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**CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE:
POST-VIETNAM**

by

Nicholas A. Trongale

**A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education**

University of San Diego

2001

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ABSTRACT

CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE: POST-VIETNAM

Since the Vietnam War, Navy leadership theory and practice has changed, becoming more like current civilian leadership theory and practice than traditional military leadership of old. Indicators of this alteration have been seen in journal writings, the new Navy performance evaluation structure, current Navy leadership training, and by the birth of a Navy Command Leadership School.

This study was designed to explore the evolution and recent history of the Navy's leadership theory and practice for indications of change. Combining a qualitative and quantitative methodology, this study used a 5-point Likert-type scale survey that included a written comments section. Over 70 % of 561 participants responded to the survey's open-ended questions, adding explanatory power to the quantitative data.

The findings in this study show that Tailhook was viewed as a major event associated with the changes in Navy leadership since the Vietnam War. Of the two participant groups surveyed, Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam Navy officers and senior enlisted veterans, Vietnam-era aviators felt the strongest in this belief. Vietnam-era veterans believed that the change had not been for the good of the Navy, whereas active duty personnel were much more favorable in their assessment about changes in leadership. Women showed significantly greater agreement that change in Navy leadership theory and practice during their time on active duty was for the good of the Navy, and whites

expressed a more favorable attitude to the direction Navy leadership was taking than non-whites.

Other contributors to change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were the post-Cold War force drawdown and technological advancements of the 1990s. Changes in Navy leadership were perceived differently depending on participants' race, gender, or rank--usually only varying in degree of agreement or disagreement with certain aspects of Navy leadership.

What started as a gradual change in Navy leadership theory and practice accelerated after the 1991 Tailhook Convention scandal. Tailhook was a watershed event that sent shock waves throughout the Navy hierarchy. The event and its aftermath forced the Navy to change how it viewed the role of women in combat. To some, Tailhook represented a quintessential breakdown in Navy leadership.

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Dedication

To my wife Kate, my children Danny and Megan, and my mother for their love and support, and to the United States Navy for 21 fantastic years filled with opportunity and challenge.

Preface

I would like to acknowledge and thank my dissertation director, Dr. Mary Scherr, Ph.D., and my dissertation committee members, Dr. Fred Galloway, Ed.D., and Dr. Daniel Miller, Ph.D., for their expert guidance throughout my pursuit of this doctoral degree, and for their understanding of the scope of my primary job and constraints I was living under in the Pacific Northwest and being out to sea for the majority of this dissertation process. Without their help and support I still would be trying to complete this dissertation. I would also like to thank Dean Paula Cordeiro, Ed.D., for her help and counsel during my studies at the University of San Diego; Dr. Janet Littrell, Ed.D., who was instrumental in starting me off in the right direction in the leadership program by supporting a studies template that did not look achievable to anyone but us; Dr. William Howe, III, Ph.D., for his mentoring, and for his ability to meld teaching leadership with practicing it; to Dr. Marie Thomas, Ph.D., for her immensely valuable analytical assistance in this study; and to Bev Callaway for her ability to merge the myriad of elements necessary to form a dissertation.

I would also like to thank Sr. Terri Monroe, RSCJ, for all her support and interest in this study; those members of the United States Navy, past and present, who participated in the survey, particularly the Vietnam-era veterans who had the courage to tell it like they saw it, and in many cases, signed their name to their comments. Lastly, I would like to

thank the countless other individuals who assisted me during my pursuit of this epic undertaking--individuals that I cannot mention by name and still ensure anonymity.

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CHAPTER ONE CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE: POST-VIETNAM

A review of official Navy documents indicated that since the Vietnam War, Navy leadership theory and practice appear to be changing, becoming more like current civilian leadership theory and practice. Indicators of this convergence can be seen in journal writings, the new Navy performance evaluation structure, current Navy leadership training, and by the birth of a Navy Command Leadership School. However, these are recent changes. For an officer in the early 1980s, technical competence appeared to be a more important quality than leadership ability. Leadership training was viewed as a way for officers to improve themselves. It was the responsibility of the commanding officer to ensure that leadership training was conducted and to teach leadership through example. Only after officers were qualified and trained for their primary responsibility was it deemed time for leadership training (Mack & Konetzni, 1982).

The importance of leadership was downplayed elsewhere in the Navy at this time, too. Admiral Rickover, best known as the father of the nuclear Navy and his less than conventional approach to leadership practice, saw little utility in what officers were writing about leadership. In 1981, Rickover suggested that

Leadership is an esoteric concept which cannot be defined--particularly by young and immature officers. I recommend that the Naval Institute call a hiatus on leadership articles for a decade or so. No harm will be done to the U. S. Navy or

the commonwealth. In fact, some good may ensue. Readers of the Proceedings (the Naval Institute's magazine) will not be faced with more of the same sophomoric drivel (Mack & Konetzni, 1982, p. 146).

Mack and Konetzni (1982) shared Rickover's view that naval officers of that era had little to add to the field of leadership studies. Leadership was "the subject of hundreds of books and thousands of lectures and articles, yet every naval officer fancies himself an expert on the subject. Few are" (p. 146).

There were other indications that, perhaps for officers, leadership was secondary to technical knowledge. It was not until 1995 that a reporting senior officer was required to grade a subordinate officer's leadership ability based on periodic formal evaluations. The same evaluations were used by promotion boards that selected officers for their next higher rank, and by selection boards that selected officers for command. The Navy's old evaluation form, which was used from the mid-70s until July 1995, did not have a block for leadership. Reporting seniors were encouraged to remark on the subordinate officer's overall leadership ability and estimated or actual performance in combat in the comments section of the performance evaluation form, but they were not required to do so. Any mention of leadership was purely at the discretion of the reporting senior. In 1995, the new performance evaluation form (see Appendix A) was implemented for officers and chief petty officers. Reporting seniors were now required to evaluate a subordinate's leadership ability--defined on the form as organizing, motivating, and developing others to accomplish goals. Leadership and six other performance traits (professional expertise, equal opportunity, military bearing/character, teamwork, mission accomplishment and initiative, and tactical performance) were graded on a 5.0 scale with 1.0 being below

standards, 2.0 progressing, 3.0 meets standards, 4.0 above standards, and 5.0 greatly exceeds standards.

The mid-1990s also appeared to usher in a new Navy philosophy vis-à-vis leadership training. A 1992 Navy-wide personnel survey highlighted that leadership training was insufficient (Hollingsworth, 1996). Soon after that survey was conducted, Thomas, Perry, and David (1994) noted the following: "The career histories of women warfare officers should be reviewed to ensure that women and men receive equivalent developmental assignments and leadership training" (p. 20). The recommendation was based on their analysis of the narrative section of 240 performance evaluation forms for each gender that showed that commanding officers were not placing women warfare officers in assignments in their ships and squadrons that were traditionally thought of as leadership positions. They further concluded, "Leadership was the only area of performance in which women were rated significantly lower than men" (p. vii).

