leader-only decisions to group-only decisions, with variations in between. Reinforcement theory has a Pavlovian assumption insofar as behavior is reinforced on the part of both leaders and subordinates, a notion that flies in the face of

what we know about how people learn. Exchange theory
explains leadership as the result of mutual exchanges
between the leader and the follower with the leader providing
rewards, direction, and positive feelings in return for
support and high performance. Graen and Cashman (1975) have
their own version of this model which they label the
vertical dyad linkage theory wherein a leader channels
rewards, status, and power to selected subordinates which
become his core following and upon which the leader relies
for control of the organization.

J. Hunt (1984) has proposed a multipe influence model of
leadership which suggests that there are multiple contexts
which leaders must consider and which can influence the
leader's decisions. A leader must take into account
macrovariables and microvariables and must therefore be very
precise in giving directions to employees. It is a complex
theory and not very suited for the practitioner.

The major problem with all the theories discussed so far
is that they do not define leadership at all and are merely
theories for managing organizations, not leading them. The
failure to distinguish between management and leadership,
which is characteristic of all organizational theories, is
the subject with follows.

Leadership versus Management

Another major shift in thinking about leadership
occurred with the introduction of specific organizational
theories of leadership. The concept of management

superceded the concept of leadership and consequently, leadership either became a subset of management or it was identified as synonymous with management. It is curious that organizational theorists such as Bass (1981) and Hersey & Blanchard (1984) do say that there is a difference between leadership and management but their distinction boils down to the assertion that all management is leadership but not all leadership is management. In fact, the two words are used interchangeably in these works with no interest in distinguishing the two.

Zaleznik (1982) did distinguish between leaders and managers by suggesting they are different types of people and the conditions favorable to the growth of one may be inimical to the other. He believed that managers and leaders have different attitudes toward their goals, careers, relations with others, and themselves. Whereas managers are status quo people, leaders seek out change; managers prefer a controlled, rational structure, while leaders are involved in turbulent, intense, and emotionally-filled structures and relationships; managers are low-risk people, leaders work from high-risk situations; managers are reactive while leaders are proactive; managers are a part of their organizational environment, leaders feel separate from their environment, never really belonging to any one organization; the managers' identity is a part of what they do, while the leaders' sense of who they are does not depend upon work roles. Zaleznik raised the question of whether leaders can truly be a part of organizations and

suggested they can but at a very different level and with a different role than managers. Tucker (1981) also distinguished between leadership and management, defining management as the day-to-day group life, and leadership as the directing of a group during the time of important decisions.

Rost (1985) has also been articulate in pointing out the conceptual mess that has resulted from equating leadership with management. He claried this distinction by arguing that managers hold a position while leaders may or may not have a position of authority; management is a relationship of authority while leadership is a relationship of influence; managers compete for employees in the job market while leaders compete for followers on the open market; managers are motivated by objectives and goals while leaders are motivated by a vision; managers are agents for stability and order while leaders are change agents; managers try to avoid or resolve conflict while leaders use conflict creatively; managers do not make intuitive decisions while leaders, on the other hand, do; managers act in a predictable manner while leaders live with more ambiguity; managers regulate while leaders create; managers are organizational-need driven while leaders are human need driven; and managers have an external locus of control while leaders have an intellectual frame of reference and internal locus of control. Rost also concluded that some managers are leaders when they have "mutual purposes, transforming motivations, and intended but real change" (pp. 13-14).

But what we usually read is the equation of management and leadership. Schriesheim (1982) and associates concluded their review of leadership research with the statement that "We believe that leadership is an aspect of the managerial job" (p. 296). A relatively recent and popular organization theory book by Kouzes and Posner (1987) came out with the promotional tease, "Leadership--the most important management challenge today." As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, any theory of leadership that does not distinguish between leadership and management has not addressed the deep structure (Pondy, 1978) or the nature of leadership.

Linear, Hierarchical Approaches & the Bottom Line

Further evidence of leadership scholars' failure to address the distinction between leadership and management is revealed in all organizational theories of leadership discussed above which essentially focused on rational, linear, authoritarian and hierarchical structures in which leadership is a function of a position (Baldridge,1978; Bolman & Deal, 1984; Maccoby, 1981). If an individual holds a position of authority in an organization, particularly if s/he is the CEO, it is assumed that person is a leader. This, of course, is not unusual since it occurs in most other theories of leadership as well. The failure to distinguish between leadership and management raises two additional problems with leadership studies: the first is the assumption that leadership is always positional and the second is the assumption the individual holding the position

is a leader. Management theories are particularly guilty of both assumptions.

A smooth, well-oiled machine is the metaphor used by organizational theorists. Organizational theories are focused on two basics: (a) the expected support, acceptance, and commitment to the decision of the manager by subordinates, and (b) the amount of structured, clear, decision-relevant information available to the manager/leader (Chemers, 1984, p. 98). Attention is paid to the bottom line, and leadership/management is understood as the suppression of conflict, the increase of efficiency, and the exercise of interpersonal influence to direct group behavior. Again, followers/employees are given token attention, but primarily for the benefit of the organization, not the employees. Followers, better understood as selected interest groups, are cultivated in order to meet corporate needs, not follower needs. Many, if not most, of the organizational theories have much value as management theories, particularly the contingency and situational models, but we must challenge the prevailing notion that management is equated with leadership. While espousing an open systems framework, as in the Bass-Valenzi model (Bass, 1976), the background assumptions in these theories are essentially closed systems oriented.

Research Findings

Some results of the research behind organizational theories of leadership should be integrated, however, with

leadership studies. Some of the research findings by organizational theorists do have implications for leadership. For example, such studies found that managers manage better with higher levels of employee acceptance; productivity can be elevated when there is a positive relationship between manager and employee; managers do need to develop different styles for different situations; with clarity of tasks and strong support, employees are more willing to accept a manager's autocratic decisions, but participative decisions fare better when clarity or support is lacking; working environments have positive and negative impacts on employee morale and productivity; employees who are high in dogmatism respond better to managers who engage in high levels of structuring behavior; and low-dogmatism followers perform better with considerate manager behavior (Chemers, 1984). Leaders can utilize these findings in their relationships with followers, but they remain management findings.

While one can merely infer that these findings might contribute to the exercise of leadership within organizations, they do not illuminate our understanding of the nature of leadership. The information provided by organizational theorists may assist in understanding certain factors that influence the relationship between leaders and followers, but far more attention must be given by these same theorists to distinguishing between management and leadership.

Entrepreneurship

The notion of entrepreneurship may be more appropriately discussed under a heading such as economic approaches to leadership, but the idea is appropriately discussed within the organizational frame since entrepreneurs are linked to business organizations. A number of theories exist on entrepreneurship, many covered by Kilby (1971) in his edited volume. Since a few of these theories have suggested that the entrepreneur is also an economic leader, it is worth reviewing briefly some of the assumptions behind this equation.

Schumpeter's (1971) work, beginning in 1911, represents one of the first dynamic concepts of the entrepreneurial function as innovation. In this sense, the entrepreneur is not a manager, but is one who is carrying out new combinations in the areas of new goods, new methods of production, opening new markets, discovering new sources of supplies and raw materials, and reorganizing the industry. Schumpeter called this combination of innovation and entrepreneurship "economic leadership," and it occured only "where new possibilities present themselves" (p. 65). The entrepreneur also has followers in the sense that he "leads the means of production into new channels" and "draws other producers in his branch after him" (p. 66).

McClelland's theory, as set forth in The Achieving Society (1961), can be seen as a development of Weber's (1958) Protestant ethic in which an intermediating psychological motive (the need for achievement) is

introduced. The need for achievement is the primary formative factor in the creation of the entrepreneur-leader. McClelland ascribed the inculcation of the achievement motive to child-rearing practices which stressed standards of excellence, maternal warmth, self-reliance training, and low father dominance. The emphasis in The Achieving Society is on the empirical: developing need for achievement as a quantifiable variable. Correlations between need for achievement and the above factors, in addition to climate, were measured. His studies indicate that people who are high in the need for achievement tend to work harder at certain tasks, to learn faster, to do their best work when it counts for the record and not when special incentives such as money prizes are introduced, and to choose experts rather than friends as working partners. McClelland found that entrepreneurial behavior is exhibited by people who are high in (a) their desire to take personal responsibility for decisions, (b) their preference for decisions involving a moderate degree of risk, and (c) their interest in concrete knowledge of the results of their decisions (1971, p. 116). Therefore, occupational choice is a multiplicative function of the individual's need for achievement, the difficulty of the occupation, and the probability of success as affected by one's social class status. McClelland and others have equated the need for achievement as the primary formative factor in creating leaders who are entrepreneurs.

Young (1971) provided a theory of entrepreneurship that more directly equated the role of entrepreneur with that of

a leader in the creation of solidarity among a group of individuals. He translated the idea of entrepreneurship into the concept of solidarity structure and defined solidarity "as the degree to which activities, beliefs, and even artifacts are coordinated into a coherent outlook on the world" (p. 146). The individual entrepreneur-leader, is identified as a catalyst of particular subgroups. Young also indicated that the direction of influence in his model is not from the top down, as is characteristic of most organizational theories of leadership, but from the bottom up. Economic development is therefore a process of the formation of group solidarity which operates as a kind of social chain reaction. Young's theory is sociological in contrast to McClelland's psychological approach. Young is therefore less interested in the personality factors and more concerned with intergroup relations. His theory of change is based on society's incorporation of reactive groups that take on a leadership role in reshaping the economic structures of society. Such a group will become reactive, in Young's schema, when two conditions coincide: a group is experiencing low status recognition and denial of access to important social networks, and it possesses a greater range of institutional resources than other groups in society at the same level of the system.

Finally, on another level, Eidheim (1971) has translated entrepreneurship within the political arena in his studies of the Lappish minority situation in Norway. Norwegian society and governmental policies have discriminated against

the Lapps. At the local township levels, Norwegians
frequently held the political positions of authority.
Following World War II, Eidheim reported that several
national Lapp organizations were formed which began to be
key players in the political drama. Those seeking political
position, whether they were Norwegians or local Lapps, had
to become entrepreneurs by exploiting the needs and demands
of the politically emergent Lapp population (for example
having the Lapp language taught in schools) and only then
could they win office. Politicians, in other words, had to
treat the Lappish situation as they would a new market in an
economic environment. Such political entrepreneurs could
then gather a following of Lapps and become a leader.
Eidheim concludes, "A political entrepreneur is a person who
works to attain desirable power positions. . . by obtaining
the stewardship of votes from clients" (p. 23). In this
sense, the political entrepreneur-leader, if he is a
Norwegian, must become enculturated into Lapp identity and
culture.

Entrepreneurship is therefore understood primarily as a
critical factor in the economic flow of a society. It may
be interpreted to apply to a leader who is defined as an
entrepreneur or to the group which functions in a leadership
capacity by influencing the economic structures of society.
It is possible to place theories of entrepreneurship within
either the psychological approaches to leadership or the
social approaches to leadership. While entrepreneurship
theories do not offer a perfect fit in organizational

theories, I have included them here since they generally have a bearing on business and the production of goods, both central to organizational science.

Organizational Approaches to Leadership & Culture

When comparing organizational theories with the properties of culture, there is little that can be identified as a favorable integration. There is some authentic attention to group dynamics. Political skills certainly play a role, particularly in the power play between employers and employees and in competition with other organizations. Language and symbols come into play at various levels of communication systems, but, when looking at the overall approach, one is hard pressed to integrate the properties of culture identified in the previous chapter with organizational theories of leadership. Theories of entrepreneurship do offer another perspective that is somewhat more interdisciplinary, and these theories identify the cultural components of needs, group development, resourcefulness, and social structures. More research is needed in linking entrepreneurship and leadership.

Summary

I am convinced that most organizational approaches have contributed very little to our understanding of leadership. While such approaches have advanced organizational theory and management science, I contend they have confused the notion of leadership by their casual and uncritical equation

of management with leadership. Part of the problem seems to lie in the fact that societies have been conditioned to think that the modern image of the hero is comparable to an organizational leader. In our current Western societies, we have elevated the supermanager to the level of hero and that, in turn, is translated into leader. Our Western celebration of individualism created and reinforced by our economic philosophy of capitalism, our religious heritage of Protestantism, and our enculturation of the need for achievement have fed our onging hunger for heroes, saviors, and great men, translated by our industrial society into the super CEO. Organizational theories of leadership have only confused our notions of leadership by equating them with management.

Political Approaches to Leadership

The theories of leadership discussed so far are relatively apolitical or recognize the presence of politics but give it a minor role. The theoretical framework that is on the cutting edge for many leadership scholars today is a political one. Political theories of leadership, developed primarily by political scientists or historians, focus on the linkage of political motives with structures of

political opportunity (Burns, 1978). An underlying assumption is that the quest for power is central, but it is not the only motive. Furthermore, the quest for power within political theories of leadership is distinguished from raw power wielding or mere domination. As noted by Burns (1978): "For the study of leadership the crucial distinction is between the quest for 'individual recognition and self-advancement,' regardless of its social and political consequences, and the quest for the kind of status and power that can be used to 'advance collective purposes' that transcend the needs and ambitions of the individual" (p. 106). While political scientists do not question the leader's need for esteem, prestige, reputation, or admiration, there is also the sense that the hallmark of most leaders in most cultures "is not uncontrollable ambition or irrational, immoral, or aggressive behavior but prudence, calculation, and management; otherwise, in most cultures, they would not be leaders" (Burns, 1978, p. 114).

Early Theories

Early theories of political leadership assumed that leaders had the ability to impress their will on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (Moore, 1927; Phillips, 1939). This was later softened somewhat by identifying the leader as one who guides and directs (Allen, 1958), but even Bennis (1959) suggested leadership is the process by which an agent induces a subordinate to behave in a desired manner. These compliance

induction theorists regarded leadership as a "unidirectional exertion of influence and as an instrumentality for molding the group to the leader's will" (Bass, 1981, p. 9).

Power, Competition, & Conflict

The primary factor in political leadership has usually been defined in terms of differential power relationships between leaders and followers (Neustadt, 1960; Pfeffer, 1981). Power can be interpreted as both coercion or force, and as social exchange or influence. The relationship between coercion and leadership is debated since some scholars believe that raw force has nothing to do with leadership, but there are varying interpretations of force that may lend themselves to understanding leadership (Kracke, 1978). The problem faced by many organizational theories of leadership is that a form of coercive power is present in most supervisory-subordinate relations (Goode & Fowler, 1949), and when employees do not comply, coercive power is used to deal with noncompliance (Greene, 1976; Sims, 1980). French and Raven (1959) identified five kinds of power: (a) reward power; (b) coercive power; (c) legitimate power; (d) referent power, based on identification of A with B; and (e) expert power. Power can also be identified as personal, which equates with influence and persuasion, or positional, which equates with authority.

Political approaches to leadership also identified competition and conflict over who is going to lead, who gets the prizes, and what goals will be achieved once the leader

is established (Burns, 1978; Lindblom, 1968; Paige, 1977; Tucker, 1981).

Influence & Persuasion

For many political scientists, however, the influence process has become more appropriate to the definition of leadership than compliance or forms of coercion (Cohen & March, 1972; Edelman, 1964; Haiman, 1951; Lindblom, 1968; Shartle, 1951; Stogdill, 1950; Tucker, 1981, 1987). Influence implies a more reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers, one not necessarily characterized by domination, control, or coercion. The notion of persuasion served a similar purpose. Influence and persuasion were joined in Bell's (1975) definition of influence as the process of using persuasion to have an impact on people in a relationship. The definition of leadership as a form of influence and persuasion was more appropriate to those scholars and others who were opposed to authoritarian concepts (Bass & Barrett, 1981; Copeland, 1942; Weiss, 1958). An influence relationship also permits freedom of choice which a coercive relationship forbids. Influence leadership identifies the need for leaders and followers to persuade each other while recognizing that each can choose to not be persuaded.

Policymaking, Resources, Skills, Goals

Besides identifying leadership with compliance, influence and persuasion, the political theorists all

suggest that the processes inherent in political theories of leadership include policymaking, the distribution of limited resources, and the strategic use of specific power skills such as conflict analysis, strategizing, manipulation, coalition building among interest groups, and power plays to accomplish specified tasks. To put it more bluntly, leaders are in it to win.

Easton (1965) defined political as those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society. He proposed a systems approach to political life and although his notion of leadership lacks focus, Paige (1977) suggested that he included political leaders under the broader idea of gatekeepers which was Easton's structural definition or mechanism for regulating the conversion of wants into demands and thenceforth into social policy. In explaining how demands are negotiated through to outputs by structural means that produce decisions, compliance, and implementation, Easton introduced the concept of authority roles. He also included leaders among the authorities who contribute to want conversion. Paige pointed out that Easton's systems approach made leader behavior "more a product rather than a producer of system influences" (p. 23). Easton's systems approach has had a marked influence on succeeding notions about the relationship between politics and leadership.

Kellerman (1984) defined political leadership as the process by which one individual exerts more impact than others on the direction of group activity. She also defined

the leader as one who make things happen that otherwise would not happen. She distinguished political leadership from other forms of leadership by suggesting that political leadership is concerned about public policy and political leaders are legitmated by the state and governmental processes. Moreover, she argued that political leadership implies some kind of ideology or partisanship in relationship to group goals and structure. She ventured into the psychology of leaders and argued that patterns of political leadership behavior are the function of many variables, including personality role, organization task, values, and the reciprocal relationship between leader and follower. In terms of followers, Kellerman believed there were two basic reasons why followers follow leaders: leaders satsify individual need and leaders satisfy group needs.

The idea of resources is important to political leadership insofar as the competition that exists in the political process is the competition for limited resources. Political theories understand leadership essentially as an interactive process of competing for limited resources (Rost, 1982). Resources normally refers to the economics of society, but can include any number of other resources, including ideas, things, people, values, etc.

Current Political Theories of Leadership

The more articulate proponents of political theories of leadership who have emerged more recently are Burns (1978),

Lindblom (1980), Paige (1977), Rost (1982), Tucker (1981) and Wildavsky (1964). Each responded to the relationship between leadership and politics by evaluating why leadership is essentially political. Paige's political leadership is somewhat fuzzy but his eighteen dimensions of political leadership have been synthesized by Rost (1982) into four generic dimensions: power, affect, instrumentality, and morality. Tucker's (1981) definition is that leadership "is a process of human interaction in which some individuals exert, or attempt to exert, a determining influence upon others" (p. 11). His focus is on the relationship between leaders and followers, much like Burns'(1978) definition. He is also interested in distinguishing between leadership and management, describing management as the day-to-day group life, and leadership as the directing of a group during the time of important decisions.

Lindblom's (1968) reconstructive leadership was developed in response to the policymaking process. His leader is one who uses power and influence to get the policy s/he wants. Leaders operate on what Lindblom called a policymaking ladder, the various steps of which are filled with the subleaders and followers, and the most apathetic people are on the very bottom of the ladder. The higher the people are on the ladder, the more active they are and the more influence they have in the policymaking process. The position of people on the ladder changes with the issue being decided and during the course of any issue's resolution the positions on the ladder are fluid. "The

influences moving up the ladder constrain, instruct,
command, permit, and otherwise bend the higher-level
participants to the wishes of those at the level below them.
At the same time, influences moving down the ladder shape
the positons taken at each lower level" (p. 103).

Wildavsky's (1964) model of leadership in a small town
focused on the mobilization of resources to influence the
distribution of stakes. The resources that he identified in
a small town were wealth, financial obligations, social
standing, friendship, and official position. He further
advocated a coalition approach to leadership.

According to Rost (1982), there are essentially five
linkages between leadership and politics that have been
identified by the major proponents of political leadership.

1. Leadership is a form of power.

2. Leadership uses influence and persuasion to achieve
goals.

3. Leadership means having goals, purposes, and values
as well as the motivation to mobilize resources to achieve
them.

4. Leadership involves competition and conflict.

5. Leadership demands that the motives and purposes of
both leaders and followers be realized. This may involve
bargaining, compromise, trade-offs, and coalition building.

Rost's 1982 political theory of leadership underwent
major surgery in 1989 when he developed an entirely new
paradigm that revealed a major shift in his thinking. His
most recent definition argues that "leadership is an

influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes" (p. 17). I will analyze Rost's latest theory more fully in the next chapter.

Burns's Transformational Model

The model of leadership against which all models must be compared, however, is Burns' transformational leadership which he proposed in his seminal work entitled Leadership (1978). Burns explained that "leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes, mobilize in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize the goals mutually held by both leaders and followers" (p. 18, emphasis in the original). The key elements of his definition include motives based on wants and needs, purposes, mobilization of resources, competition, and satisfaction of motives and purposes of leaders and followers. Burns added that "leaders with motives and power bases tap followers' motives in order to realize the purposes of both leaders and followers" (p. 18). Leadership is a dynamic process that is relational or interactional, collective, and purposeful.

Departing somewhat from other political theories of leadership, Burns believed that leadership was related to power but was also separate from it. If the goal and

purposes only met the leaders needs, and not the followers'
needs, then it was power wielding. Another area of
departure is Burns' distinction between bureaucratic
authority and leadership. He maintained that authority that
is equivalent to bureaucracy is antithetical to leadership,
offering four reasons why he made this distinction: (a)
bureaucracy assumes consensus and discounts competition and
conflict, (b) it discourages tapping of motivational basis
among employees, (c) it pursues goals that may become
separated from human needs, and (d) it butresses the status
quo (p. 296). Burns added, "To the extent that bureaucracy
is in _practice_ the simple application of authority from the
top down, it is not leadership. To the extent that it
exemplifies conflict, power, values, and change in
accordance with leader-follower needs, it embodies
leadership" (p. 298, emphasis in original). His distinction
also serves to challenge other theories that equate
management with leadership.

Fundamental to the process of leadership for Burns is
making conscious what lies unconscious in the minds and
hearts of followers. This is one of the criteria by which
Burns distinguished between two fundamentally different
forms of leadership. The first he called transactional
which exists when "one person takes the initiative in making
contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of
valuable things. The exchange could be economic or
political or psychological in nature" (p. 19). It is simply
a quid pro quo, less than a moral relationship between

leaders and followers and while the purposes of leader and follower may be related, they are not identical.

The second form of leadership is transformational. "Such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality" (p. 20). This form of leadership is a consciousness-raising process, a moral pursuit transforming both leaders and followers to higher levels of ethical existence. Transformational leadership has broad human purposes and goals and its essence is the recognition of real need, a realignment of values, a restructuring of organizations, and real, intended change in consciousness, values, and society.

Burns relied upon Maslow's (1954) and Kohlberg's (1963) development stages to define the process of elevated consciousness and behavior. Leadership is an enabler of progression and change that is morally directed. Transformational leadership is not maintaining the status quo, which is another reason why it must be distinguished from management. Leaders must have an ethical and philosophical base from which to operate. With his conviction that leadership is an ethical mandate, he further separates his theory from most other political theories before and after him. In one sense, the notion of transformational leadership has transformed our understanding of leadership and challenges any theory that defines leadership without an ethical base. Burns' notion of ethical leadership has been challenged by Bailey (1988)

whose portrayal of leaders is characterized by manipulation and humbuggery and the need for leaders to transcend the moral order of their society.

Politics & Ethics

Apart from a minimal treatment of followership and interpreting the nature of leadership through the lens of life histories, political theorists generally divorced ethics from leadership. It was an underlying assumption that politics had a seamy side that, if not unethical, was amoral.

Burns, however, did link leadership and ethics. Leadership, he contended, must be ethical on two counts: the character of the leaders/followers relationship and its vision of human need. The test of the leaders/followers relationship is how the leader exercises power. A person engaging in power wielding and tyranny is not a leader. Dialogue and conflict are the hallmarks of the leader. As pointed out earlier, Burns developed his notion of human needs on Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs and Kohlberg's (1963) research on moral reasoning. Ideally, according to Burns, human beings, in a leaders/followers relationship, move from lower levels to higher levels in a moral hierarchy. Leaders take followers up the hierarchies, while tyrants take them farther down the hierarchies.

Tucker on Leadership and Ethics

In Politics as Leadership (1981), Tucker presented his

own model of leadership, providing a critique of Burns'
work by observing that Burns made an incorrect distinction
between leadership and power wielding. While Burns would
not consider Hitler or Stalin a leader, Tucker did. This is
interesting in light of his own notion about the issue of
ethics in terms of a response to followers' needs:

> Leadership is not the exercise of power for power's
> sake, nor is it the simulacrum of statesmanship that the
> rhetorician may produce by flattering the populace with
> his art of persuasion. It is an activity with utility
> for the polis, the activity of giving direction to the
> community of citizens in the management of their common
> affairs, especially with a view to the training and
> improvement of their souls. (pp. 2-3)

It is difficult to reconcile Tucker's statement, however,
with the fact that he believed Hitler was a leader. Tucker
believed that as long as an individual directed or
controlled a political community, that individual was a
leader. Leaders diagnose a situation, prescribe a course of
action, and mobilize a group toward a defined goal or
implementation of a policy.

The relationship between leadership and ethics is
difficult to define and Tucker's inclusion of Hitler in his
leadership model points to the difficulty of this
relationship. Bailey's (1988) latest study on leadership,
delivered from the perspective of a political
anthropologist, further highlights this problem in a
provocative and challenging way by suggesting that "leaders

everywhere must set themselves above the morality of their own society" (p. xi). If political theorists of leadership are to allow philosophers any input in the study of leadership, then they must come to grips with the relationship between leadership and the moral order of society, which, with the exception of those noted above, they have failed to do.

Generative Leadership

The most articulate proponent of Burns' transformational leadership is Rost (1982, 1984a, 1984b) whose own notion of generative leadership is an important step beyond Burns' theory. In his generative model, Rost has offered three important contributions to leadership studies. First, Rost (1985) has continued to make a case for distinguishing between leadership and management. Secondly, he (1984a) has developed the notion of generative leadership, building on Erikson's (1963) generativity stages, and suggesting that leadership has a processual, developmental nature insofar as leaders and followers mature and move to higher levels of moral behavior. The learning that happens in the process of leadership by leaders and followers is passed on to future generations, thus giving to future society a developed, more mature consciousness and social order. The third contribution is his synthesis of leadership studies and futurist studies. Rost (1984b) believed that leadership must have a futurist perspective so that leaders and followers advance into the future with a

sense and conviction that they can create the future, rather than just letting the future happen undirected (see also, Henrickson, Jeffries, & Rost, 1987). Rost (1989) has recently advanced a new theory of leadership that presents a model of leadership based upon a post-industrial perspective. I wish to save my evaluation of his latest paradigm, however, until I present my own theory in the next chapter.

Foster's Critical Model of Leadership

Foster (1986) has added another dimension to this discussion by combining critical theory with leadership. Although Foster is an organizational theorist and not a political scientist, I have chosen to place his theory in the political context since he himself defined leadership as "a political and courageous act to attempt to empower followers" (p. 187, emphasis in original). Foster's cutting edge of leadership is its capacity to "focus on the same goals as the spirit underlying critical theory--to release us from our prisons of ideology and to give vision" (p. 188). In Foster's approach, leadership enables discourse, critical thinking, evaluation and transformation of social structures, and vision. Leadership empowers followers to engage in participative decision making and to educate people in such a manner as to "demystify structures and penetrate 'normal' conditions" (p. 187). Building on Burns' (1978) notion of transformation, Foster argued that the goal of leadership is a rational discourse in which

multiple perspectives and all arguments can be heard without
the barriers created by hierarchical arrangements. Foster
further believed that leadership was not linked only to the
position of a person, but rather to the direction leaders
and followers are taking. His penetrating summary says it
well: "Leadership lies not in the position given, but in
the position taken" (p. 15, emphasis in original). Foster
is very concerned about the relationship between leadership
and ethics in his critical theory approach to leadership,
believing that it is the purpose of leadership to create a
vision of "a just and equal social order" (p. 188).
Transforming the human condition to a more equitable society
is based upon understanding and critical inquiry. Foster
(1988) has updated his theory somewhat and I wish to save
further comment until the discussion on my own theory in the
next chapter. Suffice it to say that Foster's approach,
although expressed within a political frame, is clearly an
alternative approach to leadership that offers a new and
important dimension that has not heretofore been identified.

Politics' Contributions to Leadership Studies

Political theories of leadership have contributed much
to our understanding of leadership. Essentially, they have
identified six key elements that other theories have either
undermined or ignored. First, they have underscored the
importance of the relationship between leaders and
followers. Second, they have sharpened our understanding of
the behavior of leaders and the fact that leaders must

understand their role in relationship to followers. Third, they have clarified the nature of leadership as power, competition, and influence. Fourth, the importance of mobilizing resources has been highlited by political theories. Fifth, the relationship between leadership and public goals and purposes has surfaced as primary. Finally, it should be noted that four political theorists, Burns (1978), Foster (1986), Rost (1982), and Tucker (1981), have raised the issue of ethics, but for the most part, ethics is not a major part of political theories. Also political theories have given new direction in understanding the heart of leadership as followership, but no solid conceptual understanding of followers or leadership as collective behavior has emerged.

Problems Remaining

Even with these important contributions, political approaches to leadership are in need of more research in five areas before they deserve full acceptance by leadership scholars. While they have included followers in their model, a definition of the nature of followers or collective behavior must still be tackled. Political theories of leadership are still too focused on the leader from the upper echelons of society and they leave little room for leadership among the middle and lower levels of society. This suggests that they are still courting the great man theory of leadership. Second, the interfacing of leadership and politics provides a forum in which the needs of

followers have been taken seriously since political theories, unlike previous theories discussed, recognize the need to forge a consensus among followers to implement change and create policy. While political theories have addressed the empowerment of followers to accomplish goals, none offers a substantive understanding of the leaders/followers relationship. That relationship has not been conceptually identified and is normally overshadowed by an exclusive focus on individual leaders. Even Burn' Leadership (1978), though articulating a notion of followership, is primarily devoted to an analysis of F. D. Roosevelt, a single leader and, possibly, a great man.

Third, political approaches have not adequately addressed the many issues surrounding ethics, particulalry ethical relativism (Hatch, 1983; Ladd, 1973; Wong, 1984). The relationships between leadership and ethics is a difficult domain, yet it is one of the most real phenomena in political and social behavior. To ignore it is unaccaptable. To casually select one of any number of ethical constructs as the only frame of reference is enthnocentric.

Fourth, political leadership theorists must articulate the positive side of politics so that it does not come across as the seamy side of leadership.

Finally, the nature of the political process must be separated from the personalities of politicians, just as leadership must be distinguished from the personalities of leaders. We must be more precise in our definition of the

political process in order to understand how leadership and
politics are linked. Politics and leadership have both form
and process and a clearer distinction between the form and
process of leadership is needed.

Political Approaches to Leadership and Culture

When analyzing a comparison between political theories
of leadership and culture, there are positive correlations,
some less positive, and some where there are no correlations
at all. Political theories of leadership do respond to
human needs and wants, though with little definition of what
the needs are. Frequently, the needs are the leader's
needs, not the needs of followers. Political theories do
recognize the processual nature of society and understand
the need to adapt to changing environments. Likewise, they
are very resourceful in their approach and specifically
identify the mobilization of resources as essential to the
leadership process. Naturally, political theories are well
correlated to the political property of culture and to the
notion of group development. While political theories do
understand the structural web of social systems, they are
not equipped to address those systems as meaning-making
systems. This is related to their inability to address the
ethical framework of cultures. Language and symbols, at
best, get only lip service, but not substantive treatment.
Apart from Rost (1984a), political theorists do not address
the generative side of culture.

Summary

While political theories of leadership are currently in vogue, there are problems remaining with their approaches as I have suggested above. But a major contribution has been made by political scientists and historians in identifying the political nature of leadership and in further articulating the political process as an interdependent set of variables that influence leadership, including power, influence, competition, motives, resources, goals, constituencies and interest groups, and symbols. The important factor that politics contributed to leadership was the notion that politics is the study of groups in action going after what they want. This basic notion of politics should suggest that the political nature of leadership is inherently a group process, not the process of a single individual.

Corporate Cultural Approaches to Leadership

America's boardrooms need heroes more than Hollywood's box office need them. Heroism is a leadership component that is all but forgotten by modern management.

Deal & Kennedy (1982, p. 37)

In the 1980s a wave of books and articles hit the market with such a force that many leadership scholars saw the dawn of a new age in leadership studies. Offering a new twist on

leadership studies by suggesting that organizations can be viewed as cultural systems, these leadership authors of the 1980s focused exclusively on organizations that had what they labelled a corporate culture. Such theories of leadership claimed to view leadership through the metaphor of culture by examining an organization's myths and stories, symbols and language, shared meanings and behavior patterns.

All organizations, the corporate culturists claimed, have a culture and at the helm of this corporate culture was the super CEO, the hero of the 1980s. In its quest for simple solutions to complex problems, culture was defined basically as values and "heroes personify those values" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 37). The corporate culture theorists characterized leadership as the manipulation, or to use their softer word, coaching, of an organization's internal culture or its values in order to achieve some level of mutual need satisfaction between employers and employees, which again they defined as leaders and followers. A new age had begun, they claimed, and their banner was a new and updated version of the great man theory of leadership. Now the great man (still masculine) was not a prince, not a general, not a president, but rather a CEO.

The more articulate proponents of the corporate culture theory include Adams and Spencer (1986), Bennis and Nanus (1985), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Kotter (1988), Kouzes and Posner (1987), Levinson & Rosenthal (1984), McCall & Lombardo (1987), Peters (1987), Peters & Waterman (1982), Potts & Behr (1987), Schein (1985), Sergiovanni (1984, 1987), and Tichy & Devanna (1986), Vaill (1984), and

Waterman (1987).

The Metaphor of Culture

The concept of an organizational culture evolved out of
organizational theory and can be traced back as early as the
1950s with the works of Firth (1951) and Jaques (1952). The
enormous popularity of the corporate culture authors today
suggests that they have advanced a shift in thinking from
previous organizational theories discussed above. The
cultural perspective relies upon phenomenology, ecology,
hermeneutics, and anthropology to inform its approach.
According to Sergiovanni (1984), the object of leadership in
this perspective is "the stirring of human consciousness,
the interpretation and enhancement of meanings, the
articulation of key cultural strands, and the linking of
organizational members to them" (p. 8).

Within a cultural frame, the theorists argue, leadership
focuses on the informal, symbolic aspects of reality and the
notion of purposing is advanced by Vaill (1984) as "that
continuous stream of actions by an organization's formal
leadership which have the effect of inducing clarity,
consensus and commitment regarding the organization's basic
purpose" (p. 91). In many respects, however, the underlying
assumptions of the corporate culturists have not radically
shifted from those of other organizational theorists.
Following a review of the key components of the corporate
culture theories, the strengths and weaknesses of their
approach to leadership will be evaluated.

Values & Beliefs

The key component of a corporate culture is an organization's values and beliefs. They are the bedrock because they provide a common direction for employees and guidelines for behavior (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Argyris and Schon (1978) identified espoused values which may predict what people say, but may not actually reflect how they behave. Organizations must work at making espoused values congruent with daily operations. Posner and associates (1985) identified a positive correlation between shared values and organizational vitality. Alderfer (1984) has pointed to the problems of changing values and beliefs, particularly when those values and beliefs are race related (see also Schein, 1985; Staw, 1984b).

Shared meanings

A second component is the shared assumptions and meanings of an organization. Schein (1985) identifed five basic assumptions to a corporate culture: (a) relationship to the environment, (b) nature of reality, time, and space, (c) nature of human nature, (d) nature of human activity, and (e) nature of human relationships. Schein's discussion is signficant, primarily because, unlike most corporate culture theorists, he relied upon anthropology to inform his notion of culture. As the assumptions of an organization become stated values, they also become the foundation for what are the shared meanings. If the meanings are not shared, the corporate culture is weakened. Wilkins (1984) argued that since meanings and assumptions are usually

hidden, a culture audit is necessary to bring them to the surface. Kanter (1983), Posner et al (1985), Putnam (1983), Smircich (1983), and Weick (1983) have also made useful contributions to this same discussion.

Language & Symbols

A third component discussed by most corporate culture theorists is language and symbols. March (1984) focused on "how people talk" in organizations and the storytelling that is present in corporate cultures. Schein (1985) claimed organizations often develop a common language. Deal and Kennedy (1982) discussed the sales pitch as an example of language development in an organization and promoted the notion of storytellers who impart legends and stories about the visionary heroes, the CEOs. Borman (1983), Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujello (1982), and Redding (1980) also identified language as a critical factor in the formation of a corporate culture.

Some organizational theorists call corporate culture theory the symbolic approach (Bolman & Deal, 1986) since symbolism is included by all the corporate culture proponents. Pondy's Organizational Symbolism (1983) is the seminal work in this area and his work views organizations through the lens of anthropology rather than exclusively through organizatonal theory. Symbols are included in an organizations' rituals, ceremonies, humor, stories, and in its play. Bennis (1984) wrote that "symbolic expression becomes the major tool of leadership" (p. 70). Meetings, strategic planning, training and evaluation programs, and

public relations materials are some of the areas where symbols are prominent. The public often judges organizations by what they appear to be, not by what they actually do.

Along the same line, Sergiovanni (1984) suggested that "what a leader stands for is more important that what he or she does" (p. 106). Hirsch and Andrews (1984) opined that leadership was "knowing which set of symbols to involve at different points in time" (p. 170). One of the favorite quotes by corporate culturists comes from Ricoeur (1974): "I am convinced that we must think not behind symbols, but starting from symbols, according to symbols, that their substance is indestructible, that they constitute the revealing substrata of speech which lives among men. In short, the symbolic gives rise to the thought" (p. 299).

Myths, Rituals & Stories

The fourth and final component includes myths, rituals, and stories. While each interfaces with language and symbols, the corporate culture theorists separate them. Bolman and Deal (1986) advanced the idea that these three elements serve four major functions: to socialize, to stabilize, to reduce anxieties and ambiguities, and to convey messages to external constituencies.

The relationship between leadership and corporate culture has been articulated by all the theorists referenced thus far. A summary of that relationship suggests that leadership is the manipulation of culture (Schein, 1985); leadership is an artform that raises human consciousness,

builds meanings, and inspires human intent (Bennis, 1984);
leadership is a corporate cultural expression and seeks to
build unity and order within an organization (Sergiovanni,
1984); leadership is a willful act attempting to construct a
social world (Greenfield, 1984); leadership is a
representation of core values and prime objects (Taylor,
1984); or leadership is the art of getting others to want to
do something you are convinced should be done (Kouzes &
Posner, 1987).

The corporate culture approaches to leadership have made
many important contributions to the development of
leadership theory. The most important is their association
of leadership with the concept of culture. For the first
time, leadership has been identified with the metaphor of
culture in a relatively substantive manner. Nietzsche
(1968) argued that the use of the metaphor is basic to the
intellectual processes by which humans establish truth and
meaning and is also instrumental in our will to power. Kuhn
(1962) suggested that metaphors are also basic to the nature
of scientific revolutions and can influence major shifts in
world view. The corporate culture theories have also
affirmed the reality of processes in the relationships
between leadership and organizations, as well as linked
hermeneutics and critical scientific methods to the analysis
of organizational problems (Foster, 1984). Among the more
significant processes these theories have identified are the
cognitive and ideational processes that are integral to
language, symbolism, and meaning-making structures.

Problems

There are three properties of culture that the corporate culture approaches fail to address. The first is adaptation. The corporate culture is an internal culture and relatively unrelated to its larger external environments. It ends up appearing isolated and a closed system even though it espouses an open systems framework. Second, as indicated above, its use of resources from the outside is not addressed. Third, the isolationism of the corporate culture is further illustrated in its complete neglect of the political processes and structures in the environment. One is hard pressed to find anything of substance on the relationship between politics and the corporate culture in these theories. Finally, the ethics of the corporate culture framework is questionable insofar as the ultimate concern remains the bottom line, and little attention is paid to responding to problems or ethical issues of the larger society and world. Their fiduciary responsibility is to themselves, not to the larger community. There is much talk of excellence, but it is a concept directed inward, not to the larger context. If corporations are allowed to ignore such issues, the implications for world peace and harmony are vast and troubling.

There are other problems with this theoretical approach to leadership. Although it gives lip service to the needs of followers/workers, its attention is directed to how super CEOs can manipulate a culture to create a high performance system (Vaill, 1984). The needs of employees are not

articulated outside the usual listing of job security, pay scales, etc., and employees are given only minor roles in the leadership of an organization. Another major problem with this approach is its superficial treatment of the concept of culture and its general failure to follow a consistent definition of culture, though this is not surprising given our confusion about its meaning and the fact that the theory is still in its early stages of development. Most corporate culture theorists have not researched anthropol–gal approaches to culture to inform and clarify their own theories (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Pondy, et. al., 1983; Smircich, 1983; Van Maanan, 1979), though credit should be given to Adams and Specer (1986), Schein (1985), and Sergiovanni (1984) for trying to understand culture from an anthropological perspective.

Another problem is the lack of cross-cultural approaches. The generalizability of the findings of the corporate culture approach is limited by the fact the most research is done with European, Japanese, or American samples (Chemers, 1981). One study conducted by Birnbaum and Wong (1985) of twenty multinational banks concluded that organizational structure is largely unrelated to an individual's cultural preferences. Their findings were in contrast to a study by Lincoln, Hanada, & Olson (1981) who found that native born Japanese are most satisfied with Japanese organizational structures and do not fit well in non-Japanese multinational structures. Neghandhi (1975) presented a model of cultural effects on organizational structure in which cultural or national differences act

indirectly on management practices by affecting the organizational environment. He argued that organizational structure and managerial policy are more important than other cultural factors in determining behavior. This view contrasts sharply with the underlying assumption of the corporate culture theorists. Reviews by Barrett and Bass (1975), Chemers (1984), and Tannenbaum (1980) concluded that cross-cultural research on leadership has been characterized by weak methodologies and by a paucity of theory, both of which make the interpretation of the findings problematic.

A final problem with corporate culture approaches to leadership is that, once again, no distinction between management and leadership is made, even though some authors give lip service to such a distinction. The question remains, "Can employees be treated as followers when the element of choice of leadership is absent?" But, in the short time that the corporate culture framework has been studied, it has enabled leadership scholars to view the nature of leaderhship from yet another lens. It has also put out a mandate that we need to explore more precisely anthropology's understanding of the relationship between culture and leadership.

Corporate Culture Theories & Culture

Obviously, the corporate culture approach to leadership incorporates many of the primary properties of culture. The bio-basic property of culture is present in the corporate culture's interest in human needs, values, and meanings. It is also resourceful in its utilization of symbols, stories,

rituals, and language, but it does not include external resources very well. It tends to celebrate its internal culture more than utilizing resources of the surrounding environment. Group development is central to the corporate culture approach. A structural web of shared meaning is the heart of a dynamic culture within an organization. The semiotic and symbolic are primary to the existence of a culture within an organization. Ethics comes into play insofar as there is attention paid to the needs of employees/followers, but the larger issues of business ethics and an ethical concern for the problems of the larger society are not addressed by the corporate culture theorists. Finally, the generative component is present by virtue of the presence of learned values, extensive training programs, and continuing educational opportunities. As suggested above, the elements of adaptation to the larger social and cultural environment and the political are lacking in the corporate culture approaches.

Summary

The total picture we receive from the corporate culturists of leadership is positive and heading in the right direction. Their attempts to incorporte the metaphor of culture into their understanding of leadership is a major step beyond what earlier organizational theories of leadership offered. As Petrie (1984) observed, "The great strength of the cultural perspective is that it reminds us how intimately involved in our human experience is our cultural background" (p. 313). While some problems in their

approach and definition remain, they have made a major
contribution to leadership studies by linking leadership with
culture.

Anthropological   Approaches   to Leadership

> The Polynesian chiefs . . . are at first sight
> dominated and constrained by their office; but in
> fact they have a measure of strategic freedom and
> their success depends on the astute use of that
> freedom. Conversely, Melanesian big-men, at first
> sight free to make (or break) their own careers, are
> no less than the Polynesian chiefs hemmed in by the
> constraints of their cultures. Their is no reason to
> suppose that one or the other type of leader has an
> advantage when the situation calls for innovation and
> adaptation to changing circumstances. Both,
> moreover, succeed to the extent that they can venture
> with impunity into the region of conduct forbidden by
> the dominant values of the cultures that ostensibly
> guide their actions.

> F. G. Bailey (1988, p. 46)

Leadership figures prominently in the ethnographies of
anthropologists and, in fact, many of the major
ethnographies include it in some fashion, usually as a
category that identifies rulers, chiefs, big men, tribal
heads or anyone in the position of authority. With few
exceptions, anthropological articles on leadership identify
it within a political framework of a given culture. The
word leader is generally applied to those individuals who
hold some office or are in a position of authority, but some
important exceptions will be noted in which leaders do not
hold positions of authority. Many of the articles take into

account the constituency or followers attached to the
leader. Structurally, therefore, the notion of leadership
within anthropology is usually characterized by both leaders
and followers. It is to the credit of anthropologists that
they normally identify cultural processes within the
framework of the group, rather than the solitary individual.
C onsequently, discussions on leadership by anthropologists
identify followers and leaders in the leadership process.

It is unfortunate that leadership scholars who are not
anthropologists rarely include any anthropological
monographs or ethnographies in their studies, even when such
scholars call for a multidisciplinary approach to
leadership. This is remarkable not only because
anthropologists have contributed much to our understanding
of leadership, but their ethnographies offer leadership
scholars an opportunity to instantiate their theories in the
grounded reality of cultural experience. One of the
motivations underlying this study is the conviction that
anthropology is not only a discipline that leadership
scholars need to incorporate in their theories, but that
anthropology is on the cutting edge of the current
development of leadership theory.

Since Chapter Five will focus exclusively on four
anthropologists' approaches to leadership, my purpose here
will be to review the general direction taken by selected
anthropologists in their monographs on leadership by briefly
summarizing their approaches to leadership in various
cultures. There are a number of anthropologists whose
ethnographies include an interest in leadership: Bohannan

(1958), Cartwright (1978), deVries, Kets, & Miller (1985), Dubinskas, (1983), Eidheim (1968), Gow (1982), Hollander & Julian (1969), Levi-Strauss, (1967), Lienhardt (1958), MacDougall (1982), Miller (1977, Powell (1967), Swartz (1968), Turner (1957) and Tuzin (1978). These are only a few whose works have offered more salient examples of the contributions by anthropologists to the study of leadership. Most of these ethnographers have understood the context for leadership as political and therefore their models, in part, compare to other political models discussed earlier. They frequently drew upon the political models of Easton (1959), Paige (1977), and Tucker (1981), all of whom were discussed above. Their concepts of leadership are often linked to a positional approach in which leadership is identified with those individuals holding an authority position within a tribe, clan, kinship systems, or state. Since many of the cultures studied included both the colonial form of government alongside the tribal form, there is much attention paid to the relationship between these two structures which, although different, had to cooperate in the governing of the society. This invariably complicated the discussion on leadership, but it also motivated certain culturally internal forms of leadership to arise as an expression against external rule. The review of these ethnographers follows. A sense of anthropological approaches to leadership will emerge as these anthropologists instantiate how leadership and culture are coterminous processes.

Leadership & Kinship

Lienhardt's (1958, 1961) studies on the Dinka, an
African people living along the central Nile basin in the
Southern Sudan, shed light on the relationship between
leadership and kinship. The Dinka society is segmented into
tribal groups. A tribal group is an aggregate of tribes
which, in turn, are divided into subtribes, which may also
be further segmented into units. The tribe is the primary
political segment for defense purposes, but the smaller
segments also meet various political needs, particularly
since Dinka men are very ambitious, according to Lienhardt.
The Dinka value the unity of their tribes, and of their
descent groups, while also valuing the autonomy of their
component segments which can lead to fragmentation.
Lienhardt explained the causes for groups separating and
combining, a process called fission and fusion.

> The basis of this occassional contradiction of values
> lies in each Dinka's ambitions and in the necessities of
> their cattle-herding. A man wishes to belong to a large
> and united tribe and subtribe, because they have the
> strength which enables them to claim and hold the best
> pastures either in the dry season or the wet. . . . A
> man similarly wishes to belong to a large descent group,
> because the greater the numbers of his agnatic kin who
> have still not formally segmented into separate agnatic
> groups, the wider the range of people from whom he can
> hope for help in collecting marriage-cattle, and the
> wider the range of kin upon whom he can for certainty
> rely for help in quarrels either within the tribe or

outside it. On the other hand, each man wants to found his own descent group, a formal segment of the subclan which will for long be remembered by his name, and wants to withdraw from his more distant agantic kin in order not to be required to help them in their marriages. These values of personal autonomy and of co-operation, of the inclusiveness and unity of any wider political or geneological segment and the exclusiveness and autonomy of its several sub-segments, are from time to time in conflict. (1958, pp. 117-118)

This model of proliferation of equivalent political segments also includes the notion of personal leadership. Fission does not occur haphazardly, but as the result of the action of ambitious and dissatisfied individuals who gather around them followers. There is also another structure called dual leadership in which the roles of master of the fishing spear and war leader are enacted. Each subtribe has its own master of the fishing-spear who ensures victory in war and prosperity in cattle by his prayers and invocations, directed again human and animal foes. The prayers are supplemented and even implemented by the physical combat of the warriors under the war leaders. In Dinka thought, if such dual leadership is to be harmoniously maintained, the master of the fishing spear and the war leader should be maternal kin. This pattern is that of an agnatic descent group. This, of course, is the ideal structure, and Lienhardt admits the real picture is much more complex. But it illustrates the relationship between leadership and kinship that anthropologists have identified in other

cultures besides the Dinka.