Subsequent to the Navy-wide survey and report by Thomas, Perry, and David (1994), the Navy changed its evaluation criteria and made it mandatory to grade the leadership ability of all officers and senior enlisted. The Navy also established a Command Leadership School in Newport, Rhode Island. Addressed in the school's central course, Command Leadership, was the necessity for leading change. The school teaches its prospective commanding officers Kenneth Blanchard's situational leadership model and transformation leadership theory (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1997). Transactional, transformational, and situational leadership are taught to lower ranking officers and senior enlisted personnel during the Navy's Intermediate Officer Leadership

Course, giving further credence to the notion that Navy leadership theory and practice are changing (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1996).

In September 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations (1998a) established a policy requiring that all service members attend and successfully complete the requisite leadership-training course for the appropriate stage of their careers. For example, formal leadership schoolhouse training would take place within the first 2 years after commissioning, at the 7 to 9-year point, the 11 to 14-year point, and the 15 to 21-year-point in an officer's career.

Three months after the Navy made it mandatory for all personnel to successfully complete formal leadership training at certain milestone points in their careers, the Chief of Naval Operations announced the establishment of a Permanent Military Professor (PMP) Program (1998b). The PMP Program was established to take officers out of their normal areas of expertise, whether it was surface warfare, aviation, submarine warfare, etc., and make them permanent professors at the Naval Academy. The PMP Program established five different leadership areas: military sociology, industrial/organizational psychology, social psychology, organizational behavior, and organizational studies. If an officer was selected for the program and did not already possess a Ph.D., the Navy would send him or her, depending on the area of leadership studies required, to Georgia Tech, University of Southern California, Duke, Yale, Harvard, Case Western Reserve, Northwestern, George Washington, or Boston College. Upon completing the fully funded degree, the officer would be obligated to serve as a professor until reaching statutory retirement (28 years for the rank of commander (O-5) and 30 years for the rank of captain, (O-6)).

The Problem

A review of official Navy documents indicated that Navy leadership theory and practice have changed since Vietnam. However, the researcher was unable to find quantitative data that assessed the perception of change in Navy leadership since the Vietnam War among Navy personnel. The researcher was also unable to find data that either supported or did not support the notion that change in Navy leadership since Vietnam can be attributed to any one significant social or world event, such as the 1991 Tailhook scandal (Tailhook) or the post-Cold War drawdown. Nevertheless, both Tailhook and the post-Cold War drawdown were consequential social and national events that effected the United States Navy, warrenting further discussion.

The 1991 Tailhook Scandal.

Tailhook was a significant event that negatively affected how the American people viewed the Navy and particularly naval aviators. It represented a breakdown in naval leadership that was illustrated in two ways: by a culture that supported and nurtured patterns of behavior that led to the scandal, and by the method in which senior Navy personnel dealt with the scandal. Tailhook was a watershed event that sent shock waves throughout the Navy hierarchy. Still backpedaling from the aftermath of Tailhook, seemingly overnight the Navy was forced to change how it viewed the role of women in combat in the military (Vistica, 1997). To some, Tailhook represented the quintessential breakdown in Navy leadership, forcing a near decade of zero tolerance for mistakes by anyone at any level. Ironically, the breakdown of leadership did not happen in battle on the high seas; it happened in Las Vegas, Nevada. The scandal itself was a result of

molestations and acts of indecency that occurred at the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium, which 4,000 naval officers attended in September 1991.

The 1991 Tailhook scandal had a major impact on Navy leadership, if for no other reason than the sheer media and congressional scrutiny the Navy sustained on account of the incident. However, no empirical data that attempts to estimate Tailhook's impact on the United States Navy is currently available. Opinions range from Tailhook being the worst catastrophe to confront the Navy since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Vistica, 1997) to the possible erosion of proper civil-military relations (McMichael, 1997). What was Tailhook and how did it happen?

The Tailhook Association, a private, nonprofit, social/professional organization of naval aviators, contractors, and others involved in naval aviation, hosted an annual professional conference each year in Las Vegas. Full membership in the Tailhook Association is open to anyone who has achieved at least one carrier landing; associate membership is open to anyone interested in furthering the cause of naval aviation (The Tailhook Association, 1998). The Association had been the host of the annual event at the Las Vegas Hilton for decades and received full support from the Navy (McMichael, 1997; Office of the Inspector General, 1993).

According to the Office of the Inspector General (1993), the Navy supplied expert briefers and technical information for symposium events, allowed officers to attend the symposium without taking leave (and, in some cases, even made it mandatory for individuals to attend), and supplied air transportation to Las Vegas for those interested in attending the event. The official responses to the acts, which received extensive press

coverage, included Congressional scrutiny and public outrage over the nature of the offenses (Mitchell, 1997; Office of the Inspector General, 1993).

The chain of events that exposed the incidents started when Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, assaulted during the night's activities of partying on the third floor of the Hilton, reported the incident to her superior in accordance with the Navy's sexual harassment policy (Mitchell, 1997; Vistica, 1997). Lieutenant Coughlin was a helicopter pilot and the personal aide to Admiral Jack Snyder, then commander of Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center (home of the Navy's test pilot school). As Mitchell and Vistica explained, Snyder did little or nothing about the incident that Coughlin reported to him. Frustrated with the system and feeling betrayed by her fellow aviators, Coughlin filed an official charge.

It was not until a month after the incident and only after an impending article by *The San Diego Union* newspaper about the wrongdoing, did then Secretary of the Navy, Lawrence Garrett, take action (McMichael, 1997). According to McMichael, Garrett ordered the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) to look into the allegations. After a lengthy investigation, NIS uncovered that 26 women, about half of them naval officers, had been assaulted; two suspects were identified. The NIS concluded there was a definite cover-up of events and wrongdoings. NIS had received little or no cooperation from the aviators they questioned (Office of the Inspector General, 1993; Vistica, 1997).

With Congress and the public not satisfied with the findings, the Office of the Inspector General was put on the case. After another lengthy investigation, files on 140 individuals were referred back to the Navy by the Office of the Inspector General for further investigation and possible courts-martial or disciplinary action (Office of the Inspector General, 1993). Of the 140 individuals charged of wrong doings, only one

underwent court-martial proceedings and was subsequently acquitted. All of the remaining 139 individuals formally implicated by Tailhook were cleared of criminal charges due to lack of substantial evidence. McMichael (1997) suggested that Congress was extremely frustrated by the prosecution's results and by what it perceived as stonewalling on the part of the Navy. Many in Congress, particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, felt that more officers should have been punished. Unable to punish the officers directly, Congress (responsible for the approval of military officer promotions) retained the names of Tailhook attendees and rejected every Navy promotion list (names of officers who qualified for promotion) that contained the name of any of the 139 officers who attended Tailhook regardless of the fact that the officers were cleared of all criminal charges. According to McMichael, the Navy was forced to deny promotion to any individual who was on Congress' list; the list included many more officers than were formally charged with offenses.