Evans-Prichard's (1940, 1951) study of the Nuer is closely aligned to Lienhardt's study of the Dinka since the two groups are both Nilotic tribes. In the case of the Nuer leaders, there is also a sacred association with the leopard-skin chief who, like the master of the fishing spear among the Dinka, has ritual duties and is also called upon to settle blood feuds which are frequent. However, the leopard-skin chief does not have much general authority outside specific social situations and, as Evans-Prichard (1940) observed, "I have never seen Nuer treat a chief with more respect than they treat other people or speak of them as persons of much importance" (p. 173). As in the case of the Dinka, a chief comes from only certain lineages, but normally he does not belong to a dominant clan or have aristocratic status. The reason for this is to enable him to be an impartial judge in the settling of disputes between dominant clans. Evans-Prichard pointed out that although the leopard-skin chiefs have no judicial or executive authority and no means of compelling people to settle disputes, the parties of a dispute normally do listen to him in order to maintain some equilibrium in their political and social structures. "He is the machinery which enables groups to bring about a normal state of affairs when they desire to achieve this end" (1940, p. 175). The influence of a chief is one of persuasion and the possible threat of ritual curses, though Evans-Prichard never saw this done. Frequently, however, the threat of a curse would be enough to cause disputing parties to settle their affair.

Evans-Prichard also identified the prophet and the Man of
the Cattle as ritually influential among the Nuer. But even
with these three ritual leaders, there was no formal
structure of leadership or even of legal institutions among
the Nuer. The Nuer society was an acephalous kinship state
and their social system was labelled by Evans-Prichard as
the form of ordered anarchy. But given the Nuer as a
"product of hard and egalitarian upbringing" (p. 181), it
was impossible for the Nuer to recognize anyone else as a
superior. The Nuer society was quite remarkable in its
deeply embedded democratic sense of the self and the social
order.

Both Evans-Prichard's and Lienhardt's studies of the
Nuer and Dinka are classics in anthropological literature
and are particularly helpful in identifying the link between
culture and leadership, which in both cases is a critical
coefficient linked to the kinship system and notions of the
sacred among the Dinka and the Nuer.

Leadership, Art, and Symbolism

Certain anthropological studies have also linked
leadership with a culture's art patterns and symbolic
systems. Tuzin (1978) observed that among the Ilahita
Arapesh, art criticism becomes the idiom for political
confrontation. The collectively based production of
religious art and architecture fixes on the ambitious artist
an authority which can be generalized. The magical
character of the art implies that innovation or borrowing of
new forms amounts to the creation of a new spirit entity.

This, in turn, becomes an act of political assertion inasmuch as it proclaims the autonomy of a new descent group under the sacred patronage of this spirit. This ties in with the Arapesh symbolism which was discussed in the previous chapter (Tuzin, 1976, 1977).

Both Dubinskas (1983) and Gow (1982) have identified leadership at symbolic levels. Dubinskas observed the political symbolism in Yugoslavia where processions are an important symbolic process in enacting the leaders/followers relationship. He noticed that religious processions, weddings, funerals and secular parades cast a structure for leaders and their followers to maintain a pattern for enacting asymmetric or hierarchic relationships. Even village style conversational singing is played out in the same terms with the words _vodit_ (to lead) and _pratit_ (to follow) appearing frequently in songs and conversation. Symbolizing the political leadership of Marshal Tito through the same model evokes a broad cultural nexus of historically-validated activities in village life. By enacting this processual symbol for hierarchy, participants create both the relationship and meaning while they also enhance the legitimacy of the leader.

Gow's study analyzed the ideologies and political organizations of four twentieth century leaders in the southern Andes. Although the goals, backgrounds, and methods of the four leaders varied considerably, at a symbolic level they became one through their identification with Inkarri, the prototypical Indian savior and leader. Gow revealed that an apparently simple symbolic

identification between a contemporary leader and a mythical hero can have profound and far-reaching effects on the followers in the current revolutionary movements in the Andes. Both Gow's and Dubinskas' accounts illustrate the coterminous relationships between leadership and cultural symbols.

Muller (1976) studied the use of the drum as a symbol for chieftaincy among the Rukuba of Nigeria. Drums are frequently selected as symbols in African states in preference to any other kind of musical instrument. Muller questioned why this was so and determined in his analysis that the drum installation ceremonies of the Rukuba show that by virtue of contrasting sounds that can be obtained from the drum. It is the perfect musical alter ego of the divine king; for the drum can embody both (1) order, that is discontinuity and differentiation to which the ryhthm of the drum corresponds, and/or (2) disorder, that is continuity and un-differentiation, to which the drum also corresponds when used as a friction drum.

Thus, cultures use symbols and art forms to articulate and formulate structures of authority and leadership. The importance of symbols in the process of leadership is pervasive in anthropological studies.

Competitive Leadership & the Big Men in the Trobriands

In Powell's (1967) study of the Trobrianders, particularly of the population in Northern Kiriwina Island, leadership has been identified with the Big Men who are the highest ranking individuals in a matrilineal descent group.

The population's economic and political relationships tend to focus upon the Big Men so that the people become organized as a following. But they must cooperate as a unit in competition with similarly led and organized populations of other localities. Trobriand political activity consists of a continuing process of creation, expansion, and contraction of followings and areas of influence by Big Men qualified to compete for leadership. The unique feature of this system is that the relationship between the Big Men leaders, and their followings do not crystallize into or become stabilzed as permanent major chiefdoms or administrative hierarchies, but disintegrate when their creators, or leaders, lose support or die. When this happens, successor Big Men must start again the whole process of building up followings for themselves. There is no organized structure that can carry on when the leader is no longer a leader.

The Trobriand Islands were first described by Malinowski (1922a, 1922b). He identified the headman of a subclan as the recognized leader. The opportunity of becoming a cluster leader, a more prestigous role, exists for a leader of a subclan, but he must compete for the position. Powell (1967) explained that competition for this more important role is linked to the mechanisms of the kinship and marriage systems, or the urigubu and pokala. If a subclan leader can manipulate these variables within his subclan, and, in effect, position both himself and his subclan through urigubu and pokala, then his chances for becoming a cluster leader are increased. He is in competition with other

leaders of subclans and must outmaneuver them in order to
advance his own role. Obtaining wives from other clans,
securing the support from other subclan leaders, and
claiming urigubu tribute from kin can favorably position a
leader for advancement. Thus, the source of the leader's
power is not from an administrative hierarchy, but from his
personal skills at competition. It is an example in which
leadership is not invested in positions of authority, but in
persons of influence and skill. Even when a subclan leader
becomes a cluster leader, the competition between clusters
continues and the cluster leader must become even more
sophisticated in his competitive strategies if he is to
remain a cluster leader. A cluster leader who loses
support is toppled. At this level, the cluster leader must
deal with warfare and intracluster cooperation is pursued
which in turn promotes intercluster competition. This form
of cluster competition becomes the primary political
organization among small villages of the Trobriand Island of
Kiriwina. Allen (1972) provided a similar study on the
correlation between the entrepreneurial skills of the
Nduindui Big Men of New Hebrides and leadership.

Powell's study is, in part, characteristic of the
anthropological approach insofar as it identifies the
critical element of choice among followers and places
leadership in a context that is essentially free of
administrative hierarchies, again pointing to leadership
outside the context of positions of authority. Leaders,
therefore, cannot rely upon the administrative position they
hold to exercise power; they must actively compete for and

cultivate followers if they are to remain in a leader role. This process is more fully developed by Barth (1959) and Leach (1964). It is important to our understanding of the nature of leadership to remove it from the context of administrative hierarchies which most other theories of leadership have not been able to achieve. Unlike most theories of leadership that have been discussed so far, some anthropologists have been able to isolate leadership apart from adminstrative structures and hierarchical positions, thus allowing us to view the process of leadership without all the trappings of administrative structures.

Anthropologists have challenged our equating leadership with administrative and hierarchical roles by identifying leadership in those cultures that are not enfolded in the linear trappings of complex administrative forms. The concepts of both choice and competition within the process of leadership further challenge theories that suggest that employees in organizations can be treated as followers and managers as leaders. The problem, of course, is that employees do not have much choice in the selection of their leader--though in certain cases they might--and while managers may be competing with other managers for a position, they are not necessarily competing for followers. Consequently, we are left with the equation of management and leadership. Studies of leadership in other cultures offer a needed challenge to our current leadership theories, especially those that have evolved out of purely organizational approaches.

Leadership, Power, & Schism

Although not formulated in precisely the theorectical terms of leadership, Turner's (1957) studies of the rural and urban areas of what were formerly British Central Africa, particularly of Ndembu village life, offer an important contribution to leadership studies that most anthropologists since Turner's study have relied upon to articulate their own political and cultural ethnographies. At the core of the Ndembu village was a group of matrilineal kin, and unity of kin and stability of the village were proclaimed as Ndembu ideals. Turner showed, however, that such ideals were rarely possible of achievement because of a number of irreconcilable principles that were built into the structure of the Ndembu village, giving rise to tensions which were expressed in frequent and bitter quarrels between neighbors and kins. Many of these disputes focused on competition for succession to the village headmanship.

Turner demonstrated these processes through the technique of the social drama which illustrated the broader issues of conflict and the maintenance of social control and continuity. Following this line of analysis, Turner related a number of different features of the Ndembu social system, in particular the conflict of virilocality and matrilineal descent, the two major principles governing the social composition of Ndembu villages. For example, marriage was brittle as men sought the irreconcilable goals of maintaining control of their wives and sisters, the one in response to the demands of virilocality and the coresidence of male siblings, the other because they were dependent upon

their sisters to maintain and perpetuate the strength of the group. Similarly, he argued how beliefs in the power of the curse, in ancestral spirits, and in witchcraft provided the Ndembu with alternative explanations for a variety of afflictions, and that the events which these beliefs were invoked to explain or reinterpret were associated predominantly with tensions within the matrilineage. He suggested here that in certain types of conflict situations, ritual provided an appropriate mechanism of redress. The performance of the village ritual could thus be regarded as a means by which the forces potentially disruptive of the village were drawn off, and the conflicting members of the group united, purged of anger, in amity of common worship. But in the end, the ritual could only operate as a temporary salve, for after a period of outward and apparent calm, the forces making for conflict would be revived in new forms, the end product of which was likely to be village fission.

Against this backdrop the headman, or big man, symbolized the unity of the Ndembu, just as the ritual symbolized the Ndembu unity by keeping alive the values shared by all Ndembu from village to village. The big man was not an enduring position nor was it a hereditary position. Big men were expected by their kin to gather a following around them and go out and found their own villages. Within the larger area, villages competed with one another. Big men were expected to increase the size of their following which increased their influence and prestige, but the more people a big man succeeded in attracting to his village the greater the likelihood of the

development of internal faction and fissionary tendencies.
Over time, these disputes caused fission and group unity
could no longer be maintained. This situation provided
opportunities for new leaders of the seceding group to
establish themselves as independent headmen.

Both Epstein (1968) and Sahlins (1963) have also studied
the big men of Melanesia and their conclusions concur with
both Powell (1960) and Turner (1957), as Sahlins wrote of
the big man:

> The indicative quality of the big man authority is
> everywhere the same; it is _personal_ power. Big men to
> not come to office; they do not succeed to, nor are they
> installed in, existing positions of leadership over
> political groups. The attainment of "big man" status is
> rather the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a
> person above the common herd and attract about him
> coteries of loyal, lesser men . . . . Little or no
> authority is given by social ascription: leadership is
> a creation—a creation of followership. (p. 289,
> emphasis in original)

Epstein, in contrasting the Tolai big men with the Ndembu
big men, suggested that the principle of competition was
apparent in all ventures and activities as big men committed
themselves to ever more and more grandiose and expensive
schemes, including dance festivals, weddings, and other
ritual feasts, until some would overreach themselves and
exhaust their riches.

These anthropologists have made important contributions
to leadership studies by identifying leadership in what is

essentially politically decentralized societies. Our modern
conception of leadership is so wedded to centralized
authority structures that we have difficulty in imagining
the exercise of leadership outside that context. For a more
extensive discussion of societies that have no centralized
political authority, Cohen and Middleton (1967) and
Middleton and Tait (1958) are particularly helpful.
Turner's studies illuminate the relationship between
leadership and personal power that is culturally embedded
and the use of personal power by big men in the tension
between continuity and schism in Africal tribes.

Leadership, Social Structure, and Resourcefulness

Levi-Strauss (1967) has given us a remarkable monograph
on the Namibikuara tribes of South America. His study is
useful for our purposes for three reasons. First, he has
illustrated the relationship between social structure,
particularly the marriage and kinship systems, and
leadership. Secondly, he describes leadership in a
functional vein insofar as he identified the need for
leadership in order to secure resources for survival.
Finally, he has contributed to our understanding the
relationship between leadership and choice by his
explanations of consent and reciprocity in the tribal
structure of the chief and his followers.

Levi-Strauss was particularly interested in the
Nambikuara tribes because they "confront us with one of the
simplest conceivable forms of social and political
organizations" (p. 47). The backwardness of the Nambikuara

was displayed by the following description:

> At least, some of their bands do not build huts and are
> wholly ignorant of pottery and, even among the others,
> these two arts are exceedingly poor. There is no
> weaving, except for the narrow arm and leg bands which
> are made of cotton; no dress whatsoever, either for the
> men or for the women; no sleeping contrivances, such as
> hammocks or platforms; the natives being used to
> sleeping on the bare ground without the protection of
> blankets, mats or hides. Gardening exists only during
> the rainy season and does not free the Nambikuara from
> wandering during the seven months of the dry season,
> looking for wild roots, fruits and seeds, small animals
> such as lizards, snakes, bats, spiders and grasshoppers
> and, generally speaking, anything which may prevent them
> from starving. (p. 48)

This extraordinarily simple society was an interesting
contrast to modern societies to Levi-Strauss and represented
an opportunity to discover the bare basics of leadership.

The structure of leadership was shaped by the formation
of nomadic bands, each under the leadership of a chief, who,
during the dry season, must lead his people to food
resources. The first point to be noticed is that as the
larger population splits into several bands, individuals can
select the chief they wish to follow. Bands are formed on a
free choice basis. The reason this can happen is that
"everybody is everybody's kin" (p. 50) since their kinship
system is based on a cross-cousin marriage. All men in one
generation are either brothers or brothers-in-law and men

and women are either siblings or spouses to one another. Similarly, children are either sons and daughters or nephews and nieces in relation to the adults. As a result, there was no great choice of terms to express kinship, and the formation of bands always results in a kinship formation.

Why then the splitting-up process, asked Levi-Strauss? The reason was economic. The scarcity of wild food resources and the subsequent high square-mileage needed to feed one individual during the nomadic period made the division into small bands almost compulsory. While the need for scarce resources created the band structure, the role of leader had much to do with the makeup of each band. Leadership, or chieftainship, was not hereditary. It was based on the ability of the chief, or uilikande, to unite a group together and successfully lead them to the food resources necessary for basic survival. "Personal prestige and the ability to inspire confidence are thus the foundations of leadership in Nambikuara society" (p. 52). The leader must order the start of the wandering period, select the routes, choose the stopping points, order and organize the hunting, fishing, and insect or fruit collections, and he must monitor the conduct or disgruntled band members. Followers, therefore, selected the chief that was in closest accord to their needs. In this sense, "consent is the origin of leadership, and consent, too, furnishes the only measure of its legitimacy" (p. 53).

The notion of reciprocity is critical to the social structure of the nomadic band. On the one hand, the instrumental force of the chief's power rested in his

generosity. He must always have at hand surpluses of food, tools, weapons, and ornaments, all of which are scarce resources, to give to his followers, who are very greedy. On the other hand, the chief is allowed the unique privilege of polygamy by the band members. While band members can only have one wife, the chief receives several wives from the group, not only to meet his sexual and emotional needs, but also to meet the needs of leadership since he has many tasks to fulfill and needs helpers to assist him. Levi-Strauss distinguished between quantitative reciprocity, which linked more isolated members of his following through individual prestations, and qualitative reciprocity, which provided for a deeper, moral linkage between the chief and his followers, based upon the marriage system as well as individual prestations. If a chief married a band member's sister, there was a stronger bond created than if the chief did not have a direct marriage tie to someone, even though everyone was related in some fashion.

Levi-Strauss concluded his monograph by departing somewhat from his discussion to suggest that there is in every society a leader class born for leadership, a notion he labelled natural leadership. This, of course, falls back on the great man theory discussed earlier in this chapter. Why he suggested this idea when nothing in his study would support it remains unclear.

Despite his conclusion, his study offers a major contribution to leadership studies by identifying the relationship among leadership, social structure, and resourcefulness. This linkage further supports the basic

anthropological approach of identifying the nature of leadership with cultural processes.

Leadership and the Cultural Entrepreneur

Eidheim's (1968, 1971) study of the Lappish minority situation in Norway offered yet another avenue to understanding the relationship among leadership, culture, and resourcefulness, or as Eidheim called it, entrepreneurship. There are two key aspects to Eidheim's study on which I wish to focus. The first is the notion that a person seeking political office in a township when there is a strong Lappish voting bloc, especially if that person is a Norwegian, must exploit or market the demands and needs of the Lappish people in order to secure their following, or as Eidheim also called it, their clientship; in a word, their votes. Post World War II saw the emergence of a number of Lappish movements which forced politicians to become entrepreneurs of the Lappish vote market.

A second dimension to Eidheim's study is his portrayal of leadership as a group movement rather than in terms of single individuals. What forced politicians to become political entrepreneurs of the Lappish people was the emerging power of the Lappish movement directed against the stigma of inferiority which was sanctioned in Norway by ridicule, insults, and avoidance as well as policies that prevented the practice of Lappish language and customs in such social institutions as education and government. It was simply an issue of minority rights against a majority-dominated system. Many Norwegians joined on the

side of the Lappish minority as public debate in the late
forties and early fifties acquired a more liberal view of
minorities. In fact, at the United Nations, Norway was
active in the preparation of the Declaration of Human Rights
and thereby committed itself to principles that were not
fully in effect within its own society. The movement
started in Lappish local communities but eventually moved
onto the national forum. This, according to Eidheim, was a
case example of Barth's (1963, 1966) generative model of
social organization in which the process of leadership in
the Lappish community generated both new processes and forms
that responded positively to their rights and their heritage
as a people. Eidheim's study is a good example of
leadership arising out of a particular cultural context, but
within a larger cultural environment.

Leadership and the Sacred

Bohannan (1958), Firth (1979), and Shack (1979) have
each made important contributions to understanding the
relationship between leadership and notions of the sacred.
Bohannan studied the Tiv who are the largest pagan tribe in
Northern Nigeria, numbering at the time of his study about
700,000. The two characteristic features of leadership in
Tiv society were influence and the mystical protection
against the evil of men and witches. Leadership normally
surfaces when there is threat of one tribal segment warring
against another, in which case a leader or tyo-or emerges.
He leads his people in war and represents it in peace
negotiations, but he steps out of his role of tyo-or when

the internal affairs of his segment emerge. In other words, he is a leader only when the tribal segment must be united against another segment. Leadership by an individual is legitimated through the possession of <u>swem</u>, the emblem of truth and mystical protection against the evil of men and witches. Swem is a form of the sacred in Tiv society and causes the land to be productive, the rain to fall, the sun to shine, and people to have children. Valid leadership is correlated with the possession of swem. In this sense, Tiv leadership is an expression of the peoples' cosmological views.

Firth (1979) studied the changing Tikopia society, a former pagan, but recently converted Christian Melanesian people in the western Pacific. In Tikopia society, chiefs were elected by the people and were <u>tapu</u>, a term which Firth rendered as sacred. The chiefs' sacred role included ritual performance of elaborate series of formal symbolic acts that were linked to the pagan gods. The modern Tikopia chiefs, since they are Christian, no longer perform these ritual acts, but they remain sacred in the eyes of the people. Firth asked the question, How have the chiefs managed to preserve this traditional attribute? Firth discovered that tapu in Tikopia is not just taboo in the sense of Durkheim's (1915) interdictions designed to prevent the profane from intruding to the sacred, or the sacred from overflowing on to the profane. In Tikopia society, the sacred has a "positive, mystical, image-enhancing character" (p. 151) that is correlated with high respect, such as that given the Pope by Catholic Christians. It is a form of pious

reverence. Firth pointed out, however, that when applied to chiefs, the notion of the sacred identifies the quality of a social relationship more than a quality of a person. He further expounded that equating the notion of divinity with this notion of the sacred is mistaken in the sense that the Tikopia chief is not really divine. Firth pointed to the structure of political authority as the underlying meaning of the Tikopia notion of sacred and thereby the sacred and profane are brought more into alliance with one another than separated, as is often characteristic of descriptions of the sacred and profane. There is a comparable comparison of the Tikopia notion of the sacred with Weber's (1952) idea about the routinization of charisma, according to Firth. On another level, the transformation from pagan into Christian society has also transformed the symbolization of the Tikopia chiefs as a safeguard of the prime values of the society, though those values now have a Christian flavor. Through the concept of the sacred and its relationship to leadership, there has been an adaptive adjustment that enabled the transition from pagan to Christian society. Firth also pointed out, however, that the persistence of the concept of the sacredness of their chiefs was also "tacitly a Tikopia declaration of faith in the values of their traditional culture" (p. 166). In this sense, the role of chief and the concept of the sacred were together the bridge than enabled the Tikopia people to move from pagan to Christian society, but it is also significant that the cultural bridge wasn't burned.

Shack (1979) carried out research among the Western

Gurage of Ethiopia and wrote that upon first entering the
Gurage society, "I was struck by the pervasiveness of sacred
norms and values in the domain of secular leadership" (p.
169). The earlier sources of coexistence of the sacred and
the profane date back to Mwagamana clan chiefs who had their
own divinities and conquest in warfare was understood by
chiefs to be the result of the superiority of their
respective divinity. Gurage society became more centralized
ritually than politically, and prior to the 19th century,
the primary divinity was the Caha divinity which achieved
the status of the national Free Spirit for the Gurage
polity. The clan chiefs in the next couple centuries
eventually had their authority vested in administrative
positions appointed by the Ethiopian government. During
this period, Ethiopic Christianity secured its grip, and
local clans were brought under the rule of the central
government headed by emperors of the new nation state of
Ethiopia. Internal civil fighting continued among the
Gurage houses, but at a reduced level. By the time the
imperiod government of Haile Sellassie was restored in 1941,
the local autonomy of Gurage chiefs had been fully
surrendered to the authority of the central government. But
the role of priest counsellors remained powerful in local
Gurage societies, and any claims to secular leadership
became increasingly dependent on sacred approval by the
priest counsellors who still represented the Free Spirit.
Shack reported that in an effort to preserve the forces of
tradition against modernity, postrestoration changes in
local level administration strengthed, rather than weakened,

ritual dominance in the Gurage polity. In one sense, the real leadership shifted from chiefs to priest-counsellors whose office was regulated by the principles of patrilineality and primogeniture. Conflict also developed between priests and chiefs, even though the chiefs were liturgically subject to the priests. It is an exmaple of traditional authority in the form of the priests confronting modern administrative authority, now in the form of the chiefs. Shack speculated at the time of writing his study that the relaxation of central political authority by the revolutionary socialist government that deposed Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1974 may stimulate rebellious movements by the Gurage Houses and "the Free Spirit may attain greater symbolic religous meaning for Gurage today than in yesteryear" (p. 187).

Thus, Bohannan (1958), Firth (1979), and Shack (1979) have contributed valuable data that instantiates the relationship between leadership and a culture's notion of the sacred. Sacred and ritual structures figure prominently in most indepth studies of cultures. But many have not identified the relationships between leadership and the sacred as well as these three ethnographers.

Swartz's Local-Level Leadership

Swartz (1966, 1980, 1988 [in press]) is both a political and a cultural anthropologist and has completed texts in both arenas. His understanding of the relationship between culture, politics, and leadership lends itself to this discussion in a particularly useful way.

Swartz has been interested in the dimensions of human behavior--why people act the way they do, why their patterns of behavior differ from culture to culture, and how the answers to these two questions help us understand the consequences of a distinctively human pattern of evolution. His two approaches to these questions are contained in the concepts of culture and politics. Swartz defined culture as "the shared ways of believing, evaluating, and doing that are passed from generation to generation and from person to person within a group through the process of learning" (1980, p.8). Culture is a behavioral guide and is composed of cognitive elements and processes. He advanced the notion of a processual approach to culture and politics, pointing to the dynamic and diachronic analysis of social structure, in contrast to an evluation based on a static and synchronic analysis.

Social structured, argued Swartz, are the mechansims for distributing culture and refer to relations between people and the orgnaizations of those relations. Statuses and roles are the key categories which classify people and establish expectations for behavior within those classifications. Groups are also a cultural part of social structure.

Swartz (1969, 1982a) understood the relationship between culture and personality in terms of motivation, which, in turn, included three processes: drives, means, and goals. Culture either satisfies or reduces drives by the attainment of goals through a particular means. Thus, culture is (a) shared understandings (b) operating processually and (c)

creating social structures as mechansims for the distribution of culture (d) to satsify the motivational, moral and generative needs of the human personality.

Politics referred to "the event which are involved in the determination and implementation of public goals and/or the differential distribution and use of power within the group or groups concerned with the goals being considered" (1968a, p. 1). Swartz's notion of politics included six key components: (a) public goals, (b) resources, (c) support, (d) legitimacy, (e) competition, and (f) administration.

Goal seeking, Swartz argued, is not political unless it is the seeking of public goals. Swartz rejected the notion that politics was primarily understood in terms of dominance or subordination, or in terms of ideology. Resources can include anything--ideas, relationships, material objects, symbols, forces, personal qualities, supernatural beliefs, laws of nature, and even hidden resources that may be utilized unconsciously--that contribute to goal achievement. Support Swartz (1968a) defined as "anything that contributes to the formulation and/or implementation of political ends" (p. 10). Rulers may gain support by force, by persuasion, or by consensual power by which compliance is exchanged for the understanding that at some future time the compliers will gain favorable decisions from the power holders. Legitimacy occurs when followers believe their wants or needs will be met. Legitimacy is the moral element based upon an interaction between leaders and followers. Swartz defined competition in terms of faction which identify political groups that are not corporate group but

are formed by centralized figures, such as leaders. The
final component is administration which is the structure for
the hierarchical assignment of power to individuals.
Politics, then, is the process of people seeking public
goals through resources, support, legitimacy, competition,
and administration.

The critical role of leadership in the processes of both
culture and politics is to serve as the linkage of the two.
Politics and culture are dissimilar in form and structure,
but similar in process and nature. While Swartz has not
himself proposed this linkage, the following relationship
between cutlure and politics can be inferred as a linkage
based on leadership. First, public goals is referent to
shared understandings and support. If there were no shared
understandings, there would be no public goals. Secondly,
both culture and politics are processually linked; neither
is static and synchronic. Thirdly, social structures are
referents to administration, competition, and factions.
Finally, motivational and personality needs are referents to
legitimacy and the moral relationship between leaders and
followers. When both culture and politics are linked in
this fashion, it is leadership that Swartz is discussing.
Although I have inferred that leadership is the linkage
between Swartz's notions of politics and culture, there is
much to support such an inferrence and it offers an
important step toward understanding the relationship between
leadership, culture, and politics.

While other anthropologists will take a somewhat
different direction in their definitions of culture and

politics, there remains this unifying notion of leadership as the linkage between the two. Although anthropologists would submit that their concept of leadership is generally defined within a political frame, they are understanding political in the larger framework of culture and are therefore offering a significantly different approach to leadership than has been proposed by political theories of leadership. It is more significant that anthropologists define politics as an underlying assumption about the nature of culture. The political theories of leadership do not have these same underlying assumptions. Thus, while both political scientists and anthropologists may call their theories of leadership "political," they are, in fact, different from each other. I intend to further demonstrate this difference in the case studies in Chapter Five.

Summary

I do not understand why the important contributions that anthropologists have made toward the study of leadership have been largely ignored by leadership scholars in other disciplines. I have summarized only a few of the ethnographies that are available to leadership scholars on the subject of leadership, though I believe the ones summarized are among the more important. While anthropologists generally define their perspectives on leadership as "political," their notion of political differs somewhat from that of political scientists insofar as it incorporate a wider range of other cultural elements. I have suggested, therefore, that anthropologists would be

better off not calling their approaches political, but rather simply calling them cultural.

The monographs I reviewed also give greater attention to the dynamic of the leader/followers relationship. With the exception of political approaches, most other theories of leadership have failed on this count, and even political theories of leadership have not given it the same attention as ethnographers. I would expect this to be true because anthropologists are by training highly sensitive to the group processes of cultures, certainly more so than political scientists who give greater attention to single individuals as shapers of political events.

I do think anthropologists have generally not been able to come to grips with leadership outside the context of positions of authority, though I cited some exceptions. I might note, however, that in the case of the cultures studied by anthropologists and reviewed above, the position of authority was granted only <u>after</u> the individual proved his leadership capacity. This suggests that leadership occurs prior to the position and not after it as is frequently implied in other theories of leadership.

Although the monographs reviewed above do not give as full and substantive a treatment of leadership as four case staudies in Chapter Five do, they nevertheless provide important evidence for the linkage between culture and leadership and contribute significant new outlooks on leadership as a cultural process. Anthropology provides a rich, and heretofore untapped, resource for the study of leadership at a level that matches theory with practice.

Furthermore, I believe that ethnographies offer a wider context in which leadership can be viewed in relationship to the many variables with which it interacts. I think the wide screen on which leadership is viewed by ethnographers is a major direction for the future study of leadership.

Conclusion

Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it, and finds himself no wiser than before. He is full of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without having come by their ignorance the hard way.

Kurt Vonnegut (1961, p. 112)

A story shared at a recent conference on leadership (Khare & Little, 1984) told of the senator who was returning from a Washington event and, recalling the people they had met, turned to his wife and said, "Isn't it tragic, darling, that there are so few great men left today?" And she turned to him and said, "There's one less than you think there is, darling."

This story was shared by one of the participants in that 1982 conference that tried to come to some understanding of the interdisciplinary nature of leadership. In the published material on the proceedings of the conference, Thompson (1984) wrote,

Leadership is so complex and so difficult to assess and

measure . . . that almost any proposal regarding
leadership represent a series of contradictions,
tensions, and antimonies. Any proposition put forward
from one standpoint about leadership is almost
immediately subject to qualification on the other side
of the ledger. . . . In thinking about leadership, for
every truth, there is a balancing truth; in the
application of leadership, for everything there is a
season. What seems appropriate and effective in one era
is less effective in another. (pp. 9-10)

Thompson concluded that three issues regarding leadership
remained problematic. "The first of these is our
ambivalence about leadership. The second is our uncertainty
about the nature of leadership. And the third is our dimly
perceived concept of future leadership or the demands of the
future with regard to leadership" (Khare & Little, 1984, p.
131).

Leadership's Multidisciplinary Nature

The primary conclusion that emerges from the voluminous
approaches to leadership summarized in this chapter is that
the study of leadership needs to be conceptualized in terms
of a complex set of interacting variables and processes. We
can no longer accept a unidimensional or a single
disciplinary approach when thinking about leadership. While
it is easier to try to identify leadership within the
conceptual framework of a single discipline, we need to
understand that such a narrow approach is no longer
intellectually tenable. Continuing efforts are needed to

clarify the nature of leadership as a multidisciplinary phenomenon.

Each of the disciplines discussed in this chapter has constructed its interpretation of the nature of leadership through its own frame of reference. The political scientists assume the underlying structure of leadership is political; the psychologists assume it is psychological, and so forth. The above review of leadership theories confirms the state of confusion that exists today in understanding leadership. It also confirms that no single theory has succeeded in defining leadership. Some theories, such as the great man, traits, and charismatic theories, must be rejected completely since they merely identify types and characteristics of individuals who may or may not be leaders, but say nothing about the nature of leadership. Organizational theories have certainly advanced our understanding of management, but have contributed little to defining the process of leadership by equating leadership with management.

Most theories have focused on the diverse forms of leadership rather than on the process of leadership. Furthermore, no single discipline has offered a perspective on leadership that serves to identify the multidimensional nature of leadership. A purely disciplinary approach to leadership is inadequate. Leadership can only be understood and defined as a multidisciplinary phenomenon.

However, when viewed together, the disciplines may offer us a composite understanding of leadership. A synopsis of what each discipline has defined as the quintessential

nature of leadership is revealing and will serve to illuminate the conclusion that a multidisciplinary perspective is necessary to understanding the nature of leadership. A brief review of the salient characteristics that each discipline has contributed to the study of leadership will provide the necessary basis toward which we can synthesize a composite view.

The philosophers were among the first to propose the idea of leadership and when asked what made leadership philosophical, their answer focused on the need for understanding society within a moral order, suggesting that leadership can only be grounded in the ethical world view of a given culture and, furthermore, that the ethics of leadership must be defined in terms of Plato's justice, Socrates' dialogue, Hobbes' passion, Nietzsche's transformation, Rousseau's equality, Luther's doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, or the human rights issue that had its beginnings in the eighteenth century doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even Machiavelli's unethical prince operated in an ethical context.

When asked what makes leadership biological, the answer is linked to assumptions about biological or genetic determinism, or to what the sociobiologists have called the universal traits of human nature. Some of the universal characteristics of human nature include language, aggression, sexuality, socialization, altruism, and religion. Biologists argue that certain individuals may be genetically predisposed toward leadership behavior and other individuals may be more predisposed to being followers. The

great man and traits theories have been discredited, but biologists, sociobiologists, and physical anthropologists make a growing case for the coterminous relationship between universal bio-basic and psychic features of human nature and the processes and structures, including leadership, that constitute culture. Biologists and physical anthropologists still have a major role to play in defining what the basic needs of humans are.

The psychologists' answer to why leadership is primarily psychological comes close to the biologists' answer, but they argue for incorporating a combination of nature and nurture in their answer. Leadership, according to their theories, can be traced to any number of interdependent psychological factors, including the Oedipal complex and the law of the father, child rearing practices, developmental stages, object relations and cathexis, cognitive patterns, adaptive mechanisms of the ego, group dynamics, self-psychology mechanisms, interaction, attribution, or generative characteristics. Essentially, they argue that leadership results from a dynamic interaction between personality, culture, and the social/structural environment.

The sociologists' approaches to leadership point to the family and its influence, the impact of social institutions such as the educational, religious, and political systems, the power of cognitive or ideational influences, symbolic interactionism, role-playing, group needs, prestige or self-esteem needs, and the drama of everyday life in which individuals must wear many masks in order to create a

social/psychological reality. Their answer to why leadership is primarily social focuses on the influence of social structures on group dynamics.

The political scientists and historians interpret leadership as political. They identify the components of power, influence, competition, mobilization of resources, group pressure, and public goals. Many leadership scholars, including most anthropologists, agree that leadership is primarily a political phenomenon.

Organizational theorists believe the primary context for leadership is the corporation and cite the components of organizational structures, tasks, styles, skills, human resource programs, missions and goals, teamwork, employee motivational programs, and super CEOs as the underlying components of leadership as it is practiced in the corporate world. They argue that good management means leadership and the effective manager is a leader.

The corporate culture theorists advance organizational theory to a new level by arguing that leadership occurrs when a dynamic culture is created within an organization. Thus leadership is identified with the metaphor of culture and culture, in turn, is traced to values, symbols, stories, meaning, language, quality work environments, and a deep moral commitment of employees to organizational values and the employer/manager.

Finally, the anthropologists, while normally placing leadership in a political context, offer yet another dimension by bringing to the surface certain assumptions about the nature of leadership as a cultural construct. The

anthropologists identify cultural variables such as symbols, kinship, ritual and the sacred, language, collective movements, and various political factors as critical coefficients in the process of leadership within diverse cultures. These assumptions make their approach to leadership significantly different from the approach taken by the political scientists, and reinforce an emerging sense that leadership is a cultural expression.

Each discipline has provided a perspective on leadership that by itself is incomplete, but when all disciplines are linked with each other, there emerges a composite picture that more accurately identifies the nature of leadership. The development of this composite picture comes into sharper focus as disciplines define leadership as a set of interdependent variables, or more precisely, as a cultural phenomenon. The precise shape of this composite picture is the subject of the next chapter.

Problems Remaining

Even with all the theories present in our dialog on leadership, there are problems which no theory and no single discipline have addressed satisfactorily. The single most glaring problem is the failure to take followers seriously as the core of leadership. While theorists give lip service to the importance of followers, none have either struggled with the nature of the relationship between leaders and followers or, to put it another way, have come close to identifying the follower coefficient in the process of leadership. The great majority of theories continue to

focus essentially on the single individual, the great man, the super CEO, the hero, the celebrated personality, or the individual in an authority position. They have interpreted leadership through the very narrow perspective of a single individual and consequently have not identified the multidimensional nature of leadership. Leaders are critical to leadership, but it is even more critical to understand that a leader is not synonymous with leadership. A leader is only one of the variables within a set of interdependent variables that form the composite nature of leadership.

A second problem is the mixing of form with process. As indicated earlier, most theories have focused on one form of leadership, the leaders, and while their understanding of the form of leadership may be historically or psychologically illuminating, it does not capture the nature of leadership because different forms exist both between and within cultures. Form alone does not identify nature because leadership can exist in multiple forms inasmuch as it includes a set of interdependent variables. A focus on leaders is problematic because there are no two leaders who are alike. Researchers have identified no universal traits or characteristics or personality patterns that identify leaders. Leaders are as diverse as personalities, and efforts to identify leadership by an indepth evaluation of individual leaders is interesting but it does not identify the nature or process of leadership.

A third problem is the minimal attention that has been given to the relationship between leadership and ethics. Philosophy has identified a moral mandate in the process of

leadership. Burns (1978), Foster (in press), Rost (1982) have insisted that leadership is inherently ethical, but other scholars have not addressed the issue of leadership and ethics in a substantive fashion. A deeper understanding of the process and structure of ethical leadership is needed. In light of the current debates over ethical relativism, it is all the more important that we understand the nature of the relationship between leadership and ethics, or our attempts at leadership behavior will either ignore ethics, give in to ethnocentrism, or include it in a subconscious, undefined manner. Burns' reliance on Maslow (1954) and Kohlberg (1963) also needs to be re-evaluated in light of more recent theory and research. Related to the ethical dimension of leadership is the issue of progress. If leadership is the elevation of the moral consciousness of leaders and followers as Burns (1978) argued, then what is the criteria by which this moral progress is to be evaluated?

A fourth major problem is the confusion that results from equating leadership with management. Just as theorists have interpreted leadership through the life of a single individual, so they have more recently tried to define leadership through the small lens of management. Again, lip service has been paid to the conceptual distinction between the two, but no theorist has given any indication of how they differ and why.

A final problem encountered by most theories, exempting anthropological approaches, is the formulation of most leadership theories outside the context of culture. I am

convinced that leadership is first and foremost a cultural expression, and the failure of leadership theorists to articulate their theories outside the context of culture is one of the primary reasons why we are still confused about the nature of leadership. Related to this problem and, in part a solution to the problem, is the exclusion of anthropology from the study of leadership by most leadership scholars.

A New Cultural Theory is Needed

The conclusions from this review are that no single discipline's definition of leadership is adequate, that leadership is a set of interdependent variables and processes, that it must be understood as a multidisciplinary and multidimensional phenomenon, that it is inseparably linked to notions of culture, and that there are serious problems in the study of leadership that yet need to be addressed. Furthermore, while all theories of leadership have failed to identify the nature of leadership, each of the disciplines in which the theories have been developed has offered a contribution toward the overall task of isolating the critical properties of leadership that will define its deep structure and nature. It is only through a multidisciplinary approach that the nature of leadership can be identified and that a composite picture of leadership can emerge with focus and dimension.

I am primarily convinced, however, that it is time for a new theory of leadership that both emerges from this composite portrait and that defines leadership as a cultural

expression. Through a synthesis of the theories within each discipline and an integration of this synthesis, I intend to articulate a theory that defines leadership in terms of properties that are universal and are coterminous with the properties of culture. My next task is, therefore, to articulate a new cultural theory of leadership.

CHAPTER 4

A CULTURAL THEORY OF LEADERSHIP

To leap beyond, yet nearer bring.

Walt Whitman (1855/1950, p. 38)

Introduction

The Spectrum of Leadership

In his remarkable bestseller <u>Chaos</u> (1987), Gleick tells
the story of one of the minor skirmishes of science in the
first years of the nineteenth century regarding the
difference of opinion between Newton's followers in England
and Goethe in Germany over the nature of color. To the
followers of Newtonian physics, color had a static quality
that could be measured in a spectrometer and pinned down
like a butterfly to cardboard. The touchstone of Newton's
theory was his famous experiment with a prism which breaks
white light into a rainbow of colors, spread across a whole
visible spectrum. Each color could be identified and
measured. Red, for example, is light radiating in waves
between 620 to 800 billionths of a meter long. The
identification of colors in separate properties was science
at its best.

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Goethe, on the other hand, proposed that color was not a static quality, to be measured in a spectrometer, but was a matter of perception. Goethe also conducted a set of experiments with a prism. Rather that hold it before a light as Newton did, Goethe held the prism to his eye and looked through it. He perceived no color at all, neither a rainbow or individual hues. He saw not the separation of white light into colors, but uniformity. However, if a slight spot interrupted his view, such as a cloud in the sky, then he would see a burst of color. Color, he concluded, was an interchange of light and shadow. Color is a degreee of darkness, argued Goethe, allied to shadow. Color was a matter of perception and that perception was universal. Goethe asked: What scientific evidence was there for a definable real-world quality of redness or yellowness independent of our perception?

Thus while Newton was reductionistic, Goethe was holistic. Newton broke light apart and found the most basic physical explanation for color. "Goethe walked through flower gardens and studied paintings, looking for a grand, all-encompassing explanation" (Gleick, 1978, p. 165). While Newton was trying to be mathematical, Goethe was trying to be artistic. It is an example of how different sorts of scientists looked at one problem in different ways.

Frequently, we cannot see something until we have the right metaphor to let us perceive it. This nineteenth century story offers a metaphor on which to make a couple observations about leadership and leadership theories. I would suggest that the theorists reviewed in Chapter Two

have subscribed to the Newtonian approach. They have been reductionistic, breaking leadership down into parts. Each discipline took a different part and viewed the whole of leadership through one part, one color. Consequently, each disciplinary analysis of leadership is not entirely wrong, it is merely incomplete. A single disciplinary approach is not holistic. It has tried to define leadership as a static quantity that can be measured by various leadership spectrometers.

In this chapter, I take the side of Goethe and seek a more holistic approach which looks for universality of the fluid properties of leadership. In one sense, the prism is culture itself, and the interchange of light and shadow will reflect the diversity of culture while still identifying the same spectrum of colors cross-culturally. Leadership is white light which, when borken into its spectrum of properties, reveals the same universality cross-culturally, even though the prism of culture casts its rainbow or individual hues according to the degrees of any given culture. The oscillating limits of the poise and counterpoise of nature are reflected in the diversity of cultures and in the variety of forms that leadership takes in those cultures. In the discussion that follows, this metaphor is useful in identifying the full spectrum of the properties of leadership while viewing the prism of culture.

The Current State of Leadership Studies

Speaking of light and darkness, an overwhelming number of leadership theories and studies may leave us feeling more

in the darkness than in the light. The review of leadership theories from a disciplinary perspective in the previous chapter has pointed to the need for a multidisciplinary understanding of leadership as a construct of reality and a process bearing upon the relationship between leaders and followers. Reductionism has not fared well in the study of leadership. It is time for a holistic approach.

Yet with all the theories in existence, a holistic, multidiscipinary approach is absent. Scholars today still wonder why we have not been able to get a solid grasp on the nature of leadership. As recently as 1985, Bennis and Nanus complained that "thousands of empirical investigations of leadership have been conducted in the last seventy-five years alone, but no clear and unequivocal understanding exists as to what distinguishes leaders from nonleaders" (p. 4). Bass (1981) and, earlier, Stogdill (1974) collected and analyzed approximately five thousand studies of leadership listed on 189 reference pages. Stogdill concluded that "the endless accumulation of empirical data has not produced an integrated understanding of leadership" (p. vii). Bass offered a similar conclusion, but with a note of controlled optimism: "Some disparage the thousands of research studies of leadership completed with the supposed lack of progress. Yet . . . there seems to be progress in the field" (p. 617). Burns (1978) wrote "There is, in short, no school of leadership, intellectual or practical . . . . An immense reservoir of data and analysis and theories has been developed. No central concept of leadership has yet emerged" (pp. 2-3). Even more recently, Rost (1989)

lamented, "The upshot of all this is that we have a lot of ink spilled on the peripheral elements surrounding leadership and the content of leadership instead of on the nature of leadership, the process of leadership viewed as a dynamic relationship" (p. 3). The current state of leadership studies, therefore, is one of confusion, unidisciplinary thinking, and a search for form instead of the nature of leadership.

Industrial Theories in a Post-Industrial Age

It is even more disturbing that between 1984 and 1988 we were teased by a number of leadership books which raised our hopes that finally a solid theory might appear (Bass, 1985; Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Cleveland, 1985; Gardner 1986; Garfield, 1986; Hickman and Silva, 1984; Hunt and his associates, 1987; Kellerman, 1984; Kotter, 1988; Kouzes and Posner, 1987; Levinson and Rosenthal, 1984; McCall and Lombardo, 1987; Peters, 1987; Potts and Behr, 1987; Rosenbach and Taylor, 1984; Schein, 1985; Sergiovanni, 1987; Tichy and Devanna, 1986; Tucker, 1987; Vail, 1984; and Waterman, 1987). But none did.

While each of these works advanced earlier theories on leadership content, it is incredible that no new grasp of the nature of leadership surfaced. We were simply hearing updated and perhaps more appealing versions of the old song-and-dance. For the most part, these recent approaches are still operating under the assumptions of an organizational approach--now called corporate culture--to leadership, or within a political framework, as discussed in

the previous chapter. As Rost (1989) has pointed out, these models still reflect the industrial era models that are "scientific, rational, management oriented, quantitative, technocratic, goals dominated, cost benefit driven, male, personalistic, hierarchical, short term, pragmatic, and materialistic" (p. 10). Excellence is the bottom line, not leadership. Such characteristics also reflect most of the disciplinary theories discussed in the previous chapter. Scholars have promoted industrialized leadership, but we are fast approaching a postindustrial era. That is the rub!

Reevaluating Burns

Even Burns's (1978) brilliant theory of transformational leadership has failed to develop the school of leadership that was the purpose of his Leadership. While Burns moved us quantum leaps ahead in our thinking about leadership, his theory is problematic. It is embedded exclusively in a political frame of reference; he gave lip service to followership, but over 400 of his 500 pages are devoted to male biographies of Ghandi, Roosevelt, Mao Tse Tung, Lenin, and Hitler which suggested he really bought into the great man theory, equating leadership with being male and on top of the hierarchy; he raised the issue of ethical leadership, but based his moral theory on Maslow (1954) and Kohlberg (1963) who have come under heavy criticism by scholars (Gilligan, 1982), and he doesn't deal with the issue of ethical relativism. Finally, his notion of leadership is not distinguished from management. But credit must be given where it is due. If leadership studies have followed an

evolutionary track, Burns's theory was a quantum leap and ten years after the publication of his Pulitzer Prize winning book, there is still no better published work on leadership.

The Next Step

Where do we go from here? There are three avenues of response to the hundreds of theories of leadership before us. First, they could be dismissed out of hand, and we could start over again. That approach doesn't give any credibility to the scholarship that has gone into the study of leadership thus far. While that will not be our direction, it is the direction some leadership scholars have taken.

Another direction would be to examine those parts of previous theories that have more credibility than others and by isolating those parts, reassemble a new hybrid of leadership that contains the best genes of other theoretical bodies. Choosing which genes to accept and which to reject would be problematic. What surfaces from this mix usually appears to be new and creative, but underneath there exists the same assumptions and generalizations about leadership that I have argued need to be challenged. It would seem that this second approach is the one most often taken by scholars, especially in the organizational and corporate culture theories of leadership.

The third approach is multidisciplinary and would propose that each discipline has contributed an important perspective on leadership that now needs to be synthesized

and integrated with other disciplinary perspectives. Such a direction would identify a composite portrait of leadership that can be seen as emerging from the salient characteristics of the various disciplines out of which the multiple theories have emerged. I will explore this third approach further in pursuit of a new theory of leadership that is multidisciplinary by synthesizing and integrating previous theories. I therefore intend to first formulate the multidisciplinary nature of leadership and, secondly, define the essential properties that combine to form a new cultural theory of leadership.

A Multidisciplinary Approach

Our world of knowing is made up of separate disciplines and sciences, each with a private constellation of intellectual forefathers and foremothers. Each discipline has its own picture of how the world is shaped, having created its own landscape of ideas that conceptualizes reality. Each views reality through its own lens and each is biased by the customs and assumptions of its discipline. The study of leadership has suffered from such single channel approaches. I submit that a consensus of ideas, theories, and scholars from many disciplines must be shaped in order to understand the nature of leadership. Our world of knowing must become multidisciplinary.

A multidisciplinary approach to a new theory of leadership is built on the assumption that a synthesis of the theories in each discipline that has addressed the issue of leadership can isolate the primary contribution from each discipline toward an understanding of the nature of leadership. It further assumes that each of the disciplines discussed in the previous chapter lends one or more key components to our understanding of the nature of leadership. Identifying the key elements from each discipline that will contribute to a composite picture of leadership is the purpose of the discussion that follows.

Philosophy & Ethics

Philosophy informs us that leadership has an ethical foundation, that it is a process rooted in the ethical constructs and moral codes of a social context. The ethics of Plato's philosopher-king were founded on irreducible moral properties. Aristotle's ethic realized human potential and fulfilled human needs. Socratic leadership was built around the moral behavior underlying a critique of self, of meaning, and of relationships. Machiavelli's sole ethic was power, though he may not have chosen to call power an ethical framework. Hobbes's ethic was built on an authority legitimized by the consent of followers, even though, according to Hobbes, the followers had corrupt natures. Nietzche's ethic was transformation. Rousseau called for equality and passion. The ethics of Luther's Reformation gave rights and privileges to the community of believers, elevating the importance of followers to the

dignity of the priesthood. The philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries called for a new doctrine of authority that became institutionalized to protect the rights of people against power-wielding tyranny. Kant and Locke placed the individual in a position above society and initiated the issue of human rights. Although different ethical frameworks have emerged, philosophers have consistently identified leadership as an ethical mandate. Whatever ethical framework is present in any given culture, it is that same framework that is the premise on which people, including leaders and followers, must construct their meaning-making systems. In whatever philosophical or theological framework these meaning-making systems may evolve, ethics is inextricably bound to the nature and the process of leadership. Philosophy, then, has isolated for us the ethical property of the nature of leadership.

Biology and Human Needs

While biologists are not especially interested in ethics, they are interested in the biological and genetic basis of behavior. Along with the sociobiologists and the physical anthropologists, the biologists have proposed rather persuasively that there are selected biological or genetic characteristics that are universally present in human nature which have the functional ability to influence, and at times control, human behavior. They have flexed their empirical muscle on the side of a new naturalism that argues for genetic determinism as one of the critical components in the makeup of human social behavior. They

argue that we can no longer assume that all behavior is purely a product of culture, but rather there are certain genetic factors that <u>may</u> predispose individuals toward selected behavior patterns. Their findings do not suggest that genetic factors are the only, or even the primary, factors in influencing human behavior, but rather such factors do play a part to a degree which is yet to be researched. I would suggest that it is possible to infer from this view that the process of leadership is a response to basic biological human needs. Moreover, the motivational imperatives that direct individuals toward the leader role or in the direction of the follower role may be influenced to some degree by biological predisposition. Leader and follower behavior is therefore a product of both genetic and cultural determinants.

All this is not to suggest that the traits theory, the great man theory, and the theory of charismatic leadership are correct. As I have stated earlier, there is no evidence whatsoever to instantiate these theories. But while certain individuals may not be genetically predetermined to be leaders, the process of leadership as a behavioral phenomenon cannot be divorced from the genetic coding of the human species. I am not suggesting that the current research by biologists has been sufficient to make any further claim than the recognition that there is some level of influence on behavior by our genetic coding that may impact the behavior of leaders and followers. To infer from this research, however, that the behavior of leaders and followers is <u>primarily</u> determined by genetic coding is

unacceptable. I am still of the conviction that the cultural determinants outweigh the genetic determinants in leadership behavior, but at the same time I believe it is necessary to acknowledge the influence of biological factors.

There is another dimension here. In the previous discussion I have suggested that leadership behavior is, in part, a product of biological needs. Social institutions are also the products of basic human needs, and it is leadership that manifests social institutions and social systems. As Spiro (1987) has pointed out, "Since human social systems are rooted in man's biological nature, any discussion of the generic attributes of these systems must take its departure from certain biological dimensions of human existence" (p. 111). He added, "In general, it seems to be agreed that there is feedback between social system and personality such that the social system creates those personality needs which, in turn, are satisfied by and motivate the operation of the social system" (p. 140). Others have argued that social systems evolve in order to satisfy biological needs, group needs, and emotional needs; social systems are thereby viewed as an instrumental apparatus (DuBois, 1944; Kardiner, 1939; and Le Barre, 1954; Malinowski, 1944; Roheim, 1943). The process of leadership takes on a unique form in each culture. That form frequently can be identified in social systems, such as ritual, kinship, or political systems. Social systems are therefore the products of both human needs and leadership.

Thus, while I categorically reject the theories that
suggest leaders are ontogentically predestined to be
leaders, and followers likewise are ontogentically destined
to be followers, I believe we must acknowledge the fact that
if there are selected innate universal characteristics of
human nature that influence behavior, they are inextricably
bound up with leadership insofar as leadership is one of the
processes created in order to provide a continuing
instrumental mechanism for meeting human needs. It should
not be difficult to understand that if aggression,
sexuality innate language structures, altruism, and
religion, are universally characteristic of human nature,
then these characteristics must have some relationship to
leadership, though more research is needed to define more
precisely what that relationship is. Some physical
anthropologists are even telling us that we are on the edge
of a new biological revolution and we have only begun to
understand the depths and behavioral ramifications of our
biological selves (Lasker & Tyzzer, 1982; Wilson, 1978).
Biologists are thereby inferring that leadership has a
bio-basic property that is identified in both the behavior
of leaders and followers and in the social institutions and
systems that are manifested by leadership behavior to meet
human needs. In summary, leadership is a critical mechanism
or instrumental process to meet basic human needs.

Psychology & Personality Mediation

Bordering the biological inquiry into the universal
characteristics of human nature is the psychological inquiry

into the determinants of behavior in relationships between individuals, groups, and social institutions. Psychological theories of leadership have proposed that the process of leadership and the behavior associated with leaders and followers are naturally <u>and</u> culturally determined insofar as individuals inherit certain behavioral tendencies that are further defined, refined, and directed by our childhood experiences and the impact of socialization. Our cognitive ability to shape our reality and direct our ideational life is an adaptive mechanism and assists us in the basics of survival in a rapidly changing world. Psychologists contend that there are personality resources that are interfacing with social resources throughout our lives, and we are always in a dynamic, evolutionary process of becoming ourselves. The self is not a product only of inheritance or only of the influence of our environment; it is a product of both factors. Leadership is an emotional relationship seeking to fulfill psychological needs of leaders and followers, and, in this sense, leadership serves as a mediator between social structure and personality.

Furthermore, psychological theories of leadership, though diverse, have identified leadership as an evolutionary process rather than as static content; as an interactive relationship among people to meet human needs; as a resourceful mechanism to facilitate adaptation; as a key creator of our cognitive, symbolic, and ideational mapping structures that define and interpret our reality; and, again, as an instrumental mechanism for mediating between social structure and personality. The contributions

of psychology to our understanding of the nature of leadership are extensive. What Burns (1978) wrote over a decade ago still applies: "The key to understanding leadership lies in recent findings and concepts in psychology" (p. 49). Krackes (1978) study of the Kagwahiv Indians illustrates more precisely the contribution of psychology to our understanding of leadership.

Sociology & the Web of Social Relations

The social approaches to leadership found in sociology have identified the context of leadership in social institutions and organizations. It is in organizations and institutions that the drama of leadership is played out. Institutions such as the family and religion, and social organizations manifested in the educational, political, and economic systems offer multiple contexts in which relationships are constructed and leadership is enacted. These socialization structures interact with the individual's concepts of reality, meaning, role taking, and self-esteem, and form the basis of group dynamics. The social approaches to leadership have not only tied leadership to the structural web of social institutions, but have also identified this intricate web as the key determinant in our collective conscience, our meaning-making systems, and in our symbolic interaction. Sociologists have identified that the process of leadership takes place within a collective context and the structural web of social relationships.

Political Science & Power Relationships

Political scientists have brought to the surface that side of leadership which incorporates power plays, competition, conflict, mobilization of resources, goal seeking, influence, and the impact of interest groups in the leadership act. Political theories have identified politics as a critical and central component of leadership. Political theory has also understood leadership as an interactive process that exists only in the dynamic relationship among leaders and followers. Both social and political approaches to leadership can be credited with identifying the heart of leadership as an interaction among leaders and followers, and with the notion that leadership empowers followers. Political approaches have also identified the key role individuals play as leaders within the framework of history. Political theories of leadership have simply identified the nature of leadership as political, focusing on the dimensions of power in the relationship between leaders and followers and the environment in which leadership is enacted.

Organizational Theory & Context

Organizational and management theories of leadership inform us that leadership needs organization to make it work in a specific context. Leadership demands an organizational structure that gives context and content; it demands teamwork and purposeful goals; and it relies on communication and human resources. Although leadership has been equated with management in most organizational

theories, selected organizational theorists have pointed to
the illusion of management as a science and have helped to
shatter the equation of leadership with management (Benson,
1977; March & Cohen, 1976; Lincoln, 1985; Weick, 1976 &
1979). Organizational theories have defined leadership in
terms of the modern, complex organization that plays a
prominent role in the lives of most individuals.
Organizational theorists have also linked bureaucracy and
its principles of efficiency and production to leadership, a
linkage which I and others have challenged. In addition,
organizational approaches to leadership have introduced the
systems perspective into the leadership framework, offering
notions of closed and open systems which identify the
presence or lack of a relationship between the organization
and its environment. The major focus of organizational
theorists has been on management and the equating of
leadership with management. While management theories have
offered valuable information about management, it is
problematic to assume they have defined leadership.

Corporate Culture & Values

As an extension of the management field, the corporate
culture theories have linked the metaphor of culture with
leadership and identified the presence of values, language,
symbols, stories, and meanings within the corporate process.
The corporate culturists have also refocused attention on
the nature of employees as followers and the importance of
the interactive nature of the employer-employee
relationship. The corporate culture theorists' equation of

management with leadership and employees with followers
remains problematic. While the corporate culture theories
are a product of organizational theory, they have made an
important contribution to leadership studies by equating
leadership with culture, even if their conceptual grasp of
culture is weak. The idea of culture in the organization
has been applauded because it focuses on the shared values
and understandings within a defined group of individuals.
The corporate culturists suggest that leaders can manipulate
and change a culture within an organization to make it more
productive. It is unfortunate, however, that they are
unable to move beyond their purely management perspective
since it weakens their contribution to the study of
leadership.

Anthropology & Culture

Finally, anthropologists have proposed that leadership
and culture are inseparably linked, belonging to similar
conceptual and processual domains. This is the single, most
important message of anthropology, but in addition, it has
also given us a remarkable analysis about the nature of
leadership as a multidisciplinary process, which is
instantiated by its subfields. Physical anthropologists, for
example, ha· told us much the same story as the biologists
and sociobiologists in its emphasis on human nature and
evolution. Economic anthropologists focused on economic
resources and how they are used in an adaptive capacity.
Structural anthropologists have a message similar to what

the sociologists and linguists have written about structure
and leadership. Symbolic or semiotic anthropologists have
concluded that the role of language and symbols is similar to
that articulated by the corporate culturists. Political
anthropologists have informed us about the nature of politics
in culture and leadership. Social anthropologists have
identified many of the same issues as sociology. And
psychological anthropologists have pointed to the interplay of
nature and nurture, of genes and culture, in our daily ability
to function, adapt, and survive. Anthropologists are simply
saying that leadership is multidisciplinary. But the single
message of anthropological theories of leadership is that
leadership is a cultural expression. Anthropologists contend
that leadership can only be defined in a cultural context.
Leadership as a cultural expression is the central idea in
this study and is instantiated and thereby illuminated in the
remainder of this chapter and in the next chapter where four
ethnographies on culture and leadership are evaluated.

A Multidisciplinary Portrait of Leadership

A capsule summary of the above discussion is in order.
My task has been to establish a multidisciplinary
understanding of the nature of leadership by synthesizing each
discipline's theories of leadership into one or more central
constructs that inform the nature of leadership and that
contributes to a definition of the nature of leadership.

Philosophers interpret the nature of leadership as
essentially ethical. Biologists interpret the nature of
leadership as a mechanism designed to meet basic human needs.

Psychologists interpret the nature of leadership as an emotional relationship which mediates between social norms and personality. They understand leadership as a dynamic, adaptive, and evolutionary change process of interaction between personality needs and social environment. They further understand leadership as a relationship that creates cognitive, symbolic, and ideational mapping structures that define and interpret our reality. Sociologists interpret the nature of leadership as a structural fabric or web of social institutions which manifest our need for socialization and meaning. Leadership is a collective consciousness given structural form and generated through learning. Political scientists interpret the nature of leadership as political, focusing on power-sharing relationships and utilization of resources. Organizational theorists interpret the nature of leadership as human resources needing a social context in which to operate. Corporate culture theorists identify culture as a metaphor for leadership and define culture in terms of language, myths, values, symbols, and shared meaning. Anthropologists interpet the nature of leadership as cultural, but define culture through its subfields as inclusive of most of the components discussed from other disciplines as categories of leadership. Anthropologists suggest that culture and leadership are running on parallel tracks.

Based on the above synthesis of the disciplinary approaches to leadership, I propose that an integrated, multidisciplinary definition of leadership includes the following essential properties:

1. Leadership is bio-basic to human needs.

2. Leadership is dynamic, adaptive, & evolutionary change.

3. Leadership is resourceful.

4. Leadership is a process of collective relationships.

5. Leadership is a structural web of shared meaning.

6. Leadership is political.

7. Leadership is semiotic & symbolic.

8. Leadership is ethical.

9. Leadership is generative.

Since the nature of any given phenomenon is composed of the essential qualities or properties of a thing, or in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971), "the inherent and inseparable combination of properties essentially pertaining to anything and giving it its fundamental character" (p. 1900), I propose that the nine properties described above are the most basic characteristics of leadership and therefore identify its nature. In the same manner, I identified the properties of culture as the nature of culture in Chapter Two. The fact that both leadership and culture share similar properties is revealing and points to a single direction in my effort to define the nature of leadership.

Leadership & Culture Compared

By comparing these properties of leadership with the properties of culture that were identified in Chapter Two, a clearer picture of the notion posed by this study that culture and leadership are running on parallel tracks and have an isomorphic congruence emerges.

Culture	Leadership
Bio-Basic	Bio-Basic, meets human needs
Adaptive & evolutionary change	Dynamic, adaptive, evolutionary change
Group development	Collective relationships
Structural web of shared meaning	Structural web of shared meaning
Political	Political
Resourceful/utilitarian	Resourceful
Semiotic & symbolic	Semiotic & symbolic
Ethical	Ethical
Generative	Generative

A Definition

This striking comparison between culture and leadership leads to one conclusion: Leadership is a cultural expression or manifestation. The process of leadership is inseparable from the process of culture, though, of course, they are two distinct conceptual categories. Accordingly, a multidisciplinary approach defines leadership as a dynamic, adaptive and ethical process through which leaders and followers form collective relationships that create socially meaningful structures by utilizing social, political, linguistic, symbolic and learning resources to meet human needs. Insofar as this definition includes all the critical properties of culture as well as the critical properties of leadership, I propose that leadership is the process by which culture is created and reformulated. Leadership creates

culture, but because cultures must change in order to survive, leadership is also the mechanism by which cultures are reformulated. What I am suggesting is not only that leadership and culture are inseparable, but that leadership cannot be defined apart from both the beginnings of culture and the survival of culture.

It is important to understand that while the natures of culture and leadership are similar, the form each takes in identifiable contexts will be dissimilar. That is to say, what results from culture's adaptive, ethical, or generative properties will not be comparable to what results from the same properties in leadership. Both culture and leadership are processes, they are not content. The processes of both take different forms from society to society and produce diverse content. The essential nature of culture and the essential nature of leadership, however, are to be understood as process, not form and not content. Because the processes of culture and leadership are linked by similar properties, they have an isomorphic congruence not because they share similar forms but because they share similar properties. It is no coincidence that this isomorphic congruence occurs; leadership is defined only in terms of its relationship to culture.

Universality versus Relativity

This comparison further identifies the universal nature of culture and leadership across time and place. Leadership scholars have not been able to identify the universal nature of leadership because they were too preoccupied in looking for

universal forms. To draw upon the prism metaphor, leadership scholars were preoccupied with reductionism, analyzing one color rather than viewing the full specturm. Consequently, they ignored a holistic approach. This is precisely the problem leadership theories have had in coming up with a definition of leadership that has universal application. Theorists have been trying to identify leadership by its forms rather than by its nature. Anthropologists have had the same problem in defining culture. They have been looking at forms of culture rather than its nature. As a result many anthropologists see culture as incommensurable. Thus, process identifies universality; form relies on reductionism and therefore identifies diversity and relativity.

The Forms of Leadership

This failure to distinguish between the processual nature of leadership and the forms that leadership may take is apparent in most of the theories of leadership that have been discussed. The early great man, traits, and charismatic leadership theories attempted to identify biological or behavioral traits as the basis of leadership. What they were identifying was form, not nature. Undoubtedly, certain leaders do exhibit extraordinary behavior and charisma and, in some cultures, leaders have been great men and great women, but obviously the theory doesn't hold water because the same traits, charisma, and behavior could be present in other people who do not become leaders. Moreover, leaders cross-culturally exhibit diverse traits and behavior. The theories simply identified a form that leadership may take,

but they did not identify the basis of leadership.

To further illustrate this problem, the psychological theories of leadership tried to identify leadership as an Oedipal relationship, as the result of certain developmental patterns, as a product of child rearing and environmental impact, or as a response to unmet needs, and so forth. They have identified the forms that leadership _may_ take, but not all individuals respond in like manner to these patterns, and therefore leadership behavior and motivation are too diverse to identify a universal pattern. Again, the sociologists tied leadership to group dynamics or the influence of social institutions, both of which may or may not be forms of leadership. Political theorists of leadership argued that leadership was exercised by powerful people. Consequently, their focus was on political leaders. Again, the form, not the nature, was identified. Organizational theorists said good management and an excellent product are leadership, but good management and an excellent product frequently have nothing to do with leadership.

Leadership's Cultural Base

It is because of this confusion between nature and form that a cultural understanding of the nature of leadership is so useful. It is imperative that understanding leadership means identifying the inextricable bond between culture and leadership. Leadership is primarily a cultural process and a cultural expression. Our understanding of leadership cannot be isolated from our understanding of culture if we expect to identify leadership. When theorists define leadership apart

from culture, they are merely grasping for the tangible, material form that may or may not have anything to do with leadership. They have failed to define the critical properties of leadership and therefore lack any criteria for judging the presence of leadership. Understanding the critical linkage between leadership and culture gives theorists the properties and the criteria that have been absent in previous theories of leadership. Understanding the dynamic relationship between culture and leadership will allow theorists to evaluate the presence of leadership in any culture, and it will give to practitioners the knowledge base upon which leadership can be practiced.

It is equally critical to recognize that if we cannot define culture, then we cannot define leadership. Leadership cannot be articulated or conceptualized in isolation from culture. Culture and leadership are two processes headed in the same direction on parallel tracks. Remove one of the tracks and the other is useless. Take away culture, there is no leadership; take away leadership, there is no culture.

The form that leadership takes in any given culture will vary from culture to culture, but if the form is truly leadership, it must contain all of the properties of the nature of leadership. If one or more of these properties is absent, that form is not leadership. This is why it is important to identify the nature of leadership by isolating its critical properties, for only then can we truly know if all the forms that the theorists label as leadership really are what they claim they are. We may call an orangatan a gorilla because their primate forms have something in common,

but that doesn't make it a gorilla. We will later discover in the ethnography of an Amazonian tribe by Kracke (1978) that within the same culture there are two chiefs, both of whom represent opposing styles of leadership. If our disciplinary theorists of leadership were to evaluate these two chiefs, they would be compelled by their theories to select one chief over the other as an example of leadership. What we will discover is that both are truly leaders, but in different forms. This distinction between the form of leadership and the nature of leadership will be made more apparent as the discussion on each of the properties of leadership unfolds.

Summary

The definition of leadership that has emerged includes nine essential properties that universally identify the multidisciplinary nature of leadership in any culture. The properties of leadership are coterminous with the properties of culture identified in Chapter Two. Since the properties of culture and of leadership are similar processes, I proposed that leadership is essentially a cultural phenomenon, and furthermore, it cannot be isolated from its cultural context. While the form that leadership may take will vary cross-culturally, the nature of leadership is universal. The remaining task of this chapter is to define more rigorously the nine properties of leadership and identify the relationship between culture and leadership. It is important to bear in mind that the underlying assumption is that each property must be present if the

process or relationship is to be called leadership. Once
these properties are understood by scholars and
practitioners, they will be able to use these nine critical
components to distinguish leadership from other
relationships and to identify the specific cultural form
that leadership is taking.

Leadership   as   Bio-Basic

Leadership as bio-basic has two dimensions. First it
identifies the crucible of leadership, i.e., its formative
beginnings. Secondly, it identifies the primary mechanism
by which cultures satisfy ongoing human needs as individuals
and cultures mature and change. In general, leadership
scholars and anthropologists recognize in both culture and
leadership the two mechanisms by which human needs are
addressed. The bio-basic property means that leadership is
grounded in human need. While human needs can be identified
from the perspective of many disciplines, the purpose in
this discussion is to focus on those needs that are
attributed to the biological basics of human nature. Other
needs will be discussed under the ensuing properties of
leadership. This discussion will focus on the beginnings of
leadership in the wellspring of basic human needs (Burns,
1978).

An Ontogenetic Function

Leadership emerges out of human nature as a mechanism for the satisfaction and fulfillment of basic human needs and drives. In this sense, leadership has an ontogenetic function. From a comparative biological perspective, leadership is a social process born out of a functional requirement of human life to respond to the psycho-biological needs of what the biologists and physical anthropologists term a generalized, fetalized, and highly plastic primate (Bolk, 1929; La Barre, 1954; Montagu, 1951; Spiro, 1987).

Leadership and culture are the two most important mechanisms that provide the means of need satisfaction for the human animal who is not born with instinctive means for drive reduction and whose plastic and imaginative mind must be shaped according to cultural norms. Apart from the organic needs of food and protection, human life "demands that forms of social interaction, methods of social cooperation, techniques of conflict resolution, and the like be learned . . . .A typically human existence depends on the existence of socially shared behavior patterns which satisfy (1) biological needs, (2) those group needs that are an invariant concomitant of social life and (3) those emotional needs that develop in the interaction between biology and society" (Spiro, 1987, p. 112). Culture and leadership are what Malinowski (1944) called the instrumental apparatus of social systems, promoting physical survival, social structure, and social solidarity.

A Universal Human Nature

The culture versus nature debate isn't over, and in fact, with the emergence of new claims by sociobiologists, it may have just begun. Recent theorists in sociobiology and physical anthropology are joining forces with biologists to claim that there is something called a universal human nature that can identify constants in the genetic coding of the species we call human. Wilson, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, On Human Nature (1978), proclaimed, "The question of interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent" (p. 19). He went on to discuss the innate censors and motivators in the brain that predispose humans towards selected behavior patterns. He disagreed with the geneticist Dobzhansky (1963) who wrote, "In a sense, human genes have surrendered their primacy in human evolution to an entirely new, nonbiological or superorganic agent, culture" (p. 146). Wilson devoted most of his book to the argument that there are essentially four elemental categories of behavior that have their origins in our genes: aggression, sex, altruism, and religion.

According to Wilson, aggression includes the categories of territoriality, dominance, sexual aggression, hostility, predatory behavior, aggression against prey, and moralistic and disciplinary aggression used to enforce the rules of society. Spiro (1987) added competition and rivalry to this list.

Sex, Wilson argued, does not have the primary functions of reproduction and pleasure, but its primary purpose is to

create diversity among the species. Diversity, in turn, can be understood as adaptability, and diversity and adaptability preserve the family, which Wilson called one of the universals of human social organization. The innate sexual purpose of diversity also accounts for a universal taboo against incest which impedes diversity. Wilson even made a case for the normalcy of homosexuality and the innate potential for bisexuality within the brain.

Altruism, normally understood as self-destructive behavior for the benefit of others, is divided by Wilson into hard-core and soft-core altruism. Hard-core altruism insures the survival of the in group, but if there were only hard-core altruism, "history might be one great hymenopterous intrigue of nepotism and racism" (p. 171); therefore, human nature has a sufficient amount of soft-core altruism which Wilson called ultimately selfish in the sense that the altruist expects reciprocation from society for him or herself. "Reciprocation among distantly related or unrelated individuals is the key to human society . . . . Through the convention of reciprocation, combined with a flexible, endlessly productive language and a genius for verbal classification, human beings fashion long-remembered agreements upon which cultures and civilization can be built" (p. 163).

On religion, Wilson wrote: "The predisposition to religious belief is the most complex and powerful force in the human mind and in all probability an ineradicable part of human nature" (p. 176). People would rather believe than know, argued Wilson, and he drew upon Nietzche to suggest

that they would rather have the void as purpose than be void of purpose. The social purposes of religion include subordinating self-interest to the interests of the group, enhancing survival and procreation, regularizing relationships and establishing categories for right and wrong behavior. Religion sanctifies what would otherwise be arbitrary regulatory mechanisms, and it classifies individuals and gives them purpose, a process theologians call the sacralization of identity. Wilson's ideas have their source in much of Durkheim's (1915) study on the elementary forms of the religious life in which he characterized religious practice as the consecration of the group and the core of society.

The wellsprings of culture and leadership are to be found in the universals of human nature, what Spiro (1987) called the psychic unity of humankind. Both culture and leadership are borne out of basic human needs to provide mechanisms by which those needs can be fulfilled and controlled. In his final chapter entitled "Hope," Wilson (1978) concluded:

> The elements of human nature are the learning rules, emotional reinforcers, and hormonal feedback loops that guide the development of social behavior into certain channels as opposed to others. Human nature is not just the array of outcomes attained in existing societies. It is also the potential array that might be acheived through conscious design by future societies. By looking over the realized social systems of hundreds of animal species and deriving the principles by which

these systems have evolved, we can be certain that all human choices represent only a tiny subset of those theoretically possible. (p. 203)

Emerging Needs

Wilson's notion of the potential array of behavior patterns that can be achieved through "conscious design by future societies" identifies the second meaning of leadership as bio-basic, viz., to provide for existing cultures an ongoing mechanism by which developing and emergent human needs can be addressed. Human needs may be present in identifiable forms at birth, but humanity evolves and much of human need emerges as individuals age and as cultures mature. Burns (1978) concluded his monumental study on leadership with great conviction: "The ultimate test of practical leadership is the realization of intended, real change that meets people's enduring needs" (p. 461, emphasis in original). In addition to responding to the innate needs of human beings, culture and leadership also are the instrumental apparatus for dealing with the emerging needs of people.

Eugenics

Since human nature is not only ascribed to the genes we inherit, but is a mixture of both genes and the individual's interactions with and adaptations to the cultural environment, then it is an underlying assumption of the processes of culture and leadership that changes in values also define changes in needs. It is signficant that Wilson

(1978) identifies one of the developing primary values of humanity as universal human rights, an issue I traced back to Rousseau, Kant, and Locke. He argued that human rights are the product of both genetic and cultural evolutions. These evolutions based on genes and culture are studied in a science called eugenics. Wilson argued that human rights are not only socially and philosophically appealing, they are also genetically appealing since the long term consequences of inequality are visibly threatening to kinship and species preservation. Wilson hopes that the search for values can be the result of an alliance of biological need and cultural need. He concluded, "In time, much knowledge concerning the genetic foundation of social behavior will accumulate, and techniques may become available for altering gene complexes by molecular engineering and rapid selection through cloning. At the very least, slow evolutionary change will be feasible through conventional eugenics. The human species can change its own nature. What will it choose?" (p. 216). Ten years later, we are much closer to that day. We can create clones. Scientific development is on the cutting edge of reshaping human values and needs through alterations in our genetic codes. Leadership has a critical role to play in the decision making process that influences individual change, the decisions made in the reshaping of values, and cultural evolution.

Summary

A cultural theory of leadership thus includes the

primary property of bio-basic as one of the spectrums we see through the cultural prism. This bio-basic property identifies leadership as the critical process to meet human needs, both those innate needs characteristic of all human beings and those emerging physical, emotional, and psychological needs which both individuals and cultures develop as they mature. Leadership is a culture's mechanism to meet the basic and developing needs of human beings and of cultures.

Leadership as Dynamic, Adaptive, & Evolutionary Change

Leadership is identified by three types of change: (a) dynamic change, (b) adaptive change, and (c) evolutionary change. Leadership does not maintain the status quo, that is management's job. An underlying assumption of leadership is that reality is neither static nor in a state of harmonious equilibrium, but rather it is fluid and processual, much in accord with Heisenberg's (1930) theory of uncertainty, Kuhn's (1962) science as revolution, Prigogine's & Stenger's (1984) theory of dissipative structures, and Gleick's (1987) theory of chaos, all of which see reality as a dynamic process of becoming, movement and flux.

Dynamic Change

The word _dynamic_ is important insofar as it not only suggests continuous and productive activity, but it also identifies a pattern of forceful change and growth. Leadership as dynamic change identifies change that is highly directed and influenced by human behavior. Social systems and the process of culture itself are a dynamic reality that is inherently in a state of change. Bhaskar (1975) wrote, "It is not necessary that society should continue. But if it is to do so, then men must reproduce (or more or less transform) the structures (languages, forms of economic and political organization, systems of belief, cultural and ethical norms, etc.) that are given to them" (p. 196). But more imporant it is the very nature of culture to change., Bearing in mind, then, that culture and leadership are running on parallel tracks, it is the nature of leadership to facilitate change and by actively and intentionally engaging in the processes of choice and decision making, leaders and followers are enacting dynamic change. Foster (1986) summed this up well: "This is the essence of leadership: The desire and attempt to change the human condition" (p. 187).

Transformational Change

As a corollary to this notion of dynamic change, Burns (1978) defined leadership as transactional and transformational, and his test of leadership was real, intended change. "The leadership process," he wrote, "must be defined, in short, as carrying through from

decision-making stages to the point of concrete changes in people's lives, attitudes, behaviors, institutions" (p. 414). As a political scientist and historian, Burns relied on human history to demonstrate that leadership, as he understood it, has brought about periods of great progress and development. Ghandi and Martin Luther King essentially transformed human consciousness, according to Burns, and as a result of that, a transformation of social conditions occurred. Other leadership scholars have drawn upon social movements over time, including the more recent black movement, women's movement, and the human rights movement, to identify the contexts of leadership in society. Taylor's (1988) recent study of the civil rights movement offers a striking example of how leadership has reshaped human consciousness.

Social movements are only one example of forces that create cultural change. There are also ecological changes in the environment, new neighbors, cataclysmic upheavals caused by natural or human-induced disasters such as violent storms or war, value changes, economic and political shifts and revolutions, and evolving social changes, such as single-parent families, all of which demand an adaptive capacity to a shifting, fluid reality. There are also the long-term changes created through an evolutionary process manifest in cultures and inherent in the very nature of the human species. Few scholars contest the presence of biological evolution though it lends itself to diverse interpretations. Such organic change in our psycho-biological structures have impact upon our cultural

and social structures as well. While the parallel between organic and social evolution is not always appropriate, it is useful in identifying the long term and continuous process of change in all social systems.

Intended, Real Change

For Burns (1978), however, change was to be "intended, real change." Rost (1989) is helpful in describing the strengths and weaknesses of this notion of change. The word _intended_ means that changes are purposeful but Burns puts it in the past tense rather than the present tense, which Rost considered more appropriate. By placing it in the past tense, Burns seemed to be offering it as a test for analysts and scholars who want to look back on a series of events and decide whether leadership took place. By making it the present tense, argued Rost, leaders and followers can recognize leadership as it is happening, and thereby distinguish it from other relationships in the here and now. The word _real_ points to changes that are substantive and transforming, changes that affect lives, attitudes, behaviors, and basic assumptions in individuals, groups, organizations, societies and civilizations. Again, I think the notion of intended, real change is a fitting description of the meaning of dynamic change.

Leadership, Goals, & Products

Rost (1989) also identified what I believe is a critical problem with Burns's (1978) theory of leadership as it relates to the notion of change. Burns' view is very

product oriented, thus articulating the management, or industrial, model of leadership. Rost pointed out a number of quotes which define Burns' notion of leadership in terms of a change that has been achieved, or a product. This has resulted in a host of theorists promoting the notion that leadership delivers excellence--excellent organizations, excellent products, and excellent CEOs--which is the same idea that equates leadership with management. Rost argued, moreover, that leadership intends real change, but products, success, results, or excellence are not essential elements of leadership. "Leaders and followers can fail to achieve real change and still be in a relationship called leadership" (p. 34). While leaders and followers can intend that their leadership results in real change that is visible in successful products, it is a mistake to understand the process of leadership as a product.

Both Burns and Rost argued that the criteria for change must reflect the mutual purposes of leaders and followers. While Burns did not make a distinction between purposes and goals, Rost clearly does, believing that the word goals is too industrial and reflects the quantitative, segmental, and objective standards of organizational theories of leadership. Purposes, on the other hand, are "broader, more holistic or integrated, more oriented to what people ordinarily think of as a mission. Purposes are most often stated in qualitative terms" (Rost, 1989, p. 38). The cultural definition of leadership I have developed subscribes to this important distinction.

Adaptive & Evolutionary Change

While the notion of dynamic change has been identified by both Burns and Rost, they have left out a critical element in understanding leadership as change. Neither has defined leadership as adaptive and evolutionary, two processes that go to the very heart of the meaning of change and that, moreover, go to the very heart of understanding the relationship between culture and leadership. In Chapter Two, adaptation was defined as the process of modification to suit new conditions. Evolution was defined as a systemic and continuous change over time. Bearing in mind the definition of culture as adaptive and evolutionary, it is critically important to understand that leadership is not only processually involved in change in order to create a better or more purposeful society, it is also involved in adaptive and evolutionary change in order that cultures may survive. Drawing upon the idea of biological adaptation and evolution, the central meaning is that change improves an organism's fitness to survive and reproduce. When applied to the human organism, adaptation and evolution result in a genetic change in a population of organisms from generation to generation. To borrow from this biological construct, the idea that leadership is adaptive and evolutionary addresses the genetic fitness, if you will, of culture itself. Leadership becomes culture's mechanism to insure survival of the fittest. To identify leadership as adaptive and evolution change is not to suggest, however, that cultures have some type of innate biological mechanism, such as the human organism has, that determines or directs

adaptive and evolutionary change. The biological analogy is only useful insofar as identifying a type of change that cultures must experience in order to survive. If cultures do not adapt and change, they atrophy and die. Cultures need a mechanism to insure survival. Leadership is that mechanism.

Leadership is the directing process that challenges cultures to modify to suit new conditions and to maintain a systematic level of change over time. Adaptive and evolutionary change in cultures is not biologically determined, as may be the case with human beings, and therefore such change must be externally instituted. Leadership is that instrumental apparatus which functions for cultures in much the same manner as the genetic pattern of change functions for the human organism. Leadership is not only responsible for the creation of culture, but is also responsible for its continuous reformulation. Social adaptive and evolutionary change is illustrated by studies referenced earlier, including Barth's (1971) generative model, Kilby's (1971), McClelland's (1971), and Schumpter's (1978) studies on entrepreneurship, and Eidheim's (1968, 1971) studies on the Lappish minority's movement toward political power through adaptive entrepreneurship (see also Atkinson and Hoselitz, 1963).

Summary

Change, then, as it relates to leadership, is defined as dynamic, adaptive and evolutionary. As a dynamic change agent, leadership is purposeful and transformational,

seeking intended, real change. As adaptive and evolutionary change, leadership is the mechanism by which cultures adapt to suit new conditions in a systematic and continuous way. Leadership change occurs at a mutually purposeful level in which the change is judged by an ethical framework of intent, motivation, or mutual purposes of those involved in the leaders-followers relationship, or change many occur at a more basic level in which the change is valued by how well it has contributed toward the survival of the culture. Leadership has an instrumental capacity to facilitate adaptative and evolutionary change in order for cultures to survive, adapt, and mature. While adaptive and evolutionary change is biologically directed for the human organism, the same change process must be externally instituted for cultures. Leadership is the instrumental apparatus by which cultures adapt and evolve in a comparable way that human organisms adapt and evolve through innate instrumental genetic mechanisms. The nature of reality as dynamic, processual, and fluid requires a mechanism that can direct and manage change for the benefit of cultures. That mechanism for cultures is leadership.

Leadership as Resourceful

In the discussion on culture as resourceful in Chapter Two, it was pointed out that anthropologists are quick to

identify the use of tools as critical in early human adaptation. Adaptation throughout human evolution has depended upon the utilitarian skills of human beings or resourcefulness. Resourcefulness was described in Chapter Two as the ability to utilize any resources to adapt to change. Frequently, resoucefulness and utilitarianism are referenced to only the material aspects or economic structure of a social system. While resources are often material, such an understanding of resources is too narrow. Swartz & Jordan (1980) have identified resources to include anything--ideas, beliefs, technology, language, symbols, politics, relationships, material objects, forces, personal qualities, laws of nature, and other things. A cultural theory of leadership subscribes to this broader understanding of resources.

The Resources of Culture

Burns' (1978) notion of leadership included "mobilizing various economic, political, and other resources" (425). I can only wish he would have articulated more clearly these other resources, for leadership as a cultural process is inherently dependent upon all the resources of culture. In addition to economic and political resources, there are also the equally important cultural resources of language and symbols, ideas, values and beliefs, rituals, ethical constructs and meaning systems, learning or educational systems, social institutions, kinship systems and collective behavior, psychology, cognitive patterns in the construction of reality or, more concisely put, all the properties of

culture.

Hidden Resources

It is important to articulate the resourceful property
of leadership because of the general assumptions embedded in
theories of leadership that resources are exclusively
economic and political in nature. A cultural approach to
leadership recognizes the value of all resources in the
process of leadership. In a recent conversation with
anthropologist Marc Swartz, professor in the department of
anthropology at the University of California at San Diego,
he reminded me that many resources of culture are hidden
from our consciousness. There are a host of individual and
collective resources that people utilize but they may not be
aware of them. Many resources are utilized by leaders and
followers at a subconscious level within personality
structures or are buried beneath the surface structures of
culture.

Bailey (1977) illustrated some of these hidden resources
in his discussion of the masks that leaders and followers
wear, such as the masks of Reason which believes there is a
logical answer to all problems, or the mask of Sermon which
guard our eternal verities. Bailey believed that masks are
frequently worn unconsiously, identifying the hiddenness of
a resource. Berger & Luckmann (1967) illustrated the hidden
resources that bear upon our cognitive construction of
reality, indicating once again that these were unconscious
and therefore hidden mental processes. Hidden resources
have also been articulated as personalized symbols by

Dubinskas (1983), Gow (1982), Muller (1976), and Tuzin (1978).

Social Structure & Resourcefulness

Levi-Strauss's (1967) study of the Namibikuara tribes of South America, reviewed in Chapter Two, serves as an excellent example of the relationship between leadership and resourcefulness. His study revealed that the social structure and the survival of the Namibikuara people were totally dependent upon the resourcefulness of its leaders. If the leaders could not find food, shelter, and did not tell their followers what was expected of them, their existence would be jeopardized.

Frequently, resources and power are interrelated. Eidheim's (1968, 1971) study of the Lappish people in Norway and their use of entrepreneurship to secure political power is another example that serves well in instantiating the relationship between leadership and resourcefulness. Bailey's (1969) notion of leadership also includes the idea of resources: "Leadership is an enterprise. To be successful as a leader is to gain access to more resources than one's opponents and to use them with greater skill" (p. 36). Bailey also believed that a leader must constantly expand resources in order "to keep the lamp shining bright and into the eyes of the followers" (p. 37).

Gardner (1986c) shared the story that Lyndon Johnson once told him. "When the press talks about my success as Senate Majority Leader they always emphasize my capacity to persuade, to wheel and deal. Hardly anyone ever mentions

that I usually had more and better information than my colleagues" (p. 12). Gardner went on to suggest that the most important resources for today's leaders are knowledge of complex organizational machinery and knowing how to work the system.

Kracke's (1978) study of the Kagwahiv Indians illustrates various resources needed by two very different leader-followers relationships, one of which was ecological. Since Kagwahiv life depended heavily upon gardenening and fishing, the selection of a settlement location was critical and one of the factors that influenced the selection of leaders by followers. More abundant food resources among the Kagwahiv gave one leader a significant edge over others. He illustrated how symbols played a promiment role as a resource. The studies on symbolism illustrate the use of symbols as resources. The use of ritual and the sacred resources in the monographs by Bohannan (1958), Firth (1979), and Shack (1979) are also important to recall.

Interaction & Choice

In the discussion of culture as resourceful in Chapter Two, I recounted that Cohen (1974) and Firth (1951, 1967) applied economic theory to culture and suggested that economic processes essentially involve interactions between people and the relatively scarce resources available to them. Moreover, economics deals with the implications of human choice in the selection of scarce resources. The application of economic theory to an understanding of the nature of culture has an equally direct bearing upon the

understanding of leadership. The economic side of leadership implies interaction and choice. The notion of choice figures prominently in Leach's (1964) case study and is important not only in an economic sense, but also in the larger sense of followers choosing one leader over another. Such a choice is frequently made because the selected leader has access to more resources. Any discussion of leadership and resources must therefore include the processes of interaction and choice.

Technology

The resourcefulness of leaders and followers will invariably depend upon access to technology. Leadership involves not only the knowledge and use of technology as a resource, but also the control of technological systems. An underlying assumption here is that major changes in cultures occur because of the impact of technological factors. Leaders and followers therefore can use technology in the process of change which may, in the end, determine how technology will change social systems.

Summary

The key point outlined above is that the resourceful property of leadership is linked to all the properties of culture which become resources in the process of leadership. The second key point is that adaptation and change are dependent upon the resourcefulness of leaders and followers. Their resourcefulness is directly proportional to the adaptation process and the survival of culture. Leaders and

followers must not only utilize resources skillfully, but they must also be equipped to compete for resources that are often scarce. Critical components in understanding the resourceful nature of leadership include interaction, choice, & technology. Most resources are utilized by leaders and followers in a conscious effort to implement change, but frequently resources are hidden in cultures and are used subconsciously. To limit resources to the material aspects or econcomic structure of a society is too narrow an understanding of resources. A broader approach to resources is necessary for interpreting a cultural understanding of leadership.

Leadership as Political

Leadership as political focuses on relationships of power. Most leadership scholars who view leadership within the political frame mix politics with resources, arguing that leadership is the utilization of power resources in the process of change and adaptation. I believe that leadership as political needs to be treated separately from leadership as resourceful even though the two properties will overlap because some resources are political in nature. Moreover, leadership as political needs the distinction of a separate category because it also linked to the collective nature of leadership. Burns (1978) identified the collective nature of politics when he wrote, "We must see power--and

leadership--as not things, as <u>relationships</u>" (p. 11,
emphasis in original). The discussion that follows will
identify leadership as political by focusing in its four key
components: power, motives, influence, and legitimacy.

Power

Leadership is a power relationship and according to
Burns, the two essentials of power are motive and resource.
Rost (1989) also identified resources with power and
accordingly listed the following power resources:
"reputation, prestige, personality, purpose, status, content
of the message, interpersonal and group skills, give and
take behaviors, authority or lack of it, symbolic
interaction, perception, motivation, gender, race, religion,
and choices, among countless other things" (p. 17). Gardner
(1986c) identifed power as the "capacity to ensure the
outcomes one wishes and to prevent those one does not wish"
(p 3). He listed the sources of power as physical strength,
custom, organizations and institutions, beliefs, public
opinion, and knowing how to work the system. While these
listings do identify power resources, I suggested earlier
that limiting the notion of resource to power or politics is
unacceptable because such an understanding of resources is
too limited. There are many other resources besides power
resources that are used in the process of leadership.

Power is linked to the leaders-followers relationship
insofar as certain individuals are able to exercise more
control over others through the application of resources,
bearing in mind the meaning of resources extends beyond

political resources. Power within the political dimensions of leadership is displayed by access to and utilization of resources. Leaders and followers are more powerful when they have access to and utilize more resources than their competitors or opponents. With greater resources at the disposal of leaders and followers, there is the greater possibility for discharging the purposes and intended change of the group. The dimension of power operates in the same manner among leaders and followers insofar as those individuals who have greater access to more resources will become the leaders. It is their access to resources rather than their position of authority that is the primary determinant in the emergence of leaders who do leadership. While many individuals in positions of authority do indeed emerge as leaders and do leadership, it is not because of their position that they became leaders, but because their position enabled access to and use of greater resources. Thus power is defined as access to and utilization of resources.

Motives

The notion of motive has to do with intent and purpose. What are the intentions and purposes of those who hold power and those with whom power is shared? The assumptions here must be clarified. All power holders are obviously not leaders, and all those with whom power is shared are not followers. Power wielders have only their own interests at heart. Burns (1978) therefore suggested that leadership is a power relationship when either the motives of followers

are satisfied, or when "goals that represent the values and the motivations--the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations--<u>of</u> <u>both</u> <u>leaders</u> <u>and</u> <u>followers</u>" (p. 19, emphasis in original) are met. And again, "<u>power</u> <u>and</u> <u>leadership</u> <u>are</u> <u>measured</u> <u>by</u> <u>the</u> <u>degree</u> <u>of</u> <u>production</u> <u>of</u> <u>intended</u> <u>effects</u>" (p. 22, emphasis in original). Toward the end of his book, Burns identified leadership as political by "the extent of the realization of, purposeful, substantive change in the conditions of people's lives. <u>The</u> <u>ultimate</u> <u>test</u> <u>of</u> <u>practical</u> <u>leadership</u> <u>is</u> <u>the</u> <u>realization</u> <u>of</u> <u>intended,</u> <u>real</u> <u>change</u> <u>that</u> <u>meets</u> <u>people's</u> <u>enduring</u> <u>needs</u>" (p. 461, emphasis in original).

Dictatorial relationships were defined by Burns as power wielding and contrary to the leadership process because they were designed to control people and keep them subservient. Power wielding had the interests of the power wielders at heart and not the needs of the people. Coercion is antithetical to leadership. Power wielders did not allow for the open competition among leaders for the people's support, and Burns identified competition as a crucial ingredient in the leadership process. Thus, motives are a critical ingredient in leadership as political insofar as motives separate power wielders from leaders.

Influence

The problem of understanding leadership in terms of a product was addressed earlier. Burns (1978) clearly tied power with effectiveness and achievement of goals. Rost (1989) has differed with Burns's understanding of power and

leadership on another point. Rost has defined leadership as an influence relationship and relied on Bell's (1975) definition of influence as the process of using persuasion in order to have an impact on the other people in a relationship. People wanting to have influence use power resources. Leadership as an influence relationship also rejects the use of coercive techniques. Most important to Rost's notion of influence in leadership is that the leadership relationship is multidirectional.

> The relationship involves interactons that are vertical, horizontal, diagonal and circular in direction. This concept means that (1) anyone can be a leader or a follower, (2) followers persuade leaders and other followers as do leaders, (3) leaders and followers may change places in the relationship, and (4) there are many different relationships (one-on-one and small group) that make up the overall relationship which is leadership. (pp. 17-18)

Burns (1978) rejected the notion of influence in his approach to power and leadership: "I dispense with the concept of influence as unnecessary and unparsimonious" (p. 19). Burns relied on McFarland's (1969) distinction between power and influence: "If the leader causes changes that he intended, he has exercised power; if the leader causes changes that he did not intend or want, he has exercised influence, but not power." (p. 174).

Rost's preference for influence as an essential element in defining leadership is consistent with his rejection of identifying leadership through products or effectiveness,

and it is useful in both articulating the nature of the relationship among leaders and followers and in identifying the unacceptable nature of coercive power.

Rost (1989) is among the first to clarify the nature of the power relationship with his understanding of influence. He distinguishes between influence and power, however, by suggesting that influence must be noncoercive if it is connected to leadership. Power is related to the control of some people by others and is frequently exercised in a coercive manner. Rost points out that when power is exercised with coercion, the relationship is defined as power wielding and not leadership.

Influence in the act of leadership allows for freedom of choice by the person being acted upon. Rost points out that the notion of freedom to choose is essential to influence relationships. Coercive relationships disallow this freedom and a follower is never forced to follow a leader in a cultural approach to leadership. Followers must always have the freedom to choose other leaders and leaders must have the same freedom if the relationship is to be identified as leadership.

Legitimacy

A cultural approach to leadership goes yet a step further in defining the nature of leadership as political. A cultural approach utilizes the notion of legitimacy as an additional criteria in identifying the relationship that is leadership. The concept of legitimacy is useful inasmuch as it links the political components of a culture with the

nonpolitical components in establishing support and trust among leaders and followers. At one level, legitimacy is conferred by the position of authority that a leader may hold. At another level, legitimacy is a process that gives credibility to the relationship among leaders and followers insofar as a bond is created that is based on the expectation that articulated needs will be addressed because there is a support system among leaders and followers that is built from the culture they share. This support system is derived from the values, beliefs, and meaning systems held by individuals in a given culture and normally, though not always, transferred to the governance system of that culture. When, for example, a relationship between leaders and followers is embedded in political needs as well as shared values, beliefs, and meanings, the legitmacy of the roles of leaders and followers as well as their motives and purposes is very strong.

Easton's (1957) notion of legitimacy as simply the rules of the game is more in keeping with the notion of legitimacy as conferred by the position of authority a leader may hold, but it poses problems insofar as rules and positions of authority can be based upon force or coercion. Legitimate power in a cultural approach is consensual power, i.e., there is an interaction among leaders and followers in which support for decisions concerning their collective needs is secured and commitments are made to each other to proceed in a common direction. A cultural approach to legitimacy rests upon what the culture requires in the way of criteria for determining which leaders are legitimate and which are not

and this criteria will vary from culture to culture, since the values, beliefs, and meaning vary among cultures. I would point to studies by Epstein (1968) Powell (1967), Sahlins (1963) and Swartz (1968a) as illustrative of the different criteria for determining legitimacy among cultures. Legitimacy is linked with the values, social structures, and cognitive or collective consciousness of a culture.