Post-Cold War Drawdown.

The post-Cold War drawdown was the result of the demise of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of open hostilities between two super powers—hostilities based on ideological differences, mistrust, and fears of aggression. In one camp was the Soviet Union, representing world communism. In the other camp, the United States fought for world democracy. The Cold War was characterized as a continuous threat of world annihilation by nuclear weapons. The last decade of the 20th century ushered in the end of the Soviet Union and the bi-polar world that had existed for 50 years (Kennedy, 1997). It also represented the end of a Cold War-sized military by the United States. According to Spence (1998), during the past decade, the United States

military was reduced from approximately 2.2 million active duty service men and women to 1.4 million active duty sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen. The reduction in military-related spending was managed primarily by eliminating jobs. The Department of Defense cut in excess of 100,000 uniformed men and women each year and 45,000 civilian personnel from 1990 to 1995 alone (Peters, 1996). Without personnel to fly, sail, or carry rifles, the Department of Defense was forced to reduce Air Force Fighter Wings from 36 to 19, Army Divisions from 18 to 10, and Navy ships from 547 to 346 (Spence, 1998). According to Government Executive (Anonymous, 1998), the post-Cold War drawdown is not over yet. Secretary of Defense Cohen called for additional active duty military cuts of 60,000 from 1999 to 2003 and two more rounds of base closures, one in 2001 and one in 2005.

Many believe that the end of the Cold War did not lessen the world commitments and operational requirements of the United States military. For example, Barnes (1999) argued that since 1989 the Navy was reduced by 36% while operational commitments around the world have increased by 300%. This reduced force structure, along with increased world commitments, has led to personnel difficulties that translate to leadership challenges for the Navy. According to the Government Accounting Office (1997):

For 25 years the Navy has not properly assessed personnel requirements for its shore-based activities primarily because of the low priority that the Navy traditionally gave to managing the shore establishment, ineffective management and oversight of the shore establishment, and changes in program direction (p.12).

The effect of the drawdown translates to other leadership challenges vis-à-vis morale and retention. Reduced defense budgets lead to aircraft that cannot be flown due

lack of spare parts; aircraft that have to be cannibalized to keep other aircraft flying; naval vessels that are undermanned; and, aircraft, like the B-52, that are 45 years old. Maintenance personnel must work harder and longer hours to keep up with increased commitments (Barnes, 1999).

A survey of the Navy's submarine force retention showed the number one reason (51.2%) submarine junior officers were leaving the Navy was quality of life, an area that directly related to the drawdown (Kennedy, 1997). However, according to Kennedy, only 3.5% of all junior officer resignations were attributed to leadership. Kennedy believed that the difference between the large number of submariners who were leaving the Navy compared to the small percentage of submariners who were leaving because of poor leadership might have existed because leadership must review and endorse a departing officer's resignation request.

Carretta (1998) summed up the quandary of today's Navy officers commissioned after 1991 as follows:

Today's junior officers--those in year groups 1991 and later--have a different perspective. They are the post-drawdown, post-Tailhook officers who have witnessed the decline of the U.S. Navy (and naval aviation in particular) since their days of active duty. They have never known anything but a shrinking Navy, with reduced career opportunities, fewer resources, and eroding benefits; therefore, they have little faith that the situation will improve. As they approach the end of their initial commitments, an alarming number are choosing to leave (p. 35).

The remainder of this chapter briefly addresses the purpose of the study, the research questions, significance of the study, methodology, the study objectives, and a discussion of the terms used in the study.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to assess the perception of change in Navy leadership since Vietnam; determine if any significant social or world event attributed to changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam; and, to establish if the perception of change in Navy leadership varied by race, gender, or rank.

Research Questions

The researcher explored the following three questions:

1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank?
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam and post-Vietnam-era veteran's perception of change in Navy leadership?

Significance of the Study

This study is significant in the context of research on U.S. Navy leadership studies and important for many reasons. The following items are critical: (a) The entire United States Navy (not just those individuals who are responsible for leadership development and training) needs to identify and acknowledge that change in Navy leadership theory and practice has and/or is taking place; (b) the identified change needs to be analyzed to determine if it is acceptable and in line with the vision established by senior Navy leaders;

(c) the desired change needs to be accepted by the entire Navy; and, (d) the Navy needs to understand the effect that significant events have on Navy leadership, near and long term. The aforementioned is important because change driven from without the organization may be resisted by Navy leaders. Further, change may have an overall detrimental impact on the organization if its leaders do not anticipate or account for the effects of change. This may be especially true when change is driven by a significant negative event such as Tailhook.

Methodology

This study used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to answer the three research questions. Two distinct groups of Navy veterans served as participants: Vietnam-era veterans and post-Vietnam veterans. Vietnam-era veterans included officers and senior enlisted who served in the Navy at any time during the Vietnam War but were not still on active duty in the year 2000. Post-Vietnam veterans were defined as officers and senior enlisted who served in the Navy after 1975, the end of the Vietnam War. The officer and senior enlisted participant population was chosen because they represent a group that was more than likely placed in leadership positions during their time in service and because of their seniority, not that the researcher feels that the lower enlisted rates do not exhibit or have knowledge of leadership.

Survey questions were developed from the results of the researcher's review of pertinent documents and pilot interviews. The researcher collected documents on Navy leadership training, performance evaluations, and leadership award criteria. Then the researcher conducted four open-ended pilot interviews of two officers and two senior enlisted. The pilot interview questions were derived from the researcher's document and

literature review. Based on the results of these interviews and review of the collected documents, a 5-point Likert-type scale survey was developed. The survey was distributed to enough individuals to receive returns from 450 Navy officers and senior enlisted personnel (150 Vietnam-era veterans and 300 post-Vietnam veterans). Both groups of veterans were administered the exact same survey. To help ensure proportional representation, the researcher sought to collect survey returns from post-Vietnam veterans who mirrored the latest Navy demographic data available at the time of distribution. A 2-month survey window was targeted and maintained. Again, based on demographics, an effort was made to increase response rates for under represented categories; additional surveys were administered to determine how, if at all, the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank.

Study Objectives

The objectives of the study were as follows: frame leadership in both a military and civilian context; examine how Navy leadership is viewed by Vietnam-era veterans and post-Vietnam veterans and compare the two; identify if the perception of change in Navy leadership varies by race, gender, or rank; and, identify any recurring themes that emerged from the interviews, events such as the 1991 Tailhook scandal.

Discussion of Terms Used in the Study

1. Military leadership: For the purpose of this study, military leadership was defined as a process that is purposeful and visionary, involving the organized search for changes, analysis, and the capacity to move resources from areas of lesser to greater productivity.

2. Civilian leadership: For the purpose of this study, civilian leadership was framed as presented by James MacGregor Burns (1978), Joseph Rost (1991), and others who define leadership in transformational and/or postindustrial paradigm terms, i.e., leadership that is collaborative, episodic, and intends significant change, or leadership that must respond to adaptive challenges as Ronald Heifetz (1994) suggests.

3. Tailhook Association: The Tailhook Association is a private, nonprofit social/professional organization of Naval aviators, civilian contractors, and others involved in promoting carrier aviation. For decades, Tailhook hosted its annual professional conference each year in Las Vegas. Up until the scandal of Tailhook '91, the association enjoyed the full support of the Navy.

4. Naval aviation: Naval aviation includes Navy and Marine Corps aviation. All naval aviators, Navy and Marine, receive exactly the same flight training up to the time they earn their wings.

5. Combat: The Navy defined combat in the context of combat missions. For the Navy, a combat mission is defined as a mission of an individual unit, ship or aircraft that individually, or collectively as a naval task organization; it has, as one of its primary objectives, to seek out, reconnoiter, and engage the enemy. The normal defensive posture of all operating units is not included within the definition. This definition resulted from the Navy's 1987 study and the DOD's study of Women in the Military that were conducted for the purpose of supporting the maximum assimilation of women within the limits of the Combat Exclusion Law (Ebbert & Hall, 1993). For the purpose of this study, combat was defined as the act of engaging an enemy in armed conflict.

6. **Commanding officer:** The commanding officer is the individual who has absolute responsibility for his or her command and whose authority is commensurate with that responsibility.

7. **Navy officer rank structure:** The Navy officer rank structure, from bottom to top, is Chief Warrant Officer (W-1 through W-4), Ensign (O-1), Lieutenant junior grade (O-2), Lieutenant (O-3), Lieutenant Commander (O-4), Commander (O-5), Captain (O-6), Rear Admiral lower half (O-7), Rear Admiral upper half (O-8), Vice Admiral (O-9), and Admiral (O-10).

8. **Senior enlisted:** For the purpose of this study, senior enlisted refers to the enlisted rates of Chief Petty Officer (E-7), Senior Chief Petty Officer (E-8), and Master Chief Petty Officer (E-9).

9. **Chain of command:** Chain of command is the term referred to as the succession of officers through which command is exercised. For example, the chain of command for a seaman on a ship may resemble the following (from top to bottom): commanding officer, executive officer, department head, division officer, assistant division officer, division chief petty officer, division leading petty officer, and the individual seaman.

10. **Total Quality Leadership (TQL):** TQL has a very significant place in Navy history and was mentioned quite often by survey participants as an example of what leadership is not. However, TQL, the military's version of W. Edward Deming's Total Quality Management, is a management process designed to achieve quality through process improvement. How that process is implemented represents leadership in that it takes vision, team building, empowerment, and other sound leadership practices (Friel, 1999).

In the next chapter the researcher presents a review of the related literature that includes civilian leadership theory, military leadership theory, and the practical applications of leadership theory.

CHAPTER TWO REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter is a critical review of the research literature covering an overview of civilian and military leadership that is followed by a section devoted to the practical application of leadership theory.

Civilian Leadership Theory

The phenomenon of leadership is older than humankind itself. Allee (1945, 1951) concluded that all vertebrates that live in groups display social organization and leadership. Although the phenomenon of leadership predates humankind, its origin as a word did not appear until the first half of the 19th century. Therefore, leadership, being a relatively new concept, has nearly as many different definitions as there are people who have attempted to define the concept (Bass, 1981). Burns (1978) stated, “leadership is one of the most observed...phenomena on earth...it is one of the least understood” (p.2). Blackmar (1911) framed leadership as a point of polarization for group members; in turn, leadership focuses the attention and releases the energies of group members in a desired direction. Schenk (1928) defined leadership as “the management of men by persuasion and inspiration” (p. 110). Redl (1942) expanded on Blackmar’s findings and concluded that the leader is the focal person who integrates the group. Gibb (1954) defined leadership very simply by saying, “leadership is what leaders do in groups” (p. 884). Tanenbaum, Weshcler, and Massarik (1961) explained leadership in goal-oriented terms. For them leadership was an “interpersonal influence exercised in a situation and directed through the

communication process, toward the attainment of a specific goal or goals” (p. 21). Burns (1978) broke away from mainstream leadership theory by defining leadership as “the reciprocal process of mobilizing by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers” (p. 425). Bennis and Nanus (1985) heightened the importance of morality as a component of leadership. For them leadership was ‘an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that morally elevate organizations and the people in them” (p. 218). Bass (1985) called for a paradigm shift in leadership theory. Rost (1991) answered Bass’ call with his postindustrial definition of leadership. In his definition, Rost made the distinction between management and leadership by elevating the role of the collaborator, and eliminating the moral component of leadership found in Bennis and Nanus’ definition. Leadership for Rost was “an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes” (p. 102).

Heifetz (1994) departed from current transformational leadership theory altogether. He defined leadership as an activity rather than a societal position of authority or set of personal characteristics. According to Heifetz and Laurie (1997), leadership is the responsibility of every individual, at every level and should no longer be thought of as “the responsibility of the few, a rare event, or a once in a lifetime opportunity” (p. 134). In an article based on their experiences with managers throughout the world, they move away from leadership theory that contends leadership requires a vision and the ability of one person to align his or her followers to that vision. For Heifetz and Laurie, the seminal challenge confronting leaders today is to lead adaptive work, i.e., mobilize individuals in

organizations to do adaptive work. They delineate six principles for leading adaptive work: getting to the balcony; identifying the adaptive challenge; regulating distress; maintaining disciplined attention; giving the work back to people; and protecting the voices of leadership from below.

Heifetz (1997) addressed why leaders are removed from leadership positions. According to Heifetz, the main reason leaders are removed from organizational life or “killed in political life” (p. 63) is not because they take calculated risks. They are removed from leadership positions because they fail to see that an action or course of action will get them fired, or as Heifetz refers to, failing to stay alive. In excerpts from a seminar he conducted at the Nieman Foundation in February 1997, Heifetz addressed two specific actions that would assist a leader in staying alive. He stressed the importance of leaders stepping back in the midst of an action and debriefing with a confidant about what went right and what went wrong during the day’s events. Heifetz (1997) believed that these routine acts of reflection would help protect a leader from getting blind-sided and ultimately killed. Heifetz contended that although leadership requires the willingness to die, “martyrdom is almost always futile and destructive to the public, to progress” (p. 69).