Legitimacy as a form of consensual power based on cultural norms can be understood as a moral component in the relationship among leaders and followers. The moral nature of the relationship is present in the mutual definition of needs, the shared commitment to respond to the needs, and the pledge of support to the collective direction or strategy.

The critical factor in understanding legitimacy is to acknowledge its cultural context. Cultures give diverse forms and interpretations to what legitimacy means. Although the process or concept of legitimacy is similar from culture to culture, the forms by which it is identified will vary. Kracke's (1978) study of an Amazonian tribe illustrates that two separate forms of legitimacy can exist in the same culture.

Summary

Leadership as political identifies leadership as a relationship among leaders and followers identified by four key components, including power, motives, influence, and legitimacy. A critical distinction between leadership and

power wielding is the manner in which power is utilized.
Leaders and followers use power in order to access and
utilize resources; power wielders use power as coercion and
threat. Influence points to the mutuality among leaders and
followers insofar as leaders influence followers and
followers influence leaders. Motives also identify the
mutuality of purposes and direction among leaders and
followers. Finally the notion of legitimacy is linked to
leadership as political by identifying both political and
nonpolitical elements in a culture that create a form of
consensual power by which support is secured and commitments
are made to proceed in a common direction. Critical to this
discussion is the fact that the political nature of
leadership is embedded in culture and further underscores
the coterminous relationship between leadership and culture.

Leadership as a Collective Relationship

When Mazlish (1981) wrote "the leader does not exist,
fully formed, before the encounter with the group he is to
lead" (p. 218), he identified the major problem that
characterizes most theories of leadership on the market
today, viz., the failure to provide a substantive
understanding of leadership as a collective relationship.
The relatively exclusive focus on individuals called

leaders has been at the sacrifice of the collective nature of leadership. Because leadership theories have invested in the analysis of only half the leadership equation, the following analysis explores new ground. Following a brief review of selected psychodynamic theories of collective behavior, my purpose here is to identify the three key primary components that create the bonding among leaders and followers.

Leadership as a Relationship

Among the key points this study is making is that leadership is not a property inherent to individuals, but is a behavioral relationship among both leaders and followers. The distinction between leaders and followers draws from a differentiation in role and not from any notion that leadership is caused by individuals who are somehow an elite group invested with vision, power, and extraordinary skills. A cultural approach to leadership rejects any notion of leadership that is elitist in its definition of who cannot be leaders. The categories of leaders and followers are not reserved memberships. Rost (1989) has correctly pointed out that followers and leaders exchange places with one another, and that followers are not always followers in all relationships, but can be leaders in some relationships. He further argued that followers do not do followership, they do leadership. Foster's (in press) notion of leadership as a "community of believers" reinforces this idea that leadership exists in a community of people, not in solitary

individuals.

Theories of Collective Behavior

I believe it useful to review very briefly selected theories of collective behavior in order to illustrate that any notion of collective behavior cannot be divorced from the cultural context. Secondly, a review of such theories will assist in understanding the three components that bond together leaders and followers. The theories of collective behavior to be reviewed are informed by psychoanalytic and psychosocial thought and include studies in the Oedipus complex, the law of the father, authoritarianism, object relations theory, culture-and-personality, and psychology of the self. Although there is no consensus on a definition of collective behavior (Currie & Skolnick, 1970), the conventional definition of relatively organized patterns of social interaction among multiple individuals who may be either homogenous or heterogenous in their ethnic and cultural background is most widely accepted.

Freud (1913, 1921, 1930) explained collective behavior and social organization by suggesting that basic biological drives and needs becomes the determinants of social behavior as adults and of the structure of society itself. The ties to family in early life are later enacted in the larger social arena and in group behavior. Freud posited that an individual's relationship to the external world was primarily shaped by the overarching and immortal wish of the son to displace the father in order to possess the mother.

Such attempts at replacing the authority figure are reenacted in social organization. Society, in Freud's view, has evolved on the basis of repression, renunciation, and sublimation as a defense against the fulfillment of this father-replacement wish. Moreover, the encounter of the individual with the father figure is the key determinant in the individual's relationship to authority in the larger sphere of social life. Authority in society is shaped by this family structure. Thus, Freud postulated a notion of collective behavior that is the mandated social product of childhood identification with and internalization of parental behavior.

The issue of the father-son relationship and its impact on later social behavior generated a host of ideas on authoritarianism and the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al, 1950). The idea has been posed in two different and opposing scenarios. Adorno and Fromm (1941) suggested that the adult need for highly authoritarian social structures was the result of a rigid, punitive, and highly controlled family. This approach identified an individual as gravitating toward a group that could be characterized as very authoritarian with leaders who were little more than power wielders. Marcuse (1962) presented the opposite view by arguing that the same personality may also derive from a family wich does not exercise control or does so only minimally.

Another approach to collective behavior introduced by Freud (1921, 1922), but developed by others is object

relations theory. Hartmann (1939) is recognized as its principle formulator. According to object relations theory, the relationship of the individual to the love object becomes the primary determinant in ego formation and frequently the social group becomes the love object when the primary love object, the family, is lost. Hartmann postulated a formulation of the autonomous ego which functions as an adaptive mechanism to assist the individual in identifying with and internalizing external love objects to meet internal needs. Social reality and collective behavior are identified as projections of internal or unconscious needs and wishes or fantasies. Hartmann believed that individuals who wish to be identical to the social love object will modify personal behavior to conform to group behavior, thereby strengthening the bond between individual and the group. Culture itself may become the cathected object and thereby constitutues, in part, the personality. Weinstein & Platt (1973) extended the object relations theory by proposing that attachments to groups are ongoing processes that are heavily influenced by the cognitive, affective, moral, and symbolic dimensions of a culture, suggesting that individuals may move in and out of various collective relationships in order to respond and fulfill developing needs.

While Hartmann was developing his ego psychology, Kardiner (1937, 1939, 1945) proposed his own theory of the relationship between culture and personality. Along with Du Bois (1944) and Linton (1936, 1939), Kardiner developed the

notion of "basic personality structure" which became the central tenet of the culture-and-personality studies. Basic personality does not correspond to the total personality of an individual, but it identifies those values and attitudes which are enculturated into the personality by the culture. Culture, Kardiner argued, "can be seen molding, directing, and controlling biological and social needs, and at the same time determining the conditions under which they can be satisfied" (1939, p. 10). A society forms its secondary institutions, such as religion, myth, ritual and folklore, based on this basic personality structure. Consequently, collective behavior, expressed through these secondary institutions, is the result of biosocial needs which can no longer be met by the primary institution of the family. Kardiner called these secondary institutions "projective systems" because they provide compensatory gratifications for personality needs. In this sense, Kardiner's model illustrates the relationship between personality, collective behavior, and culture as highly reciprocal with the stability or instability of one affecting the equilibrium of the other.

Pyramiding on the object relations theory and the culture-and-personality studies, various psychosocial approaches to collective behavior further identified culture and its social institutions as having the upper hand in shaping personality and collective behavior. Parsons (1953) argued that collective behavior, whether in the family unit or in the larger social arena, is primarily shaped by the

needs of a culture's social and economic institutions. In the West, for example, he viewed the industrial economy as the primary functional determinant in shaping collective behavior. Collective behavior is therefore articulated according to the needs of economic institutions; hence he postulated a notion of economic determinism that shaped collective behavior.

Erikson (1963) took a different approach than Parsons by identifying the psychosocial stages as the determinants for collective behavior. He argued that historically grounded social patterns and institutions, such as those that influenced the lives of Luther and Ghandi, will impact collective behavior, thus giving history a role in shaping the values and attitudes that form the core of collective behavior patterns. Many of the psychobiographies (Albin, 1980; Glad, 1973; Greenstein, 1969; Mazlish, 1974; Platt, 1980) pointed to similar determinants in the formation of collective life.

A final approach to collective behavior has been suggested in some of the self-psychology theories. As expressed by Kohut (1977) and Mazlish (1981), these theories focus on the notion of a psychic repository, containing the multiple texts of a culture--its values, ideals, imagery, symbols, myths, literature--as the basis for collective behavior and the formation of what Kohut called the group self or the grandiose self. Individuals could expand their self by an alliance or cohesion with the group, thereby finding self identify in a group identify. Mazlish

specifically postulated a theory of group psychology for leadership, suggesting that the relationship between leaders and followers energizes the content of the psychic repository, thereby realizing ego ideals.

In summary, this review of selected psychodynamic approaches to collective behavior points to the conclusion that collective behavior cannot be articulated apart from its cultural framework. From Freud to more recent theories, there is consensus that any notion of collective behavior must be embedded in the cultural context. This leads to a second conclusion: No matter how one might define the nature of leadership as a collective relationship, such a definition cannot be divorced from the culture in which leaders and followers are enacting leadership.

Unfortunately, few leadership theorists have ventured to offer any notion of what bonds the relationship among leadership and followers. Therefore, in the remaining part of this section, I wish to identify the three critical components of leadership as a collective relationship. I propose that the three key components are emotional, moral, and transactional.

The Leaders-Followers Relationship as Emotional

While the approaches to collective behavior were presented primarily to reinforce my general premise that any theory of leadership must interpret collective behavior within a cultural context, they also serve a secondary purpose in this discussion. I propose that leadership is an

emotional relationship insofar as leaders and followers have an emotional bond that is one of the components that identifies the bonding among leaders and followers. The previous discussion on psychodynamic approaches to collective behavior points to this reality. While I do not propose to subscribe to any single psychological theory, I do believe that each of the theories presented identifies the reality of the psychic and emotional needs that are met by individuals becoming a part of the group process. I would further suggest that individuals approach the leadership process with a variety of motivations and needs that are quite diverse and beyond the scope of my interest, but that the process of leadership as a collective relationship can meet such motivation and need factors, whether they be with leaders or with followers.

Redl (1942) addressed this emotional factor in the leaders-followers relationship by suggesting that identification needs, drives, and ego support were fulfilled in the relationships between leaders and followers. Mazlish's (1981) theory of the psychic repository, referenced above, also identifies leadership as fulfilling emotional needs of leaders and followers. Lasswell (1930) proposed that the self-esteem needs of individuals are met in the leaders-followers relationship. Burns (1978) identified the need for affection and belongingness as manifested "in leadership in small groups, where the warmth of close, stable, and affective relations may compensate for the deprivation of affection in

childhood" (p. 67). Even Freud (1922) specifically identified the leader as the symbolic crystallization of the father-superego needs of followers.

In addition to fulfulling selected and diverse emotional needs of leaders and followers, leadership as a collective relationship also serves as a mediator between the psychic structure of personality and social institutions. I believe the notion that Hartmann (1939) and others in ego psychology have proposed about the ego as an adaptive mechanism to mediate between external reality and internal needs can be translated into one of the emotional functions of the process of leadership. Just as leadership serves in an adaptive capacity for cultures, so it serves a similar function for individuals in providing a mediating mechanism for individuals between emotional needs and social reality. Since leadership seeks real, intended change, it serves to respond to and fulfill the developing needs of individuals and of culture. Therefore, individuals participating as leaders or followers are engaged in the process of leadership because of changing and evolving needs and the need for a mechanism to mediate between changing needs and external structures. Thus, leaders and followers engage in a collective relationship in order to meet the emotional needs that they have in common and that they have individually. This emotional bonding, when linked with the process of leadership, serves to meet human needs and to change the social structures so that such structures better serve the developing needs of human beings.

The Leaders-Followers Relationship as Moral

While the emotional component of the leaders-followers relationship identifies that bonding that is internal insofar as it is related to personality needs and drives, the moral component identifies a bonding that is created by those external elements in a culture such as the instututions of religion, myth, kinship, folklore, ideology, symbols, and rituals. The moral component was identified by Hartmann (1939) as the secondary institutions and by Mazlish (1981) as the psychic repository of a culture.

These moral elements create a linkage among leaders and followers that establishes a dimensionality to their relationship. As more of these elements are present in the leaders-followers relationship, the stronger the bonding will be. A relationship that is formed by ideological, religious, and kinship ties will be morally stronger than one formed by ideological ties only.

The moral dimension to the leaders-followers relationship also helps to identify the concentric circles that can exist in the process of leadership. In other words, leaders will have a closer relationship to certain followers than to others because more of the moral elements are present. The point is that the relationship among leaders and followers will not necessarily be equal. Some followers will have a closer relationship to some leaders because more moral ties exist. In any collective relationship, this pattern of concentric circles will exist, and it also is true of leadership as a collective

relationship. There will be inner circles of followers whose relationship to the leader is morally stronger than those followers in the outer circles. This notion of concentric circles helps to explain why certain followers may have one image of a leader while other followers have quite another image.

In cultures that are highly homogeneous, the relationship between leaders and followers will frequently have a stronger moral bond than in those cultures that are heterogeneous. Communities that have a multicultural population may form a leaders-followers relationship based on only one or two moral components. Societies in countries where the population has remained ethnically and culturally homogeneous may form leaders-followers relationship with all the moral components present. Insofar as the latter relationships do contain most or all of the moral elements, it is easier to understand how an individual develops a self identity only in concert with the collective consciousness of the group. As an example, it is difficult for the Western mind to understand the process of leadership in Arab countries, such as Iran, where there appears to be such total group solidarity and very little room for self expression. In such countries, the moral bonding of a highly homogenous culture is far greater than most individuals growing up. in a Western multicultural environment could possibly experience. The theory of the group self as proposed by Kohut (1977), of object relations theories, and the culture-and-personality studies are very

useful in understanding how collective behavior is formed
and how it shapes personality in such highly homogeneous
cultures. The point to be made here is that the process of
leadership will take various forms in terms of its
collective nature, particuarly as it assimilates these moral
elements.

The Leaders-Followers Relationship as Transactional

The third component of the relationship among leaders
and followers is one that has been identified previously by
Burns (1978) as transactional. He identified a
transactional relationship as it related to leadership as
one which "occurs when one person takes the initiative in
making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of
valued things" (p. 19). He further suggested that this
exchange could be political, economic, or psychological. I
do not subscribe to his definition of transactional as
psychological, but I think the political and economic
application is appropriate. The transactional component of
the leaders-followers relationship is one which in not
incorporated in the above descriptions of the emotional and
moral components and essentially includes that bonding among
leaders and followers that is created by the need of both to
gain access to resources to meet tangible and physical
needs. Unlike the multiplex relationship of the moral bond,
the transactional bond is a single interest relationship
based upon economics and the delivery of material goods.

The relationship among leaders and followers will

invariably contain a transactional component that is one of
the bonds holding the group together. It is important,
however, to understand that a transactional component by
itself does not constitute leadership. The transactional
component must be combined with the emotional and moral
components if the relationship is to be identifed as
leadership. All three components are necessary; if any one
is missing, then leadership is not occurring. Since the
concept of transactional leadership has surfaced with other
authors besides Burns, I would suggest that such a label is
incorrect. Transactional can only be applied as one
component of the relationshp between leaders and followers,
but should not be extended into a definition of leadership.
The primary point is that the need for resources on the part
of both leaders and followers is not addressed in either of
the two components discussed above, and therefore needs a
third component to identify its reality. I have previously
discussed the property of leadership as resourceful and
therefore have illustrated the importance of access to
resources as a critical property in defining leadership.
The notion of transaction serves to identify this element in
the effort to understand why leaders and followers come
together.

Summary

Most previous theories of leadership have been marked by
their failure to articulate a theory that defined leadership
in terms of the relationship among leaders and followers.

Leadership is not an elitist process reserved for the exclusive membership of leaders only. It is a dynamic relationship between leaders and followers who can participate in many leadership relationships, some in which their role is leaders and some in which their role is followers. I have identified three critical components to understanding why leaders and followers come together to engage in the collective behavior defined as leadership. The three key components are emotional, moral, and transactional. An emotional bonding is identified in the psychic and developmental needs of leaders and followers; a moral bonding exists in the shared social institutions such as religion and ideology; and the transactional component points to the economic dimensions of the relationship among leaders and followers. By reviewing selected psychodynamic theories of collective behavior, I have demonstrated that any approach to understanding the dynamics of collective behavior cannot be divorced from its cultural frame. I have also utilized these selected theories to support my own notion that the leaders-followers relationship is essentially formed by emotional, moral, and transactional factors.

Leadership as a Structural Web of Shared Meaning

Leadership as a structural web is one of the more difficult properties to articulate because the concept of structure, conventionally equated with a solid, tangible object, such as a physical structure, is here used to describe a fluid process rather than a concrete reality. In one sense, structure applies to the process of how relationships occur. The notion of structure as it relates to leadership espoused herein is more in line with the philosophy of structuralism which seeks to identify the process of how structures and human relationships are linked to one another, a notion identical with my earlier discussion of culture as a structural web of meaning. Deriving primarily from the disciplines of social anthropology and sociology, as well as linguistics, structure assumes the person is a complex of social relationships with other people and with the institutions in society. Social structure is generated from human interaction.

Anthropologists frequently link structure with the notion of praxis, a word used to describe structure as both context and action. Structure is thereby associated with the day-to-day enactment of social life and is the process by which social forms are generated. Social forms are the various systems that are present in any social order.

A Web of Relationships

An individual within a given culture is involved in many structural connections with other people and with the systems that have been generated by this interaction. These connections are a result of and also generate shared meanings among the participants who interact. This web of relationships is the context of leadership. Bearing in mind that leadership is a collective relationship, the structural web of shared meanings is, in a metaphorical sense, the glue that makes the leadership relationship work.

Leadership as a structural web of shared meanings identifies the relationship between leadership and the social context in which leaders and followers operate. That relationship is the source of what is meaningful in people's lives. Thus, leadership can be seen as a network of interrelations among the constituent parts of a culture, the structure that creates a functioning whole that is leadership.

A Fluid Reality

The process of leadership suggests that people, in concert with their social structure, create their own reality and shape their own meaning systems. The social systems of kinship, belief, economics, and politics, for example, are the products of the process of leadership as a structural web of shared meaning. They are not products in terms of permanence or stasis, but in terms of a fluid reality that is continuously changing. When leadership is absent from a culture, such systems may establish themselves

as fixed institutions, but they do not continue to meet the developing needs of the people in the culture. An underlying assumption of leadership as a structural web of shared meaning is that people's needs are, by nature, evolving and changing; they are not static. People's meaning systems are, in turn, formulated around changing and evolving needs. A structural web of meaning in cultures identifies the social institutions, as well as the relationships with those institutions, that individuals form in order to manifest their needs in social structures. Leadership functions as the instrument by which social structures in a culture are shaped and reformulated to meet collective and individual needs.

When leadership is present, the context of social structure is fluid and interactive. It is a process whereby individuals through praxis consciously and unconsciously weave a web or construct paths through the social space, acting through or out the complementarities and contradictions of their various perceptions of reality and their society. Leadership is the process whereby people evaluate the present and reshape the future through a structure of social interaction.

Shared Meaning

Leadership as a structural web of shared meaning is an ongoing reflection and re-evaluation on social processes and meaning-making systems present in any culture. This property of leadership is linked to the assumptions of the philosophical approaches to leadership in which the moral

order of societies shapes what is perceived as meaningful.
Foster (1988) has captured this moral evaluation by
identifying leadership as critical. He wrote, "A particular
aspect of leadership is to examine the previous conditions
of social life and subject them to critique" (p. 13), an
idea more strongly stated by Nietzsche's (1883/1969)
superman who re-evaluates all values. On a more subdued
note, Schon (1984) called leadership reflection-in-action.
Cooley (1909) and Mead (1934) also identified this property
of leadership in their understanding of leadership as
symbolic interaction. Their notion of symbolic interaction
simply means that the social world is a human construct
which is both a consequence and a contributor to dominant
meaning systems. They argued that society is, above all, a
relationship among people bound together by shared ideas,
and leadership exists insofar as it arouses these ideas in
the imaginations of people.

Directing the Collective Consciousness

Leadership is the process of enacting the communal
interpretation of reality or of directing the collective
consciousness of a culture. Leadership is the interaction
that constructs meaning out of a social world and then also
sustains those meanings. People's perception of the world
and of reality is always filtered through the structural web
of shared processes and meanings. When a relationship
exists among people that satisfies needs, then meaning
exists in the flow or process of that relationship.
Leadership is this universe of discourse that characterizes

the fluid or processual nature of relationships and meaning. In the absence of leadership, meaning can become stagnant and lose its capacity to respond to changing or developing needs. Our social reality is the result of the values, beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes which attain validity only through the relationships that we define as the structural web of shared meaning. The very notion of leadership grows out of and recreates the human search for meaning and the cognitive construction of the social models of reality.

Examples of leadership as a structural web of meaning were provided in most of the anthropological monographs reviewed in the last chapter, but a few stand out as particularly exemplary, including Linehardt's (1958, 1961) and Evans-Prichard's (1940, 1951) studies of kinship among the Nilotic tribes of the Dinka and Nuer, Levi-Strauss's (1967) study of social structure among the Namibikuaru tribe of South America, and Eidheim's (1968) study of the Lappish minority movement in Norway.

Summary

The identification of leadership as a structural web of shared meaning adds yet another connecting link to our understanding of leadership as a cultural expression. Leadership, like culture, is a pattern of interrelations among its constitutent parts and a structural web is formed by the necessity of many parts to create a functioning whole. Leadership is necessary in the generation of patterns of belief and systems of shared meaning. At a more cognitive level, the process of leadership serves as a guide

in helping individuals find the goals and directives of culture to be motivationally satisfying. Moreover, the process of leadership in the social construction of reality and meaning is universally present in all cultures. Leadership plays a critical role in the creation and maintenance of religious, ritual, and mythical systems that are key factors in the meaning-making processes of culture. What will differ from culture to culture is the precise forms and interpretations of the social reality, but the need for leadership to provide an ongoing critical evaluation and recreation of meaning-making systems is essential if a culture is to offer a mechanism for meeting the developing and changing needs of its people. In identifying the interdependence and interrelations of people and social institutions, leadership as a structural web of shared meaning illustrates the need to define leadership as a cultural phenomenon.

Leadership as Linguistic and Symbolic

The linguist-philosopher Whorf (1956) wrote, "Speech is the best show man puts on. It is his own 'act' on the stage of evolution, in which he comes before the cosmic backdrop and really 'does his stuff'" (p. 249). Leadership is linguistic and symbolic in the same way that culture is

linguistic and symbolic. The link between leadership and language and symbols may strike us as so obvious, it doesn't need definition. But this is precisely why so many leadership theorists have failed to understand the link between leadership and culture. The structural web of shared meaning could not occur without language and symbols.

The nature of culture's collective consciousness, the nature of humans as meaning making persons, the shaping of experience through meaning, and the processes of reflection, communication, learning, perception, interpretation, and symbolization are barren without language and symbols. The reality of interaction is constructed upon the foundation of language and symbols.

Language

Wittgenstein (1958) has identified why leadership is linked to the language of a culture. He pointed out that words have many antecedents and their meanings are learned by employing them in the customary cultural context. There are underlying assumptions about the meanings of words that will vary from culture to culture. Many words and concepts have a cultural flavor that can only be sensed by people in their respective cultures. People in Great Britain and the United States may call their languages English, but when a citizen of each travels in the other country, it does not take long to learn that Americans and the British do not always speak the same language. Language is built on antecendents that are culturally defined.

Pondy (1978), relying on Chomsky's (1968) creative

aspect of human language, suggested that "the set of leadership acts is of the same order of magnitude as the set of sentences in a natural language" (p. 91). In searching for the deep structure of leadership, Pondy found it useful to compare leadership to the components of grammar.

> Suppose we think of leadership as a language. To practice, say, democratic leadership is to understand the set of meanings (values?) to be conveyed, to give them primitive expression, to translate them into stylistic representations, and ultimately to choose sounds and actions that manifest them. My worry is that this overarching process has been truncated, and that we have reduced the grammar of leadership to its phonetics. The syntactics and especially the semantics of leadership have been lost sight of. (p. 89)

Pondy believed that people have lost the creative unboundedness of leadership because we have reduced it to phonetics. In this regard, Pondy argued, a leader's use of language is a critical factor in determining effectiveness, credibility, and influence. A leader's empathy and sensitivity to followers can be identified in something so subtle as the use of verb tenses. Moreover, the use of language by leaders and followers is linked to making events and purposes meaningful, "to give others a sense of understanding what they are doing, and especially to articulate it so they can communicate about the meaning of their behavior" (p. 94). Pondy believed the real power of Martin Luther King was not only that he had a dream, but that he could describe it and make it accessible to millions

of people. "This dual capacity to make sense of things <u>and</u> to put them into language meaningful to large numbers of people gives the person who has it enormous leverage" (p. 95, emphasis in original).

Taylor's (1988) remarkable biography of King provides numerous examples of the relationship between language and leadership, particularly noted in the power of King's sermons. Taylor tells of the response to one of King's political addresses at age twenty-six, following the arrest of Rosa Parks:

> The crowd retreated into stunned silence as he stepped away from the pulpit. . . . his oratory had just made him forever a public person. In the few short minutes of his first political address, a power of communion emerged from him that would speak inexorable to strangers who would both love and revile him, like all prophets. (pp. 141-142)

Thus, in Pondy's mind, language, meaning, and leadership are coterminous processes, a notion that has been echoed in the writings of others, including Boaz (1911/1966), Chomsky (1968), Geertz (1973), Malinowski (1922), and Sapir (1931). Language not only reflects our reality, it creates reality and objectifies the world, translating our experience into a cohesive order.

Perception

The creation of reality through language has much to do with how we perceive the world around us. Hallowell (1955) argued that while perception is biologically rooted, the

ability of people to perceive is culturally based. Literal
perception by an individual occurs as a function of the
culture in which the individual has been raised. Berger &
Luckmann (1967) advanced the notion that the reality of
everyday life is a reality that is subjectively perceived,
originating in human thought and action. Goffman (1959)
proposed a similar idea, using the dramaturgical metaphor as
the framework in which people perform in the manner of
actors before an audience. Long before any of these
scholars wrote about perception, Hume (1738) voiced his
ideas on the relationship between moral distinctions and
perception:

> It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to
> the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions
> of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and
> thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can
> never exert itself in any action, which we may not
> comprehend under the term perception; and consequently
> that term is no less applicable to those judgements, by
> which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every
> other operation of the mind. To approve of one
> character, to condemn another, are only so many
> different perceptions. (pp. 22-23)

Through the use of language and symbols, leadership
shapes perceptions and creates a reality that directs
behavior and thought. This notion of perception frequently
surfaces in terms of the leader's identity--"what the leader
is really like." Bailey (1977, 1988) focused on symbols in
his discussion of the leader's many masks. My present

concern is not so much with what leaders are really like or what masks they may be wearing, but rather with the collective influence of leaders and followers on social reality and perceptions that leaders and followers can have. If individuals have an impact in shaping perceptions and reality, it is only because such individuals are part of a collective movement that influences social thought. Since symbols may have a greater impact on perception than language, we need to evaluate the relationship between symbols and leadership.

Symbols

The importance of leaders and followers utilizing symbols as well as language comes through in a poem by Wallace Stevens (1947) against the negation of death:

It was not important that they survive.

What mattered was that they should bear

Some lineament or charcter,

Some affluence, if only half-perceived,

In the poverty of their words,

Of the planet of which they were part. (p. 25)

Language often fails to communicate the depth and meaning of our perceptions, our images, our concepts, our ideas and our relationships. Bateson (1972) argued that our language is thing-oriented and is impoverished when it comes to thinking about, describing, and talking about relationships. In The Wisdom of the Heart (1960), novelist Henry Miller warned of the difficulty of expressing new realities following World War II within the limits of language:

In the very heart of the modern spirit there is a schism
. . . . We who are affected cannot make ourselves clear
. . . . This is an era when apocalyptic visions are to
be fulfilled. We are on the brink of a new life,
entering a new domain. In what language can we describe
things for which there are as yet no new names? And how
describe relations? (p 132)

What normally surfaces when our language fails us are
symbols. We need to rely on symbols as well as language to
communicate the deeper sense of meanings and the emotion
behind our impoverished words. Symbols are frequently
charged with emotion and can speak to the unconscious in
ways that ordinary language cannot.

Some scholars have suggested that symbols actually
function prior to speech insofar as they constitute the
revealing substrata of speech and therefore give rise to
thought, perceptions, and ideas (Ricoeur, 1974). Speech and
language occur after symbols have elevated to consciousness
the underlying thought processes.

Sperber on Symbolism

Sperber (1970) argued against a semiological view of
symbolism which basically understands symbols as paired with
interpretations that have meanings. Rather than focus on
the resemblances between symbols and language, Sperber
concentrated on the differences between them. Language uses
hearing and speech and has a specific organization. But for
symbolism, information may come through any or all of the
senses and has no identifiable systematic properties.

Language has a cultural homogeneity to it, such that the speech of one individual is quickly identified and understood by another individual in the same culture. The grammar an individual constructs is essentially similar to that constructed by others in the same culture. Conversely, argued Sperber, a good part of the data of symbolism is idiosyncratic data linked to individual experiences which do not belong to a shared legacy. He added that a large part of the data of symbolism is shared in a culture, but unlike language, there is that part of symbolism which is relatively personal.

Sperber also claimed that symbolism and language evolve in different ways. Language has a brief learning period, usually prior to puberty. This is not to say that one cannot learn a language after puberty, but that part of language that is innately suited to learning is most developed early in life. Symbolism, on the other hand, is not limited to any chronological age and the process of evoking symbols and relying on symbolism for learning can occur late in life as well as in our early years.

Our knowing about our world and our culture happens, therefore, on two different levels. Language is one level of knowing. Through language we can learn, for example, that a lion is an animal or that our neighbor is a bank president. Through symbolism, we learn at another level. The lion or president take on very different dimensions when they are used as symbols. To give another example fairly common to all cultures, a religious ritual or ceremony, such as the Roman Catholic liturgy of the Mass, depends upon both

language to communicate on one level, and it relies upon the many symbols in the Mass to communicate at quite another level. The learning that accompanies symbols frequently transcends our semantic ability to communicate a message. Herein lies much of the mystery, magic, or hidden reality of religious practices in all cultures. Symbolism can be a powerful evoker of reality because it frequently defies our efforts to diffuse it with language.

There are several implications this discussion on symbolism has for leadership. First, symbols affect all the senses and are therefore more powerful emotionally. Leadership is a relationship that is both emotional and cognitive. Symbols may more readily communicate with the emotional side of the relationship while language may be used for the cognitive side. Secondly, symbols may communicate in ways that language simply cannot. Thirdly, symbols can be created and used throughout the maturing process. Language cannot be recreated and therefore may not be as useful in the process of creating new perceptions or new interpretations of reality. It is more difficult, according to Sperber, to change the interpretation we have given to a word since our youth than it is to channel meaning and knowledge through a new symbol. Fourthly, since symbols can be both shared and more personal, there is the possibility that leadership can be a relationship not only at the level of shared symbolization in a culture but also at the level of small groups that have in common more idiosyncratic symbolization patterns. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our knowing about the world and about our

cultural frame of reference is accomplished by both language and symbols and each communicates at different levels. As a relationship, leadership can only exist when both levels of knowing are present. Thus, leadership relies upon symbols for their emotional and cognitive effect, for nonlinguistic communication, for recreating reality and shaping perception, for identifying what is shared among leaders and followers, and for creating ways of seeing the world in reference to the cultural context.

Symbols as Mediators

On yet another level, the notion of personalized symbols (Obeyesekere, 1981; Poole, 1987; Tuzin, 1972, 1977) and how they mediate between an individual's psychic structure and society are important to this discussion. Such personalized symbols, when adopted by enough individuals, can become the personal symbols of groups which in turn can evolve into a leadership movement if the symbol so motivates the group to some form of action. Frequently, the more personalized symbols become the communication basis of subcultures within the larger culture. These subcultures have been called networks by Ferguson (1980) and can become a primary source of communication for leaders and followers seeking change. Symbols mediate between individuals and social norms as well as between individuals seeking change and the collective context that is provided by the relationship between leaders and followers who also seek change.

The Signs of Our Times

Leadership plays prominently in the introduction, control, and management of the signs and symbols in a culture. For example, America has become a semiotic society. Solomon's (1988) analysis of the signs and symbols in America suggests that America has moved from an era of print communications to a culture awash in visual symbols. Waves of images, launched by growing armies of advertisers, politicians, consultants, designers, publicists, manufacturers and marketers, leave the passive American consumer afloat in a cultural limbo and victim to every manipulating message that comes along. While leadership may or may not have been responsible for this change, the point is that leadership can direct and influence the signs of our times if that is what leaders and followers intend to do.

Summary

Language and symbols are two critical components essential to leadership insofar as they are the tools for shaping reality and the collective consciousness. Communication, learning, perception, and interpretation occur only because of language and symbols. Human interaction is dependent upon linguistic and symbolization skills. Whether our approach to symbols is semiological or more in the line of Sperber's non-semiological approach, or conceived in terms of personalized symbols, or symbols referenced to the ritual, political, or esthetic elements of a culture, it is critical to understand the relationship between leadership and symbols in order to direct the

process of communication, knowledge, and learning. Language
is important insofar as it offers for the entire culture a
commonly patterned set of grammatical constructs that are
relatively homogeneous. Symbols, however, are not as
homogeneous in their patterns, but offer different
dimensions of communication and learning within a culture.
Both language and symbols are instruments of influencing
perception and formulating reality. Leadership is a series
of acts that shape both perception and reality and that
direct and influence the signs of our times. Leaders
and followers need both language and symbols in order to
create relationships that are transmitted and meaningful.
Thus leadership must be defined in terms of its linguistic
and symbolic property, but recognizing that language and
symbols are culturally based.

Leadership   as   Ethical

In its simplest form, ethics is the inquiry into the
meaning of life; in its more complex form, it is an exercise
in the use of language to explain what makes life worth
living. We have already learned that our language is
impoverished when it comes to expressing what we are
thinking or feeling and this is particularly true when it
come to ethical propositions. As Wittgenstein (1958) wrote,
"My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who

ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language" (p. 415).

Since it is through language that people define their ethical framework, I have used several key words to define leadership, and all have ethical implications in any cuture: relationships, needs, change, adaptation, power, meaning, reality, collective consciousness, collective behavior. The scope of ethical relativism was reviewed in Chapter Two, concluding that there is no universal ethic. Human beings in all cultures demonstrate great diversity in their ethical frameworks and categories of moral behavior. The ethical property of leadership is linked, therefore, to the reality of ethical relativism. In Kiplings' (1919) words:

> The wildest dreams of Kew are the facts of Khatmandhu
>
> And the crimes of Clapham chaste in Marbatan" (p. 32).

Leadership as ethical means that the process of leadership is inextricably linked to the ethical framework of the culture in which leadership is exercised. There is no single ethical framework that has emerged as characteristic of all cultures.

A Leader's Personal Ethics

The issue of the personal ethics of leaders frequently becomes the focus of many discussions on ethics and leadership. Bailey (1988) suggested that leaders must transcend the ethics of their respective cultures in order to manipulate, and in part, deceive the followers. Other scholars might agree with Baldelli's (1978) highly cynical summary that "leadership even at its purest is unethical"

(p. 187).

Leadership as ethical does not mean that we measure the ethical content of any single individual, especially the leader's personal ethics or lack thereof, in order to evaluate the presence of an ethical framework in leadership. Of course, there will be leaders and followers whose personal motivations and behavior could be judged as unethical or amoral. History is filled with a great variety of Machiavellian leader-heros. Even Hitler has been called a leader by some leadership scholars, including Bailey (1988) and Tucker (1981). I think that Bailey is probably right in suggesting that individual leaders are frequently not very principled individuals, and that such individuals do little more than wear ethical masks to convince followers that they are morally motivated. Moreover, I can only begin to imagine the problems associated with trying to identify leadership by the personal morals of leaders or even individual followers. The relationship between leadership and ethics does not rest upon the ethical framework of single individuals, whether those individuals be leaders or followers.

Ethics as a Collective Construct

Leadership as ethical is a description of the collective relationship in its cultural context. As described in Chapter Two, all cultures have one or more ethical frameworks and leadership is a collective relationship within these frameworks. Leadership is ethical because it is a collective relationship; it cannot be otherwise. It is

that relationship which exists in a cultural frame that constitutes the ethical nature of leadership.

There is nothing in the nature of leadership that innately identifies it with any particular ethical framework that applies cross-culturally. It is precisely a cultural approach to leadership that validates this. As a cultural process, leadership is linked to the ethical framework(s) of the specific culture in which it is operational, and any attempt to import an outside ethical framework may be good evangelism but it is not leadership. But the structure of leadership and ethics in a given culture needs further exploration. First, I will review briefly the approaches taken by Burns (1978), Rost (1989), and Foster (in press).

Burns on Ethics & Leadership

Burns' (1978) notion is that transformational leadership raises leaders and followers to what he called higher levels of motivation and morality. He wrote, "Transforming leadership is elevating. It is moral but not moralistic. Leaders engage with followers, but from higher levels of morality; in the enmeshing of goals and values both leaders and followers are raised to more principled levels of judgment" (p. 455, emphasis in original is a heading). As discussed earlier, Burns' notion of moral development was based upon Kohlberg's (1963) and Maslow's (1954) notions of moral development in stages. From Burns' view, leaders take followers up the moral hierarchy, while tyrants and power wielders take them farther down the hierarchy. This approach has been criticized on different levels, but the

primary criticism is that Kohlberg's and Maslow's frameworks are not based on arguments from ethical literature or ethical philosophy.

Apart from suggesting this notion of ethical leadership, Burns does not explore it in any depth. In a morally complex and ambiguous world, the relationship between leadership and ethics cannot be casually laid at our doorstep with the expectation that we will unquestioningly adopt it. Furthermore, Burns' notion of a moral hierarchy is a very Western idea and has no meaning and value in non-Western cultures.

Rost on Mutuality & Coercion

A long-time disciple of Burns' leadership model, Rost (1989) has only recently rejected Burns' idea of ethical leadership, no longer believing that leadership requires raising people to higher levels of moral development. Rost rejected Burns' view of ethical leadership basically because of the issues related to ethical relativism. The other problem Rost raised is that leadership may exist in a culture and represent two entirely different ethical frameworks and yet both can be identified with leadership. Rost believed that the primary criteria for leadership is transformation and while change may be good at one point in time, it can be judged bad at another. Therefore, the ethics of leadership do not deal with content, but only with process and with the issue of coercion. "The ethics of leadership require that the interactions which generate the intentions among leaders and followers to change something

develop a mutual purpose. Interactions which are coercive
do not usually develop a mutuality of purpose" (p. 49).
After rejecting the criteria of content as a basis for
determining the relationship between leadership and ethics,
Rost concluded:

> Thus, the ethics of leadership focus on how mutual
> the relationship among leaders and followers is. Some
> of the ethical dilemmas that are raised in focusing on
> the mutuality of the leadership relationship are classic
> and timeless: Individual vs. common good, self-interest
> vs. public interest politics, personal vs. civic virtue,
> short vs. long range perspective, end vs. modal values,
> and utilitarian and expressive individualism vs.
> biblical and republican traditions. These ethical
> dilemmas go to the heart of what the common purposes of
> a leadership relationship is all about. (p. 50)

Leadership & The Common Good

Foster (in press), on the other hand, accepted Burns'
notion of elevating people to new levels of morality, but
argued that the ethical mandate of leadership is oriented
toward democratic values within a community. Foster
believed that the common good was the criteria in defining
the relationship between ethics and leadership. "Leadership
carries a responsibility not just to be personally moral,
but to be a cause of 'civic moral education' which leads to
both self-knowledge and community awareness" (p. 19,
emphasis in original). Foster rejects any relationship that
is built on coercion, threat, or dehumanization as

antithetical to leadership. Moreover, Foster (1986) earlier subscribed to transformational leadership as a provider of vision, "a vision of a just and equal social order" (p. 188).

The notion of the common good was also raised by Bellah and associates (1985) in their discussion of individualism and committment in American culture. The fundamental question they posed was how to preserve or create a morally coherent life in the face of rampant individualism. Is there a moral language in the American culture than transcends radical individualism? Their answer was not very positive.

> This is a society in which the individual can only rarely and with difficulty understand himself and his activities as interrelated in morally meaningful ways with those of other, different Americans. Instead of directing cultural and individual energies toward relating the self to its larger context, the culture of manager and therapist urges a strenuous effort to make of our particular segment of life a small world of its own. (p. 50)

They suggest that the common or public good in American culture has given rise to six distinct visions, identified as pairs, all of which reflect the ambivalence about the meshing of self-reliance and community. Those pairs of public good visions include establishment versus populism, neocapitalism versus welfare liberalism, and the administered society versus economic democracy. They conclude that our current notion of the public good has been

swallowed up by the notion of economic man.

Absolutism versus Relativism

The discussion in Chapter Three of philsophical approaches to leadership and in Chapter Two of ethical relativism are at the heart of the relationship between leadership and ethics. According to certain philosophical approaches, there are absolute standards of ethics that are cross-cultural, a notion that has recently been defended by Bloom (1987). On the other side of the fence are the ethical relativists who argue that the data points to quite a different reality in which each culture establishes its own ethical constructs that are not fully accepted in other cultures. There is no universal set of ethics that applies cross-culturally.

Ethics & Culture

Therefore, a cultural approach to leadership makes two basic claims about the relationship between leadership and ethics. As stated earlier, all cultures have ethical frameworks that may be as diverse as cultures themselves. As a relationship, leadership cannot possibly be divorced from the ethical frameworks of any given culture and any attempt to import an outside ethic into a culture is antithetical to leadership. For example, it is improper to apply the standards of Christianity to non-Christian cultures when determining the nature of leadership in that culture. Leadership is ethical based upon the standards and moral norms of the culture in which it is present. It

is virtually impossible to apply Burns' standards of moral development cross-culturally. On the other hand, if any given culture accepts similar notions of moral development, such standards can appropriately be applied in that given culture by those engaged in leadership.

A Universal Ethic

The second claim made by a cultural approach to the relationship between leadership and ethics draws upon earlier discussions by Kluckhohn (1953), Lloyd & Gay (1981), Quinn & Holland (1987), Redfield (1957), and Spiro (1987). If the connection between leadership and ethics were to identify a universal ethic that is cross-cultural, such an ethic would need to be linked to either what is universally identified as human nature or what is universally acquired in the process of human development. In other words, what philosophers had proposed as an absolute ethic needs to be instantiated. Redfield and Spiro agree that there is a growing interest in the sciences to describe more precisely that which is universally inherent or developed in human life. Some of the ideas presented on the universality of human nature have been discussed previously in this study. Kluckhohn's hopes for the discovery of a few invariant points of reference which will make comparison of cultures clear and precise is one such example.

What needs to be identified is a composite photograph or portrait, if you will, of a universal collective life. Such a composite would not be composed of content, but rather of those elements that are relationship based and which evoke

something that is intuitively felt and, hopefully,
empirically demonstrated, to be human. One example often
referenced is the incest taboo. Others might be shame or
guilt, the satisfaction associated with success, our
seemingly common need for intimacy and affection, our sense
of self-consciousness, or our need for belief or religious
meaning. Lloyd and Gay (1981) and Quinn and Holland (1987)
have suggested that universals might be discovered in
cognitive approaches in which the processes of the mind's
functioning might be similar cross-culturally. Along with
Spiro (1987), they are looking for those invariant
psychological and cognitive characteristics which
universally mediate the contours of culture with those of
personality. Spiro and others are building on Hallowell's
(1955) notion of intrinsic symbolization which postulates
that culture does not impinge directly on behavior, but is
mediated through personality processes relating to
individuals. Spiro came to believe that the contours of
these processes were best delineated by Freud in his
concepts of the id, ego, and superego. He also suggested
that these processes have been identified by Kardiner's
(1945) notion of projective systems which were similar to
culturally mediated symbolic systems discussed earlier.

It is worth recalling that distinguished scholars like
Boas (1938), Brandt (1954), Childe (1951), Flugel (1944),
Fortes (1949), Frenkel-Brunswik (1954), Fromm (1947),
Kluckhohn (1953), Kolb (1953), Levi-Strauss (1945), Linton,
1952), Maslow (1954), Murdock (1945), Rapaport (1950),
Roheim (1950), and Steward (1949) have all argued that there

is a universal ethic, but as yet no one has given it a clear formulation.

Only through a more precise definition of a universal human personality, a psychic unity of humankind, could we then identify the categories on which a universal ethic could be applied. Redfield (1957) has also pointed out that just as there is a sense that some moral norms are more common than others, so there is a common sense that certain extremes of human conduct are unacceptable, such as the cruelty of the Nazis, or cannibalism, or slavery. Spiro (1987) echoed the same sentiment when he wrote, "It is because the emotionally driven irrational has no limits, or--to be more cautious--because its limiting case is Auschwitz, that I believe that there are standards 'worthy of universal respect' by which cultural frames can be evaluated" (p. 55, emphasis in original).

The Ethic of Human Rights

It is interesting that in today's world communities, the cry for human rights cross-culturally may be the universal ethic that we are seeking. There is throughout our world an emerging cry that there are certain basic rights which transcend cultures, ideologies, religions, and politics and that voice seems to be heard in every culture around the world. Wilson (1978) considered human rights a primary universal value and argued that it was an expression of "raw biological causation" (p. 206). The human rights issue is the most salient example we may have of both identifying what is universally human and what is rapidly

becoming a universal ethical mandate. The human rights story, as it unravels, may tell us that the basic similarities in human needs and nature are there, but they still need to be identified. This example is at the very core of the relationship between leadership and ethics. Under this second scenario, it is the ethical mandate of the leadership process to help all cultures identify our composite self. The beginnings of this composite self may be in the human rights movement.

Summary

Until such time as philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and biologists have formed a multidisciplinary effort to formulate the basic categories of a universal ethic, we are left with the philosophers' hope and expectation that such an ethic is possible. Perhaps the ethic has been theoretically developed by the philosophers, but now needs grounding in the data of cultures around the world. Until that time, leadership as ethical is essentially culture bound in its formulation of moral behavior. The issue is not one of individual motivation and morality, but rather one of a collective relationship grounded in a cultural context and operating within the norms and standards of the cultural frame. As I have been proposing all along, leadership is a cultural expression and, until such time as we have formulated a universal ethic that is cross-cultural, leadership as ethical is culture-bound. In the words of Shakespeare's Hamlet: "Nothing is good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

Leadership as Generative

Branch's (1988) illuminating history of the civil rights
movement and Martin Luther King's own personal leadership
and growth during the years 1954-1963 offer insights on the
learning and maturing processes of leadership in the civil
rights movement.

> To King, the lessons of leadership and unity came first,
> the militancy of the church next, and the "discovery" of
> nonviolence last. . . . The function of the boycott
> leaders had been to inspire, to react, and to persevere.
> Not until Birmingham . . . would King's idea of
> leadership encompass the deliberate creation of new
> struggles or the conscious, advance selection of
> strategies and tactics. For now, his notion of
> leadership emphasized the display of learning. (p. 195)

King understood the value of learning as an investment
in the future. Just as leadership creates and expresses
culture, so it generates the future. Leadership as
generative means that the process of leadership cares about
future generations and the preservation of a culture for
those generations. Leadership as generative is identified
in the learning and maturation processes as well as in the
ongoing generation of social forms that meet human needs.

As a learning process, leadership as generative has an
educative component that addresses the issues of meaning,
mystery, decision making, change, development and future
leaders and followers. As a maturation process, leadership

as generative means that leaders and followers intend to leave a culture to its inheritors as one that is, relatively speaking, more mature, more developed, more responsive to changing human needs than the culture of today. As a generator of social forms, leadership is a process resulting in the creation of new structures and institutions to meet the adaptive and evolving needs of humans.

Education

Burns (1978) believed that education and leadership "shade into each other to become almost inseparable, but only when both are defined as the reciprocal raising of levels of motivation rather than indoctrination or coercion" (p. 448). Burns tied leadership and education to his notion of transformation. He argued that both shape the future to meet the "broadest possible goals and the highest possible levels of morality" (p. 448).

Rost (1984b) built on Erikson's notion of generativity and identified generative leadership in three forms: (a) leaders want to generate something in their lifetime that is better than what was handed down to them; (b) leaders want to develop future leaders who will demand more of their generation than the present leaders have demanded of this generation; and (c) leaders want to build a world that is more civilized, more humane, more moral than the world in which they live.

Foster (in press) also identified leadership as educative: "To the degree that leadership can critique traditions which can be oppressive, and aims for a

transformaton of such conditions, then it must be educative" (p. 16). He further suggested that leaders are important in the creation of vision which he defined as consciousness raising and showing new social arrangements while still demonstrating a continuity with the past. Other leadership scholars have also linked leadership with education.

Within a cultural approach, leadership as generative takes diverse forms according to the culture's definitions of education and maturation. For example, in Cleveland's (1985) notion of the American leader as a knowledge executive and gifted generalist, the form that leadership as generative takes is interdisciplinary, integrative, self-analyzing, real-world oriented, focused on social goals and public purposes, and will have a global perspective. Cleveland's view, however, is culture specific to Western cultures and leadership as generative may take quite a different form in other cultures.

Maturation

The same diversity across cultures in education holds true for the notion of maturation. I interpret maturation in a cultural sense as a deepening awareness of the collective self. If leadership is applied to Western cultures educated in Western ideas of psychology, the process of maturation might include such concepts as spontaneity, expressive release, naturalness, self-acceptance, impulse-awareness, self-actualization, and the like, while concepts of control, inhibition, discipline, training, shaping, and so on would be regarded as regressive

and not facilitating maturity. But such standards of maturation vary from culture to culture.

In understanding the nature of leadership as generative, it is important to note that the process of leadership takes different forms in diverse cultures, but the nature of leadership as learning and maturation processes are universally present cross-culturally. Cultures care about their future generations, and leadership is the mechanism by which cultures express that care. Leadership is the mechanism by which a culture shapes and directs maturation.

Burns (1978) tried to capture this notion of maturation when he suggested that leaders and followers help each other in consciousness raising and self-actualization.

> It is their capacity to <u>learn</u> from others and from the environment--the capacity <u>to be taught</u>. That capacity calls for an ability to listen and be guided by others without being threatened by them, to be dependent on others but not overly dependent, to judge other persons with both affection and discrimination, to possess enough autonomy to be creative without rejecting the external influences that make for growth and relevance. Self-actualization ultimately means the ability <u>to lead</u> <u>by being led</u>. (p. 117, emphasis in original)

In this engagement with their followers, leaders are transformed as well as the followers, and in the process, both mature. On another occasion, Burns suggested that the reversal of roles among leaders and followers is also an act of growth and maturity.

Only through a notion of maturity at a cultural level

can leadership be linked with progress. While scholars have not identified a universal theory of progress--noting, perhaps, the possible exception of Prigogine's & Stenger's (1984) theory of dissiptive structures--the sense that individual cultures do mature and progress is compatible with the notion of the generative property of leadership.

Thus, education and learning, and maturation and progress are key components of what I have defined as the generative property of leadership. The third component is related to these two, but deserves additional explanation since it addresses the need to create new social forms to meet developing human needs. The idea that leadership generates social form has been best conceptualized by Barth (1966) and Schwartz (1988) and their models were reviewed in Chapter Two. Following a brief summary of each model, I will apply their models to the cultural approach to leadership.

Leadership as the Generation of Structure

Barth's (1966) generative model is useful in understanding leadership as the generation of structure and social forms. The process of change in a culture is addressed by this notion of leadership inasmuch as shifting values and collective choices create or generate new social structures. The interactions of people in a culture create new connections that were not there before and these connections also create new social forms and institutions. While this is a mechanism by which cultures adapt and survive, it is primarily a way of meeting new needs that

develop with new generations.

Schwartz's (1988) distributive model of culture is also useful in understanding the generative property of leadership. In his model, the learning process occurs as individuals internalize the experiences informed and interpreted by the culture and in interaction with other enculturated adults. The internalization of culture in individuals is passed on to others creating what Schwartz called a life-history-thus-far.

Leadership has the function of generating or creating new connections among people that were not there previously. These connections are frequently caused by choices or by new values, as in the case of Barth's generative model, or by the distribution of the personality structure from one individual to another, as in the case of Schwartz's model. Leaders and followers are actively making choices and challenging old values as well as generating new values to meet developing human needs. Since leaders and followers are actively engaged in intended, real change, they must also be concerned about the social forms that need to be created in order to support or sustain the social forms resulting from change. Leaders and followers express their care about the preservation of culture as well as care for future generations by exercising choices that create change and generate new social structures. In its generative form, leadership as a construct has come full circle insofar as the generative nature of leadership evolves out of the bio-basic needs of a developing humanity.

Summary

Leadership as generative addresses how leaders and followers care about future generations, about the survival and maturity of their culture, and about their own development as human beings. Education and learning play prominently in the exercise of leadership. The notion of maturation and progress are the second key components in the generative property of leadership and identify the progressive development of a culture through its leaders and followers who intend a more mature, more need-satsifying culture than they currently know. Along with learning and maturation, leadership as generative includes a third critical component which I have identified as the generation of social form, building on the models proposed by Barth (1966) and Schwartz (198 8). The process of leadership creates new structures and social forms caused by shifting values, choices, and intentional change. These new social forms meet the developing needs of human beings. A most critical point is that leadership as generative is again linked to the isomorphic natures of leadership and culture.

Conclusion

It has been my purpose in this chapter to present a new cultural theory of leadership that articulates a model of leadership representing a major shift in thinking from traditional and current theories of leadership. The essential elements of this theory include the following: (a) leadership must be studied as a multidisciplinary phenomenon; (b) the nature of leadership can only be defined in terms of process rather than content; (c) when leadership is defined as process, it has a universal application; when defined in terms of its content, it is incommensurate; (d) the nature of leadership is embedded in the nature of culture; (e) therefore, leadership is essentially a cultural expression; (f) as a cultural expression, the nature of leadership can only be defined in terms of the nine properties of leadership that parallel the nine properties of culture; (g) if any one property is missing, that process is not leadership.

By incorporating the nine properties, the definition that emerges suggests that leadership is a dynamic, adaptive and ethical process by which leaders and followers form collective relationships which create socially meaningful structures by utilizing social, political, linguistic, symbolic and generative resources to meet human needs. Since this definition of leadership includes the critical properties of culture as well as those of leadership, I further proposed that leadership is the process by which

<u>culture</u> <u>is</u> <u>created</u> <u>and</u> <u>reformulated</u>. Leadership is not only responsible for the initial formation of cultures but is also responsible for generating new social forms by which changing and developing human needs can be satisfied. If leaders and followers do not act upon this mandate, then cultures will atrophy and die.

For scholars and practitioners alike, a cultural understanding of leadership has two far reaching implications. First, the study of leadership cannot be removed from the study of culture. Each of the nine properties that constitute the nature of leadership is linked to the cultural context. If leadership is to be researched, then such research must be conducted within the framework of specific cultures. Secondly, the practice of leadership is also embedded in the cultural context. The roles that leaders and followers take and the forms which emerge from the process of leadership will be culturally diverse. The practitioner of leadership cannot easily apply what worked in one culture to another. While the process of leadership is universal, the form and content it takes in each culture will vary and practitioners must realize that leadership can be exercised only when it is a cultural expression of the culture in which it is exercised. What constitutes a strong leader or follower in one culture may not translate into comparable forms in other cultures. I would suggest that those individuals that historians have labelled as great leaders--Churchill, Roosevelt, Ghandi and others--would not have been great leaders in cultures significantly different from the ones in which they lived.

A cultural approach to leadership does not suggest that there can be no world leaders, however. Most Western societies represent multicultural backgrounds and many leaders-followers relationships today are polycultural. The process of leadership as articulated in a cultural theory of leadership is as applicable to multicultural settings as it is to unicultural settings. The only difference is that in a polycultural environment, the leaders-followers are representing multicultural needs and share the mutual purposes that are present in those individuals from multiple cultures. Inasmuch as leadership is the process for creating and reformulating culture, I would note that leadership in a polycultural setting creates a consensus of need and unity that formulates a single culture within a polycultural environment. By reviewing the properties of culture, we will notice that the nature of culture is not limited to populations that are homogeneous; people with very mixed backgrounds can be formed into a unified culture, a premise widely held by proponents of the corporate culture movement. Leadership is the process of shaping a single culture out of leaders and followers who, at the same time as they share a single culture, can also participate in their separate and unique cultural backgrounds. It is in this polycultural setting that it is so important to articulate the nature of leadership as a process that creates and reformulates culture. Like leadership, cultures are dynamic processes that are not in a state of equilibrium, but are in process of becoming and represent a fluid reality. As a cultural phenomenon, leadership is

directing and shaping this reality.

Finally, I wish to point out that our world is experiencing an accelerated level of change, unlike people previously have known. Nations are becoming increasingly aware of their interdependence and together are discovering a need to identify a global culture that identifies the basic needs of all peoples in order to survive in a world of peace rather than be destroyed in a global holocaust. As our global consciousness emerges, we are also struggling with issues of human rights, threatened natural resources, nuclear terror, and we are more aware of the horrors of tyranny, warfare, genocide, and other forms of cruelty and destruction. I believe that a cultural approach to leadership can address such issues because it is a universal theory that can articulate the needs and dimensions of an emerging global culture.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES ON LEADERSHIP

Leadership makes the social system work.

Waud Kracke (1978, p. 236)

Introduction

Grounding Theory in Ethnography

In his own essay on the "Properties of Culture," LeVine
(1984) wrote, "Formal definitions [of culture] do little to
clarify the nature of culture; clarification is only
possible through ethnography" (p. 67). My discussion of the
properties of culture and leadership thus far has been
theoretical, with only occasional pieces of ethnographic
data thrown in. My purpose here is to instantiate the
proposed cultural theory of leadership by turning attention
to four anthropologists whose ethnographies of actual
cultures reveal people engaged in the process of leadership.

The case studies of four anthropologists serve to ground
the proposed theory in the empirical data of their
ethnographic accounts. By examining some very diverse
cultures, I will determine whether the proposed theory of
leadership can be grounded in the thick descriptions of
ethnography.

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My methodology is based on a comparative analysis of the empirical data of each ethnography with the properties of leadership identified in Chapter Four. Only then can we instantiate the proposed theory and evaluate its application cross-culturally as well as determine its validity as a universal theory.

Four Points of View

The four anthropologists chosen--Barth (1959), Leach (1964), Bailey (1969, 1977, 1988), and Kracke (1978)--have identified leadership as central to their ethnographies. Barth, Leach, and Bailey have approached leadership primarily from a political frame. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that although they are viewing leadership through a political lens, their understanding of leadership is, in fact, more clearly and precisely understood when viewed through the wider scope of a cultural lens. I do not wish to undermine their political perspective on leadership, but only to suggest that a political approach is too narrow when trying to identify the nature of leadership. The political lens only allows us to see one or two colors in the wide spectrum of leadership.

Kracke, on the other hand, took a different point of view in his framework of leadership by looking through a psychoanalytic lens and identifying leadership as primarily an emotional relationship. Even though there are some striking differences in the approaches of all four anthropologists, I will argue that in each of their case studies, the proposed cultural theory of leadership emerges

as a more useful and appropriate approach to understanding the nature of leadership.

The Foundations of Barth and Leach

The order of presentation is based not only upon the chronology of the studies, but also--and perhaps more significantly--upon the fact that Barth (1959) and Leach (1964) laid important groundwork in the development of their views of leadership by arguing against the notion of equilibrium as it had been presented by their very distinguished predecessors: Durkheim (1915), Fortes (1940), Evans-Pritchard (1940), and Radcliffe-Brown (1940). This critical foundation laid by Barth and Leach had a major influence on ethnographies that followed, and upon both Bailey (1969, 1977, 1988), and Kracke (1978) who built their own leadership frameworks on the formulations of Barth and Leach and their notions of change and adaptation. Consequently, those same formulations had a major impact on their understanding of leadership.

Bailey's Contributions over Twenty Five Years

Although the discussion of Barth and Leach come first, the presentation of Bailey's work will be the longest. There are three reasons for this. First, he has written the most and all of his works are either directly or indirectly addressing leadership. Secondly, his studies, dating from 1957 to 1988, show his maturing notion of leadership that is worth tracing. Thirdly, Bailey gave us essentially four different contexts in which his own model of leadership

emerged, the Konds of Highland Orissa, the Valloire housewives, Losa peasant communities, and the modern academic arena. Bailey's approach to leadership has emerged over time and the theme of leadership can be traced from his earliest work in 1957 to his most recent work, published in 1988.

Kracke's Psychoanalytic Approach

Kracke's study of the Kagwahiv Indians in Brazil is, in my opinion, the ethnography that most persuasively grounds the proposed theory of leadership. Perhaps this occurs because Kracke, currently a professor at the University of Chicago, was also convinced of the universal nature of the process of leadership. I think, too, that his approach to leadership through a psychoanalytic lens is more in touch with the concern I have expressed repeatedly in this study over identifying the collective relationship inherent in leadership. Furthermore, he corroborates my earlier conviction that leadership serves as a mediator between culture and personality.

Can Leadership be Empirically Grounded?

The problem of doing empirical research on leadership has been raised by Kracke in his recent article in _Ethos_ called "Encounter with Other Cultures: Psychological and Epistemological Aspects" (1987). It is most illuminating in describing the personal experience of immersion in a culture very different from one's own and the positive and negative aspects of such an experience. Kracke offers a

personal evaluation of the epistomological problems of ethnography as a methodology. His article raises the problem that this theoretical study poses: How does one do empirical research on the nature of leadership? I hope that the case studies that follow will serve as a partial answer.

Fredrik Barth

In the analysis of Barth's work, I will review and evaluate his approach to leadership in his primary ethnography, <u>Political Leadership among the Swat Pathan</u> (1959a). Other works (1959b, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1973, 1981) will also be discussed insofar as they illuminate his model of leadership. His <u>Models of Social Organization</u> (1966) is particularly important to this discussion. Barth's interest in leadership serves as the primary framework in which his works are reviewed. In his notions of process, choice, collectivity, and generativity, Barth laid the foundation for future ethnographies on leadership and identified the isomorphic congruence of culture and leadership.

Setting

Barth's study describes certain aspects of the society of the Pathans of the Swat Valley in what was formerly a part of India but is now the northwest frontier province of

Pakistan. The Pashto-speaking people of the Swat Valley belong to a group loosely called Yusufzai Pathans of Afghans and it includes the descendants of a common distant ancestor, Yusaf, and those persons who are politically dependent on his ancestors. The Yusufzai number about one million and the population of the Swat Valley approximates 400,000. The Swat Pathans are isolated by natural boundaries, closed off by mountains on all sides. They support themselves by the cultivation of grain and by some cattle breeding. Land is limited and highly productive, thereby making it extremely valuable. The Pathans are Islamic and authority is uncentralized and dependent upon a tribal system.

When the Yusufzai tribes entered the valley as conquerors, they distributed property rights to lineage segments, but decreed that the land should be periodically realloted. In this system, individuals do not own land in the sense of having rights to particular fields; rather they hold shares in the total landed assets of the subtribe. The non-Yusufzai majority of the population never took part in this reallocation of land, thus two classes emerged: the gentry class of landowners, and the subordinate population, serving the different landlords. The latter include farmers, labourers, blacksmiths, carpenters, shopkeepers, barbers, shepherds, muleteers, and other craftsmen, all dependent on the landowners both politically and economically.

The Political Structure of Swat Society

Barth viewed culture through a leadership lens and in his ethnography of the Swat Pathans of Pakistan, he developed a model of leadership in which the culture of the Pathans is structured around dyadic relationships between leaders and followers so as to create corporate political followings. Barth's focus on leadership emerged for two reasons. The first focused on his notion of generativity to describe social organization. The second surfaced because of the political structure of Swat society, the description of which was his primary purpose.

The grouping of individuals in Swat society was not based upon any simple principle for the recruitment of such groups such as descent, castes, or associations. That is not to say there were no descent groups or castes, for in fact there was a patrilineal descent system. This system defined the principles for the ascription of status or rights, and the caste system created occupational categories. But the organization of Pathan society was not predominatly based on the patrilineal descent system. According to Barth, the language of the Pathans identified their primary political groupings around leaders who were either chiefs or saints. Political corporate groups were the result of the actions of leaders. "Any such group consists of all the persons whom a leader is able to mobilize in the event of conflict" (p. 72). Barth's study of the Swat Pathans in Pakistan is built around this notion of corporate groupings created by leaders who are either chiefs or saints.

Barth's study understood leadership not by defining the traits and skills of the chiefs and saints, but by identifying the general form of a leader's following and the wide field of political influence needed to build and maintain a following. Barth's study is important to this analysis of leadership because of his understanding of leadership as a relationship between leaders and followers and his notion of generative leadership. In order to understand Barth's approach to leadership and his generative models of social organization, as well as lay a foundation for our later discussions on Leach and Bailey, it is helpful to trace briefly the history of the concept of equilibrium.

History of Equilibrium

Barth's theory of leadership is, in part, a reaction to the concept of homeostatic equilibrium as it had been proposed by Durkheim (1915), Fortes (1940) Radcliffe-Brown (1940), and Evans-Pritchard(1940), all of whom shared the assumption that social systems are naturally endowed with an equilibrium which is a demonstrable fact and which maintains the political structure. The driving mechanism behind such social and political equilibrium was identified by Durkheim as "mechanical solidarity" which was the integration of social rules with the commitment of social units within the society to contribute to the attainment of collective goals. Such integration created a balance toward an equilbirium that maintained harmony and kept the social structure from falling apart.

Fortes' work, African Political Systems (1940), was

based on structural functionalism which favored the concept of equilibrium. He wrote, "This does not mean that Tale society was ever stagnant. Tension is implicit in the equilibrium. . . . But conflict could never develop to the point of bringing about complete disintegration" (p. 271). In other words, the notion of equilibrium acted as a force to repress any conflict or change that threatened existing social and political structures.

Radcliffe-Brown (1940) proposed that equilibrium was an inherent fact of nature. He argued that political systems were necessary for the "maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or possibililty of use, of physical force" (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. xiv). The assumption of systemic order with the notion of equilibrium was also characteristic of Evans-Prichard's (1940) study of the Nuer and his driving mechanism was the concept of a segmentary lineage system.

> Any segment [of a tribe] sees itself as an independent
> unit in relation to another segment of the same section,
> but sees both segments as a unity in relation to
> another section; and a section which from the point of
> view of its members comprises opposed segments is seen
> by members of other sections as an unsegmented unit.
> Thus there is . . . always contradiction in the
> definition of a political group, for it is a group only
> in relation to other segments of the same kind and they
> jointly form a tribe only in relation to other Nuer
> tribes and adjacent foreign tribes which form part of

the same political system, and without these relations
very little meaning can be attached to the concepts of
tribal segments and tribes. . . . Political values are
relative and . . . the political system is an
equilibrium between opposed tendencies toward fission
and fusion, between the tendency of all groups to
segment, and the tendency of groups to combine with
segments of the same order . . . . The tendency toward
segmentation must be defined as the fundamental
principle of their social structure. (pp. 147-148)

Against this backdrop, Barth (1959) and later on, Bailey
(1969), and Leach (1964), developed their challenges to this
concept of equilibrium, arguing that more is involved in
politics than is accounted for in the structural
functionalist approach, viz., processes and change. In
Political Leadership among the Swat Pathan (1959), Barth
begins his introduction by raising questions about
Radcliffe-Brown's (1940) definition of political systems and
suggested that the notion of equilibrium had not dealt with
the complexity in social structures nor had the notion
explicated the fact that followers have free choice in their
decisions to follow leaders and to exercise individual
choice between alternative allegiances.

In many anthropological accounts of tribal peoples, one
has the impression that political allegiance is not a
matter of individual choice. Each individual is born
into a particular structural position, and will
accordingly give his political allegiance to a
particular group or office-holder. In Swat, persons

find their place in the political order through a series

of choices, many of which are temporary or revocable. .

. . This freedom of choice radically alters the way in

which political institutions function. (1959, pp. 1-2)

Briefly, Leach and Bailey followed in Barth's path,

arguing against the notion of equilibrium and for a model of

social organization that incorporated competition, change,

historical flux, and the manipulaton of variables. Leach

(1964) worte, "Real societies can never be in equilibrium. .

. I hold that social structure in practical situations

consists of a set of ideas about the distribution of power

between persons and groups of persons" (p. 4). As discussed

earlier, Swartz (1968) became a key player in this arena by

proposing a processual (the adjectival form of the noun

process) approach to political and social organization. He

argued that social and political systems are always in a

state of becoming and thereby affirmed the more fluid

quality of the political process. Bailey (1969) argued that

the notion of equilibrium "does not allow for the

possibility that a structure may be radically changed or

quite destroyed" (p. 14). Thus, by challenging the notion

of equilibrium, all four anthropologists opened a new

channel for understanding leadership as a primary mechanism

for cultural change and development.

Structure and Change

Barth's reaction against the notion of equilibrium was

further defined in his essay "Segmentary Opposition and the

Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization" (1959b) in

which he argued that corporate groups in the political
system of Pathans are formed by the strategic choices on the
part of the participants, and do not emerge by virtue of a
mechanical solidarity deriving from likeness as had been
proposed by Durkheim's (1915) notion of "mechanical
solidarity." Barth was among the first to react against the
underlying assumptions of the concept of equilibrium as it
was first proposed by Durkheim (1915) and later by
Radcliffe-Brown (1940), Fortes (1940), and Evans-Pritchard
(1940). Barth t'.ereby had a strong influence on the later
works of Leach, Swartz, and Bailey, as well as many others.

The Swat Pathans

As mentioned earlier, Pathans are members of patrilineal
descent groups, castes, and occupational and residential
groups based on such territorial units as villages, wards,
areas, and subareas. Although the territorial units are
administrative units, they are not the framework on which
political power and processes operate. Authority relations
of each individual are the product of a series of choices,
though certain aspects of the individual's position are
ascribed to him by birth and residence. Each citizen is
placed in several formal frameworks, namely a territorial
system and a caste system which is a hierarchically-ordered
hereditary caste. All citizenship is vested only in members
of the landowning Pakhtun caste, and these serve as
political patrons for all members of the lower castes.

Chiefs

A duality of leadership and two bases of authority existed in the power structure. One focus is the Pakhtun chief, or khan. The power and authority of a chief depended to a great degree upon securing the loyalty of followers, and competition for followers is great. A following requires control of land, money, and women--all necessary resources for leadership--and an intense struggle took place among chiefs for them.

In order to retain the loyalty of the followers, land is loaned or rented to individuals and crops are distributed as gifts. Services of the other followers are bought by gifts and by promises of more gifts, and in some cases the support is guaranteed--or compelled--by threats and force. The struggle for followers is constant. Political loyalty of house tenants, for sale to the highest bidder, is bought by reward and security. Thus the following of a leader is never secure.

Saints

The second segment of leadership and authority is composed of the saints who are propertyless and whose authority is based upon reputations for morality and holiness. Saints can influence affairs by calling on supernatural sources: their control over the graves of saintly ancestors; their legal and moral dedication; and their claim of spiritual leadership supports their ability to mediate and give advice. Whereas pride, rivalry, and virility are expected of chiefs; moderation, reasonableness

and meekness are expected of saints. In the event of a holy war, their role in the leadership of an army is important. Saints also have followers, or disciples, and they are an important political presence in a chief's overall political strength.

Individual Choice among the Pathans

Barth did not deny the principles of unilineal descent and equivalence of siblings which formed social and political bonds. He simply argued that in the Pathan kinships system, there were alliances created by individual choice that did not fall within the basic frame of the assumptions inherent in notions of mechanical solidarity. Recruitment into these alliances or groups had to be understood in terms other than descent. Barth attempted to demonstrate how the socioeconomic transactions and exchanges of individuals influence the choices they make regarding their personal affiliations. These choices ultimately influence the composition of sociopolitical groups and result in structures that provide alternatives to the more traditional groups.

A Structural Web

All Pathans were involved in what Barth called a web of local relations between villagers. But no position in these local webs of relationships necessarily implied allegiance to a particular political officeholder, or dominance over any specific other person. All relationships implying dominance are dyadic relationships of a contractual or

voluntary nature. The authority system of the Swat is based upon such dyadic relations. Any person can select the bonds which define his various relations of dependence on others, and thus his reasons for submitting to the authority of these other persons, or inversely, the sources of his authority over others. The relations which give a position of dominance and authority to one partner are occupational contracts, house tenancy contracts, membership in men's houses and religous tutelage. "Political action, in this setting, is the art of manipulating these various dyadic relations so as to create effective and viable bodies of supporters--in other words, so as to create corporate political followings" (p. 4).

Land & Conflict

Central to the creation of political followers were the patterns of land ownership and tenure which were complicated and could easily result in alliances among local territorial groups that would not fall within the limits of what is usually expected in lineage systems. All conflicts related to land and land rights. From the title to land springs all political power--wealth, the control of clients, and a voice in the councils. Since the pattern of land tenure is based more upon a shareholder system than ownership of a particular field, most conflict occured over the periodic reallotment of shares. Every fourth, fifth, or tenth year, each man is allotted new fields, and problems arise over different levels of reallotment, wherein individuals have their eyes on particular fields, and especially where deaths

and transfer change the distribution of shares from one time
of allotment to the next.

Competition

Competition is particularly high among close agnatic
collaterals (a kinship system traceable exclusively through
males) and settlement is supposed to occur in council.
Other areas of conflict revolve around inheritance, field
borders, and water for irrigation. Normally, a Pakhtuns's
political activities are directed at gaining an advantage
over agnatic rivals, as only through their defeat can he
achieve his own aggrandizement. His political strength is
increased by alliances with small, distant collateral groups
against his close collaterals. Opposition between agnatic
rivals leads to a dichotomization of their associates into
supporters and opponents.

Landowners need tenant farmers, laborourers,
blacksmiths, carpenters, craftsmen, shepherds, and others to
complete the economic system. A landowner, or chief, must
maintain a variety of relationships with different
categories of his subjects; he must also maintain
relationships with his fellow landowners who are his lineage
equals and potential rivals as well as with the holy men, or
saints, and their religious followers.

The Men's House

In order to cultivate his followers, the chief invites
them to the men's house where he gives food and other
valuables to maintain his followers, many of whom are

nonlandowners and exist barely above the subsistence level
and are therefore dependent upon the provisions of the men's
house and the generosity of the chief. Primarily through
his hospitality, he creates the wider obligations and
dependence which he can then draw upon in the form of
personal political support and, if necessary, military
support. It is by becoming a leader among the nonlandowners
that a Pakhtoun chief maintains his position. But each
Pathan has the strategic advantage of switching allegiance
to another landowner if a better deal can be arranged. Thus
the relationship between landowners and nonlandowners is a
voluntary contract. A leader can exercise control by
threatening to withdraw benefits, and a follower can
exercise control by threatening to join another chief's
household. Thus, the exercise of choice is crucial in the
political and economic system.

Alliances

The basic bond on which the wider Swat organization
depends is the alliance, which is a contractural promise of
mutual support in political conflicts, particularly relating
to debates in public assemblies and to the use of force.
Political leaders of an area, with their followers, are thus
grouped through a set of alliances into two opposed blocs.
The leaders of each are the chiefs and other minor
landowners, such as saints. At any given time, the chief's
house is composed of followers who are tenants, minor
landowners, craftsmen, and others who have an economic
relationship with the chief. Relationships based upon an

economic exchange are more vulnerable than those based upon other cultural ties, such as kinship, ritual, and tradition.

Transactional & Moral Bonds

Barth described a leader's followings as a series of concentric circles in which there are those followers who are closest to him, such as family, relatives, and village people; then there is a larger circle of other leaders and other small communities; and finally a larger circle of neighboring areas. Some followers have a strictly economic basis that ties them to a leader, while others have a stronger moral bond based on kinship, ritual, religious, and traditional systems. Barth also called these various levels of leaders and followers a web of social relations.

Theory of Games as Metaphor

Barth's (1959b) theory of games is an analysis of how political groups recruit members among the Pathan. The groups are based on patrilineal descent, but only the father and his sons form an indissoluble union, and the children of brothers unite and divide according to carefully calculated personal advantage. Barth used Neumann's and Morgenstern's (1944) theory of games as a metaphor for the political relationships of the Pathans. A game, like the Pathan political organization, has the following three features:

1. The presence of a persisting opposition of interests.

2. Contractual political alliances based on an unrestricted freedom for the units of the system to form

coalitions on the basis of strategic choices.

3. The recognition and positive value given to the status of chief and local leader, i.e., there is a set of individual bonuses, the distribution of which is the subject of an understanding among persons.

The game is built around at least three players competing for control of one basic good--land. By its rules, each player may choose one partner. Two players who choose one another form a couple, or coalition, and are able by their simple majority to extract a value from the third player. Various combinations of choices can be made. The game can also include five players. Bascially, it illustrates that an advantage is formed only by forming coalitions. When a coalition has not been formed, a player gains no advantage. Barth used this theory in describing the structures of competition and coalition building between the Pakhtun chiefs.

Barth's Generative Model of Social Organization

In 1966 Barth proposed a generative model of social anthropology which has wide implications for his notion of leadership. There is a similarity between his generative model and his reaction against the notion of equilibrium in the sense that through his generative model he defined more precisely the fluid nature of social processes and also identified how social forms are generated. "Form in social life is constituted by a series of regularities in a large body of individual items of behavior" (p. v). Barth believed his generative model had three uses: (a) It

explains what generates form; (b) It describes change and studies the changes that generate forms; and, (c) It facilitates comparative analysis as a methodological equivalent of experiments.

Process & Form

Barth's basic argument for studying process had been formulated earlier by Boas (1940): "If anthropology desires to establish the laws governing the growth of culture it must not confine itself to comparing the results of growth alone, but whenever such is feasible, it must compare the processes of growth" (p. 280). Building on Boas' call to compare processes of growth, Barth argued that social forms are the results of processes. They are frequency distributions of behavior which may be explained as the outcome of social processes acting on a limited number of determinants. The differences between comparisons based on models of form and those based on models of process are as follows: "A model of form is a pattern which describes major features of the empirical units under study. . . . A model of process, on the other hand, consists of a set of actors which by specified operations generate forms. Through changes in one or several of these factors, different forms may be generated by the model" (p. 22). Barth examined processes of transaction and processes of integration to illustrate his generative model. What follows is Barth's discussion on transaction and integration.

Transaction

Building once again on Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Barth argued that "process itself consists of an immense multitude of actions and interrelations of human beings, acting as individuals or in combinations or groups . . . . A statement of such significant general features of the process of social life constitutes a description of what may be called a 'form of social life'" (1966, p. 1). A key word is frequencies, i.e., "our claim must be that we have discovered some non-random frequency distribution in actions" (p. 1). The exercise of choice is the most simple and general generative model. Such choices are usually moral choices and therefore what people do is influenced by moral injunctions and motivations.

A listing of injunctions and obligations, however, does not provide the full basis on which to understand choice. The process which generates the form must also be analyzed. In other words, choices and decisions are generated through processes of interaction and from that construct rules governing behavior. One basis for such rules is found in the transactional nature of most interpersonal relations, in the reciprocity which we impose on ourselves and others. In any social relationship we are involved in a flow and counterflow of prestations, of appropriate and valued goods and services.

The general notion of reciprocity is that of a process which results where parties in the course of their interactions systematically try to assure that the value gained for them is greater or equal to the value lost. In

such a generative model the incentives and constraints on choice are effective through the way they determine what can be gained and lost. Each actor's social adjustment to the other party in the transaction is depicted in terms of alternative possible moves, and how they in turn affect an ego's value gains. This occurs over time, it is a model of process. This same idea occurs in the theory of games to analyze political choice. This generative model is one whereby one may generate forms according to the rules of strategy, given the parameters of value. For example, behavior roles can be generated from statuses.

Implicit in this model is the idea of values. Barth suggested that transactions are analytically important because (a) where systems of evaluation (values) are maintained, transactions must be a predominent form of interaction; (b) in them the relative evaluations in a culture are revealed; and (c) they are a basic social process by means of which we can explain how a variety of social forms are generated from a much simpler set and distribution of basic values (p. 5).

Transactional behavior takes place with reference to a set of values which serve as generalized incentives and constraints on choice; it also takes place with reference to a pre-established matrix of statuses, seen as a distribution of values on positions in the form of minimal clusters of jurally binding rights. To illustrate, Barth drew upon a study of winter herring fisheries in which the statuses involved were a skipper, a netboss, and fishermen. In each case, status influenced the way behavior roles and choices

were exhibited.

Integration

Barth's (1966) second focus in his generative model of process is integration in culture. By integration he means "the extent to which phenomena constitute a system, show determinancy and consistency in relation to each other" (p.12). Behavior patterns exhibit various kinds of integration, and since values are the determinants from which social forms and behavior patterns are generated, Barth focused his notions of integration on people's principles and scales of evaluation.

Barth believed values are empirical facts which may be discovered, views held by actors which exhibit significance, worthwhileness, preferences for things and actions. "They are the criteria by reference to which alternative actions are evaluated, and are the basis on which choice is exercised" (p. 12). As such, they are not objectively correct, but cannons of judgement which people impose on things and actions.

The integration of culture is frequently represented as one of logical or psychological consistency, but Barth believed they are only to a slight degree available for observation by social anthropologists and they do not explain views or values of people which are inconsistent. Alternatively, the functional view of cultural integration seems to lead to a Malinowskian theory of need fulfillment which, in Barth's view, is highly problematical.

Instead, Barth argued, it is through transaction that we

can observe and study the basic process which creates
consistency between the different standards of evaluation in
a culture. Transaction means that each part consistently
tries to assure that the value gained is greater than the
value lost. The process of how agreements over a
transaction can be reached between two parties, when done
over time, reinforces the values which become systematized
and shared.

> They become systematized because when, and only when, we
> are faced with the repeated necessity of choice, are we
> forced to resolve dilemmas and make some kind of
> comparison between, and evaluation of, the alternatives
> with which we are presented. They become shared, or
> institutionalized, because in groping for a solution to
> the dilemmas, we prefer to use other people's experience
> as our guide rather than risk the errors implied in a
> trial-and-error procedure. Thus we adopt their
> principles of evaluation, and collectively grope toward
> a consistency of values. (p. 14)

As a process generating consistency in values, social
transactions would seem to be more effective and compelling
than any contemplative need for logical or conceptual
consistency as evaluated by philosophers. Barth's
assumption in constructing this model of the process whereby
the integration of values is achieved includes the initial
state of arbitrary, disparate values because they were
man-made.

> First, values become progressively systematized as they
> are used to mediate the comparisons of prestations in

transactions: over-arching canons or principles of
evaluation are necessary for persons engaged in such
transactions. Secondly, values become progressively
shared by being made known through transactions: the
principles of evaluation, and their uses, become public
and serve as guides in the choices of others. The
process of transaction thus simultaneously generates
trends towards integration and institutionalization.
Finally, in an on-going system, where patterns of
behavior are generated from a set of shared values, the
resolution of individual dilemmas of choice by the
construction of over-arching principles of evaluation
will have a feed-back effect on the shared values. The
shared values will be modified and 'corrected' in the
direction of greater consistency and integration, and
other patterns of choice and behavior will in turn be
generated. (pp. 14-15)

Through transactions, evaluations are not only corrected
with reference to consistency and sharing; they also also
modified in the direction of consistency in terms of natural
and external criteria, i.e. they become less arbitrary.
Barth drew upon his study of the Pathan men's houses to
illustrate the use of transactions to establish integraton
and consistency of values. "A concept of transaction
provides not only a model for social process, but also for a
process whereby integration is effected between the
different values of a culture" (p. 20).

The Problem of Comparison

Barth set his generative model, or model of process, against models of form and argued that his model of process improved the methodology of comparison. By comparing his model with a model of form, such as lineage systems, Barth suggested that a model of process explains more fruitfully the relationships between the structure of a kinship system and a political system. Models of form do not allow for the growth of various systems. Lineage and descent systems are better understood as empirical processes that generate empirical forms. Rather than comparing forms in a social system, the anthropologist should proceed from the view that there are determinants of form and a valid comparison presupposes an understanding of the processes whereby forms are generated from such determinants.

The steps involved in such a comparative analysis are three: (a) Formulating a hypothesis about the empirical determinants and process which affect form; (b) Constructing a generative model with variables depicting these determinants (e.g. descent rights) and operations depicting the processes (e.g. transaction, growth); (c) Comparing the forms generated by the model and those of the empirical cases.

The purpose of comparison is to explain differences, i.e., explain in the sense of locating the determining factors, and showing how variations in these factors can have those specific, ramifying effects which characterize the forms.

Barth believed a conscious use of generative models in

comparison would represent a step forward in methodology.

It makes explicit those hypotheses which we are
entertaining about determinate interconnections; it
makes it possible to encompass a greater variety of data
in single, structured hypotheses; it isolates more
clearly the logical operations from the empirical
observations and thus facilates the falsification of
hypotheses. Perhaps most importantly, a use of
generative models directs our attention to the
observation of the processes whereby form comes about,
rather than a narrow concentration on form alone, and
may lead to a greater sophistication in the way we
depict these processes" (p. 32).

Leadership as a Generative Model

By the use of generative models, Barth believed
anthropologists could reduce uniqueness in cultures to a
minimum, and elevate the few differences that exist in the
processes that generate the great differences in social
forms. Barth utilized his generative model to explain
leadership as a process and as a generator of social forms.
This understanding of generative leadership was an important
contribution to our understanding of leadership in cultures
as process and not as content.

Leadership is generative in that it generates new forms
and participates in a changing environment. Leadership and
change have a close kinship in Barth's generative model.
Change refers to the alteration in alignments of personnel
as well as processual, unfolding development. Change within

Barth's leadership framework is not so much cyclical as it is transformational. Change results in a structure which is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the one that preceeded it.

Barth's Model of Generative Leadership

From the above discussion, it is possible to identify Barth's model of leadership as essentially a cultural model. First, Barth understood leadership as a process and as a set of relationships, rather than as content or a single individual behaving in certain ways. Barth's notion of generativity is among the best descriptions we have of leadership as a process that generates social forms. It is fitting to call Barth's model "generative leadership." Barth understood leadership as a generative relationship that creates culture. This is the central characteristic of Barth's model and forms the basis on which succeeding anthropologists defined social structures and organization.

Secondly, Barth's notion of generative leadership meets the basic needs of subsistence as well as the needs of power, socialization, aggression, rivalry, and religion. The men's houses are a primary social structure that addresses a host of basic needs in the Swat society. The role of saints as leaders also focuses on the needs of religion and ritual.

Thirdly, Barth's generative leadership is resourceful and political. In fact, Barth would himself understand his notion of leadership as primarily political. But I think that is too limiting. Nevertheless, the political system

and sources of authority derive from the leadership
relationship among leaders and followers with the emphasis
falling on the followers and how they form the basis of
political activity as leaders try to cultivate and maintain
their following. Economic contracts and alliances are key
resources. Women, gold, and land were resources. The
patrilineal descent and caste systems were resources.
Power, competition, rivalry, and legitimacy all come into
play in the political game. Sources of authority derive
from the whole range of the leader's relations to his
followers. The principle of individual captaincy drives
from the notion of legitimacy. The metaphor of the game is
appropriately used to describe the political process and one
which Bailey (1969) also utilized.

Fourthly, the collective nature of leadership is very
apparent in the elementary corporate units that were built
on the relationships between leaders and followers. Barth
has successfully defined the process of leadership as a
collective process and has avoided entirely any notion of
leadership that is built only around the individual leader.
In the Swat society, the leader is nothing without his
following and if the leader fails to respond to the needs of
his followers, he can easily lose them.

Fifthly, a structural web of shared meaning can be
identified in Barth's generative leadership. He himself
used the idea of a web of social relations to describe the
intricacies of the leaders/followers relationship.

Sixth, Barth tied his model of generative leadership to
language and symbols. The men's house is one of the most

important symbols. The symbolism of the priest as leader and the relationship between leadership and religious ritual were pointed out on numerous occassions.

Seventh, the notion of ethics is quite apparent in both the moral nature of the relationship among leaders and followers in contrast to purely contractual relationships that other leadership scholars have written about. It is also present in the role of the saints as leaders since they manage the rituals, myths, and beliefs which shape behavioral norms.

Summary

Barth emphasized the importance of individuals making strategic choices in their interaction with other people where these choices are aimed at achieving the goals of the chooser. He further focused on the dynamic nature of culture and leadership, opposing the assumptions inherent in previous notions of equilibrium. His approach to leadership illustrates the centrality of the relationship between leaders and followers. His focus on choice in the selection of leaders by followers also allowed Barth to examine how individuals attempt to manipulate political systems for their own benefit and to the detriment of their opponents. Finally, Barth's concept of generativity illustrates that leadership is a mechanism by which people generate cultures wherein social structure meet human needs. Although Rost (1982) coined it first, the label of "generative leadership" is appropriately applied to Barth's model.

Edmund R. Leach

Parallel to Barth's (1959) approach to understanding social structures and leadership, Leach created a model for interpreting the dynamic nature of culture, focusing his discussion on leadership by examining three factors: (a) the seeking of power as the basis of social choice, (b) the definition of myth and ritual in the collective consciousness, and, most significantly, (c) the distinction between ideal and real patterns of behavior, expressed as political doctrines of gumsa and gumlao. This analysis of Leach's approach to leadership will be based primarily on Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (1964). Prior to analyzing Leach's view of leadership, an explanation of the complexity of the social structure in Kachin society is necessary. His analysis sets the stage for understanding his views on the coterminous relationship among leadership, social structure, and culture.

The Setting

Leach's study was with the Kachin and Shan population of Northeast Burma, a population speaking a number of different languages and dialects with wide differences of cultural forms. The Shans occupy the river valleys where they cultivate rice in irrigated fields; they are relatively sophisticated with a culture somewhat resembling that of the Burmese. The Kachins, on the other hand, occupy the hills

where they cultivate rice mainly by the slash and burn
techniques of shifting cultivation.

Leach indicated that the literature throughout the past
century had treated the Kachins as if they were primitive
and warlike savages, far removed from the Shans. While the
distinctions between Shans and Kachins are real, Leach
observed that since they are close neighbors, sharing the
Kachin Hills, there is much that is shared between the two
groups. Previous ethnographic accounts, therefore, were
unreliable. Many family lineages reveal both Kachins and
Shans, and one of Leach's problems was sorting out Kachins
from Shans.

Kachins and Shans are mutually contemptuous of one
another, even though both share a common ancestory. While
the cultural dress of each group is different, the history,
values, and symbols are strikingly similar. This is what
Leach found perplexing: "I am concerned not so much with
the structural interpretation of a particular culture, but
with how particular structures can assume a variety of
cultural interpretations, and with how different structures
can be represented by the same set of cultural symbols. In
pursuing this theme I seek to demonstrate a basic mechanism
in social change" (p. 17).

Equilibrium

Leach's field work, first among the Kurds resulting in a
1940 monograph, and later among the Kachin during World War
II, convinced him that the traditional notion of equilibrium
as proposed by Durkheim (1915), Fortes (1940), and

Evans-Pritchard (1940) did not address the rapid changes that he witnessed among the Kurds and Kachin. Like Barth, Leach believed that all societies maintain only a precarious balance at any time, and are really in a constant state of flux and potential change. He wrote, "Real societies can never be in equilibrium" (1964, p. 4).

Leach argued that "every real society is a process in time" (p. 5) and the norms which exist are neither stable nor inflexible. In Leach's earlier essay on the Kurds (1940), he wrote, "There can never be absolute conformity to the cultural norm, indeed the norm itself exists only as a stress of conflicting interests and divergent attitudes . . . . The mechanism of culture change is to be found in the reaction of individuals to their differential economic and political interests" (p. 62).

This being the case, Leach argued "in order to make the description intelligible at all, some degree of idealization seems essential" (1940, p. 9). He believed that analysis must therefore operate at two levels. First, the anthropologist builds up a model of how the society might be expected to work as if it were in equilibrium, if it were well integrated. But in order to capture the historical reality, one must also evaluate the interplay of personal interests which can only temporarily form a balance and which must in due course alter the system. Equilibrium, Leach postulated, could only be assumed for purposes of analysis, but one had to remain aware of the fictional nature of this assumption and recognize that "the reality situation is in most cases full of inconsistencies; and it

is precisely these inconsistencies which can provide us the
an understanding of the processes of social change (1964, p.
8).

If the anthropologist needed an ideal pattern to provide
an orientation, so did the people themselves. In the case
of the Kachin, Leach proposed that this ideal pattern was
set out in ritual which expressed symbolically "the system
of socially approved 'proper' relations between individuals
and groups" and which "momentarily makes explicit what is
otherwise a fiction" (1964, pp. 15-16). The very ambiguity
of ritual and symbol, the levels of uncertainty inherent in
ritual and cultural communication were necessary. They
permitted the actors a range of legitimate choices. Leach
also identified rituals or symbolic actions as the ethics of
a culture insofar as they identify what is sacred. Leach
disagreed with Durkheim (1915) by arguing that there is no
absolute dichotomy between the sacred and the profane and
that "the great majority of social actions partake partly of
the one sphere and partly of the other" (p. 13). Leach
confessed to a basic psychological assumption in his
approach to ritual. "I assume that all human beings,
whatever their culture and whatever their degree of mental
sophistication, tend to construct symbols and make mental
associations in the same general sort of way" (p. 14). Thus
Leach joined with Barth in challenging the assumptions
implicit in the notion of equilibrium.

Social Change as Power, Esteem & Choice
The notions of power and esteem were central to Leach's

theory of social change, much as they were for Barth, because individuals are continually faced by choices among alternatives for action. Leach believed that when they make these choices, the primary basis for the decision is to gain power, or to access esteem which leads to power. This seeking of power is the basis for social change. Related is the social competition for prestige and reputation to enhance social mobility.

The structural analysis of the anthropologist and the rituals of the people are therefore both idealized abstractions, attempts to impose an as if fictional but comprehensible order upon the flux of social life. Beneath these attempts at formalization lies the reality of individuals in pursuit of power. Leach believed that power was an inherent need of human nature and he accordingly he assumed "that individuals faced with a choice of action will commonly use such choice so as to gain power, that is to say they will seek recognition as social persons who have power; or, to use a different language, they will seek to gain access to office or the esteem of their fellows which may lead them to office" (1964, p. 10). Social actors were in pursuit of esteem in their quest for power, and Leach believed that "esteem is a cultural product" (p. 10). In the competition for power, actors make a series of choices which collectively alter the structure of their society. Choice is the primary change agent in cultures.

Rituals, Myths, & Symbols

Rituals were directly related to power, esteem, and

reputation because they "express the individual's status as a social person in the structural system . . . describ[ing] the social actions which occur in sacred situations" (pp. 10-11). Leach did not agree with Durkheim's (1915) distinction between religious rites which are sacred and technical acts which are profane. He argued that the great majority of social actions partake of both spheres. Ritual, then, is "a symbolic statement which 'says' something about the individuals involved in the [social] action" (p. 13). Kachin religious sacrifice, for example, was both a sacred act and an economic act insofar as the ritual act also cooked and distributed the meat for consumption.

Myth, in Leach's terminology, is the counterpart of ritual; "myth implies ritual, ritual implies myth, they are one and the same" (p. 13). In the classical definitions, myth and ritual are treated as separate conceptual categories which had a functional interdependence--ritual dramatized myth and myth sanctioned the ritual. Leach disagreed with this definition, believing instead that both myth and ritual say the same thing, but ritual says it in actions while myth says it in words.

In a cultural context, ritual and myth create a pattern of symbols and such symbols, along with the ritual they portray, make explicit the social structure of a culture. Leach assumed that all human being construct symbols as a part of their basic need to communicate and socialize. Together, ritual, myth, and symbols provide the form, or dress, of cultures. Because Kachin culture was complex with its various languages and dialects, rituals were relatively

simple and provided a common basis of communication within the culture. Among Kachins, the telling of myths is a professional occupation, carried out by priests and bards of various grades. As a result, different versions of the myths emerged, providing a mechanism for social change as well as a resource of power and esteem for the priests and bards. As Leach concluded: "Myth and ritual is a language of signs in terms of which claims to rights and status are expressed, but it is a language of argument, not a chorus of harmony. If ritual is sometimes a mechanism of integration, one could as well argue that it is often a mechanism of disintegration" (p. 278).

Gumlao and Gumsa

The primary structure for social change was expressed in terms of the concepts of gumlao and gumsa. There were three basic types of political systems in the Kachin Hills area--the egalitarian, almost anarchic system of the gumlao Kachin; the unstable, intermediate gumsa form, a sort of ministate or a ranked, hierarchical feudal state; and the Shan state, identified geographically as highland Burma. Leach was primarily concerned about these types of political doctrine as they affected the Kachin. These two doctrines were ideal types, but useful to the people in classifying real communities. While existing ethnographic accounts prior to Leach's study described Kachin social organization as always the gumsa system, Leach discovered that Kachin communities swung from one type to another. He also found that the gumsa communities were particularly unstable.

Leach examined the categories used by the people to describe these systems, and he showed that they were represented in terms of the same set of symbols but in different combinations. When a community swung from one type to another, as a result of political activity, the people might then weigh the value of the various symbols differently while still in a sense speaking the same ritual language.

The essence of the difference between the gumsa and gumlao organizations was revealed in the pattern of leadership insofar as the real Kachin society was not a rigidly structured hierarchy of fixed classes and well-defined offices, as earlier ethnographic accounts had portrayed. Rather it was a system in which there was constant and at times very rapid social mobility. In other words, the real behavior did not match what was considered the ideal behavior. It was a simple discrepancy between theory and practice.

Shan Social System

The Shans generally have a relatively common culture, but dialect variations between different localities are considerable, though it can be said that all Shans speak one language, namely Tai. An important criterion of group identity is that all Shans are Buddhists, though not devout. Historically, Shan states of north Burma retained a considerable degree of independence and tended to owe fealty to China rather than Burma and as a result suffered destruction at the hands of the Burmese armies during the latter part of the 18th century. Since then they have been

treated as feudal dependencies of the Burmese crown. The
principle form of the economic structure is wet-rice
cultivaton.

Shifting between gumlao and gumsa

The Shan social system is relatively stable compared to
the Kachin systems of gumlao and gumsa. As suggested
earlier, Shans and Kachins did not display much affection
for one another, although they essentially shared a similar
culture. The majority of Kachin communities are organized
according to the gumsa system which is, in effect, a kind of
compromise between gumlao and Shan ideals. But Kachin
communities also oscillate between the two polar types of
gumlao democracy and egalitarianism, on the one hand, and
Shan autocracy and feudal hierarchy on the other.