How civilians view military leadership has a direct correlation to their education level. According to a University of Michigan study, the more highly educated a civilian is, the lower he or she perceives a military leader’s competence to be (Bowers & Bachman, 1974).

Military Leadership Theory

Major writings about military leadership began with the Chinese classic *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu and continue today (Bass, 1990). Jenkins (1947) reviewed 74 studies of

military leaders and concluded that military leadership was a form of leadership that was unique and specific to the military. Meyer (1980) called for rebirth in the concern for military leadership. Believing that the military was becoming too preoccupied with managing resources, he argued that the military leader must manage resources but not in place of or at the expense of effective leadership. Since records were kept, leadership has been considered a key factor to the success or failure of armed forces (Gal & Manning, 1987). Gal and Manning agreed with Meyer that leadership was important to the military. They also concluded that better-led forces have repeatedly been more victorious than poorly led forces.

Gal (1986) suggested that there is a post-World War II correlation between unit morale and the need to civilianize military leadership practice. He surveyed over 1,200 Israeli combat soldiers for the purpose of exploring both the theoretical and practical aspects of morale. He collected the data for his study in one month in 1981 using the Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire (CRMQ) and then analyzed the data by means of inter-correlations and factor analyses. The results of Gal's study yielded several important conclusions to the study of military leadership:

1. Future military leaders would have to operate under conditions where there is less public consensus than existed in World War II.
2. Military leaders would be expected to know how to use minimal force in unconventional small-scale conflicts that are peace keeping in nature.
3. Military officers would be required to respond carefully to ambiguous circumstances.

4. Officers would have to inspire subordinates with a vision of the future that builds an atmosphere of loyalty and commitment rather than an environment of blind obedience.

In his 1986 study, Gal also addressed the need for military leadership to become more collaborative when he predicted that military leadership in the 1990s would become more dependent on relationships and be based on the commitment of subordinates who rise to the challenge of complex, risky, uncertain, and dangerous situations.

Earlier in the 20th Century, the United States Military Academy (1925) defined leadership as “the art of imposing one’s will upon others in such a manner as to command their obedience, their confidence, their respect, and their loyal cooperation” (p. 102). In another pre-World War II document that was published by and for the Navy, leadership was defined in terms of the ability to influence one’s subordinates. According to that publication, “Leadership is that quality, inherent or acquired, in a person which enables him to achieve accomplishment from his subordinates by virtue of their willingness rather than force” (Tobin, 1939, p.1). The United States’ 1944 War Instructions (1996) defined leadership as “the art of inspiring, guiding, and directing bodies of men so that they ardently desire to do what the leader wishes” (p. 1-2-3). Admiral Rickover suggested that the principles of leadership are the same for the military as they are in business, the church, and elsewhere. In a 1981 letter to the U. S. Naval Institute’s magazine *Proceedings*, Rickover cited the following principles: learn your job; work hard at your job; train your people; and inspect frequently to see that the job is being done properly (Mack & Konetzni, 1982). The United States Navy’s primary command leadership publication from 1985 to 1996, *Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best*, did not define

leadership. However, the publication had strong implications for the “excellence theory” of leadership. Current Navy views of exceptional leadership are based on a more collaborative approach to leadership. The Navy’s Intermediate Officer Leadership Course (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1996) defined leadership as “the process of influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal achievement in a given situation” (p. 1-2-3). On its revised performance evaluation form, a criterion for attaining the highest mark in leadership is that an individual “constantly improves the personal and professional lives of others” (p. 1). The Navy’s Command Leadership School viewed leadership as a combination of transactional and transformational leadership theories, stating that they were the “two leadership concepts that are recognizable in any organization, including the Navy ” (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1997, p. 2-2-4). A 1978 study on predicted military leadership in the 1990s stated that future military leaders would be more educated, with many possessing advanced degrees (Cox, 1978). According to Cox, the greater an officer’s level of education, the more likely the officer will identify himself/herself as liberal. Contrarily, Cox concluded that military leaders will continue to qualify themselves as being conservative and that there is a strong positive correlation between conservatism and combat experience.

Courage is a recurring theme in the writings of military leadership. The differences between military and nonmilitary views on the importance of courage in performing leadership are striking. Handle (1992) stated that the renowned 19th century military strategist, Jomini, prized courage as the most critical characteristic a military leader could have. Moran (1966), like Jomini, placed courage in high esteem, although he viewed courage as a consumable trait. He believed that courage is a limited supply of will power

that can be used up in war and once one's limited supply of courage is used up, it cannot be replenished. The Navy has long acknowledged the importance of courage to leadership. According to Tobin (1939),

There are two kinds of courage, physical and moral courage. The former is by far the more common of the two. Courage is an unnatural thing and exists only when a person's character is strong enough to overcome the fear instinct sufficiently to prevent its taking charge (p. 26).

The Navy in its Intermediate Officer Leadership Course stressed that "in combat, a leader may have to take decisive action that will knowingly doom the lives of good men and women" (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1996, p. 7-1-5). Covey (1989) believed that courage is the opposite of consideration. He declared that maturity is the balance between courage and consideration, appearing to give courage a negative meaning.

According to Frost, Fiedler, and Anderson (1983), taking physical risks is related to the performance of leaders engaged in professions with inherent physical dangers. Nye (1986) believed that freedom and courage are the two prime values of a warrior.

According to Nye, freedom makes one fight and courage keeps one from running away.

Stockdale (1995) agreed with Nye. He affirmed that a leader in crisis must be hardhearted and display the courage necessary to deal with fear, guilt, truth, and reality. In Griffith's (1963) translation of Sun Tzu, he declared that the ancient Chinese strategist believed that if a general is not courageous, he will be unable to conquer doubts or to create great plans.

Holmes (1985) stated that Army doctrine defined leadership as a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission. There was no mention of the relationship between courage and leadership in Army doctrine. According to Mack and Konetzni (1982), leadership training of naval officers falls into seven easily identifiable categories: personal characteristics; moral leadership; gentlemanly conduct; personal relations with seniors; personal relations with juniors; techniques of counseling and communication; and, the role of the officer in training. Mack and Konetzni placed courage, both physical and moral in an eighth category they referred to as Other Characteristics. The Navy in its Intermediate Officer Leadership Course acknowledged that “many studies point out that some of the personal characteristics desired in combat leaders do not serve them well in a peacetime military organization” (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1996, p. 7-1-5). Cronin (1993) argued that there were seven key qualities of successful leadership. Courage is absent from Cronin’s seven essential qualities. Courage is also absent from Senge’s (1990) commercially successful book about learning organizations, *The Fifth Discipline*.