Leach's analysis was concerned with the mechanisms by
which one type of system was transformed into another. The
Kachin lineages differed from the normal African patterns
described by Fortes (1940) and Evans-Pritchard (1940) in
that they were ranked relative to each other. Their rank
was fixed by a system of marriage alliances. One cannot
give a wife to a lineage from whom one takes a wife, and
vice versa. This permits an ideal ranking of lineages, with
wife-givers superior to wife-takers who are their vassals.
This combination of lineage and rank is at the root of the
instability of the gumsa system.

> The gumsa ideal order consists of a network of related
> lineages, but it is also a network of ranked lineages.
> As the process of lineage fission proceeds there comes a

point at which choice has to be made between the primacy of the principle of rank or the principle of kinship. Rank implies an asymmetrical relationship. . . .Kinship implies a symmetrical relationship. . . . The weakness of the <u>gumsa</u> system is that the successful chief is tempted to repudiate links of kinship with his followers and to treat them as if they were bond slaves. It is this situation, which in a <u>gumlao</u> point of view, is held to justify revolt. (p. 203)

There is an equivalent structural defect with <u>gumlao</u>:

A <u>gumlao</u> community, unless it happens to be centred around a fixed territorial centre such as a patch of irrigated rice terraces, usually lacks the means to hold its component lineages together in a status of equality. It will then either disintegrate altogether through fission, or else status differences between lineage groups will bring the sytem back into the <u>gumsa</u> pattern. (p. 204)

In both cases the dynamic for change is provided by individuals competing for power. The dissatisfied man with some inherited status might decide to seek office in a hierarchical system or to repudiate hierarchy, to be a rebel against the incumbent chief, or a revolutionary against the <u>gumsa</u> system. The influential figure, the one Leach called the leader, in a <u>gumlao</u> system may choose to repudiate democracy and swing his community towards a <u>gumsa</u> structure. Each system carries within itself the seeds of its contrary, and communities swing between the <u>gumlao</u> and <u>gumsa</u> extremes.

Ideal and Real Behavior

In his analysis of one small and unstable gumsa community, Hpalang, Leach illustrated the difference between ideal systems and real behavior.

> While the kinship composition of the community [of Hpalang] had remained more or less unaltered over the past 40 years, there had been radical changes in the internal authority structure. The leaders of the community still used gumsa categories to describe the respective status of groups and persons; they attached importance to the notion of aristocracy, the title of chief, and to the rights of chiefs . . . but all this was largely pretense. Had the community been organised on gumlao principles with no aristocrats, no chiefs and no tributary dues, the de facto situation would have been almost the same. This is an illustration of the fact that the contrast between gumsa and gumlao is a difference of ideal order rather than empirical fact. (p. 97)

Leach used the dynamic and complex interaction between the two to illustrate that people in cultures use ideal models as screens behind which the actual competitive relations and power struggles of community life are worked out. Bailey (1977) used the notions of front stage and back stage dramas to illustrate much the same point. The ideal model is expressed in inexact and symbolic terms, so that people can manipulate alternatives with an easy conscience, and resolve apparent contradictions at the ideological level. It is an equilibrium as if model, but one which

cannot accommodate change. The more real model was provided for Leach by the power relationships, a model in which actors made choices in terms of maximizing power. Such choices were defined, in part, by the wide range of alternatives presented in the symbolic ritual system. That is why Leach believed the symbolic system was a combination of both the sacred and the profane.

Leadership

Ritual, & Property

Leadership in Kachin society can only be understood in light of the above discussion on ritual and power, the two elements that express the ideal and the real social structures of Kachin society. The Kachin is made aware of structural relationships, such as leadership, through the performance of ritual acts and the recitation of tales which have ritual implications. But the symbolic elements of which ritual is composed are far from being precise scientific categories. The components of symbolism may have a ritual meaning, but they also at the same time have a practical meaning, and the two types of meaning are never wholly distinct. Since their ritual is tied to language, it becomes important to understand certain verbal expressions which a Kachin uses when making statements about social structure.

Bearing in mind that Kachins can be gumlao Kachins, gumsa Kachins, and Shans, most of the dispute regarding authority and leadership are related to rights of property. Political units are called villages and there are clusters

of villages which together have one senior headman called a chief who wears many hats but is primarily a leader of the ritual celebrations. His political authority depends on his ability to make sacrifices. A chief is the final authority. There is no one higher.

Categories of place and persons are also important to understand. The village is one category of place. Key concepts in the categories of persons are the family and extended family which often live in one household, a lineage or clan which can take precedence over family, and a villager which cuts across all kinship rivalries and denotes loyalty to a place.

Concepts of property and ownership include wealth or wealth objects. Wealth can mean not only having rights over property, but over people as well. Chiefs have the greatest wealth. Kachin individuals can interpret wealth by giving someone else a piece of property but then owning the rights of debtorship over the recipient of the property. As the owner of a debt, the Kachin has wealth. Besides property, cattle and food goods are considered wealth. These wealth objects are a primary currency and are the mechanisms for manipulating social status. The wealth objects also have ritual significance in sacrifices as well a practical significance.

Class and Status

Notions of class and status bear upon leadership too. A Kachin born under claims of aristocracy may live in poverty even while he is deserving of honor. Honor is expressed

through deference, notably by offering gifts and by the use of an appropriate florid or poetical style of speech. In theory, then, people of superior class receive gifts from their inferiors, but no real economic advantage accrues from this. Anyone who receives a gift is thereby placed in debt to the giver. Thus, in theory, social climbing is not really possible, yet in practice many Kachin try to work their way up the social scale by lavishness in hospitality and feastgiving, in somewhat of a comparable manner as the men's houses in Swat society. Thus, while class hierarchy is supposed to be rigid, in fact it is not. Symbols such as cattle, land, and land tenure also play a key role in status.

The Supernatural and Ritual

Concepts of the supernatural are also relevant to our discussion of leadership and illustrate once again the practical as well as sacred ends. Offerings to the spirits are in the form of sacrifice. But Kachins do not kill their domestic livestock except for sacrifice so it also serves as a feast for all who attend the ritual. Kachin spirits simply extend the human class hierarchy to a higher level and are continuous with it. Even in the spirit world there are chiefs, aristocrats, and commoners, all of which lived previous similar lives on earth. Great deities are approached by way of lesser deities, and this practice carries over into practical matters insofar as a poor commoner will approach an intermediate to intercede on his behalf with a superior commoner. The flourishing of crops

or their failure depend in large part upon the success of sacrifices and ritual. Spirits are generally good, but there are also witch spirits, which, interestingly, are a hereditary problem and lack any cure.

Leadership & Authority

Concepts of authority include political and religious office. While chiefs are important in the ritual of the villages, there are also priests of various grades and diviners and spirit mediums. As indicated earlier, while the chief holds no priestly office, his power derives from a religious role.

The chief exercises various levels of authority which Leach identified as levels of leadership. First, there is judicial leadership and in this role he settles disputes by arbitration. There are no judges in Kachin society. Lawsuits normally involve debts and the settlement of debts. The chief works closely with a judicial body or council of village people who are principal leaders in lineages. They are the wise men and the chief serves on this council.

Secondly, a chief serves in a military capacity. Warfare was usually a feudal affair, often over a woman, and fought between lineages. The chief is the commander-in-chief, but does not himself engage in the fighting.

Thirdly, the chief is involved in economic affairs as already discussed. He is expected to put on the biggest feasts, he distributes goods, he receives tribute from those who are indebted to him, and he is involved in land issues

and disputes.

In the matter of executive leadership, Leach pointed out that frequently an outstanding commoner would function as a leader of a domain for all everyday practical affairs, perhaps similar to a small town mayor. The presence of such village leaders, which was fairly common in all villages, further pointed to the ritual nature of the chief's office. Frequently, the chiefs aspired to being Shan princes and the executive affairs were left entirely to the local leaders. When the British government ruled in Burma, the chief was responsible for making executive decisions as the agent of the paramount power. But often the local leaders or the village council made the decisions. "So again there is a conflict between theory and practice" wrote Leach. "Kachin theory is that the chief rules with autocratic power; in my actual field-work I seldom identified any instruction which had issued from a chief acting on his own intitiative" (p. 189).

Ritual and Storytellers

In relation to sacrifice, the chief gave the animal that is to be sacrificed and he employed the priest who actually does the sacrifice. Again, his role is symbolically powerful, but he does not practically act in the role of priest. Priests can assume power if they are skilled in priestly acts, such as dancing or butchering, or the telling of traditional tales. In his study of an Amazonian culture, Kracke also found that the telling of traditional stories and tales was an important means of legitimizing the

leadership of one particular headman. Priests would, in part, be responsible for telling the stories upon which Kachin religion and myth were based. A very good storyteller grew in influence. Leach pointed out that since there was "no authentic version of Kachin tradition to which all Kachins would agree" (p. 266), the role of the storyteller was strengthened by the richness and embellishment that could be added without jeopardizing the basics of the myths. Leach discovered that the sacred tales were not much different from tales about local happenings of no more than twenty years ago. This was, in part, why he disagreed with Durkheim's (1915) separation of the sacred and profane. Myths simply served to justify certain rights and had as much a profane nature to them as sacred. "Since any social system, however stable and balanced it may be, contains opposing factions, there are bound to be different myths to validate the particular rights of different groups of people" (p. 277). Leach was therefore convinced that contrary to the traditional notion of myth and ritual serving to maintain an equilibrium, myth and ritual as a language of signs could represent conflict as well as harmony, and serve as a mechanism of disintegration as well as integration.

Thus, Kachin society thinks of itself as having a clear cut authority system with the chief as the peak of a hierarchy of ranked clases, differentiated from one another by rules of caste-like rigidity. But the reality does not correspond with the ideal and often local leaders are the ones with the greatest influence and power. Because gumsa

chiefs are aspiring to be Shan princes, at least in behavior, they end up giving the actual authority and power over daily affairs to others such as the council of wise men, the local leaders, or, less frequently, the priests.

Leadership, then, served as the basic mechanism for social change in Kachin communities. It was also characterized by the political model of gumsa and gumlao. Leach summed up this relationship between leadership and the tension between gumsa and gumlao:

> The real Kachin society is . . . a system in which there is constant and at times very rapid social mobility. The mobility is brought about in one of two ways. Either the holders of the minor unesteemed offices use their influence to manipulate their way into positions of higher recognized authority, or alternatively, they become revolutionaries and repudiate the authority of the higher offices altogether. This in essence is the difference between gumlao and gumsa organization. (p. 195)

Leach's Theory of Dynamic Leadership

Leach's contribution to our understanding of social structure, change, and ideal versus real social and political organization offers important underlying assumptions about and contributions to our understanding of the nature of leadership. Since his analysis is an attempt to provide the elements of a dynamic theory for social anthropology, it is appropriate to understand his approach as a theory of dynamic leadership.

Paralleling Barth's study of the political leadership among the Swat, Leach has identified the social organization of leadership as a dynamic, interactive process, and as the seeking of power within the collective relationship of people in a relatively common culture. Also like Barth, Leach was concerned about the choices for alternative action that individuals make in actual life, choices that in turn alter the value structure of a society. His primary purpose in writing his monograph on Kachin social structure was to argue against the static notion of equilibrium and to propose that change and flux are inherent in the social structures of any society and of all cultures.

Also similar to Barth, Leach has addressed leadership as a relationship that is organized to meet the needs of Kachin people, focusing on power, land, status, esteem, socialization, and survival needs. He was especially convinced of the inherent need of individuals to compete for power by securing as many of the limited resources as they could. His notion of leadership centers around the resourcefulness of people in their relationships and their political behavior to enhance their resources. He would most likely confess that leadership was primarily political because of the need of individuals to compete for power.

The detailing of the lineage, caste, family, and village systems documents his understanding of leadership in a group context. In fact, it is interesting to note how much Leach emphasized that the individuals who were the ideal leaders, were, in fact, often not the real leaders. There is something to be said about Leach's identification of all

cultures having an ideal leader symbol, but that symbolic
person may not be the one really exercising leadership.
Leach's notion of leadership was more closely linked to the
council of wise men, the local-level leaders, and selected
priests who were engaged in community activities and
rituals.

Language and symbols play a pominent role in the social
organization and leadership of Kachin society, particularly
in connection with their rituals and myths, which Leach
argued communicated the same thing, myths using words and
rituals using actions. While dialects varied greatly, the
ritual life was a commonly understood language among the
Kachin and Shan. The ideal versus real framework and the
role of ritual offer an innovative and important perspective
on the relationship between leadership and symbols and
language. While the chiefs may not have been as active in
the day-to-day affairs of the villages, they certainly were
important in the perception of leadership by the people.
And while the rituals may have identified the opposite of
the real, they were critically important in the cognitive
processes of the Kachin people and their notion of how
leadership was carried out.

Leach equated ethics with aesthetics insofar as the
rituals expressed the ideal patterns of social behavior and
norms. He wrote, "Logically, aesthetics and ethics are
identical. If we are to understand the ethical rules of a
society, it is aesthetics that we must study" (p. 12). His
notion of ritual also linked ethics with symbolism. His
conviction that the sacred and profane unite in the real

world further illustrated the ethical nature of leadership as a behavioral and cultural process.

Finally, his ideal verses real scenario is useful in understanding the generative nature of leadership in much the same manner as it was understood by Barth (1959). The ideal functions in an educative manner, much like the priest's storytelling and recreation of myths. But like the telling itself, the story is mixed with the reality of the storyteller, and so the mixing of the ideal with the real serves to educate the people and to generate new social forms. Social structure was generated primarily, however, by the choices people make, particularly when such choices express a desire for power and esteem.

Summary

Thus Leach's theory of dynamic leadership instantiates the proposed cultural theory of leadership insofar as he has identified the properties of both culture and leadership as bio-basic, adaptation and change, resourcefulness, political, group development, the structural web of shared meaning, language and symbols, ethics, and generativity. Leach's approach to leadership through individual choices and power needs, through definition of myth and ritual in the collective consciousness, and through the distinction between ideal and real patterns of behavior, expressed as the political doctrines of gumlao and gumsa, are seminal contributions that illustrate the isomorphic congruence of leadership and culture. His approach to leadership became a seminal work for all ethnographies on leadership thereafter.

F. G. Bailey

One of the more prolific writers in anthropology today is F. G. Bailey, a professor of anthropology at the University of California, San Diego. His works not only span a quarter of a century, they cover a wide variety of contexts and themes. From the Konds of Highland Orissa in India to the housewives of Valloire in southern France; from the peasant community of Losa to the modern academic arena; Bailey has developed a sophisticated model of leadership which is quite unlike that any other scholar has proposed insofar as he focuses on what he has labelled the dark side of leadership behavior. Bailey has been called cynical in his approach to leadership, particularly in his perception of leaders whom, for the most part, he views as manipulators of the highest order. His cynical attitude toward leaders has developed over time, but is strikingly revealed in his latest study on leadership, Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership (1988). In this analysis of Bailey's model of leadership, I will reveal what is behind his cynicism and how his approach to political behavior and leadership was built on the foundations laid by Barth (1959) and Leach (1964). Moreover, by reviewing his works over a span of a quarter century, we will notice a model of leadership that slowly emerged over time, coming into sharper focus with each work. More than any other student of leadership, Bailey has demythologized leadership behavior, exposing the closet skeletons, or, using Bailey's own

metaphor, revealing what really goes on backstage.

This presentation focuses on politics and leadership in Bailey's works, particularly Stratagems & Spoils (1969), Morality & Expediency (1977) and The Tactical Uses of Passion (1983), and his latest work, Manipulation and Humbuggery (1988). Selected articles in his edited volumes, Gifts & Poison (1971) and Debate & Compromise (1973) will also be reviewed. By way of introduction, his earliest works--Caste and the Economic Frontier (1957), Tribe, Caste, & Nation (1960) and Politics & Social Change (1963)--will be summarized briefly.

The Early Works

Bailey's early works (1957, 1960, 1963) are not important so much from a leadership perspective as they are from a political structural perspective. It is useful to understand Bailey's assumptions about political activity and structures in society as a foundation for his later development of a leadership model. In Tribe, Caste, and Nation (1960), a study of political life among the Konds in Highland Orissa, he offered the following "assumptions which underlie my approach to political problems" (p. 10). First, "society is an arena in which men compete for prizes: to control one another; to acheive command over property and resources, and, negatively, to avoid being controlled by others and to retain such resources as they already possess." Secondly, in order to achieve these ends, "men combine into groups, and competition lies not only between individuals but also between groups." Finally, an

"individual's motive in giving or continuing to give his allegiance to a political group is that in this way he expects to gain his ends and retain or achieve command over men and resources." When an individual cannot secure power or resources through one group, then he will switch his allegiance elsewhere, "and if sufficient people do this, then one type of group is likely to disappear and be replaced by groups of a different kind" (pp. 10-11).

Bailey's initial assumptions are important for his later development of leadership because they indicate his early grasp of the role of followers, the importance of group alliances, the necessity of meeting follower needs, and the reality of change created when follower needs are not met.

Political Structure

Bailey emphasized the relationship of the follower, which he called the actor, to not just one but several political systems within a society. The Kond, for example, had a role in the tribal political system, the caste political system, and the complex system of administration and representative democracy (hence his title Tribe, Caste, & Nation). To achieve his ends, the follower/actor could "call upon allegiances in all three systems" or he could "employ one system to redress a weakness in another" (p. 11). Yet, even the follower was somewhat difficult to identify since by Kond belief all were brothers and therefore all were equal. Bailey (1969) suggested that the multiplex grouping of the Kond created a context in which there were "no specialized political leaders because they

had no specialized political group to be led" (p. 50).
Nevertheless, even in the absence of normative leadership,
there was a political structure.

A political structure, then, was described by Bailey
(1960) as "regularities in behavior between persons or
between groups concerning power over men and resources" (p.
13). What Bailey here called "regularities," he later
defined as rules, customs, and conventions (1963, p. 224),
and it has been his purpose to identify and analyze those
rules, customs, and conventions in order to better
understand the complexity of political relationships and how
such relationships dynamically interface with other social
structures, such as kinship, ritual, and economic
structures, to form a society.

Like Barth and Leach , Bailey (1960) reacted to previous
anthropological analyses of societies as static structures,
conceptualized as the "fission and fusion" model, primarily
because a static structural analysis doesn't allow for
individual choice. Instead, he proposed that societies are
structures in action which permit the dynamics of choice and
social change. "I stressed the element of choice by
comparing the way different people acted, and by showing
that they could have acted differently if they had wished to
do so" (p. 249).

Besides focusing on the single follower/actor, Bailey
(1960) was also drawn to the issues of conflict, dispute,
and competition. "Competition underlies the whole analysis,
for my whole conception of an actor is a person (or group)
trying to gain his ends against other people who would

prevent him or would gain the same end for themselves" (p. 251). In Bailey's concept of political structures, competition is a way of stating the rules and bringing home to the disputants the message that such rules, whether old or new, will be the glue holding society together.

Defining the Political

In *Politics and Social Change* (1963), Bailey started thinking about leadership more in reference to cultures that do not have an administrative or organic social unity, such as in Orissa. These cultures are an aggregate of many simple societies, usually characterized as segmentary systems. The challenge for Bailey in this study was not leadership, but finding a conceptual framework into which both the specialized political roles of organic societies and the undifferentiated roles of more traditional and segmented societies would fit. Thus he searched for a political model that was highly interactional. He arrived at the following definition of *political*.

> The political is that aspect of any act which concerns
> the distribution of power, providing that there is
> competition for this power, and provided, secondly, that
> the competition takes place under a set of rules which
> the competitors observe and which ensure that the
> competition is orderly. Insofar as there may be no
> competition, then the action ceases to be political and
> becomes merely adminstrative. If the competitors do not
> agree upon the rules and institutions which make for
> orderly competition and resort to violence, then their

actions are warlike and are not political. (p. 223)

The distinctions between this definition of political and the three assumptions about political structures in the earlier work, <u>Tribe, Caste, and Nation</u> (1960) may be subtle, but point to Bailey's emerging political model. The 1963 definition moved in the direction of a political systems model wherein there is competition but within carefully defined parameters, articulated as rules. Such competition must also be orderly. War is not a political act in Bailey's definition, even though other anthropologists and political scientists might argue that war is the ultimate political act since its focus is either the defense of or the capture of power and resources in a highly competitive arena, the battlefield. The fact that competitors must agree on the rules also suggests a systems framework.

In other words, Bailey tightened his model between 1960 and 1963. Bailey's (1973) commitment to understanding the rules of political interaction was reinforced in a later essay on social change. "I have emerged finally on the side of those who believe that society is to be studied as a set of rules for social interaction" (p. 328). Furthermore, this model does not really address the issue of political relationships between segmentary societies. But Bailey (1963) admitted that one could handle fields of political activity "as if they were joined systemically to one another, or as if they were separate units which are considered together only because they fall into the same logical category" (p. 222). He called the first approach interactional, the second he called cultural or

attributional. He then stated that he was more interested
in the interactional approach. This interest in an
interactional model of politics is important only insofar as
I want to demonstrate that Bailey's thought underwent
considerable change in 1960-63 as his ideas about leadership
began to be formulated because his understanding of politics
emphasized interactional behavior of people and groups in
the culture. In 1969, 1977, and 1983, Bailey began to
incorporate leadership theory into his model of political
structure.

Politics as a Game

Influenced by Barth's theory of games (1959), Bailey
(1969) frequently referred to politics as a game, perhaps
for a number of reasons: there are winners and losers; many
people would rather not take politics too seriously and the
image of the game serves to place politics on a secondary
level; games, like politics, have a set of rules which must
be followed to maintain an orderly process and socially
accepted outcome, and finally, many political scientists
used the game metaphor in the 1960-70s. Bailey seemed to
straddle the fence in his use of this metaphor since he
initially rejected the game metaphor by stating that his
model is "not the game (which connotes only orderliness) nor
the fight (where no holds are barred) but competition which,
unlike the game, lies close to the edge of anarchy . . . ."
(p. xiii). Bailey's anarchy, however, was "fenced off by
rules" and his purpose was to write "about the rules which
regulate political combats, and about the regular patterns

which exist within them" (p. xiii). Even after seemingly rejecting the metaphor of the game to describe the political arena, Bailey continued to toy with it, adding in a footnote, "I am making use of an analogy and saying that the way people behave in competitive games is similar to the way they behave when competing for power" (pp. 17-18). I think the problem Bailey was trying to address was the reality of competition and the metaphor of the game didn't take competition as seriously as Bailey desired; therefore the game metaphor only worked for Bailey up to a point. In other words, Bailey accepted the metaphor as long as it was linked to competition.

On Equilibrium

In the previous presentation on Barth, I offered a brief history of the notion of equilibrium. Within that backdrop of the debate of social anthropologists over the notion of equilibirum, Bailey offered his own social anthropology of politics and ultimately constructued his model of leadership. Similar to Barth and Leach, Bailey rejected a conceptualization of structure as static networks of inerpersonal relationships manifested in groups. He defined the concept of structure in terms of the rules which govern the behavior of individuals in an activity. Bailey was concerned with refining a set of conceptual tools which facilitated the analysis of the regularities within structural and cultural diversity, and which promote the fomulation of generalizations regarding political phenomena. It could be argued that Bailey offered a bridge between the

functional-structuralists and the pure processualists.

Early in his <u>Strategems</u> <u>and</u> <u>Spoils</u> (1969), Bailey addressed the notion of equilibrium by tying it to the word <u>maintenance</u>. "In anthropological books the idea of maintenance is conveyed through the term 'equilibrium,' the metaphor being that of a disturbance throwing the structure off balance, redressive devises being brought into play, and the structure being balanced again at a point of equilibrium" (p. 13). After some discussion pointing out the problems of the notion of equilibrium, he concluded by basically agreeing with Barth and Leach.

> But equilibrium analysis, in its simpler form, does not
> allow for the possibility that a structure may be
> radically changed or quite destroyed. . . . A model of
> this kind runs manifestly contrary to experience, for
> revolutions do occur and political structures do go out
> of business . . . . Therefore, although equilibrium
> analysis and the idea of maintenance are useful analytic
> tools up to a point, additional tools are needed to
> understand social change. (pp. 14-15)

Bailey's rejection of the traditional notions of equilibrium was the first major step in formulating his model of leadership.

The Early Leadership Model

Politics: A Set of Rules

Politics is carried out according to certain rules. Bailey analyzed politics in a variety of groups from the point of view of what rules are followed in the competition

for goals. He viewed politics as a game in which there must be at least some conformity to the rules or the game changes. He also argued that the key tool to understanding social change and politics was knowing the distinction between normativ‿ and pragmatic rules. These rules are determined by the group's culture.

In Stratagems & Spoils (1969), Bailey returned to the game metaphor and stated that one should think of politics as a competitive game. Why? Because a game, like politics, is a set of rules. Even if the game metaphor is too soft, Bailey invited his readers to use the metaphor of the fight--the politics of coups and revolutions--and still there is a set of rules.

Public Face and Private Wisdom

In attempting to discover some general principles in political maneuver which transcend cultures, Bailey proposed that politics has a public face which he ascribed to normative rules and a private wisdom which was characterized by pragmatic rules. Normative rules are very general guides to conduct and do not prescribe particular patterns of action or political behavior. Pragmatic rules are the tactics and maneuvers utilized to establish an effective strategy and to win. Normative rules tend to have moral overtones and are designed for the common good. Pragmatic rules are morally neutral; they need only be effective. The latter are his primary interest which he condensed to identifying which tactics people use to win. In Morality and Expediency (1977), Bailey made the same

distinction in the political arena with his front stage
politics and back stage politics.

The Five Pragmatic Rules

Bailey included five rules in his political structure:
prizes, personnel, leadership (teams), competition and
control. First, the political structure defines what the
prize shall be--a cup, a laurel wreath, a position of power,
and so forth. Secondly, the rules indicate who is eligible
to compete for the prizes. Thirdly, there are sets of rules
about the composition of competing teams. As discussed
below, this particular set of rules focuses on Bailey's
concept of leadership. Fourthly, there are directions about
how the competition shall take place and a delineation of
fair and unfair tactics. Finally, there is a set of rules
to be followed when a rule has been broken. This is
control.

Leadership Roles

Bailey identified the third rule about teams as
leadership. Political contestants need a team of supporters
who bring to the arena a variety of resources. Within the
team, there is need for leadership roles. Here, Bailey
distinguished between the leader seen from the outside and
the leader from the inside. From the inside, the leader
must make decisions, settle disputes, and can be one
individual or a group of people. A leader's power is
relative to the power of those who support the leader.
Bailey made quite clear the fact that such power depended

upon the resources that the followers bring to the team. A strong team is composed of people with multiple resources.

Moral & Contract Leadership

Another component of Bailey's emerging notion of leadership is the distinction between moral leadership and contract leadership. Under the former, followers make a moral commitment to a leader and in the latter the followers simply make a contract to support the leader in return for some favor or service. Contract teams are more easily persuaded to change sides and follow another leader whereas moral teams are not so easily persuaded to change. If a leader does not have this core of moral followers, then leadership is weakened and there is less chance of winning. Bailey's notion of moral and contract leadership is similar in concept and structure to Barth's (1959a) description of the relationships among leaders and followers as a series of concentric circles.

Resources

Bailey's approach to leadership was built around cooperation and team-making. He called leadership an enterprise, which means that leaders must gain access to more resources than opponents and use them with greater skill. One of the key uses of resources is their distribution among followers. That is how a leader influences and directs followers' behavior and actions. This is a form of transactional leadership and suggests that followers are motivated primarily by reward. In this sense,

access to resources is a primary determinent in which a
follower chooses which leader to follow, an idea consistent
with Barth's (1959a) notion of transaction and choice.

Bailey distinguished between one type of follower called
a hireling, whose primary motivation would be a reward, and
a second type of follower called the faithful who has a
moral obligation to the leader. A faithful follower expects
the leader to not only share resources, but, more
importantly, to serve as a symbol of stated ideals, whatever
they may be.

Core and Following

Bailey believed that a leader must develop an inner
circle of moral followers who form a core and represent key
resources. The outer circle of followers whose attachment
was transactional was called a following. Again, this
pyramids on Barth's (1959a) idea of concentric circles.
Bailey used the metaphor of the rope to explain the bonding
of the relationship between leader and follower. The more
strands--kinship ties, ritual obligations, language,
economic interests--that existed between leader and
followers, the stronger the core and the higher the
credibility of the leader. In short, the core was tied to
the leader through what Bailey called multiplex
relationships, building on Gluckman's (1959) distinction
between multiplex and simplex ties, and on Parson's (1951)
distinction between the particularistic and diffuse as
opposed to universalistic and specific relations. If the
bond has only a single interest, it is a transactional

following.

Factions

Bailey also developed the idea that factions are
important to the leader in order to fulfill specific goals.
Perhaps the best way to understand factions is to think of
interest groups that become aligned with a leader in order
to achieve the objective that has brought them together in
the first place. A leader will actively recruit factions in
order to win the next round, whatever the competitive
context may be. Factions are transactional in their
relationships with the leader, and usually do not become
moral relationships because they have a single interest in
following the leader. However, an exception may occur when
the faction, for whatever reason, stays with the leader for
a long period of time. The longer the relationship goes on,
the stronger it becomes.

Bureaucracies

Apart from suggesting the idea, Bailey said very little
about bureaucratic leadership in Strategems and Spoils
(1969). He merely stated that the highest level of
solidarity between leaders and followers occurred when a
bureaucracy is organized in order for both leaders and
followers to maintain a corporate continuity, a notion that
buys into the leadership as management model. What is
strikingly important about this distinction between higher
and lower levels of solidarity is the underlying assumption
that much, if not most, of leadership occurs within

uncentralized political systems.   When Bailey moved on to the political analysis of the academic arena in Morality and Expediency (1977), he was very attentive to political tactics and strategies in the bureaucracy of academia.

The Leader's Tasks

Bailey identified the leader with specific tasks and listed tasks such as decison making, group development, resource distribution, judicial responsibility, mediation, and commanding. Consistent with his game metaphor, Bailey even suggested that one of the tasks of the leader is to be an umpire in order to prevent hot-blooded revenge within his own group. Apart from creating confidence, dividing the work, and manipulating symbols, the skills Bailey identified with leadership tended to vary from culture to culture. He also suggested that a follower may switch to another leader if that leader has developed new or better resources and new or better skills.

Adapting to New Environments

Bailey understood that leaders in political structures must interact with the environment in order to survive and compete. He addressed the question of why political structures break down by indicating "the main fact is the environment and the strains it imposes" (p. 121). Leaders must compete, must develop new resources, must create new alliances, must propose bargains, and must engage in acts of collusion. In other words, they must adapt to new environments.

Bailey also understood political structures as encapsulated within other structures in the environment, including religious, kinship, economic structures and even other political structures. The political process is always in a state of adapting to these other structures. As an example, tribalism may be forced to give way to feudalism, and feudalism to socialism. This he illustrated in his studies of European peasant communities (1971, 1973) and their need to adapt to a modern world if they were to survive.

Change & Adaptation

Encapsulation forces a society to deal with change. Bailey believed change to be a form of contest. The challenge faced by leadership is how to maintain social structures when forced to deal with changing environments. Furthermore, the introduction of new resources into a political arena may lead to uncertainty and to crisis, which in turn threatens followers' loyalty.

Bailey understood change at four levels. Limited change occurs as new resources are channeled into the environment, but not all of them feed into the political structure. Likewise, not all changes affect a given political structure. Repetitive change is merely a passage through roles and occassional shifts in balance, but without disturbing the basic equilibrium of a structure. It is cyclical rather than cumulative change. Adaptive change occurs when the environment creates enough of a disturbance to modify the rules which make up the political structure.

While not moving back to the status quo, the structure finds a new level of adjustment to its environment without seriously altering the definitive values. Finally, there is radical change such as revolutions whereby one structure is completely replaced by another.

Bailey understood change as a contest that can remain a contest or may become a fight in which more resources are consumed to the point where there is a loss for both sides. Change occurs over competition for resources. Sociopolitical change resulted from the continual process of adaptation or adjustment of the political structures--its rules and the roles which they govern--to the environment, a change in one eliciting a change in the other and thus in the system as a whole.

Components of Bailey's Early Leadership Model

Since Bailey explicity proposed a political model of leadership in Strategems and Spoils, we can summarize the following components of that model prior to moving into a discussion of later works.

Most importantly, Bailey identified leadership as process and relationship, arguing against the idea of equilibrium much as Barth and Leach had done before him. Leadership was a dynamic, interactive process that is an instrument for change and adaptation. A community's interaction with the evnironment inevitably creates stress to produce change. Leaders can help direct such adaptation to environmental stress.

Bailey's model of leadership is closely aligned with the

political theories discussed in Chapter Three. Accordingly, he identified goals, mobilization of resources, and power play with a set of rules as elemental to leadership. But he goes beyond the traditional political model of leadership by a growing focus on followers and the notion of teams in the leadership process. He identified transactional followers as a relationship bonded by single interests, usually economic in nature. He also identified a moral relationship between leaders and followers, bonded by multiplex elements that include kinship, religion, ritual, symbols, values, and what Bailey called the language of love, all of which suggest that leaders respond to culturally defined needs. Within his multiplex relationship, Bailey also identified the structural web of social organization, which he compared to the metaphor of a strand of rope.

Bailey refined these elements of leadership in his later works even more and further clarified his understanding of the relatonship between leadership and ethics, the area where he has been labelled as a cynic. In his later works he also applied his early theory to actual cultures, such as the peasant communities of Europe.

Leadership in Peasant Communities

Bailey further refined his understanding of leadership as a relationship in his studies of European peasant communities which appeared in Gifts and Poison (1971) and Debate & Compromise (1973). These studies are valuable in understanding leadership as they relate first to the notion

of reputations and secondly to the concept of innovation in peasant communities whose way of life is on the edge of extinction.

In his discussion of leadership in peasant communities, Bailey was particularly interested in social change. In an essay entitled "Political Change in the Kondmals" (1957b), Bailey summarized the article by saying that the "ultimate aim in describing social change is two-fold: first to plot the course of change; second, to describe the process through which individuals discard a relationship which belongs to one structure and take on a relationship which belongs to a different structure" (1957b, p. 435). Bailey discussed leadership in the peasant communities in terms of social change in reference to the two concepts of reputation and innovation.

The Politics of Reputation

Two years after Stratagems and Spoils (1969), Bailey edited a volume called Gifts and Poison (1971) with the subtitle The Politics of Reputation. He contributed four articles to this edited work and in each his focus was on small politics, or reputations, i.e., "about what it means to 'have a good name'; and about being socially bankrupted; about gossip and insult and 'one-upmanship'; in short, about the rules of how to play 'the social game' and how to win" (pp. 2-3). In much of Bailey's work after Stratagems and Spoils, he focused on politics in small communities. The housewives of Valloire in southern France and the signore

men of Losa, for example, became his arenas for the study of small politics. As a set of rules, the study of politics could be done with ordinary people as well as great people. Bailey (1971) wrote, "The same principles serve for political competition and political alliance alike in great issues and small" (p. 3). Bailey believed that if the anthropologist's object is to explore regular patterns in social behaviour, then the activities of small people and small communities provide evidence no less useful than the actions of statesmen and nations.

In the four essays that Bailey (1971) contributed to this volume, he focused on the management of reputations, the process of change, and how those two variables identify the political process. Small politics assume "a set of shared ideas about how life and people are and how they ought to be, and a code for communicating these ideas; it concerns power and solidarity as variables in human interaction; finally it is about exchanges of information and courtesies, one might say, about accepting and offering the gift of good manners and therefore, since no gift is wholly uncontaminated, about the poisoning of human relationships" (p. 2).

Egoism, Altruism & Small Politics

The conflict between egoistic and altruistic behaviour, between statuses of equality and inequality, and about sin and human perfectibility in European peasant communities was central to Bailey's discussion on the politics of reputation. Membership in a community means having a

reputation and that reputation consists of the opinions which other people have about a person. That reputation in turn controls the ways one can interact with other people and manipulate them to gain whatever ends one has in view. The community in which one gains a reputation is a set of shared values and categories which form the boundaries and fixed points in the game of politics. To find out the rules for maintaining or undermining a reputation, one must understand these values and categories or one cannot know why a reputation is good or bad.

Codes & Signals

Furthermore, these values and categories are transmitted by codes and signals by which the exchange of social interaction occurs. A common culture exists when persons have in common a single set of categories and an agreed set of rules for linking these categories with one another. This homogeneity among members of a community is identified in a common outlook on life, desiring the same kinds of things, using the same ways of wording the world, and sharing a system of signalling, ruled by law and regularities and standards of morality. The shared values and common signalling systems are the basis for communication. This kind of communication becomes the challenge for an anthropologist who may understand the words but miss the meaning.

From a few items of behavior, Bailey believed that people begin to formulate a picture of a person. He described this process in two steps. First, we decode the

signals given off by the behavior to arrive at images or
categories for which the signals stand; secondly, we link
one image with another, by saying for example, that being
female and middle class and being relatively well educated
might mean that she is to be found in a concert hall rather
than a beer hall. Bailey believed that a common culture is
created when a community has in common a single set of
categories and an agreed set of rules for linking these
categories with one another.

Power and Solidarity

Status and reputation are defined by similar sets of
categories and rules. Hierarchies of status evolve in
communities, and Bailey identified the modes of interaction
by which status is determined. The two key dimensions are
power and solidarity. According to Bailey, modes of
interaction in the sphere of politics include rivalry,
tyranny, trust, and leadership. If one has exchanges with
another man in the sphere of politics, then he is either an
ally, a rival, a leader/follower, or a tyrant/reluctant
subject. Bailey drew upon his earlier discussion of
leadership in Stratagems & Spoils (1969) by pointing out the
difference between the moral relationship between the leader
and follower and the amoral relationship between the tyrant
and the subject. More often than not, the tyrant/subject
relationship characterized the peasant communities when
faced with more powerful persons whom they simply feared and
therefore obeyed.

Egoism & Tyranny

In the peasant communities, egoism is tied to tyranny and usually does not win. Reputations that are positively gained are done so through the altruistic relationships between members of the community, or through conforming to those standards that are defined by the culture. A self is a set of reputations and the set arises from the interactions in which a person engages and from the message which these interactions signal about him/her. Every individual lives in the middle of a series of concentric circles of trust. Bailey (1971) wrote:

> He is at the centre; those nearest to him are those who are never in competition with him and are his friends and allies. Those beyond the furthest circle are those who do not belong to his moral community, so that when he comes into conflict with them, he need have no consideration about what is right and what is wrong. In between these two limits are categories of people with whom he has different degrees of confidence. (p. 17)

Competition takes place between those who are in the same league. A gross difference in power and in status usually has the effect of putting people so far apart, they cannot compete. Hence the paradox: people remain equal because each one believes that every other person is trying to better him/herself and in one's efforts to protect oneself, one makes sure that other persons never get beyond the level of approved mediocrity. "Equality, in communities like these, is in fact the product of everyone's belief that everyone else is striving to be more than equal.

Equality comes about through the mutual cancellation of supposed efforts to be unequal" (p. 20).

The Gift

Exchanges in society are necessary and if you make no exchanges, you do not belong. Exchanges usually invoke solidarity and may be interpreted as a challenge. All exchanges have the seed of cooperation and competition. The gift is used by leaders to invest in relationships, thereby building up power. The gift creates obligations on the part of the recipient and is therefore a weapon, of sorts, in competition, serving as a bribe. Thus, the German word for gift is also poison. There is a constant struggle between competition, disorder, and self-interest on the one hand and cooperation, altruism, and service to the community on the other. Or on the one hand is duty, community, society, and stability and on the other is self-interest, change, and uncertainty. All are involved when planning responses and intiatives.

Leaders, Reputations, & Masks

In peasant communities, evil actions are self-interested actions; to be good is to serve other people. Reputations and profit are believed to be inversely connected. An individual who has made money has not done so through hard work and his/her own merit; at best the person has stumbled upon a crock of gold, and more likely, s/he has done it by manipulating other people and so cheating them. Self-interest is understood as an attempt to upset the

existing pattern of equality. The upstart is the embodiment of evil. Many of the _signori_ of Losa arose out of humble origins and much of the antipathy felt toward the _signori_ by the peasants of Losa was built on this logic that they were driven by self-interest.

Leaders often face the same problem because leaders are often viewed as people of a different status. Thus leaders, in order to secure followers among the peasants, must wear masks which direct people's attention toward the approved interpretation they should make of what the leader is doing. The mask suggests altruism and public service. A leader must also cut down the flow of information about himself for familiarity breeds contempt in the small peasant communities. Thus, leaders also need to be remote in order to protect their reputuations. Masks also symbolize common values--duty, community, society, stability. Furthermore, masks represent the community morality as against self-interest.

The Poison

Thus, what matters to the leader is the amount and kind of information that circulates about him. The leader who has risen from the peasant ranks is in a particularly difficult situation since a great deal is known about him and his antecedents, and this information makes his quest for leadership more difficult because fellow community members are reluctant followers of someone whom they consider their equal. The leader who cannot gather followers must abdicate his leadership role. Leaders, in

turn, who are in high-status positions are more immune from envy, gossip, and backbiting. They have an easier time wearing their masks. But on the down side—the poison—a masked relationship cannot be truly one of reciprocity. Therefore, leaders, like saints, may become objects not of awe and reverence, but of fear and contempt. Thus to gain followers from the peasant communities, a leader must first extract the followers from the web of community relationships and the associated values.

Changing Communities & the Process of Change

This raises the question of how change can occur in small communities if leadership becomes easily suspect. Change occurs slowly in peasant communities since peasant farms are strongest in states of status quo. Peasant farmers are not trying to maximize production, but only trying to provide a living for their families and keep the family together. But change is inevitable in these communities as a host of external economic and political variables make their impact on these communities. Peasant communities cannot move as communities in the twentieth-century economy. Change very likely means the destruction of peasant community life. But those who would be change masters or leaders or social planners must have a systematic knowledge of the beliefs and values of the people they plan to change. Furthermore, such leaders cannot tell people to change the beliefs they hold; beliefs only change in the light of experience. Therefore such experience must be provided, and so, leadership may be both gift and poison

to the peasant culture.

The Politics of Innovation

Bailey continued his interest in social change in another edited volume called Debate and Compromise (1973), published two years after Gifts and Poison (1971). His field of interest remained the European peasant communities. Rather than the politics of reputation, Bailey was in 1973 interested in the politics of innovation. Change and innovation were studied in relationship to values, competition, crisis, and compromise. The key component was what Bailey called a hierarchy of values in any community. When one item in that hierarchy changes, all others are modified. The more ramifying the expected consequences of introducing a change or innovation into a system, the more difficult its acceptance is likely to be.

Innovation is a type of change that is both planned and consciously intended. Gradual and incremental changes are not innovations; they are just changes. Innovations have choices built into them, choices in which people must reckon costs against benefits. Innovation must also take into account the hierarchy of values which may include equality, status, the good of the community, stability, reputations, judgments about who is trustworthy, and other variables that Bailey discussed in Gifts and Poison. Understanding innovation is finding out what people think. Furthermore, if innovation is adopted, it is usually only after debate, argument, conflict, and compromise.

A Culture for Innovation

Bailey argued that certain cultures encourage the growth of innovation. The following patterns of social relations are more open to innovation than others:

1. Good reputation, good credit, and/or status of the innovator/leader favors innovation.

2. Fewer rules for social interaction favor innovation; the uncodified society is easier to change than the highly codified society.

3. Societies that are highly differentiated are more receptive to innovation.

4. The domestication of the item to be introduced increases potential for change.

5. Previous success with innovations will make communities more willing to innovate; failure will make them more cautious.

6. Openess to experience is very positive for change. Those planners/leaders who would bring the Promethean fire must be prepared to weigh these patterns of social relations prior to engaging the community for change.

Competition and Change

Bailey (1973) argued that the anthropologist's way of looking at society focuses upon the individual. The anthropologist's task is to discover the patterns which connect different rules. Bailey argued for the kind of anthropology that analyzes what people say are the acceptable justifications for making choices. "In this way part of the study of innovation must be political: it is

the study of a competition to define a situation and to make one definition prevail against others; to convince one's opponent that the item has costs or benefits of which he has been hitherto unaware or has wrongly evaluated" (p. 326).

Bailey's (1973) methodology included converting statements about choice into statements about rules which people use to make choices. The word choice in fact indicates a phenomenon which is not yet understood; understanding comes only when the appropriate rule is ascertained. "Thus I have emerged finally on the side of those who believe that society is to be studied as a set of rules for social interaction. The task is completed when the interconnections between those rules are made clear. But at the same time, through the notions of debate and compromise, we have left room for change" (p. 328).

Leadership as Reputation & Innovation

Bailey's model of leadership went through some maturation and refinement in his studies of the European peasant communities. He focused on the problems of leadership as both relationship and change processes. The relationship is built on the values, language, and reputations of people within communities, such as the peasant communities of Europe. Leadership is a process that deals with the stresses and challenges of an external environment and therefore the leaders/followers relationship is caught between the need to change and the desire to preserve valued traditions and lifestyles of the status quo. In this tension between preservation and change, the

reputation of leaders impacts the leadership relationship. Leaders are compelled to both identify morally with the needs of the followers as well as challenge those needs in face of a changing world that threatens the community's survival.

The process of leadership means that the leaders/followers relationship is involved in concentric circles of intimacy and distance, in issues of reciprocity, in the symbolism of masks, in competition, in the moral dimensions of force and tyranny, and in the overall process that is both gift and poison. To convert a society into a culture for innnovation is a relationship process that involves debate, conflict, competition, and compromise. In other words, Bailey has identified the inherent problems in the leadership relationship when change is necessary and such change is a challenge to the status quo. Leadership functions as both friend and foe, of the existing culture inasmuch as it expresses the culture as it is while at the same time critically challenging the culture to change. It is fitting that Bailey offers the metaphors of leadership as both gift and poison, and the metaphors of the political process as debate and compromise. This dialectic that is present in Bailey's notion of leadership is a red thread that identifies the ongoing tension and the flux of both culture and leadership. As Bailey moved into other arenas, this dialectic continued to mark a reality in his own thought that was in a constant state of evolution and change.

Leadership   as   Morality   &   Expediency

From the European peasant communities, Bailey moved to the academic arena and focused on a culture that was his own. His leadership model found a new context and in the culture of the American university, the concepts of myth, language, masks, and ethics take on new dimensions that further clarify the process of leadership as a cultural expression. Eight years after Stratagems and Spoils (1969), and only a few years after his two edited volumes, Bailey published his study of American academia, called Morality and Expediency: The Folklore of Academic Politics (1977). Although the words leadership or leaders rarely appear, there is much that can be gleaned from this work to illustrate that Bailey is still very much concerned about leadership. Since Bailey called his framework political, I shall continue to use his language, bearing in mind that the notion of leadership is an underlying assumption pervasive in his work, whether Bailey recognized it or not.

All the World's A Stage

What is immediately striking is that Bailey continued to utilize some of his earlier dramaturgical themes, now staging his political framework around the metaphor of the play. He extended the metaphor into a full stage drama with actors, masks, and a language of front stage and back stage imagery. Furthermore, like the drama that is actually staged, the front stage behavior is mythical with all the artifice of fiction and myth becomes akin to the normative rules discussed earlier. The reality of political behavior,

here defined as back stage behavior, has a close relationship to the pragmatic rules in a political arena. Bailey shifted from the game to the play metaphor and, as will be pointed out, this shift has implications for the leaders/followers relationship. Such a shift may also illustrate increasing maturity in his model since the metaphor of the play, when compared to the game, is more refined, more sophisticated, more articulate, and more complex.

Myth & Reality

In contrasting myth with reality in the academic arena, Bailey's (1977) scenario recalls Leach's distinction between the ideal and the real structures of society. Readers can discover that the comparison between Bailey's academic arena and Leach's Kachin society have striking parallels. Bailey began by discussing both the myths of the scholar's calling or vocation and the myths of the academic arenas in which decisions are made. He defined myth as that which "tells what one should desire (like scholarship, collegiality, or power) and how to get it; the way people are and how they should be; the reasons why things happen the way they do, especially when they go wrong; in short, myths provide values and meaning and ideas and plans and stratagems and alternative forms of social organization" (p. 7). Very much like the drama on the stage, the nature of reality is artifice and fiction; it is mythical. It is "invisible, intangible, incomprehensible, inaccessible at least in any direct way" (p. 8). Yet we humans have a sensing apparatus

that sorts out whatever is out there, and this apparatus works for us in creating the myths which translate our reality. Bailey attempted to define the process of this sensing apparatus as it is played out in the academic political arena.

If only through a myth does one sees the real world, then there are three myths of the academic dilemma. First is the myth of scholarship, or the pursuit of learning for its own sake; second is the myth of collegiality, or the benefit to be derived from belonging to a community; and third is the myth of community, or, as defined by Bailey, the goal of power. Bailey argued that these myths are in contest with the reality of experience and that in such a contest there are both the public political procedures (front stage) and the private political procedures (back stage) which appear in the drama of academe. The dramatic conflict between the demands of scholarship, collegial responsibilities, and the obligations to a wider society is the problem Bailey addressed.

Setting of the Play

One must first translate this play by Bailey in order to understand the author's underlying assumptions about life, reality, and meaning. The setting for this drama is the university committee which is characteristically small in number of members, chosen from a larger number whom they in turn represent. The committee has been given tasks or concerns, and it operates with a degree of privacy impossible for the larger group it serves. This committee

is composed of two types of members: (a) guardians of the institution and its values, godlike in their responsibilities, and (b) members operating in competition with one another because they represent outside interests. Bailey called the former elite committee members because they value their own existence and tend toward privacy, and the latter he called arena committee members because they are accountable to outside bodies or interests.