Practical Applications of Leadership Theory

According to Bass (1990), leadership models “show the interplay among the variables that are conceived to be involved; they are replicas or reconstructions of the realities” (p. 37). By the 1960s, the study of leadership evolved from research on the traits and situations that affect leadership to a view that leadership was contingent on a condition of traits and situations that involved a transaction or exchange between the leader and the led (Hollander, 1986). Burns (1978) presented the new paradigm of the transformation versus transactional leader where followers are converted into leaders.

Waldman, Bass and Einstein's (1986) analysis of surveys of senior military officers and business managers confirmed the fidelity of transformational leadership. According to Bass and Avolio (1988), transformational leadership is closer to the prototypical leadership that most people envision when they describe their ideal leader. In a study conducted for the Navy, Yammarino and Bass (1989) contended that transformational leadership was more strongly related to a subordinates and superior's evaluation of an officers' effectiveness than transactional leadership.

Heifetz (1998) disputed Burns' theory of transformational leadership, arguing that it is a leadership that fuels our tendencies to develop arrogant and grandiose visions, fleeing "from harsh realities and dailyness of leadership" (p. 26). He believed that leadership is more than influence and more than that which can be defined in terms of legitimate authority alone. Heifetz viewed leadership in terms of adaptive work--work that "consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face" (p. 22).

A hypothesized link between personality and leadership has surfaced in recent years, due in part to organizational experiences attributed to leadership failures (Johnson, 1999). According to Johnson,

A review of leadership characteristics among military personnel in extreme environments (aviation, submersibles, polar stations, and expeditions) found that effective leaders in these environments were consistently ambitious, confident, respected, and trusted by subordinates. These leaders were also sensitive to personal problems among subordinates and openly expressed pride in the

performance of subordinates and offered recognition for accomplishments of their subordinates (p. 907).

The review of the literature revealed that leadership had many different meanings and areas of application. For example, the Department of Defense's Office of Inspector General (1992) attributed the breakdown of behavior at the 1991 Tailhook Convention to failed leadership. According to the Office of Inspector General, "While each individual must be accountable for his or her own actions, commanding officers have a unique responsibility for leadership in ensuring appropriate behavior and attitudes of those under their command" (p. 2). Leadership has also been linked to the varying pregnancy rates on Navy ships and the 1991 Tailhook Scandal.¹ According to a study by the Center of Naval Analysis, "Large differences in pregnancy rates by ship may be indicative that leadership and training are key to minimizing pregnancy during sea tours" (Fletcher, McMahon & Quester, 1994, p. 27).

In summary, the review of leadership literature revealed that current leadership theory is robust, multi-dimensional, and situation dependent. It has undergone significant change throughout the 20th century, evolving in form from autocratic to collaborative to perhaps a more practitioner-based leadership theory as delineated by Heifetz.

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¹ The fact that women serving in ships get pregnant is often viewed as a leadership problem; the perception is, the better the leadership, the lower pregnancy rate.

CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter addresses the methodology used to answer the three research questions covered by this study. Included in this chapter are the following sections: research questions and design, survey instrument development, survey reliability, non-response bias, triangulation methodology, limitations, and the role of the researcher. The methodology used in this study was primarily quantitative, with most data gathered through the use of a survey consisting of a series of 5-point Likert-type scale items. In addition, comments solicited through open-ended questions were used to add explanatory power to the study, which inserted a qualitative richness to the methodology.

Research Questions and Design Overview

This study addressed three research questions. The research questions are as follows:

1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank?
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam veteran's perception of change in Navy leadership?

To address the three research questions, the following 5-step approach was used (a more detailed description of each step is addressed later in this chapter):

1. Document Collection. After receiving permission from the Navy to conduct this study, documents were collected on Navy leadership training, performance evaluations, and leadership award criteria.

2. Pilot Interviews. Four pilot interviews (two officer and two senior enlisted) were conducted to assist in the development of the survey questionnaire.

3. The Survey. A survey was developed based on the results of step 2.

4. Survey Participants. The survey was distributed to officers and senior enlisted personnel within one United States Navy carrier battle group² with the goal of obtaining a minimum of 300 surveys from post-Vietnam veterans (those currently on active duty who had not served during the Vietnam era); it was distributed to enough Vietnam-era veterans (serving during Vietnam but not on active duty in 2000) to receive 150 returns.

5. Data Analysis. Data was computer analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Survey Instrument Development

This study involved three forms of data gathering: document collection (described in Chapter One), pilot interviews, and a survey instrument. Data gathering began in December 1999 and ended in April 2000. Document collection was conducted between

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² A notional carrier battle group comprises an aircraft carrier and its air wing, two guided missile cruisers, two destroyers, one frigate, one replenishment ship, and two nuclear-powered attack submarines. The battle group comprises approximately 10,000 men and women of which about 1,000 are officers and senior enlisted.

December 1999 and February 2000 and pilot interviews were conducted in February 2000. Data from the pilot interviews were used to develop the primary research instrument used in this study. According to Warwick and Lininger (1975),

The sample survey is an appropriate means of gathering information under three conditions: when the goals of the research call for quantitative data; when the information sought is reasonably specific and familiar to the participants; and, when the researcher has considerable prior knowledge of particular problems and the range of responses likely to emerge (p. 9).

All three criteria were met for this study.

The researcher chose to use a survey as the instrument for participant response to the research questions because it was the best means to reach the greatest number of participants, ensure participant diversity vis-à-vis rank, race, and gender, and it allowed for a more objective analysis of the responses.

Pilot Interviews.

Four pilot interviews were conducted using the questions outlined in Appendix B. The purpose of the pilot interviews was to provide the information necessary for developing a survey that would best address the study's three research questions. Because the pilot interviews were key to the methodology used in this study, the results of the interviews are addressed in detail.

Two officers and two senior enlisted were interviewed over a 1-week time period. One officer was a captain/surface warfare officer and the other was a commander/aviator. Both senior enlisted were chief petty officers. All of the pilot interviewees validated the notion that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam, a deduction that the researcher

made after reviewing official Navy documents. The end of Vietnam, Tailhook, and the post-Cold War drawdown were cited as the three watershed events that affected Navy leadership. To a much lesser extent, the advent of the technological age was cited as a contributing factor to the changes in Navy leadership. Because the four pilot interviews were so important to the development of the survey, they are discussed in substantial detail in this chapter.

The surface warfare captain believed the Vietnam War shaped Navy leaders who participated in the war and who also shaped future Navy leadership--future leaders who served under officers that participated in the war. He stated that command during Vietnam molded that generation of leaders to communicate less with their people and be less involved with them personally. He stated,

I think that wartime experience tended to create a mentality that we had to get the job done and if I tell my people we gotta get the job done, that's all they need to know because we're firing 5-inch shells in support of ground troops. You didn't have to explain to your people why that was important.

He believed leaders not of the Vietnam generation practiced a more relation-type leadership style that developed them as officers and individuals. He said,

...in the middle '80s, the commanding officer began to place a lot more emphasis on developing more personal relationships, sitting down in the wardroom [a meeting/dining room for officers onboard a ship], counseling junior officers, getting to know them on a more personal basis and guiding them and mentoring them. I think that kind of thing has developed in the last 10 or 12 years. Mentoring juniors officers was not on the captain's agenda in the mid-'70s.

For the surface warfare captain, the end of the Cold War in 1991 was a watershed event for the Navy. It marked the end of a legitimate and continuous threat to United States naval forces at sea. He said, “Up until 1991, I think every junior officer, certainly all department heads, the XOs and COs [Executive Officers and Commanding Officers] felt that we could very easily get into a shooting war with the Soviets.”

He further explained,

...the most powerful influence since '91 has been the drawdown and the requirement to bring down the size of the officer corps, which reduced the opportunity for department heads to screen for XO and that XO's screen for command. And that environment got very serious in '91, '92, and '93, and by '93 it was so grim that we were throwing out, I mean literally, throwing out excellent officers who 5 years beforehand would have been shoe-in for department head.

The surface warfare captain felt the leadership he encountered during his career transitioned from an autocratic style that was exercised by his Vietnam-era commanding officers to a more transformational leadership style that he saw in leaders who were not influenced by Vietnam.³

The aviator commander also felt that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam. For him, the watershed event for Navy leadership and major impetus for the change in

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³ Autocratic and transformational leadership styles are the researcher's labeling of the leadership that the interviewee described. Both autocratic and transformational leadership theory are taught at the Navy's Command Leadership School.

Navy leadership was Tailhook. "...the Tailhook deal was the biggest change. And there was an immediate effect. The repercussions of all that, and all of a sudden the politics, you know, the political correctness of everything. It was the biggest turnoff that my community had." When speaking of Tailhook in general, he stated, "That [Tailhook] really changed my whole view of the upper echelons of [Navy] leadership."

During his discussion of the negative implications that the drawdown had on the surface community, the commander was critical of how senior Navy leadership dealt with Tailhook. He articulated,

They [senior Navy leaders] always give you no answer. To me that's not a good aspect. That was the worst aspect of leadership during the whole period...It wasn't the Admiral's fault that this [Tailhook] was happening. It's because they were being, [interviewee became emotional] you know, thumped by civilian leadership to do something about it and that's where we felt, well the leadership's got no backbone anyway. And so they're just...just a bunch of quivering yes guys and they'll do whatever it takes to save themselves. And if it means cutting a few guys off, then that's fine.

The aviator commander did not feel the drawdown had near the effect on Navy leadership that the surface captain did. He felt positive about the leaders he encountered during his career, O-6s and below, and felt, for the most part, they exercised what the researcher interpreted as transformational leadership.

The chief petty officers also felt that Navy leadership had changed. Overall, they felt that Navy leadership was effective and and getting better.

They believed Navy leadership today is, "...less forceful." They stated that leadership changed because sailors serving today are different than those who served before. "It [Navy leadership] just changed because it had to." One chief felt leaders needed to lead by example and, "...hopefully your men will follow suit." The other chief felt the absence of war was one factor contributing to changes in Navy leadership. "I think that not being at war changes things a lot as far as leadership is concerned. When you are at war, it is a whole different ball game. But not having been in a major war since Vietnam, I'm sure it's [leadership] changed because of that."

They both agreed leadership was critical but not the answer to all the problems confronting the Navy today. One chief stated,

I guess the challenge facing the Navy in as far as being a leader of men is making sure you have quality men to lead. One thing I disagree with what the Navy has said...'Well if you have a bad sailor, you can make him a good sailor. You're just not trying hard enough.' I disagree with that. You know I think some kids just don't want to be changed and they are bad apples no matter how hard you try.

One chief cited technology [computers] as a contributor to changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam. However, he did not qualify the impact of technology on Navy leadership.

Survey.

The pilot interviews discussed above were analyzed for indications of change in Navy leadership theory and practice, and for commonality of themes. Using the data derived from the pilot interviews and document analysis, survey questions were developed. The survey was then pilot-tested by 10 volunteer members of a carrier battle

group; the volunteers were equally distributed among officers and chief petty officers. The pilot survey included the following recommendations: delete a duplicate question, arrange the survey in a more user-friendly format, and reorder the survey questions. There were no recommendations for the addition or deletion of any questions.

The resultant survey (see Appendix C) consisted of three sections. The first nine questions requested demographic information, such as gender, highest military pay grade, designator, and race/ethnicity. The second section contained 26 items to assess attitudes about the components of Navy leadership, changes in Navy leadership, and current Navy leadership. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 – “Strongly disagree” to 5 – “Strongly agree.” An option was included for “Don’t know/Not applicable.” The final section of the survey consisted primarily of open-ended questions regarding events and years that marked significant changes in Navy leadership. Open-ended questions were used to allow the survey participants a means to articulate what years and events that they felt most represented change in Navy leadership.

Survey Reliability.

Survey reliability was obtained by two means. The first method was the process by which the survey was developed (document review and pilot interviews). The second method was the inclusion of several pairs of items that were the reverse of each other, i.e., “Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage” (item 25)/“Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage” (item 29); “Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown (down sizing)” (item 26)/“The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook” (item 30); “Current Navy leadership is too political” (item 27)/“Current

Navy leadership is not political enough” (item 31); “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” (item 28)/ “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough ‘warriors’ in senior positions” (item 33). Response patterns for these pairs of items were checked to ensure that participants read questions carefully throughout the survey. Of particular interest was the percentage of participants who agreed or strongly agreed with each statement within a pair since this would signify agreement with two contradictory statements (participants could disagree with both statements without contradicting themselves). For three of the pairs, less than 2% of participants agreed or strongly agreed with both statements. For the Tailhook/drawdown item pair, less than 3% of those surveyed agreed with both statements. These percentages were considered acceptable indicators of survey reliability. However, to ensure consistency of responses, these surveys were eliminated from the quantitative analysis .

Triangulation Methodology and Survey Participants

The survey was distributed to enough Navy officers and senior enlisted personnel to yield returns from 150 Vietnam-era veterans and 300 post-Vietnam veterans. A triangulation methodology was designed specifically to determine whether there is a perception that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam. For this analysis, the year 1985 was set as the point of triangulation to determine if and how Navy leadership changed for the two participant groups, Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam veterans. Data from participants in each group who served on active duty in 1985 were compared to see if and/or how Navy leadership changed. For a Vietnam-era veteran to be in the triangulation group, he or she must have served both during Vietnam and in 1985 but not

in 2000. Conversely, a post-Vietnam veteran must have served after 1975 and during 1985. Participants of these two groups share in common the year 1985. However, the two groups do not share the same experiences of serving while the Vietnam War was in progress. A comparison was made between 73 Vietnam-era veterans and 162 post-Vietnam veterans who met the outlined triangulation criteria (see Figure 1).