The Story Line

After defining the setting, the story was told. The story focused on a conflict or an issue in the university arena that needed resolution. Within the committee structure, the issue, as defined by Bailey, is usually the process of deciding on the allocation of scarce resources. The conflict or struggle occurs in this story through four processes of how such decisions are made. Put another way, the actors tell the story by one of four languages: (a) rational, bureaucratic procedures and formulae, (b) competition between strong men or baronial politics, (c) conflict between central administrators and strong men banded together, or the politics of Runnymede, and (d) a patronage network operating off-stage and out of the back door in the king's court.

Character Roles

There were also four key characters in this play. First, there was the chairman of the committee; secondly, there was a candidate seeking a professional post; thirdly,

a president of the university; and finally, the objector who represents other faculty reviewers. Bailey's drama focused on the strategies each character tried to implement in order to play out his/her part.

Front & Back Stage Drama

Where the above characters played out their parts, however, was not primarily in front of the audience, or on front stage. Most of the committee's drama was done back stage, just as it takes weeks of rehearsal to perform a two hour play. One of the rules of the game is to keep back stage discussion and decisions off the front stage. When information leaks out or there is gossip, the action shifts to under the stage and such action is certainly not unusual. It is not principled either. Front stage drama is the world of principles and objective reality; back stage drama is the shadowed world of more subjective realities, often with a different set of principles and rules.

Masks

Finally, there are the masks that must be worn by the actors in order to create character. "No effective politician presents his allies and his rivals with the rich indigestible confused complexity of his own true self: instead he uses a mask or affects a character" (p. 127). Bailey identified ten masks.

1. Reason, the mask that says all problems have a logical and reasonable answer.

2. Buck, the mask that claims there is a right price to

solve any problem.

3. Sermon, the mask that guards our eternal verities.

4. Stroke, the mask that flatters, charms, and works one-on-one.

5. Saint, the mask that applies innocence and mediation, softens the rules, and believes in the basic goodness of persons.

6. Baron, the mask that is interest directed and sees but two possibilities, to screw or be screwed, while hoping he/she is turning the screw.

7. Formula, the mask with a solution for every problem, and the solutions usually exist in the regulations.

8. Rational, a friend of reason, will compromise for the best if not the perfect solution as long as it can be implemented.

9. Patron, the mask that says resources are distributed through a network of cronies.

10. Rock, the mask that champions the oppressed, organizes boycotts, and otherwise rocks the boat.

Friendships or alliances may develop more readily between certain masks than others. In the arena of political drama, Bailey believed the mask was especially appropriate because it leads away from asking what really motivates politicians. He was not interested in the question of what really motivates politicians because it was more in the realm of psychology rather than politics. Bailey's interest was "in the range of masks available, in identifying the context into which particular masks fit, in finding rules for changing masks and for combining one with

another, and in identifying the qualifications one needs to wear a particular mask without exciting disbelief or derision from the audience" (p. 145). In other words, in Bailey's political model, when all the masks have been stripped away, there is nothing left. As a result, politicians face three options: they may wear different masks to fit the situation, or they may become typecast and are forced to wear the same mask when they are on front stage, or they may wear a mask that just doesn't fit and, as a consequence, lose credibility with the audience.

In the political arena, Bailey argued that the more effective competitors have a wardrobe of several masks and appreciate how masks must be fitted to context. The man with just one mask is a political cripple, unable to cope with a changing environment. The mask is the statement, not the individual. Some masks are best suited to front stage, such as Reason or Sermon, and when worn back stage they cause confusion. Others can be worn both front and backstage. Bailey concluded his discussion on masks by offering a word of caution. While a mask in the context of drama can be removed and hung on a rack until needed, a mask worn by the politician may also become like a crown-tooth, a permanent fixture.

Scylla or Charybdis?

Bailey's original question raised the issue of the location of political exchanges. Were they occurring in the public or in the private arenas? He believed that they occur primarily back stage. "The task of adapting

fundamental values to changing circumstances, while at the
same time preserving the facade of eternity, is done by
segregating political arenas, regulating the distribution of
information so that some arenas are public and some are
private, and controlling the type of information available
in each arena" (p. 200).

Bailey argued that his academia's political drama had
universal application and could be applied to any given
political arena. The scholar's three-way pull between
scholarship, collegiality and community or the choice
between an open world of principle and the shadowed world of
action were universal struggles, but with different myths.
Bailey posited that the sensible scholar will pilot his way
between all three, while bearing in mind that it may be
morality or it may be expediency which steers the ship. The
actors behind the stage may be the ones piloting the ship,
and yet the reality may be that there are no front stage
principles of substance. The consequence of such a
situation is that the back stage steers an unprincipled
course. Bailey concluded: "Scylla is the rock of
principle: expediency is Charybdis. Politics being what
they are, the ship seldom contrives to steer a straight
course between them. Usually, if there is progress, it is
achieved by bouncing from one rock to another" (p. 218).

Leadership as Realpolitik?

It is not difficult to understand why Bailey has been
called a cynic in his view of leaders. There is a quality
to Bailey's notion of the political intrigue in the academic

arena that reminds one of the notion of realpolitik which
views politics on the basis of material and practical
realities rather than on theoretical or ethical factors.
But has Bailey abandoned any notion of the ethical nature of
leadership? I would submit that he has not, despite the
tension between Scylla and Charybdis. There is nothing in
the proposed theory of leadership that suggests that the
ethical nature of leadership is based upon the personal
ethics of single individuals, whether those individuals be
leaders or followers. The relationship between ethics and
leadership is based upon the nature of the relationship
between leaders and followers, the standards and norms of
the culture that shape the relationship, and the purposeful
nature of leadership, i.e., whether it is meeting human
needs. I would agree with Bailey that many leaders have
long abandoned personal ethical convictions that continue to
direct them, but fortunately the process of leadership is
usually much larger than any single individual's ethical
content or lack thereof.

The Theatre of Leadership

Bailey's study of the academic arena refined some
additional concepts that bore directy upon his understanding
of leadership as language, symbol, and the structural web of
shared meaning. Along the way he further refined his
notions of political realities. The entire metaphor of the
stage drama was structured around language, perception,
interpretation, symbolism, and the structural web of how
people fabricate their meaning systems. Bailey's university

scenario offered an excellent grounding in the utilization of symbols and language as resources in the leadership process. That same scenaria further illustrated that such a grounding identifies the parallel tracks of leadership and culture. The drama is a cultural drama, even with all the political structures that are present. The masks are cutural masks, the characters take their identity from the cultural roles, the script is the language of the culture, the setting and the myth are the symbols that serve to create meaning and identity within the cultural frame, and the front and back stage dramas are identical to the ideal and real structures of life. The myths and the realities are needed in every culture, and they constitute the structural web of all social relationships.

In Bailey's theatre of leadership, an audience may initially appear as a rather passive group of followers, but in fact the audience is there because of the active participation they experience in the drama of leadership. There would be no drama if there were no audience. The needs of the audience are being met through the mythical reality of the play itself. The characters recreate the emotions and ideas of life as it is experienced by the members of the audience. The setting offers the symbols by which the audience interprets life's meaning and dimensionality. The language of the actors is their language. The drama recreates their metaphors, their myths, their stories, their tragedies and joys, their aspirations and expectations, and their life and death. The audience is not passive; it is engaged in a relationship with those on

the stage, a relationship that is very real in their perception. Bailey has given us a remarkably fitting metaphor for drama is the very heart of the relationship between leaders and followers.

In summary, I have indicated that Bailey from 1969 through 1983 defined the leadership relationship as transactional, moral, mythical, and passionate. Each of these components identifies the nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. They are critically important to Bailey's model of leadership and need additional explanation.

The Leadership Relationship
Leadership as Transactional

Bailey (1969) recognized a basic need of both leaders and followers to gain access to resources to meet or gratify tangible and physical needs. A follower will create a simple alliance with the leader who can best deliver the particular resources the follower is seeking. "Insofar as a leader is able to influence and direct his follower's actions, he does so by the expenditure of resources. What passes between them is not so much an interaction as a transaction" (p. 36). Bailey drew upon Barth's study of the Pakhtun's men's houses to illustrate this dyadic relation. Bailey also used the economic analogy to describe this relationship and stated that "loans must be serviced or re-negotiated very frequently" (p. 45). If the dyadic relation does not move beyond the transactional level, it remains a single-interest relationship based upon economics

and is easily threatened if another leader can deliver more goods.

Leadership scholars such as Burns (1978) and Rost (1988) have responded to the notion of transactional leadership at different levels. Burns acknowledged that transactional leadership existed, but he gave primacy to his notion of transformational leadership. Burns believed that transformational leadership was moral in nature, whereas transactional leadership had no moral component since it was merely an economic exchange. Rost rejected altogether any understanding of leadership as a transactional exchange. His view of leadership also rejected any notion of a dyadic relationship being leadership, citing the fact that dyads are pairs of people, or couples, and leadership by definition must involve more than just two people. The proposed cultural theory of leadership also rejects the notion of transactional leadership, though it accepts as one component of the leaders/followers relationship the basic idea embedded in transaction. The notion of a dyadic relationship is, however, acceptable insofar as it identifies the intimacy between a leader and follower and, while leadership does need more than two people, the reality of a dyadic relationship within the larger leadership arena is not only possible, it is morally necessary. Leaders need to be involved in many dyads and therefore the notion of dyadic relationships is both acceptable and necessary. At the same time, I admit that the dyadic relationship as a leadership relationship must be grounded in the larger collective nature of leadership and cannot be interpreted as

the leadership relationship as many scholars do. A simple
relationship between two people cannot by itself be called
leadership. While I do not think Bailey intends his reader
to interpret leadership as purely a dyadic relationship, he
occasionally falls into this camp. However, the fact that
he also understands leadership as moral, myth, and passion
points to the larger collective nature of his model of
leadership.

Leadership as Moral

The leadership relationship becomes stronger when it
incorprates other interests and Bailey identified this kind
of relationship as a multiplex relationship between leaders
and followers. Components could include kinship ties,
ritual and religious ties, and ideological ties. Bailey
defined this relationship as having a language of love, and
the more multiplex the relationship becomes, the more the
follower becomes a part of the core or the inner circle of
followers whose relationship with the leader is moral. As
alluded to earlier, Bailey explained this relationship by
using the metaphor of the many strands of a rope. Moral
leadership includes leaders who have a deeper bond with
followers than can be experienced in a transactional
relationship. It is a bond that meet followers' moral
needs. Bailey believed that while moral leadership forms
the crucial core, both moral and transactional followers
were essential if leaders and followers were to achieve
mutual goals. The more a relationship is embedded in the
multiple components of culture, the greater are its ethical

implications. Bailey (1977) believed that at the heart of such ethical implications lies the tension between morality and expediency and "the wish to be treated as a moral being rather than an instrument in the service of an institution" (p. 218).

Bailey's identification of a moral basis to the relationship between leaders and followers indicates that he does have an ethical component in his leadership model. The one problem that surfaces in this discussion is Bailey's notion of leadership as goal fulfillment. He understood politics as the mobilization of resources to achieve public goals and that is no problem for a model of politics. But as I have already discussed, it is problematic to suggest that a criterion for leadership is goal fulfillment. As Rost (1988) has persuasively argued, the notions of goals, products, effectiveness, and excellence are all industrial and management concepts that should not be the criteria for defining leadership. The process of leadership occurs even when goals are not fulfilled. Of course, it is good to fulfill goals, but that should not be a criterion for defining whether leadership is happening or not. My proposed theory of leadership concurs with Rost's understanding. What is important, however, is that Bailey's moral leadership is very much a part of the ethical framework of the process of leadership, and his studies in the European peasant communities and in the academic arena ground the relationship of leaders and followers as a moral bond.

<u>Leadership</u> <u>as</u> <u>Myth</u>

The relationship between leaders and followers defined by Bailey as myth is a little harder to get a hold on since Bailey doesn't explicitly identify leadership in <u>Morality and Expediency</u> (1977). But given the development of his argument in his study of the academic political arena, it is fairly easy to extrpolate from his framework the notion of leadership as myth. Bailey's own definition of myth is a major component in the leaders/followers relationship. "A myth tells what one should desire . . . and how to get it; the way people are and how they should be; the reasons why things happen the way they do, especially when they go wrong; in short, myths provide values and meaning and ideas and plans and stratagems and alternative forms of social organization" (p. 7). If myths are to be part of the structures we use to shape our reality, then followers will align themselves with those leaders who share similar myths. If myths define our values, meaning systems, ideational mappings, plans of action, and structures of social organization, then followers will seek out those leaders who are aligned with similar myths.

Furthermore, the stage drama is the classic illustration of modern myths and drawing upon Bailey's discussion on masks, we learn that followers will create alliances with those leaders whose mask or masks are either similar or complementary to the mask or masks of the followers. We admire actors only because they play a role, wear a mask, very well. The leader who wears the mask better than another will most likely draw a larger audience and have a

higher credibility rating. Followers look for leaders who play their role well and who can thereby strike a chord of identity in the followers. Bailey identified empathy as an important component in the leaders/followers relationship. As unappealing as the John Wayne mask may be to many followers, it certainly worked for Ronald Reagan.

The front stage/back stage arena of politics has application to followers as well. Most followers prefer front stage drama. They enjoy a good play and it normally means something to them, thereby creating an alignment between audience and actor. A more select group of individuals are back stage followers who prefer the shadowed world of action and intrigue. This often becomes another form of the the leader's core, or entourage, the followers who engage in the day-to-day operation of the play's production. These followers feel that they are in control and have the power to manipulate the shape and form their drama of life will take. Their motivation to be followers is the need to think they have power over what actually happens. Whether this core of followers actually has more power than others may only be a myth, but it is the myth that works for them.

Leadership as myth captures the need for the presence in all cultures of the cognitive tension between the ideal and the real, as Leach (1964) pointed out in his study of the Kachin people. We need the ideal, the drama, the myths, the rituals to provide the larger frameworks of unity, meaning, and history; but we also recognize that the myths do not always coincide with our daily reality. Hence,

the need for both religion and politics. Leach (1964) compared the notion of the ideal to the Roman Catholic Church which offers a unifying mythical framework to literally thousands of diverse cultures. He then suggested that the diverse Protestant traditions speak more to the reality. Bailey's stage play and his notions of front stage and back stage are very useful as a metaphor to better grasp this need for the the ideal and the real in the process of leadership.

Leadership as Passion

Thus, according to Bailey, the three critical compenents of the relationship between leaders and followers discussed so far are the transactional, the moral and the myth. The fourth component of this relationship between leaders and followers is passion. In The Tactical Uses of Passion: An Essay on Power, Reason, and Reality (1983), Bailey utilized the framework of passion to describe how decisions are often made in cultural settings. In this study, Bailey argued that reason plays a very small part in political action and he built his argument on the discrepancy between what people say they do and what, in fact, they actually do. There are both overt and covert sectors of culture much like there are front and back stages. Bailey's interest in this study focused not on objective reality, but rather on the subjective reality which becomes defined as a question: How do you persuade another person? The Platonic way is through reason; the other form of persuasion is the use of passion

which has nothing to do with the mind and the critical
faculties. Through the tactical uses of passion, argued
Bailey, a person can reach into the inner self of another
person and thereby have control. "So we are looking for
rules that advise on the tactical use of displays of passion
by oneself and the provocation of such displays in other
people" (p. 25). Bailey was not interested in what
individuals may really be feeling, but rather in how an
actor tactically uses passion to accomplish a political end.
It didn't matter to Bailey if the passion displayed by the
actor was not genuinely experienced.

It should be apparent that such a study has obvious
implications for the leaders/followers relationship. What
follows is a summary of the conclusions Bailey made and the
implications they have for the leaders/followers
relationship. His opening statement made his purpose quite
clear:

> This book has two themes, one on the surface and one
> beneath. The overt question concerns the ways in which
> displays of passion--anger, grief, hilarity, and so
> forth--are interpreted, and the ways in which they are
> used to exert power over other people. The inquiry
> moves from the relatively primitive arena in which
> emotions are displayed apparently involuntarily upward
> to the infinite sophistications of rhetoric. In the
> concluding part of the book, the narratives of several
> arguments. . .are used to infer some rules for winning
> (or losing) arguments by the uses of passion. (p. 7)

Displays of Emotion

Bailey posited that a display of emotion "is not only a window onto a person's charcter or mood: it is also said to reveal how we interpret events around us. These events 'cause' emotion" (p. 34) Followers respond to a leader's display of emotion in a manner that either offends followers or wins followers because a resonant chord has been touched. Followers will look to a leader to emotionally express certain passions felt by followers. A leader in turn will know how to manipulate passions to arouse or subdue followers. Bailey wrote, "Life is defined through its extremes, where passions reign" (p. 36). Between those extremes, there is a range of emotions that must be tactically displayed in the leaders/followers relationship.

Displays of emotion, or the absence of such displays, indicate what kind of self is being offered to another person or to an audience at large. Displays of emotion are similar to the masks that are worn to create a character. Bailey identified five selves falling within the range of passions.

1. The silly self is the playful, irresponsible, anonymous, embarrasing, or the letting-go self that now and then has to enact behavior in order to "get the silly out".

2. The divine self pronounces authoritative definitions ex cathedra and does not allow for rational discussion.

3. The civic self proclaims altruism in the form of a concern for society, for the common good. Both the civic and the divine self want to get things done in the world.

4. The moral self creates the borders of the love/hate

dichotomy, and, by Bailey's definition, is not associated with rights and duties as the traditional understanding of moral might suggest.

5. The tactical self is essentially self-concerned, seeking instrumental relationships in order to acquire power in one form or another. The tactical self will evade normative rules of the collectivity if necessary, or will try to manipulate them for its own purposes.

Building on Barth's (1959) use of the dyadic relationship, Bailey argued that any one of the above selves, used in a dyadic relationship, could be used to exercise persuasion. These styles may be used in a covert fashion to cover outright hostility or other blatant and socially unacceptable expressions of emotions. If there are feelings or issues that tend to be unmentionable, they are to be brought up only in ways acceptable to the culture, but the rules for how that is done may vary from culture to culture. Personal antagonisms must be worked out behind a facade of concern about issues or principles.

Covert & Overt Reality

The implications of this relationship between leader and follower suggest on the one hand that there is within that relationship a covert and overt reality, and, on the other, much of the process between a leader and a follower will center around the reality of passions behind the covert relationship. Leaders may manipulate followers by playing on their passions. Whether through manipulation or because the leader feels the same passions, followers view their

leaders as symbols of their passions, and depend upon leaders to act on those passions in concert with the followers. Whether the leader actually feels the passions of followers is not important for Bailey, only the use of passion by the leader to activate or motivate the relationship.

In this notion of passion in the leaders/followers relationship, Bailey offered an important contribution to our understanding of the process of leadership. Overall, Bailey's understanding of that relationship as falling within the parameters of transaction, myth, moral bonds, and passion are very useful in identifying the coterminous relationship between leadership and culture.

The Question of Virtue

The tone and theme of Bailey's most recent and most provocative work, Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership (1988), is captured in the joke he shared at the very beginning of his book.

> The joke is about a restaurant called the Cannibal,
> where the menu offers assistant professor at $5,
> associate professor at $10, and professor at $15.
> Status must mean scarcity and scarcity calls for higher
> prices: the logic is clear (even if the reasoning from
> status to scarcity is empirically at fault). But for a
> dean the charge is $40 a serving. Evidently there is a
> question. Are deans so much higher in status, so very
> much more scarce on the academic meat market? Or
> perhaps decanal carcasses, engorged with power, yield

some delicacy like the liver of a fattened goose? But

the proprietor, when the question is put to him, reveals

other considerations. He asks, Did you ever try to

<u>clean</u> a dean? (p. ix, emphasis in original)

From this humorous launching pad, Bailey sets out "to argue

that leaders everywhere are like deans, inescapably polluted

by what they do, and since leadership is by its very nature

defiling, it follows that moral judgements are as

appropriate in this regard as they are about foul weather"

(p. ix). To this rather harsh judgement on leaders and

leadership, Bailey added, "No leader can survive as a leader

without deceiving others (followers no less than opponents)

and without deliberately doing to others what he would

prefer not to have done to himself. Leadership and

malefaction everywhere and at all times go hand in hand" (p.

ix).

Bailey was convinced that if leaders were to be

effective, they had to break out of the morality they

recommended to other people, "they must set themselves above

the morality of their own society" (p. xi). Why must

leaders defy the moral conventions of their own societies?

Bailey's answer is related to his earlier notions of

front-stage and back-stage reality. Bailey believed that

most people live in a fantasy world (a front-stage drama) in

which their experience or beliefs are mixed with what they

ideally hope for, a wished-for-world, or a world of values.

This fantasy world may be psychologically comforting, but it

is frequently in conflict with the hard reality of political

life, the exercise of power. The leader, therefore, is

faced with a choice between what Bailey called two evils: "He must preserve the collective fantasy (that is, the ongoing system of religion and morality); at the same time he must monitor and be guided by events in the real world in the manner of an objective scientist. Inasmuch as he serves one end, he is likely to violate the other" (p. xii). Effectiveness, according to Bailey, means choosing the hard-core reality over the collective morality, thus exempting himself from the normative constraints of society. This is the "dark side to leadership" (p. xiii).

How Leaders Control Followers

Bailey stated in the first line of his first chapter that "this essay is about how leaders control followers, not about what they do to the world with the power that followers give them" (p. 1). I recall that upon my first reading this statement, I was disappointed, thinking that perhaps this was a major shift in Bailey's approach to leadership by focusing on single individuals, a shift that would be disturbing. After all, the market is full of books which discuss leaders but say nothing about leadership. Since the title of his chapter, however, was "Understanding Leadership," I thought better of his purpose. Whether Bailey discussed leadership, or only leaders, will surface as his "art of leadership" is evaluated.

The Tools of the Artist

Bailey believed that the human condition is very complicated and very messy. Leadership means simplifying

this chaos, but since simplifications usually turn out to be messy and complicated too, then the real task of leadership is "making people act as if the simplified picture were the reality" (p. 2). Unfortunately, this cannot be done in an honest, open manner. The leader has at hand his Machievellian tools:

> The leader must be a partisan. He must use rhetoric.
> He must be ruthless, be ready to subvert values while
> appearing to support them, and be clever enough to move
> the discourse up to a level where opportunism can be
> successfully hidden behind a screen of sermonizing about
> the eternal verities. Leadership is a form of
> cultivating ignorance, of stopping doubts and stifling
> questions. (p. 2)

Bailey confessed that most leaders do not have this image of themselves, and, for the most part, would reject this assertion about the tools of their trade. Perhaps many leaders have worn the masks so long, they are convinced that the mask is the reality

On another level, the notion of objective truth is antithetical to leadership, according to Bailey. His response to the question about the relationship between leaders and objective truth is that "the essence of leadership is a capacity to go beyond rationality, to operate by intuition, and to obliterate a scientific search for objective fact and at the same time to convince the followers that the leader knows what he is doing" (p. 4). In this sense, then, leadership is also the "art of diseducation" (p. 4). The fact that so many followers are

passive and willing to believe anything told to them by their leaders is, in part, a testimony to this approach to leadership. Bailey provides ample quotes from well-known leaders to substantiate his claims.

Domination

The question remains, Is Bailey really discussing leadership, or only the unscrupulous behavior patterns of individuals who have authority and are power-wielders? Bailey suggested that leadership belongs to the category of "domination or the exercise of power" (p. 7). He defined domination as "the capacity to make another person act in a particular way, whether or not that person wants to do so and whether or not he or she is aware of the domination" (p. 7). Equating of leadership with domination flys in the face of the theory of leadership proposed in this essay and the approaches to leadership taken by Burns (1978), Foster (1988), Rost (1989) and a number of other leadership scholars. It also does not concur with the three anthropologists discussed in this chapter. There is something very Machiavellian in Bailey's latest notion of leadership that is both disturbing and challenging.

Bailey defined three categories of domination. The first he called pure leadership in which the relationship between a leader and followers was moral. Followers in this relationship gave willing service to the leader and that service was its own reward. The second relationship based on domination was domination by means of shared values. It may be partially moral insofar as the devotion is not so

much to a leader as to the values that both leader and followers seek. The third relationship based on domination was instrumental, and domination is achieved by rewards and penalities. This latter relationship was one which we have earlier defined more in terms of a transactional relationship and power wielding.

Strategies for Leadership

The thrust of Bailey's essay is a focus on the variables that affect strategies. The variables include (a) the psychological disposition of the followers, (b) values and beliefs, and (c) institutions. Each of his chapters is devoted to a discussion of each of these variables that are both resources and constraints on the actions of a leader. A brief discussion on each follows.

The Disposition to Follow

Bailey categorized dispositions of followers by four adjectives: apathetic, regimented, mature, and anarchic. The apathetic is characterized by a loss of nerve and very little morale. Such individuals make poor followers. The regimented follower suggests military types of organizations, but the concept may be applied to any organization. It identifies the follower who obeys orders meticulously, doing neither more nor less than what s/he is told. Moral courage does not enter into this follower's manner, nor does any social sensitivity. There is something Pavlovian about the regimented follower, and, in this sense, the soldier is the most appropriate example. I would raise

the question: Can a solider who is compelled to obey every order really be considered a follower? Since the majority of Bailey's illustrations in his book are military, he obviously thinks that a solider can be a follower. However, given the leadership equation that has surfaced in this study, it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate to label a soldier a follower in view of the fact that no choice whatsoever is involved in obeying a commander. A military model is power-wielding in its supreme form, and we have discussed at length the problems of equating leadership with power-wielding.

Bailey's mature followers indicate that "they have confidence in themsleves, in their fellows, in the social system that coordinates their actions, and in the values and beliefs that underlie the social system" (p. 25). They freely participate in the process of leadership and share in the triumphs and the failures; they are not merely instruments. Maturity, as it relates to followers, is further defined by Bailey as "the willingness to submit to the test of reality, the capacity to use reason, to interpret instructions rather than to follow them literally and exactly, to ask for clarification and even for justification . . . . Mature people use their heads" (p. 27). The distinguishing characteristic of mature followers is their "tempered independence, their capacity to take action without a leader, but in such a way as to give the leader constructive support" (p. 27).

Anarchic dispositions in followers are characterized as rebellious, irreverent, irresponsible, or carnival behavior.

It is childlike and highly disrespectful. It is further defined by Bailey as self-sufficiency or the rejection of another's guidance. Anarchic dispositions create fragmented worlds and normally point to the failure of leadership.

Bailey believed that all four dispositons were present in most leadership relationships. Many societies encourage certain dispositions over others, while some societies stifle selected bahavior patterns that suggest one or more dispositions. Bailey believed these four dispositions are part of human nature and are universal and a "leader may be compelled to accept any of the four dispositions" within the ranks of his or her followers. Since Bailey's personal experience is primarily in the university context, he cited the president of a university as having to build plans around the presence of all four follower dispositions, and to fail to recognize that all four are present would be to jeopardize planning. The leader's challenge then is to bring about the appropriate disposition in his or her followers, and to recognize that the four dispositions are very likely present within the wide range of followers.

Values, Beliefs & Customs

As identified in Bailey's earlier works, the form that leadership took in any given culture was based, in part, upon the function of values which Bailey defined as "how the world should be," beliefs he defined as "how the world is," and customs as "how one conducts oneself under the guidance of a particular set of values and beliefs" (p. 36). The question Bailey posed was "what freedom do leaders have to

trascend those values and beliefs" and "how much room do they have for maneuver?" (p. 36). In certain cultures, such as that of the Konds which Bailey studied, and the Nuer described by Evans-Pritchard (1940), there was little room for traditional leadership, since, according to Bailey, the followers in both cultures were more of the anarchic disposition, valuing equality and disvaluing authority. Other cultures, however, may place a higher value on authority and a collective identity that is more suited to leadership. Inherited ideas about inequality among people are difficult to change and they impact the style or form that leadership will take in a given culture, such as a Hindu culture, where someone in authority must be remote, aloof, and awesome if his legitimacy is to be maintained.

Is Culture King?

Bailey then asked, Is culture king? Consistent with his ideas about the deceiving nature of leaders, Bailey answered this question by suggesting that leaders are not prisoners of their culture, although they are constrained by it, and that leaders therefore will remain on the cutting edge of changes in order to exploit the potential within cultures. There are usually diverse customs and conflicting values within any given culture, such that a leader can exploit such discrepancies to his or her advantage. In certain other societies, such as communities in the United States, there are also a variety of cultures within a given community and such variety also represents differing values and beliefs. A leader in this type of community has a

variety of cultues among which to choose and which s/he can
exploit as a resource for change and for purposes of his or
her own power. Bailey stated that from this viewpoint,
"leadership is the art of exploiting cultures" (p. 26).

Bailey pointed to the Melanesian big-men, discussed
briefly in Chapter Three, and Polynesian chiefs (Sahlins,
1963) who frequently ventured with impunity into the region
of conduct forbidden by the dominant values of the cultures
that ostensibly guide their actions.

Both chiefs and big-men live in social universes that
contain a variety of values and beliefs, including the
contrary of what is the dominant feature of leadership
in each case. That variety and the contradictions give
room for maneuver.

The Polynesian chiefs are born to privilege, having
special power and capacities to rule and to promote the
well-being of their subjects. In this respect they are
on the traditional side of the Great Transformation
(Polanyi, 1957), serving the collectivity, in a world
where rules and ruled respect each other as members of
one moral community. The fact that someone has to pay
for the rites and for symbolizing eminence is of
secondary importance. Money has to be found to build
and run the theater, but the play is what really
matters. But in fact, as everyone knows, in aesthetic
affairs and even in religious affairs, moneymaking tends
to take charge of the situation. When that happens, one
has passed to the other side of the Great
Transformation. The rulers are serving not the

collectivity but their own interests. They are no
longer part of the same moral community as their
subjets, but are their exploiters. Being a chief is no
longer a vocation but a business, and the people are no
longer the ruler's subjects but his quasi-adversaries.
(pp. 51-52)

There is usually enough latitude in the interpetation of
religious beliefs and traditional myths within any culture
that a wise leader can twist the interpretation to his or
her advantage if needed, and in so doing, convince the
followers that the interpretation given is the only one that
is possible. In this sense, a leader is exercising
manipulation in order to achieve selected goals. Passive
followers may accept this kind of behavior; mature followers
may not. Much depends upon the culture and how individuals
have been trained to be followers within that culture.

Entrepreneurs are also examples used by Bailey to
illustrate the need for leaders to reach beyond the
normative patterns of a culture in order to institute change
and adaptation. Bailey also pointed to Ghandi who, by
making use of Hindu culture and presenting himself as an
ascetic, was able to place himself outside the parochial
boundaries that would have otherwise tied him to a
particular caste and region. Not only was Hinduism widely
accepted by the majority of people in India, but it also
placed Ghandi apart from the imperial power. In addition,
Ghandi's vision was, in fact, a reshaping of Hinduism to
suit his more humanistic ideals that he had drawn from other
sources. While Bailey didn't call Ghandi a manipulator or a

confidence man, the illustration served to point out how leaders must transcend their cultural beliefs and values while at the same time convince followers that those values and beliefs are legitimate. The leader must serve the values of a culture as well as ignore them in order to keep power and in order to change the culture. There must be "room for fudging and manipulation" if a cause or a goal is to be pursued.

Institutions

Besides dispositions and values as both resources and constraints for a leader, there are the forms of organizations and institutions. The disposition of followers sets limits on organization building and influences the shape of institutions in societies. Leaders rely on institutions and formal organizations to control followers. Institutions differ from organizations insofar as an organization is brought into existence in order to achieve a given end; its purpose, according to Bailey, is extrinisic to itself. An institution is an end in itself, has a moral quality, and is usually served by organizations. Occasionally, very large and long-established organizations will present themselves as institutions, perhaps something akin to the corporate culture movement discussed in Chapter Three.

Bailey's primary point is that organizations and institutions are both resources open to the leader's manipulation and a constraint. If a leader is to be effective, according to Bailey, organizations and

institutions must, to some degree, be remade so that they are more suitable to the leader's needs.

Numenification

Bailey spends much space and time on the institutions of charismatic leadership, suggesting that such an institution in selected cultures can be manipulated to serve the leader's needs. He calls the process of followers, out of their disappointed expectations, turning to the leader as fulfillment of their irrational hopes and dreams "numenification." I have previously discredited the notion of charismatic leadership, but in terms of Bailey's notions of manipulation and humbuggery, charismatic perceptions of leadership fit right in, for such perceptions of the charismatic leader are frequently filled with deception and subterfuge. By resorting to numenification, a leader is "motivated by a simple nonrational hunger for adulation" (p. 100), but the point that Bailey wants his readers to understand is that numenification can be a strategy that fulfills the expedient needs or goals of any leader, particularly in cultures where charismatic leadership is both expected and part of tradition. Bailey argued that numenification is most useful for purposes of disruptive leadership. Gluckman's (1960) study of Shaka Zulu is the example Bailey drew upon to illustrate this form of disruptive leadership combined with numenification.

Leadership, as it is being defined in this study, would not accept Bailey's approach to leadership through numenification as a valid and substantiated theory. But I

do not think Bailey is trying to present a theory of leadership. Rather, he is illustrating how societies translate the notion of leadership, be it right or wrong, into expected behavior patterns of leaders. No doubt, charismatic leadership, or numenification, has been and still is a popular approach to characterizing what sets individuals apart from the masses. Bailey's approach to numenification as a resource that is employed by individuals to promote their own self-interests and to manipulate followers is, in my opinion, a very apt and correct understanding of charisma, as long as we understand it is inconsistent with the theory of leadership presented in this study. My appreciation for Bailey's explication of numenification is not as a valid understanding of leadership, but rather as an excellent illustration of manipulation and humbuggery by individuals some societies label as leaders.

Image, Symbols, & Political Magic

A leader has two types of followings, the mass and the entourage. The leader's relationship with the mass of his/her followers "is built on trust, or rather on a simulacrum of trust in which an essentially impersonal and instrumental relationship is presented as if it were personal and intimate" (p. 144). The entourage is in part a more familial and moral relationship, at least one would think. But if Bailey is correct, even this is misleading. Because getting the job done is the first and foremost task, "the purported devotional and moral relationship is mainly a

myth" (p. 124). Bailey argued that most of the members of an entourage are in fact very critical and ambitious, seeking some day to unseat the leader and replace him or her with one of their own. This means the leader must periodically inject his entourage with "all-purpose morale-raising drugs in amounts that will keep them devoted and regimented, well above the line of apathy but also well below that level of intoxicated enthusiasm at which they might imagine they could do without a leader" (p. 124). With the members of the entourage, the leader has a tendency to "provoke discord, unlovableness, aloofness, erraticism, eccentricity, unreasonableness" (p. 127), the very opposite qualities conveyed in the image put out for the mass of followers. Because the entourage knows too much about the leader, the members must frequently be dominated by purchase, threat, intimidation, and bribery; the masses are merely tamed by devotion.

Consequently, the task is one of preserving a mystique and using all the symbols and resources available to preserve an essentialy false image. Bailey drew upon national presidents, prime ministers and military generals to illustrate this relationship between a leader and both his mass following and his entourage. This is where political magic is needed, not political science. Images imposed upon the masses are not rational, they are the products of enchantment, make-believe, simplification, and large doses of propaganda. This is what Bailey meant by diseducation. Reason has no place in this relationship and could not survive. It is a world "wholly that of

enchantment" (p. 159).

Leaders as Metacultural Virtuosi

Bailey's approach to the behavior of leaders is driven, in part, by his professional and personal sensitivity to the reality of matacultural communities and societies. The reality of most societies in the modern world is a metacultural reality. In Western cultures, we rarely experience a community where there is only one culture that is present. Any given community in the United States, for example, is composed of multiple cultures and large metropolitan areas can identify literally hundreds of cultures within the city boundaries. Bailey has provided a portrait of the leader operating within societies that are metacultural, and therefore has correctly identified the fact that a leader cannot possibly claim genuine empathy with every culture. Yet, through manipulation and exploitation of resources, symbols, and political magic, the leader has to convince the masses that s/he is one of them, at least at some level. No other study of leadership has made this reality so strikingly clear as has Bailey's.

Within this polycultural context, it is somewhat easier to digest the villainy of leaders, only because we cannot possibly expect a single leader in a metacultural society to be honest to every convention, belief, value, and custom, simply because there are so many of them. Bailey concluded:

> A leader, by definition, must go beyond the conventions
> of his society. He is above rationality and he is above
> morality. Why so? Ex natura semper aliquid novi. A

leader has to deal with the real world, which
continually throws up something new. What is new is
unanticipated in the culture and therefore not
understood; what is not understood is threatening to the
existing order and therefore is evil. Inasmuch as the
leader can deal with new things only by acting in new
ways, he is thereby tainted. . . . So the rituals and
propaganda set out to demonstrate two things: first,
the leader is a good and moral person, by conventional
standards; second, failing conventional virtue, the
leader stands above morality because he is
necessary--his presence and his actions are inevitable
(and therefore exempt from moral evaluation) if society
is to continue. (p. 175)

Summary

I have a very deep appreciation for Bailey's latest, and
certainly most provocative, discussion on the behavior of
leaders. I think he has done what no other study on
leadership has yet accomplished and that is develop a
portrait of the stark and real behavior of many leaders in
complex and multicultural societies. Bailey has revealed
the dirty laundry that we all sense is there, but we do not
want to see it or read about it. We still want to preserve
the myths and heroic imagery of our leaders and when those
myths are shattered, we are left insecure and angry. In his
successful efforts to demythologize leadership, Bailey has
turned over the rock and forced us to look at the seamy,
dark side of much of the behavior that is very much a part

of leadership in every culture and in every society. As a
deeper insight into the very real behavior and motivation of
those individuals we label leaders, Bailey's work is
intoxicating, illuminating, and articulate.

But in this, the latest of his works, he does not
present a theory of leadership, nor does he significantly
advance what theory of leadership he has offered in his
earlier works. In those earlier works, he had identified
the nature of leadership as process, as interaction, as
collective behavior, as resourceful, as political, as
symbolic and linguistic, as generative, and as ethical.
Even after persuasively convincing me of the unethical
behavior of individual leaders, Bailey has not convinced me
that the process of leadership is unethical. In fact, by
illustrating so articulately the manipulation and humbuggery
that is practiced by some leaders, he had given added
support to the relationship between ethics and leadership.
Precisely because the behavior of the leader as articulated
by Bailey is unethical, the notion supports the idea that
leadership operates within an ethical context and that the
ethical context is shaped by the given culture, or in many
cases, by the metaculture. If leadership were not shaped by
the ethical context, Bailey would not have to identify his
leaders as villains. Leaders can get away with being
villains not because the culture condones unethical behavior
or because the cultural context itself is bad, but because
the leaders wear the masks that present an ethical image in
conert with the ethical standards of a given culture.

Recalling the front and back stage methaphors that

Bailey developed earlier, leaders are villains in the back stage arena but in the public eye of the front stage they are portrayed with all the masks that suggest leaders are the moral pillars of their communities. Bailey believes this overt and covert reality makes the behavior of leaders all the more villainous because they knowingly are trying to deceive the public about their image. The point I wish to make here is that in order for the behavior of leaders to be identified as manipulation and villainy, the cultural context must be ethical in the first place or the leaders would not be violating the standards and norms that, in Bailey's opinion, identify them as manipulators. If the people were aware of how unethical the behavior of leaders really is, they would not be followers. If, for whatever reason, some people continue to follow an individual whose villainy has become public knowledge, the process is no longer leadership. The followers of an individual like Jim Jones, Idi Amin, and other power wielding tyrants were not engaged in leadership.

The question of virtue that Bailey has raised in his recent work is a major contribution to the relationship between leadership and ethics because it illustrates more precisely the tension that he raised in earlier works between morality and expediency, or between ethics and effectivness. Bailey believed leaders could be one or the other, but not both. If leaders are to be effective, they cannot be ethical, and since the payoff in being effective is greater than the payoff in being ethical, leaders choose to be effective.

Bailey therefore challenges the proposed cultural approach to leadership by suggesting that leaders and ethical behavior do not mix. The important difference between Bailey's approach and my own is that Bailey has focused on the content of the behavior of leaders and not on the process of the leaders/followers relationship within a larger cultural and ethical context. The relationship between leadership and ethics, as proposed by a cultural theory, does not rest upon the moral behavior of individual leaders along, but upon the process of the collective relationship among leaders and followers. Indeed, many, if not all, leaders practice behavior that runs against the ethical standards of the culture, but that is not to suggest that all followers are equally manipulative and villanous. If the followers become as immoral in their behavior as the leaders, then the process is no longer leadership. No matter how leaders behave back stage, if they can maintain the credibility of their front stage image, and if the followers are committed to what that image represents in the way of a vision, then leadership behavior is being exercised. Once the back stage behavior gets mixed with the front stage drama, and the followers lose their clarity of vision because the image of the leaders becomes spoiled, then leadership behavior has been thwarted. As I have stated repeatedly, it is critically important in a cultural approach to leadership to distinguish between the behavior of solitary leaders and the collective process identified in the relationship among leaders and followers. If the nature of leadership is linked only to the behavior of solitary

leaders, then Bailey is absolutely correct in suggesting that leadership cannot be ethical. I think Bailey's earlier works offered a more collective approach to leadership than does his latest, which focuses so heavily upon the behavior of solitary leaders. This focus on individual leaders is one reason why I stated earlier than his latest work does not advance the theory of leadership which evolved from his earlier works.

Another issue related to Bailey's approach to leadership and ethics is that of linking leadership with effectiveness. Both Rost (1989) and I have argued that the process of leadership cannot be measured by goals, products, or effectiveness. The effectiveness of leadership is similar to the behavior of solitary leaders insofar as each identifies the forms or context of leadership that varies from culture to culture, but does not identify the process of leadership. Granted, all leaders and followers do not set out to fail, and, in fact, will very likely have some very specific goals and standards by which to judge their effectiveness. But even if the goals were not met and it is apparent that the leaders and followers were ineffective, the process of leadership still occurred. Consequently, I have proposed that the relationship between leadership and ethics cannot, and should not, be linked to effectiveness, success, or the fulfillment of specific goals.

Although Bailey and I differ in our approach to the relationship leadership and ethics, we find much common ground in our mutual understanding of the relationship between culture and leadership. Although his latest work

may not have advanced his theory of leadership as it emerged in his earlier works, it makes an important contribution in its demythologizing of leader behavior. The behavior of manipulation by leaders is contrasted with the public image that the masses are led to believe is the real person behind the mask of the leader. In this sense, Bailey has refined his earlier approach to leadership by utilizing the metaphor of front stage and back stage theatre. What I think is important here is that in Humbuggery and Manipulation, Bailey has focused attention exclusively on the back stage drama. Bailey has make a important step in shattering the image of leaders as heroes, great men, supermen, or messiahs. He has reinforced the need to reformulate what leadership means as a collective phenomenon by his candid portrayal of the dark side of the behavior of leaders. I am convinced that if more leadership scholars were to understand the behavior of leaders as Bailey has portrayed it, they would quickly abandon the theories of leadership that define leadership in terms of the behavior of solitary individuals. Most important, however, is that Bailey, in all his works, has instantiated the theory that leadership and culture are linked and that leadership is a metacultural expression.

Waud Kracke

Barth (1959), Leach (1964), and Bailey (1969, 1977, 1988) have addressed leadership in their case studies through what they interpret as a political lens, though I have argued that it is more appropriate to view their studies of leadership through a cultural lens. Kracke (1978) offered yet another dimension to leadership by combining psychoanalysis with anthropology in his study of the Kagwahiv Indians of Brazil. Currently a professor in the department of anthropology at the University of Illinois-Chicago, Kracke chose the subject of leadership in order "to develop a psychological comprehension of a social phenomenon that would have bearing both on the theory of social organization and on the psychological understanding of individual lives" (p. xi). His analysis offers us quite another perspective on the relationship between culture and leadership.

Leadership as an Emotional Relationship

In *Force and Persuasion: Leadership in an Amazonian Society* (1978), Kracke explored the psychoanalytic dimensions of leadership while giving an ethnographic study of the Amazonian culture of the Kagwahiv Indians. Unlike Bailey (1977), Kracke was explicitly interested in identifying psychic or emotional apsects of the leaders/followers relationship since he believed, that leadership was an emotional relationship seeking to fulfill

psychological needs of leaders and followers. In his
ethnography of two small local groups, he raised the
question: "What is the nature of the bond between a leader
and his followers that we call 'leadership,' the bond on
which a leader rests his authority? and, What makes one
leader more effective than another in drawing his followers
together into a cohesive group?" (p. 2). Kracke was
interested in exploring "what is essential to leadership,
invariant across cultural conditions" (p. 3). Thus, he is
in search of the universal dimensions of leadership.

Equally important as the emotional aspect of the
relationship between leaders and followers was the mediating
role of leadership. Building on Hallowell's (1955) notion
of the "behavioral environment," Kracke proposed that
leadership served a mediating role between social structure
and personality. "I propose in this book a conception of
the relationship between social norms and individual psychic
functioning with leadership and group processes playing a
key intermediary role" (p. 4). In proposing that leadership
mediates between the individual psyche and the social
system, Kracke further underscored the nature of leadership
as an emotional relationship within the group process.

Kracke recognized the importance of leadership in every
culture as one of the key links that held societies
together. He relied on Oliver's (1955) ethnography of the
Siuai, a Solomon Island society, in which leaders, called
mumi, formed and intensified social relationship and thereby
preserved Siuai culture when it was threatened with anomie.
Structural bonds holding groups together are weak in

Kagwahiv society and consequently "leadership is the basis for the formation of the constituent social groups of the society" (p. 3).

Yet Kracke admitted that anthroplogists had a "limited understanding of the nature of the leaders/followers relationship and its part in society" (p. 2), and many ethnographers frequently linked leadership to the personal skills or charisma of a single leader. He also confessed that most anthropological studies have treated leadership as an epiphenomenon of political structure, focusing on the strategic considerations in the achievement of positions of power or political office, "but few empirical studies have focused on the exercise of leadership as such" (p. 3).

Briefly, then, Kracke posited that "leadership is an emotional relationship at least as much as it is a jural one; and it is a relationship, furthermore, which is an integral part of group dynamics" (pp. 3-4). He defined the purpose of his study as clarifying what the psychic regularities of human relationships might be, "seeing leadership as one phenomenon which mediates between the individual psyche and the social system" (p. 5). Just as Bailey was looking for rules of the game, so Kracke is seeking out regularities in psychic behavior.

Kagwahiv Background & Social Structure

The Kagwahiv Indians are a shifting horticultural tribe of Amazonian Brazil. They live in small settlements, usually of three or four nuclear families scattered along the banks of tributaries of the Rio Madeira river. They

speak their own language and, despite nominal Catholicism, they retain many of their own beliefs and practices. The economic development of the larger Brazilian cities has impacted the Kagwahiv culture and most of the Indians work for large landowners. The outside influence is revealed by the fact that the men hunt with shotguns, but they still fish with the traditional bow and arrow. Men and women are segregated in their responsibilities. Men hunt and clear the ground for cultivation while women plant, weed, and harvest the crops. Potatoes, yams, corn, and manioc (a tuber vegetable) are the staples. The slash-and-burn style method of farming means that land must be cleared each year and causes some mobility of the communal groups as they search for new land to be cleared and planted.

The Kagwahiv environment had its behavioral impact on the cosmology, beliefs, and practices of Kagwahiv culture, borne out in a variety of spiritual beings, food and work taboos, dreams, social values, and the kinship system. Kracke focused his discussion of leadership in this society around the kinship systems which gave authority to the father-in-law over the daughters and sons-in-law, a small group which Bailey called a core. All Kagwahiv are relatives in their language and outsiders are nonrelatives. A wide variety of spiritual beings exist and the Indians believed in a spiritual relationship with nature which resulted in various taboos on the killing and eating of certain animals. Dreams weighed prominently in their spiritual life and occasionally dreams are taken to be real. Dreams are also key symbols that direct behavior. Two

overriding Kagwahiv values are high esteem for generosity and sharing with fellow Kagwahiv and the preservation of harmony in face-to-face relations. Kracke shared personal examples of his being lectured by elder Indians on generosity and gift giving. The Kagwahiv are reserved in expressing intense emotion and the stress on harmony creates repressed aggressive feelings which become directed toward the enemy with great ferocity. Sexuality, however, is fairly free and open, as well as a frequent source of conversation. Adultery is common and the exchange of sexual partners is frequent. But certain rituals limit the practice of sex, and violation of these rituals leads to severe punishment. Infants are highly indulged and the Kagwahiv lack a hard-and-fast separation between childhood and adulthood.

Homero and Jovenil

Kracke built his leadership study around two Kagwahiv chiefs, Homero, an old headman in his seventies who led the Porthino settlement in a reclusive authoritarian mode, and Jovenil, a young headman in his thirties, who led a break-off group from Portinho. Jovenil's leadership was characterized more by participation, consensus in decisions, and social intimacy. He maintained a low profile, while Homero "conducts his group with almost peremptory command" (p. 70), expecting obedience and service as his due. The styles of these two headman/leaders are compared in great detail. The degree to which each headman could assert his authority in Kagwahiv society reflected his perception of

the degree of support his followers gave him and the security of his control over them. It is also worth noting that Homero and Jovenil represent opposite styles of leadership. Kracke drew upon Leach's (1964) study in Highland Burma because the dialectic of the two traditions of gumlao and gumsa were somewhat parallel to Homero's and Jovenil's different approaches to leadership. Jovenil was domocratic and egalitarian (gumlao) while Homero was hierarchical and authoritarian (gumsa).

Commotive Leadership

Kracke believed the heart of leadership was the leader's contribution to the group process. He called this the commotive function of leadership: "that function which enables, and leads, a group of men to 'move together' in the achievement of a common purpose" (p. 84). The commotive function was a notion originally formulated by the philosopher Hocking (1937). Leadership, Kracke argued, "is never exercised wholly by one person" (p. 114). Kracke also understood a group as a "set of individuals who interact with one another over some time, with a degree of mutual recognition and openness to one another, some sense of common purpose or common destiny, and a sense of belonging together" (p. 84). Leadership was the process of both forming this group and maintaining its continuity and coordination. The commotive function of the leader was to bring the scattered intentions of several minds into the current of a common action (Hocking, 1926). Thus, the chief's responsibilities included supervising the work,

watching over the settlement, distributing and apportioning the food, sponsoring festivals, being generous with gifts, restoring and maintaining harmony, serving as an exemplar of social values, and maintaining relations with other groups. Kracke relied extensively upon both Barth and Leach to explain the quite varied relationships between leaders and followers and the presence of different ideological positions within one cultural setting.

Leadership style depends upon four commotive devices which leaders use to mobilize groups: "persuasion, personal example, encouragement of participation and the permitting and encouraging of maximum autonomy on the part of followers" (p. 91). Much of what has already been defined as the transactional component of leadership is also important to this Amazonian society. Kracke made clear that although Jovenil was more involved with his followers--more intimate with them socially--than Homero who interacted a good deal less, Homero had the credibility that old age, wisdom, tradition, and myth telling gave him. Homero was the wise, old warrior and philosopher chief; his leadership was characterized by Kracke as more embedded in the historical or traditional aspects of Kagwahiv culture.

Group Development

Kracke understood leadership as a process that is inseparble from the group. He was convinced that leadership is not primarily a formally defined role, but a relationship between leaders and the group. The process of leadership focused on the formation, maintenance, continuity, and

coordination of the group. It is the commotive function of leadership. Kracke also confessed that the headman was not the only person who performed leadership functions, but that any number of group members could also serve in similar capacities. "Each of these functions, furthermore, can be performed by more than one person in concert. The commotive function, for example, can be performed by an 'instrumental leader' focused on a task, in cooperation with an 'expressive leader' who recruits support for him, or the job may be divided in other way, with different aspects of the leadership task being carried out by different individuals" (p. 85).

One of the many strengths of Kracke's study is his data on specific followers of both Homero and Jovenil. He analysed the reasons and motivations for following one leader over another or for switching from one leader to another. For example, Jovenil sought to share his leadership with his wife Aluza, his father Ukarepuku, and with two other individuals, Francisco and Mahogi. Kracke pointed out how each of these were able to provide elements of leadership that Jovenil on his own could not have provided. He also illustrated why Jovenil was a more effective and more popular leader than Homero, who was threatened by anyone who tried to share his leadership. Kracke also explained what happened when followers had hostile feelings toward the leader and may be forced to seek leadership in another group. Homero's style of leadership relied more on force than persuasion, causing some of his followers, like Miguel and Francisco, to retreat to

Jovenil's camp because they didn't get along with Homero.
Yet because Homero was the wise old philosopher-chief who
could speak for hours on the stories and myths of his
ancestors and who had demonstrated heroic bravery as a
warrior in his youth, his leadership was more embedded in
the history of the culture and therefore he wasn't forced to
win his followers with affection and persuasion as much as
Jovenil had to do. However, because Jovenil could be more
persuasive, affectionate, and less tyrannical, some
followers switched from Homero's camp to Jovenil's.
Followers never switched from Jovenil's camp to Homero's.

Resources

Kracke identified a number of resources that he linked
directly to leadership. I discussed previously the
personality resources and styles of leadership that equipped
Homero and Jovenil for leadership, noting that such
resources were used very differently by the two leaders.
How each used the commotive devices for mobilizing his group
is one of the most significant resources, according to
Kracke. Jovenil's personality resources motivated his
followers to action more quickly than Homero's, but Homero's
style was appealing to his followers because it linked them
to the past. In conditions of combat, Homero had a
distinguished record of bravery and ferocity that could
animate his followers during warfare. The pride and very
survival of the Kagwahiv Indians had resulted from Homero's
leadership against local Brazilians in the 1950s. In some
way, Homero was more the warrior leader and fared well in

wartime, but less well during peace. Jovenil was the better leader during times of peace.

Another resource that Kracke identified was ecological insofar as in choosing a settlement location, a headman had to consider a number of factors, including water access, tillable land for gardening, year-round sources of fish, hunting grounds, and closeness to sources of commercial supply. On a social level, the ability to sponsor festas, or lavish festivals, to display a headman's wealth and power and to increase his prestige was very important, much like the men's houses in Barth's study. Kracke experienced such festas during his time with the Kagwahiv and reported that Jovenil was usually more successful in sponsoring festas than Homero primarily because Jovenil was more organized and had better cooperation among his followers. An aspiring leader can cosponsor a festa and thereby advance his own aspirations and prestige.

The distribution of food and gifts is one of the principle responsibilities of the headman and also a resource insofar as it allows the headman to both reward and punish followers. An extra portion of food is a symbol of honor bestowed upon a follower; a diminished portion is a sign of displeasure.

One of Homero's greatest resources was his ability to tell stories and recount the myths of the Kagwahiv tradition. Kracke reported that this was his favorite pastime and one which he did exceedingly well. Kracke pointed out that Homero's ties with the past and with the traditions and myths of the Kagwahiv was a key factor in

maintaining his legitimacy as a leader. "He has the deepest knowledge of Kagwahiv religion, ritual, and social practicies of any Kagwahiv I have worked with, and an impressively detailed memory of marriages and family relationships; his lists form the framework of my genealogical charts" (p. 101). Kracke called him the "wise old man," perhaps more in line with Plato's philosopher-king or Redl's (1942) patriarchal sovereign.

Another of the strengths of Kracke's study is his detailed explanation of the critical resources of followers themselves. He explained through many examples how each follower served as a resource in the leadership relationship. Jovenil was far more willing to share responsibilities and power with his followers than Homero and this factor points to a more dynamic and emotionally stable community over against Homero's settlement where Kracke observed the daily tension of power conflicts because Homero was more authoritarian, commanding his followers rather than seeking their consensual support in projects. The wives of each leader functioned as a critical resource and frequently served in a coleader capacity, especially among the women of each settlement. Because Homero's style is less appealing when compared to Jovenil's among the Kagwahiv, Sergio, Homero's second-in-command, would often assume major leadership responsibilities in order to motivate others in the settlement who resisted Homero's brash, authoritative style. Kracke indicated that it was Sergio who was often the real leader. Kracke summed up this basic difference in leadership style in relation to the

resourcefulness of followers.

It is clear why Jovenil is so much more effective, under current conditions, in maintaining an efficient and smoothly running group. He offers well-organized, future-oriented leadership combined with demonstration of personal concern for each follower's growth and welfare. Yet it cannot be unequivocally said that Jovenil's leadership is in every way "better" than Homero's. Homero, to be sure, has lost many followers in rancor; and his style is hardly conducive to harmony and efficiency in the group. Yet his leadership has some compensating strengths. . . . In the leadership tasks of regulating relationships within the group, however, Jovenil enjoys a definite advantage over Homero. In controlling the selection of the members of his group, the leader creates a certain climate, prefigures a consensus of group values, and establishes the potential for the development of certain kinds of relationships between members with complementary dispositions. The leader also has direct influence on the development of interpersonal relationships within the group, coordinating the various contributions different members make to group life and leadership and helping each member adapt to the formal position he occupies in the group. In all of these tasks, as a catalyst to positive relationships within the group, Jovenil is far more successful. (pp. 132-133)

Freudian Components

Through his psychoanalytic lens, Kracke analysed the leader-follower relationship by identifying many of the traditional Freudian components of relationships, including dreams, Oedipal feelings toward the mother, the father-son competition, rebellion, aggression, and homosexuality. He does this because it is central to his thesis that "a particular set of feelings involves some aspect of the leader's style of leadership or of his headmanship role" (p. 192). On the one hand, leadership is a structural process of developing and maintaining group identity, and, on the other hand it is a feeling relationship between leader and follower. Thus, leadership has both an instrumental and an expressive side.

On the expressive side, Kracke relied heavily on his psychoanalytic background to develop the parental model for leadership. "Yet, in the final analysis, the leader may be more apt to play into strong parental transferences than persons in other roles. . . . The leader is someone serving a key social function, . . . much like that of parents toward their children—caring for them, doing things for them, teaching, parceling out food among them, and drawing the group together into 'one big family'" (pp. 194-195). A leader therefore performs emotional functions for the follower.

Leader as Father-Figure

The parental role is helpful by placing in context the use of force by Homero. Normally, force is not equated with

leadership, but in Kracke's approach, force is not associated with power-wielding tyranny, as much as with a strict father who is more authoritarian. Force by itself could not be a part of leadership, according to Kracke. It must be combined with numerous other cultural components in order to be accepted by the followers. And in psychoanalytic terms, the forcefulness of a strong father figure can meet the needs of certain individuals. Thus, we must put in context the notion of force as it is applied to Homero. Homero could hardly be compared to anyone like a Hitler.

Kracke shared detailed psychological histories of selected individuals, some of whom had left Homero's settlement and moved to Jovenil's camp because they could not get along with Homero. One such example is revealing of the two different styles of Homero and Jovenil and how Jovenil was able to serve as a father-figure to Miguel, who fought with Homero over his drinking problems. Miguel thus left the Porthino settlement, choosing Jovenil over Homero as his leader.

> Far from provoking Miguel's anger, Jovenil helps keep it under control. Through not successful in keeping Miguel and his nephew apart from their fateful fight, Jovenil generally manages to avoid giving Miguel occasion for anger, and to calm him when he does get angry. Jovenil makes a point of not interfereing with Miguel's drinking. "He gets drunk on his own money, doesn't he?" Jovenil said to me. "I don't scold, no." This help in controlling his temper must make Miguel feel more secure

under Jovenil's leadership than under Homero's. (p. 145)

By the technique of indepth interviews and analyses of
dreams, Kracke was able to probe deeply into the emotional
elements of the relationship between leader and follower.
Much of Miguel's resentment toward Homero came out in dreams
in which Kracke revealed that Homero really was viewed by
Miguel as the father who rejected his son and Jovenil as the
father who was the replacement. "If the memory of the
father's long disappearance in the hunt represent childhood
feelings of being abandoned by his father, Miguel portrays
Jovenil in his dream as an ideal, reliable replacement.
Jovenil is (in Miguel's dreams) at least as good a hunter as
his father" (p. 147).

Oedipal fears and conflicts played prominently in many
of the dreams that surfaced among the individuals that
Kracke interviewed and with whom he conducted dream
analyses. While the stern rebukes of Homero drove Miguel
off, this same strong disciplinary approach met the needs of
Sergio who was Homero's right hand man. Sergio's dreams
revealed a great fear of Homero's rejection and scorn, and
therefore Sergio tried very hard to constantly please
Homero, much as a son seeks to please a father. Sergio's
dreams also revealed a wish "for an older man to love him as
his father did--or as he wishes his father had" (p. 175).
Kracke was also able to trace selected childhood experiences
of followers, such as Sergio's, and identify the root causes
of adult behavior patterns. For example, Sergio's father
died when Sergio was a very young child and he therefore was
left with unfulfilled father needs which Homero, in part,

met. As an adolescent, Sergio experienced aggressive, rebellious impulses which only Homero could control. Kracke believed that Sergio needed "a strong, masculine figure with whom to work out his adolescent conflicts" and, in this instance, Homero met that need more than Jovenil.

There is another significant development here that Kracke shared about the relationship between Homero and Jovenil which further illustrates the leader as father-figure. Jovenil had been Homero's apprentice, and he developed a deep admiration and affection for Homero which continued even after Jovenil became the leader of his own settlement. In this instance, however, Jovenil also fulfilled a son need for Homero, and Homero may even have had a homosexual attraction for Jovenil. In fact, Kracke believed that "there is an inescapable sexual element in dominating others" (p. 218). Jovenil, in one sense, remained a follower of Homero and looked upon Homero as a leader even when Jovenil was himself a leader. It is a good illustration of the fact that leaders are also followers. It was in this regard that Homero was able to retain his leadership position even with his difficult leadership style and authoritarian manner. He was the "patriarchal sovereign" (Redl, 1942) who functioned in the Freudian sense of the super-ego, the conscience of the community. In Kracke's words, "They admire him, ambivalently idealize him, or rebel against him; but all percieve him as representing the values of Kagwahiv life which they learned from their father, and which are an integral part of themselves" (p. 190). It is this same type of detailed analysis of many of

the Kagwahiv individuals that makes Kracke's study so illuminating about the emotional relationship between leader and followers. Kracke concluded, "The essence of leadership is willingness to take a parental role--assuming responsiblities that others shun, supporting others in their self-control and cooperation, appraising situations in terms of the needs of the different people involved, and helping them to an appraisal of the reality context" (pp. 232-233).

Emotional Functions of the Leader

Along with serving as a father figure for many followers, a leader fulfills other emotional functions as well. Kracke indicated that the emotional functions of a leader operated at two levels. "First, the leader plays a part in promoting group processes--or, from the individual standpoint, helps to integrate a person in to the group and make him feel a part of it." (p. 195). Secondly, the leader "plays a direct part in each individual's life, performing some emotional function for him" (p. 195). These emotional functions Kracke defined as marital constancy, the distribution of favors, identification out of fear, displacement of anger, dependency needs, moral regulator of gratification, encouragement in maturation, role model for aspirations, and finally, facilitation of socially accepted sexual needs.

Concerning the emotional function of meeting sexual needs, Kracke offered the suggestion that leaders and followers act out homosexual needs in their relationships without actually having sex with one another. He stated

that leaders and followers share a "receptivity to their
warm and even erotic feelings toward other men" (p. 230).
However, he did distinguish between leaders and followers on
this level by suggesting that leaders had a close
relationship with their fathers and that followers "manifest
some disruption in relations--unfulfilled longings for
closeness, a breach in the relationship, or one never quite
adequately joined" (p. 232). This homosexual element in the
leader-follower relationship is also tied to their "intense
investment in narcissistic wishes" (p. 229).

Kracke recognized that both Homero and Jovenil performed
parental roles for their followers insofar as they assumed
responsibilties others shunned, supported others in their
self-control and cooperation, appraised situations in terms
of the needs of different people, and helped group members
to be in closer touch with the reality context, all parental
resposibilities in the raising of children. Kracke also
identified the leaders' personal awareness of members of
their respective groups and the needs of individual members
as crucial, similar to Barth's dyadic relationship.

To further clarify the emotional functions of the
relationship between leaders and followers, Kracke drew upon
Redl's (1942) typology which described types of "group
formative processes," each centeringon a particular type of
central person. The types included the patriarchal
sovereign, the leader, the tyrant, the central person as
love object, the central person as object of aggressive
drives, the organizer, the seducer, the hero, the bad
influence, and the good example. Kracke pointed out that

Redl's ten categories were not a typology of leaders or
leader behavior, but of the kinds of emotional relationships
that can exist between a leader and his followers. Both
Redl and Kracke also mean to say that a given relationship
between leaders and followers is not always the same type in
every situation. For example, with the possible exceptions
of organizer and leader, Homero and his followers exhibited
all other types of relationships. With the possible
exception of patriarchal sovereign, tyrant and bad
influence, Jovenil and his followers exhibited all other
types of relationships. Kracke believed that Jovenil and
his followers were most characterized by the ego-ideal
leader relationship, while Homero and his followers
fluctuated between patriarchal sovereign, more
characteristic of his later years, and tyrant, more
descriptive of his earlier years.

Leader as Narcissist

My previous discussion on leaders and naracissism in
Chapter Three is, in part, corroborated by Kracke's study.
Much of the expressive behavior demonstrated by either
Jovenil or Homero reflects their own self-image and
psychological needs. "Many of Homero's motives for
leadership are similar to some of the forces that propel
Jovenil, but are far less stable and more fraught with
conflict. His narcissism is unrealistic and grandiose; and
his paternal identification is not, like Jovenil's, a
relatively successful resolution of Oedipal conflict, but
the playing out of an orphan's family romance in

identification with a fantasied father he hardly knew" (p.
228). Kracke suggested that in one area, Homero displayed a
more mature narcissism in his commitment to tradition and
the old ways. Both leaders, however, had an intense
investment in their narcissistic wishes to be looked up to
and admired, "but the different forms such wishes take in
the two of them have a great influence on their respective
styles and effectiveness" (p. 229). Homero had more of what
Kohut (1966) identified as the grandiose self who has an
omnipotent fantasy that he can manipute his followers to
make them do just what he wants. He also represented a lot
of what Bailey (1988) described in his latest book.

Another element of their narcissistic personalities is
"their warm and even erotic feelings toward other men" p.
230). As stated earlier, Kracke believed that there is a
sexual element in dominating others. This did not mean that
the leaders were more "homosexually oriented" than their
followers, but a leader's investment in keeping followers
can be translated into the direction of tender feelings
toward a member of one's own sex, which becomes, according
to Kracke, the ultimate form of narcissistic object
choice--"choosing as the object of one's feelings a person
like oneself" (p. 231). Kracke reported that Homero had
many ambivalent conflicts over his homosexual feelings and
that could have resulted in a more severe manner with his
followers, even to the point of sadistic discipline.
Jovenil, on the other hand, was quite comfortable in his
enjoyment of male fellowship and his frequent, sexual joking
with other men. Kracke concluded, "Narcissism has long been

recognized as a central motivation for leadership, along
with the heightened homosexual concerns that go with it" (p.
233).

Leadership as Mediator

In his concluding comments on the leadership process,
Kracke maintained that leadership is "a manifestion of
social structure; it is the very core of social structure, a
key element in its formation" (p. 235). The central place
of leadership is in the formation of social groups. He
wrote, "Leadership makes the social system work" (p. 236).
In concert with much of what we have discussed in studies by
Barth (1959), Leach (1964), and Bailey (1969, 1977, 1988),
Kracke concluded:

> [The] processes of leadership are of a different order
> from the more formal structure anthropologists
> habitually study. Leadership processes are more fluid,
> more spontaneous; they depend more heavily on personal
> quality than do jurally defined roles and kinship
> relations. Leadership is a social phenomenon that lies
> between the formal regularities of social structure and
> the spontaneous emotional patterns of the individual
> members of society. It is a mediating link between
> them, mobilizing the motives of individuals to common
> action, channeling emotional energy into the functioning
> of the social organization--or into its disruption and
> change. The leader not only serves as a focus for
> bringing people together in groups and keeping them
> together, but plays an important part in his followers'

personal lives and may encourage the follower to grow into--or outgrow--the potential of his adult social role. Leaders take account of and respond to the emotional and maturational needs of their followers in recruiting them to engage the forms of social order--whether to preserve those forms, to activate them, or to change them. (p. 235)

Kracke (1987) admitted that he was more attracted to Jovenil's style of leaderhip than Homero's, but this only confirmed his belief that styles of leader's personalities will differ in order to attract different kinds of followers. "Leadership is an interactive process, and different followers make different demands of their leaders, turning to them for the fulfillment of different needs" (p. 240). But leadership has a crucial responsibility to convert diverse needs into complementary needs so that leaders and followers will "derive mutual satsifactions from their relationship as well as furnishing complementary contributions to group life" (p. 242).

Leadership plays a critical role in serving as a buffer between the individual and the social structure. Kracke interpreted leadership as a process for actualizing the social structure for individuals and this he illustrated in both Homero's and Jovenil's role in distributing and apportioning food, the sponsoring of festivals, and supervising work parties. Leadership can cushion normative demands of society and help individuals find a niche in the group whereby the individual's needs can be satsified. Leadership helps to find a fit between diverse individuals

and common social structures. Kracke wrote, "Leaders mediate between the individual and the social system, cushioning normative demands, helping the individual find a niche in the group in which he can (minimally) satisfy his needs and (ideally) fulfill his personal potential, and recruiting the energies of individuals for the continuation and enrichment of social life" (p. 251). In this sense, Kracke believed that "leadership is itself a process of psychic interaction, permitting considerable spontaneity in choice and personal predilection" (p. 252).

Generativity

For Kracke, leadership is an emotional relationship, having its roots in the inner motives of the psychic structures of both leaders and followers. Leadership fulfills individual and group needs as well as generates and energizes social structures. He summarized his position: "Leadership is the mobilization of social group in coordinated activity that realizes the possibilities of the social form" (p. 236). In this definition he joins with Barth (1959) and Leach (1964) in explicitly identifying the generative nature of leadership in its creation of new social forms and in the "actualizing of social structure" (p. 246).

Leadership as Universal

Kracke was convinced that "the process of leadership is universal" (p. 237) and "may not differ all so greatly from culture to culture" (p. 252). Moreover, the styles of

leadership will vary greatly both cross-culturally, and, as we have seen, within a single culture, yet the process remains the same among cultures. "What differs from society to society are the ways in which leadership processes are manifested, the contexts in which they take place, and the particular values set on their various manifestations" (p. 252). In all cultures, leadership "is an interactive process, and different followers make different demands of their leaders, turning to them for the fulfillment of different needs" (p. 240).

Summary

It should be clear why I value Kracke's approach to leadership. Of the four case studies that have been explored, Kracke's notion of leadership comes closest to my own proposed theory. He clearly identified the parallel tracks of culture and leadership and each of the critical properties of a cultural theory of leadership are highly visible in his ethnography. Furthermore, Kracke recognized that leadership is both the creator of culture and is responsible for its maturation and survival. His focus on the leaders/followers relationship is among the best descriptions available and clearly illustrates that leadership cannot be identified outside the group process. He gives added dimension to our understanding of leadership by illustrating how the leadership process is instrumental in mediating between diverse individuals and a common social structure. By identifying two very different styles of leader behavior in Homero and Jovenil, he also demonstrated

that the forms of leadership can vary from group to group while the process remains the same. Moreover, he has clearly identified leadership as universal by linking it to the psychic regularities in the relationship between leaders and followers. This linkage offers an important new step in identifying the psychic unity of humankind, a possible foundation on which a universal ethical framework could also be constructed. It is rare when a leadership scholar is able to provide the data that identify a universal dimension to the process of leadership. Kracke is the only researcher I know who has accomplished this through a psychodynamic approach.

Finally, Kracke has offered a significant ethnography on leadership that is not premised primarily on a political frame, but is rather constructed from a psychological approach. By using psychoanalytic techniques, Redl's model, and the concept of commotive functions, Kracke has analyzed the relationship among leaders and followers in such a manner as to offer new and important contributions to what constitutes the emotional bonding among leaders and followers. While the scale and context of Kagwahiv society is different than other cultures, the psychic processes that constitute leadership among the Kagwahiv Indians is, according to Kracke, universal. And while boundary conditions may vary from culture to culture, the process of leadership as an emotional relationship remains universal. Similar psychic processes may become the basis for what develops as different culturally constituted structures and mechanisms in the life of different cultures, including its

structures of leadership. Leadership is of special
importance for cultures in holding social groups together,
and having an influence on the emotional tenor of life in a
group which impinges strongly on the lives of the individual
members. In this sense, leadership is a mediator between
personality and the social domain. While more research is
needed in identifying the psychodynamic and psychosocial
components of the relationship between leaders and
followers, Kracke's work offers a seminal foundation on
which future researchers can build. It is almost impossible
to come away from reading <u>Force</u> <u>and</u> <u>Persuasion</u> and not be
convinced that leadership and culture do indeed run on
parallel tracks and that a cultural approach to
understanding the nature of leadership is useful in
identifying the multiple variables that shape leadership
behavior in cultures.

Conclusion

Practice Informing Theory

The four case studies on leadership point to the
dialectic between theory and practice. Theory informs
practice and practice informs theory. Put another way,
theory is conceptual, or a way of wording how behavior is
viewed and given a perspective. It is an idea framework.
Practice is structure, or the activity and action of
relationships in the process of responding to the stimuli of

environments. The dialectic between theory and practice is frequently defined in the notion of <u>praxis</u>.

It has been my purpose in this chapter to engage in the dialectic between my proposed theory of leadership and the case studies, thereby offering an alternative perspective on the nature of leadership which can be instantiated in the methodology of ethnography. I believe the four case studies provide a solid grounding of my theory that leadership is essentially a cultural expression and that culture and leadership, by sharing similar properties, also exist in isomorphic congruence to one another. Culture could not be created and reformulated without leadership; leadership does not exist as a separate process from culture.

The <u>Universality</u> <u>of</u> <u>Leadership</u>

Furthermore, by defining leadership in terms of its process identified in the nine properties, I have argued for the universal nature of leadership. By evaluating leadership in a variety of cultures that the four case studies present, I believe that I have given ample support to the idea that the process of leadership is universal. I have argued that the underlying assumptions of Barth's (1959) generative model, Leach's (1964) dynamic model expressed in the doctrines of <u>gumla</u> and <u>gumsa</u>, Bailey's (1969, 1977, 1983) dramaturgical model, and Kracke's (1978) psychodynamic model are process-based and are inherently universal.

By identifying the nine properties of leadership in each of the case studies, I have also identified the universal

nature of leadership. I have tried to illustrate that it is
necessary to identify each of these properties in order to
evaluate critically the presence of leadership. The major
failing of previous theories of leadership is their limited
scope, their one-dimensional approach to defining what is
essential to leadership. Most previous theories were unable
to identify leadership as universal because they focused on
form rather than process. It is impossible to understand
and define leadership in terms of form, for as Barth's
generative model demonstrates, form itself is in a constant
state of evolution and change. Since there is no one best
form for leadership, there likewise can be no definition of
leadership that relies on form. The case studies in this
chapter illustrate that the forms leadership takes are
indeed as culturally diverse as cultures themselves are
diverse, and any comparison of only the forms of leadership
among cultures could only lead to the conclusion that
leadership is not universal and is incommensurable among
cultures. I have argued against the notion of the
incommensurability of leadership by approaching the nature
leadership as process rather than content. In like manner,
I argued against the same notion in regard to defining the
nature culture. By identifying the nature of leadership in
terms of process, I believe we get a very clear perspective
on the universal nature of leadership.

Leadership as a Critical Model

There is yet another dimension to leadership that the
four case studies have illuminated, one which points to a

methodology in which leadership can serve as a critical model for the study of cultures. Each of the anthropologists in this chapter studied his respective culture through a leadership lens. In the ethnographies of Barth, Leach, and Bailey, the lens had a political coating, and in Kracke's study the lens had a psychodynamic coating. .Foster (in press) . has suggested that leadership serves as a critical model insofar as it challenges and evaluates organizational and social structures within the ongoing flux of change and evolution.

I propose that the nine properties that have been isolated in this study could serve as the criteria by which cultures are studied. By utilizing these properties in the methodology, the researcher would have to evaluate culture through a leadership lens, and leadership through a cultural lens. Although the argument has not been developed in this study, I have suggested earlier that the same nine properties might also be applied to the study of personality. In effect, the four anthropologists in this chapter have used leadership as a critical model, and, as I have illustrated, they have implicitly utilized the nine properties to evaluate the respective culture each was studying.

This study is preliminary and there is the need for additional research to ground the proposed cultural theory of leadership. More research is required to provide a more complete cross-cultural testing of the proposed theory, particuarly in polycultural settings. If those who are skilled in ethnography would apply this theory of leadership

to their methodology, I am certain their results would instantiate even further the coterminous relationship between leadership and culture. It is hoped that this chapter will serve in a preliminary way to stimulate additional research, both anthroplogically in various cultures and at interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary levels.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

In this study, I have tried to redefine the boundaries
of the study of leadership, espousing a theory in which such
boundaries are drawn by a cultural approach to the nature of
leadership. I have pointed out the failure of existing
studies of leadership to address the complex,
multidisciplinary, processual, and collective nature of
leadership, suggesting that attempts to appear scientific by
leadership scholars have produced volumes of data on the
forms of leadership, but virtually nothing on the universal
processes of leadership. The distinction between form and
process has been an underlying premise of this study. I
have argued that the nature of leadership needs to be
defined in terms of its processes rather than its form or
content.

In order to define the nature of leadership in terms of
its processes, I have relied extensively upon material
provided by anthropologists in their analyses of culture,
and I have built upon that material in order to propose a
theory of leadership that is defined within a cutural frame.
In the process of analyzing anthropological data, I

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discovered that theories of culture were also articulated in terms of form rather than process, the result of which has left students of culture with an endless array of definitions of culture and very little consensus among anthropologists about those definitions. Although I had hoped to find a consensus of opinion on the definition of culture by anthropologists that I could apply to my original notion that leadership was a cultural expression, I did not find one. What I had anticipated to be the less onerous research task of this study ended up becoming the most demanding. I had to sift through volumes of studies and ethnographic material and from such data develop a definition of culture that I could utilize in defining the nature of leadership. What emerged was an entirely new approach to understanding the nature of culture, though such a discovery had not been my original intention. The definition of the nature of culture surfaced as I discovered nine critical properties that, while overlapping to some degree, had enough distinction to necessitate each being treated as a separate property of the nature of culture. I further discovered that the emergence of the nine properties revealed a universal dimension to the nature of culture, a notion that most anthropologists have been reluctant to articulate. Cultural diversity and incommensurability have the upper hand in anthropological notions of culture and, while some anthropologists have proposed a universal definition of culture, they are in the minority.

I identified the nine properties of culture by

integrating the multiple theories of culture that have been proposed by the subfields within the discipline of anthropology. Anthropology is perhaps the only discipline that has built its theoretical constructs upon other disciplines and, as a result, has an interdisciplinary and a multidisciplinary perspective on many of its key issues, culture being the most important. Through the integration of these many theories from the subfields in anthropology, I was able to identify the more salient characteristics that each subfield used to identify culture from its particular theoretical framework. These salient characteristics were the bases on which the nine properties of culture emerged. While I have limited the use of the metaphor of a spectrum to assist in understanding the nature of leadership, it serves as an equally useful metaphor in understanding the nature of culture.

Since I am not an anthropologist, I am indebted to the seminars I attended in the department of anthropology at the University of California, San Diego. There I came under the mentorship of Fitz John Porter Poole, Theodore Schwartz, and Marc Swartz. These very distinguished scholars contributed the systematic and historical approach to anthropology that I had not been able to achieve on my own in my independent research on culture. I was also able to reinforce my earlier research by coming into closer contact with the works of other scholars in that department, including Roy D'Andrade, Melford Spiro, Don Tuzin, and, most importantly, F. G. Bailey, with whom I have been fortunate to have the

opportunity of personal discussions on leadership. Each of these scholars have contributed significantly to my education in anthropology and collectively, they had an enormous impact in the formulation of my approach to both culture and leadership.

Only after constructing the properties of culture could I formulate my evaluation of existing theories of leadership. Since leadership theories were prominent in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, psychology, organizational science, political science, and anthropology, I decided to present the theories from the perspective of these disciplinary frames. This approach served to illustrate that leadership scholars have limited their understanding of leadership to the parameters of the disciplinary frame out of which each scholar was operating. I argued that approaching leadership from the single disciplinary frame was dealing with only one or two colors of the full leadership spectrum. I also argued that most leadership scholars have been identifying the forms and not the process of leadership. The common failures of most disciplinary approaches to leadership were identified as a failure to address the complex, collective, processual, multidisciplinary, and ethical components that are necessary in identifying the nature of leadership as a universal phenomeon. By comparing the salient characteristics of each of the disciplinary approaches to leadership to the nine critical properties of culture identified in Chapter Two, I also revealed that, with the exception of anthropological

approaches, most theorists of leadership had not taken into account the cultural factor in their definitions of leadership. I considered this willingness to ignore the culture-leadership relationship--the major--problem in current theories of leadership and the primary reason why such theories have only touched the surface and not the deep structure of the nature of leadership. In much the same method as I evaluated the theories of culture, I identified the salient characteristics of each of the disciplinary approaches to leadership, isolating those key components to create a composite portrait of leadership which I then used to identify the critical properties of the nature of leadership.

This integration of leadership theories identified nine properties of the nature of leadership which were comparable to the nine properties of the nature of culture. By comparing the properties of culture and leadership, I was able to point out that leadership and culture, because they share similar properties, exist in isomorphic congruence to each other. A comparative analysis between the properties of culture and the properties of leadership created the underlying basis on which I posited that there is an inextricable link between culture and leadership and any attempt to identify leadership had to be developed within a cultural frame. It was also on this basis that I pointed to the definition of leadership as a cultural manifestation.

The foundation of a cultural theory of leadership was based on this comparative analysis between the properties of

culture and the properties of leadership. I tried to
distinguish again between the process and form in
identifying the properties of the two categories, suggesting
that the properties were processes and only as processes
were culture and leadership comparable. Since they are two
separate conceptual categories, the forms each takes will
not be comparable. All this was preliminary to the
development of the theory itself and in the development of a
cultural theory of leadership, I described each of the
properties of leadership, using the metaphor of the spectrum
to illustrate that while the properties do overlap somewhat,
each has a separate structure. I also used this metaphor of
the spectrum to suggest that the concept of leadership can
only be applied when all nine properties are present. If
any single property is missing, the process is not
leadership.

Based upon the nine properties, I defined leadership as
a dynamic, adaptive and ethical process by which leaders and
followers form collective relationships which create
socially meaningful structures by utilizing social,
political, linguistic, symbolic and generative resources to
meet human needs. I further proposed that leadership is the
process by which culture is created and refomulated,
bringing to a final formulation my original notion that
leadership and culture are linked.

Since leadership is first and foremost a phenomenon that
is to be practiced, I utilized the ethnographies of Barth,
Leach, Bailey, and Kracke as case studies to ground the

proposed theory in the reality of observations on the practice of leadership in diverse cultures. While each ethnographer approached leadership differently than I have proposed in my theory, I tried to illustrate that their observations of the practice of leadership could be interpreted as evidence linking leadership and culture and secondly, as data instantiating each of the critical properties that I identified as essential in defining the nature of leadership. I also pointed out that the forms of leadership in each of the cultures were very different. A comparison of forms of leadership in various cultures would reveal considerable incommensurability, but a comparison of processes would reveal that the processes are similar. While each ethnographer highlighted selected dimensions and different forms of leadership, all four ethnographers, when viewed through a cultural approach to leadership, included the same nine properties as part of the data in their case studies.

I believe that the proposed theory of leadership offers the criteria on which very diverse ethnographies of leadership can emerge with a common notion of the nature of leadership, and I think the four case studies not only grounded the proposed theory but demonstrated how a cultural approach to leadership can be utilized in evaluating other ethnographies on leadership. Because a cultural approach to leadership can identify leadership behavior in a great diversity of cultures, as illustrated by the case studies, I think it has equal application to polycultural settings.

Conclusions

Four salient conclusions emerge from a cultural approach to leadership: (a) The nature of leadership is best defined as a cultural expression; (b) as a cultural expression, the nature of leadership is defined as a process rather than by the form that the process takes; (c) defined as process, leadership is a universal phenonemon; and (d) as a spectrum of interdependent processes, leadership is multidisciplinary in nature. Other important conclusions also surface.

From this comparative analysis has emerged a new theory of leadership; new primarily because traditional and alternative approaches to leadership have not been able to identify the full spectrum of the relationship between culture and leadership. But new also because the nature of leadership is defined as process, as universal, and as a multidisciplinary phenomenon. I have interpreted leadership not as one of many social structures, but as occupying a nodal place in the creation and reformulation of cultures and therefore existing at the very core of social structure. The central place of leadership in the formation of social groups and their collective consciousness is critical when we are trying to identify the values, attitudes, symbols, and structures of a society. Leadership cannot be divorced from the the many variables that account for the cohesiveness of communities of people. Leadership is at the center of that cohesiveness. I recall Kracke's (1978) words: "Leadership makes the social system work" (p. 236). Leadership is the force that mobilizes collective behavior

in a coordinated manner so as to manifest the social forms of the culture. Without these social forms generated by the process of leadership, there would be no society. This critical role of leadership as the creator and reformulator of culture is universal.

At the same time as I have proposed that leadership creates social forms, I have also argued that leadership as a process is of a different order than the formal structures which it creates. Leadership is that fluid reality which lies between the formal regularities of social content and insofar as it is a processual reality, it serves as a mediating link between personality and social structure. The role of mediator is realized by mobilizing the motives, needs, and purposes of individuals to common action, directing this emergent group energy and emotion into real changes in social organization. As mediator, leadership is also a buffer between personality and social structure, serving to reconcile the irregularities and idiosycracies of individuals with the regularities of the rules of social behavior. I concur with Kracke's (1978) assessement that leadership serves to "cushion normative demands, helping the individual find a niche in the group in which he can (minimally) satisfy his needs and (ideally) fulfill his personal potential" (p 251). Because leadership channels distinctive and diverse emotional, moral, and transactional behavior patterns of leaders and followers, the social forms that result from the process of leadership emerge as a response to those unique behavior patterns that are

collectively focused on transforming social organization to better meet peoples' collective needs. When regularized rules of behavior begin to counteract with enough individuals, such rules can be changed if the discontented individuals can collectively channel their energy into changing the rules. Leadership is the primary mechanism of cultures for change.

While the process of leadership is universal, the forms it takes in specific cultures will be as diverse as are the forms of cultures. Leaders and followers will come in many shapes and sizes with a wide range of styles and personalities. But those who emerge as leaders must reflect and symbolize the emotional, moral, and transactional needs of the followers as well as their own needs. A leader has no definition apart from the group s/he is leading. Leaders and followers are embedded in and constrained by the culture in which they operate. Traits, skills, styles, charisma, contingency variables, and the endless list of personality factors that shape successful leaders and followers are all the forms of leadership that are utilized only as the cultural context permits their existence. It is culture that establishes the parameters and the constraints that embellish and restrict the forms of leadership. Because the process of leadership has not been distinguished from the forms of leadership, diverse social phenomena such as management have been studied in the name of leadership.

I have therefore argued that it is imperative to distinguish between the forms of leadership and the process

of leadership which I have articulated in terms of the nine properties of leadership. As a process, leadership is an interactive relationship, but the dynamics of the relationship among leaders and followers will take on multiple forms crossculturally. In the case studies, I tried to point out the universal dimension of leadership while also identifying the incommensurate forms that leadership takes in different cultures. The point I wish to emphasize, however, is that leadership in an academic department of an American university, among the Swat Pathans, in Highland Burma, or among the Kagwahiv Indians has a universal dimension when the nine properties of leadership here delineated are used as the critical criteria to do the analysis. The challenge I would pose for future students of leadership and for scholars studying leadership in cultures different from their own is to identify this universal dimension while at the same time isolating the unique forms that leadership takes in the respective culture being studied. The value of my approach to leadership is that on the one hand it is possible to understand the process--the universality--of leadership while on the other hand it is also possible to define the different leadership realities--the forms--that are constructed in diverse cultures.

As a fundamentally cultural phenomenon at the core of social organization, and in bringing together diverse individuals into a collective relationship among leaders and followers, leadership has its roots in the basic needs of

our ongoing, emerging humanity. The roots of leadership are also the purpose of leadership: to provide people with a mechanism by which developing and changing needs can be satsified. Leadership and culture are the two primary instruments by which people can shape their identify, instill meaning into their lives, interact at mutually understood levels, and provide individual existence with dimension and hope.

I believe the cultural approach to leadership has another important dimension that again points to the failure of most traditional and alternative theories. Most theories have been elitist in their narrow definitions of who can exercise leadership behavior. I have proposed a theory in which all people in all cultures can engage in leadership behavior. I believe this notion that all people can practice leadership is a critical contribution in our time and one which can only be understood when leadership is linked to culture. Every culture was created out of leadership behavior and cultures develop and mature because of leadership behavior. Leadership is happening at more levels than we are able to document and identify. Many groups are engaging in leadership behavior as both leaders and followers who care about their communities and their nation and are who participating in local, national, and international events that are part of the whole process of leadership. Leadership is not an elitist role for a select group of leaders; it is a process in which all people can choose to participate either as leaders or followers, and my

guess is that far more people exercise leadership behavior than any leadership scholar has realized. I suggest that a cultural approach to leadership offers a model that is oriented to the common man and woman and is particularly antithetical to any elitist notions of leadership.

Nor is leadership a matter of position. Those who do not have positions of authority can be leaders. Foster's (1986) perceptive summary is right on target: "Leadership lies not in the position given, but in the position taken" (p. 15. emphasis in original). As Rost (1989) pointed out, leaders and followers may exchange positions with one another and individuals who are leaders in one context will be followers in another. Unfortunately, all the data we have on leadership behavior, including most of the material from the ethnographic accounts I analyzed in this study as well as other anthropological studies, still focus on the individual who is the CEO, the headman, the chief, the politician, the president, or the individual whose position is linked to leadership.

Linking leadership with position is a problem for two reasons. First, it continues to identify leadership with single individuals rather than with a collective relationship among leaders and followers. Secondly, it implies that leadership cannot take place apart from the positions held by selected individuals. There is nothing in the properties of a cultural approach to leadership that suggests that leadership behavior cannot be practiced apart from the position held by leaders. The reality, however, is

that such positions do offer opportunities for the person
who is a leader because positions of authority provide
access to more resources and consequently to more power. Of
the nine properties I have identified as critical components
of the process of leadership, the properties of
resourcefulness and political _may_ be strengthened by a
position of authority. The point I wish to emphasize,
however, is that while a position of authority may offer
some advantages in gaining access to resources and to power,
it is not necessary. An individual who does not have a
position of authority can still be a leader and gain access
to resources and power through the followers who have
resources and power. Every follower in the
leaders/followers relationship is a source of resources and
power, and a dynamic leader will develop and utilize the
resources and power of followers. A cultural approach to
leadership offers a model in which any person can
participate as a leader or follower. An individual does not
need to wait until s/he has a position of authority in order
to exercise leadership behavior. I think existing theories
of leadership have forced us into a conceptual prison in
which people believe that leadership can only be exercised
when individuals who have positions of authority are cast
into the role of leaders. It is no wonder we are not seeing
leadership behavior being practiced; we are looking at the
wrong people.

This examination of the relationship between leadership
and culture provides a model by which students of leadership

can view leadership from both the perspective of the scholar and the practitioner. Furthermore, a cultural model of leadership offers greater care and rigor in the definition of leadership than has typically been the case with other leadership theories that have too casually studied social phenomena in the name of leadership. By proposing a new approach to leadership, I have offered important new dimensions about what kind of concept leadership is. In addition, with the case studies, I have illustrated that the theory of leadership presented in this study can be applied to the reality of the practice of leadership. A theory of leadership that is not grounded in actual contexts is of little use. Leadership is a phenomenon that must be grounded in practice. I believe the theory that I have proposed is one especially suited for both the scholar and the practitioner. I also believe this theory fits polycultural as well as unicultural societies. Although this study is preliminary and needs additional research and testing, my hope for a new understanding of leadership as a cultural expression is coupled with the hope that the new approach offered here will provide a means for improved explanation by scholars and wider practice by practitioners.

Finally, insofar as a cultural theory of leadership represents a significantly different approach from other theories to understanding leadership as well as posits a major shift from the scientific model in defining the nature of reality in terms of process rather than form, I believe this study represents a step toward a paradigm shift in

Kuhnian terms. In the reconstruction and re-evaluation of prior theories both of culture and leadership, I am suggesting that new rules governing the prior practice of research and inquiry are needed. The scientific approach of dissecting reality for the purpose of defining difference has been achieved at the sacrifice of a more holistic understanding of that same reality. I am not suggesting that the scientific model be abandoned, but that the science of process is needed to enable definitions of similarities and universality. The full spectrum of reality cannot be observed by the exclusive application of the scientific model. A new paradigm is needed that views the nature of reality based on different assumptions than are embedded in the scientific model. In reference to culture and leadership, the assumptions of an emergent paradigm point to a reality that is complex and diverse, dynamic and processual, multidimensional and interdependent, perceptual with multiple perspectives, collective and holistic. The implications of this paradigm shift for the study of leadership are revolutionary, as I hope this study has pointed out, but also have a monumental impact on the study and research of any subject. Insofar as this study represents a major departure from mainstream thinking about both culture and leadership, I can imagine it falling on many deaf ears, but I would hope that when placed within the context of an emergent paradigm shift that is occuring in many circles of learning, it will receive a more sympathetic hearing.

Recommendations for Further Study

I envision five areas in which additional research is needed not only to further test my theory but to move forward the whole arena of the study of leadership. The first area has to do with anthropology. I have pointed out on more than one occasion that leadership scholars in other disciplines have failed to tap the valuable ethnographic accounts of leadership that anthropologists have provided. I have only highlighted some of the studies that deserve additional analysis through a leadership lens. There is a rich source of data available to students of leadership in the annals of anthropology and it still needs extensive analysis by leadership scholars both outside and within the discipline of anthropology.

Secondly, I believe that my proposed theory needs testing by anthropologists doing field work with an interest in leadership. Any theory of leadership is of value only after its has been grounded in the reality of actual experience since leadership is above all a phenomenon that is to be practiced by people. A theory of leadership that is not grounded will have very little value to scholars and no value to practitioners. I would hope that the testing of a cultural approach to leadership would be done in a polycultural setting where the challenge of leadership is to be a polycultural expression. I think my theory could also be applied to other ethnographic accounts currently in print since, as I indicated above, there is so much anthropological data that need to be analyzed by someone

with a leadership lens. As a corollary to this second area needing additional study, I would hope that my theory of culture could also be given additional scrutiny by anthropologists since, in its positing a universal dimension to the nature of culture, it does not enjoy the support of many anthropologists who view culture as incommensurable.

Thirdly, far more research is needed in further defining the collective nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. I believe this is critical because only through a more precise understanding of this relationship will scholars move away from identifying leadership in solitary individuals holding positions of authority. We have so much data on the behavior of leaders and virtually nothing on the behavior of followers. I think this is an area where psychologists and sociologists can be most helpful. Since I believe that leadership is primarily a collective phenomenon that must involve a group of people, the question of leadership as a dyadic relationship between two people also merits additional examination. While I have suggested that a single leader and a single follower can have a personal relationship, it must be within the larger collective structure. Many leadership scholars, however, have focused their entire notion of leadership upon a purely dyadic relationship. In the case studies, Barth leaned heavily toward this approach to leadership. We need to define more precisely the relationship of the dyad to the larger collective nature of the process of leadership.

Fourthly, there is always room for additional research

on the relationship between leadership and ethics. Bailey
has made a persuasive argument for the relationshp between
leaders and unethical behavior. I have responded by
suggesting that ethics needs to be applied to the collective
context and not to the behavior of single individuals. But
this is an open issue and deserves further examination by
philosophers, ethicists, and, I would hope, political
scientists. The whole issue of ethical relativism also
deserve additional study and analysis. It is currently an
issue that is debated in many circles today, particularly as
Western values are receiving their greatest challenge from
the Eastern and Islamic countries. I have tried to present
a theory of leadership that is universal and therefore I
have not espoused any particular ethical framework,
suggesting instead that leadership must be evaluated by the
standards and norms of the culture in which it is being
exercised. But I have also pointed to an emerging view by
many scholars that there exists a psychic unity of humankind
and upon that unity a universal ethical framework could be
constructed. If such a notion is to be delineated more
precisely, scholars from many disciplines will need to
become more multidisciplinary in defining the components and
the implications of this notion of the psychic unity of
humankind.

Fifthly, students of leadership in all disciplines need
to distinguish more precisely between the process and the
forms of leadership. I suspect this is true of other
categories as well. In the development of my theory of

leadership, I relied upon the science of process since it is most useful not only in defining the deep structure of reality, but also in defining what is universal. The study of forms will invariably lead to what is diverse in the structures of reality. Both process and form are needed in defining reality, but I see less data available to us which defines process. The volumes of studies of leadership are clearly focused on the forms of leadership, not the process.

Finally, the study of leadership has suffered from a lack of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches. I would guess this is true of others issues as well. Students of leadership must view the nature of leadership as a multidisciplinary phenomenon or they will miss critical components of its broad nature. Our scientific paradigms have directed us in pursuit of the fine dissection of issues, including leadership, and such models have prevented us from taking a holistic view. Leadership is a complex phenomenon, one which no single discipline can capture within its own parameters. A multidisciplinary approach is less appealing for many scholars because it challenges, even threatens, the intellectual comfort level that scholars come to know after years of research and thinking in a disciplinary mode. Perhaps the answer is in directing new students to begin their scholarship careers as multidisciplinary thinkers, and then they will be better able to deal with the issues of our time.

I conclude this section with a plea for more serious studies of leadership at universities across the country.

But I am also convinced that we need not only the scholarship that the academic context can provide, but also the integration of scholarship with practice that can be achieved in centers of leadership that are established in concert with university studies. An environment is needed in which professional people from all settings can come together to study and learn about both the concept and the practice of leadership. Since previous models have not provided the necessary theory upon which to practice leadership behavior, with the new models that emerge, it is necessary to put in place the structures that facilitates implementation of the new models for practitioners of leadership. It is not enough to only study leadership in various cultures around the world, we must do leadership in our own cultures. Schools of leadership must be combined with centers of leadership where people learn that understanding the nature of leadership means practicing leadership.

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