Perceptions of change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were obtained by comparing how the two groups answered the following survey questions: (a)“Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty”; (b)“The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy”; (c) “Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership”; (d)“Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy”; (e)“Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam, the change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy”; and (f)“I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.” If the two groups responded more like their larger group cohorts, i.e., post-Vietnam era veterans and Vietnam-era veterans, than like each other, there would be quantitative evidence of perceived change in Navy leadership since Vietnam. More simply stated, since both groups in the triangulation sample served in 1985, and each component is representative of a

Triangulation Methodology

*Triangulation numbers

Figure 1 Triangulation Methodology

larger group, then inferences could be made about changes in Navy leadership⁴

One carrier battle group was used to obtain the post-Vietnam surveys used in this study. The carrier battle group consisted of numerous ships, including an aircraft carrier and its air wing. The carrier battle group had a representative population of all Navy warfare areas, such as aviation, surface, submarine, and SEALs, both genders, and most races. Surveys were distributed with a return goal that mirrored the distribution of ranks/pay grades and gender within the battle group. In addition, an attempt was made to obtain proportional representation of personnel by race/ethnicity, based on 31 March 2000 Navy demographics. A 2-month survey window was targeted and maintained (see Table 1).

The total number of senior leaders in the battle group was 1,034. It is not known how many surveys were distributed, however, it is estimated to be approximately 450. The 383 surveys that were returned represent an approximate response rate of 85%. In total, 37% of the entire senior leadership returned surveys.

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⁴ The methodology used in this study to determine change in Navy leadership would have been stronger if a significant world and/or national event had taken place in 1985, the triangulation year that bridged both Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam era participants in the triangulation sample. If an event like this had occurred, agreement as to the significance of the event within the triangulation sample would have allowed for a stronger inference regarding intertemporal change in Navy leadership. Nonetheless, both groups in the triangulation sample did share the Reagan Administration's push for world military dominance and an arms build up not seen since the Vietnam War.

Table 1
Gender, Rank, and Race/Ethnicity Breakdowns for Post-Vietnam Sample

Variable	Desired % (based on Navy demographics)	Sample % (N = 383)
Rank		
Flag	<1	<1
O-5/O-6	5	9
O-1 to O-4	49	66
W-2 to W-4	3	3
E-7 to E-9	42	23
Gender		
Male	95	94
Female	5	6
Race/ethnicity		
White/Caucasian	80	82
Black	9	4
Hispanic	5	4
Asian/Pac. Is.	5	7
Native Am.	<1	<1
Other	<1	2

Table 1 shows gender, rank, and ethnicity breakdowns for the post-Vietnam participants.

The sample's gender and race/ethnicity distributions were compared to overall Navy demographics and matched these percentages well. Sample percentages by rank were compared to the battle group demographics. The survey sample had a lower percentage of senior enlisted and a higher percentage of officers than found in the total battle group, perhaps an indication that the surveys were distributed to officers first. The researcher was unable to obtain reliable demographic data from the Vietnam War era. However, Vietnam-era participants in this study were overwhelmingly white/Caucasian, male, officer aviators.⁵

The post-Vietnam participants had served an average of 12.7 years on active duty. Most of the post-Vietnam participants reported their primary designator to be either surface warfare (47%) or aviation (36%). About 2% said their specialty was submarine warfare, 1% were SEALs, and 12% indicated their designator as "Other." This category consisted of a number of specialties with the highest frequencies reported in the following areas: supply (25%), medical/dental (17%), and intelligence (15%). One-quarter of the post-Vietnam group had served in combat. About 87% reported receiving some type of formal leadership training while in the Navy.

Surveys from Vietnam-era veterans were obtained by mail. The majority of potential participants were selected randomly from the 1998 Membership Directory of the Tailhook Association. The two considerations for selection were naval service sometime during the period 1965 and 1974, and rank/pay grade. A total of 450 surveys were mailed. Of this number, 62

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⁵ Reliable demographic data for both the Vietnam era and a current Navy battle group were not available to the researcher. Consequently, comparisons using weighted data could not be made. However, comparisons for the post-Vietnam sample using data weighted for one battle group were placed in the appendices.

surveys were returned undeliverable; 19 surveys were completed by someone who did not fit the necessary criteria of time in service or rank; and, 11 were completed but not used because they were returned after the deadline. The number of usable surveys was 178, which yielded a usable response rate of 47%.

Within the Vietnam-era group, rank was distributed as follows: flag officer, 6%; O-5/O-6, 67%; O-1 to O-4, 25%; W-1 to W-4, 1%; and E-7 to E-9, 1%. Vietnam-era participants served an average of 19.5 years on active duty. Over 98% of these participants reported white/Caucasian as their ethnicity and over 95% were aviators. Aviators of the Vietnam era were all men and overwhelmingly white/Caucasian; therefore, race/ethnicity was not a variable of consideration for this group. Approximately 83% of these participants were Vietnam-era veterans and 78% served in combat.

Non-response Bias.

When all surveys that are distributed are not returned, there is a possibility of non-response bias. This occurs when non-participants are systemically different from participants; this is a problem that can seriously limit the generalizability of survey findings (Edwards, Thomas, Rosenfeld, & Booth-Kewley, 1997). Non-response bias is difficult to detect after the fact and, therefore, is best dealt with proactively by ensuring an acceptable survey response rate. The 47% response rate for Vietnam-era veterans is in the acceptable range for a single-mailing (no follow up) survey with no incentives (Edwards et al.). The approximate response rate for the post-Vietnam group was 85%; which is considered a high rate of survey return. However, the rank distribution shown in Table 1 indicates that officers in the sample are over-represented and senior enlisted are under-represented. This may reflect non-response bias; it more probably reflects the pattern of survey distribution, with officers more likely than senior enlisted to receive surveys.

The researcher contemplated weighting the data to reflect the battle group's distribution by rank. It was decided that, since many analyses involved comparisons with the Vietnam-era group and the data from this group could not be weighted, the post-Vietnam responses would not be weighted either. Caution must, therefore, be used when generalizing the results beyond the samples.

Data Analysis

The survey results were computer-analyzed using the SPSS. All appropriate research questions involved group comparisons of mean item scores using independent t-tests and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Independent t-tests, which are used to compare two unrelated groups on a single variable, were run for all two-group comparisons (e.g., Vietnam-era versus post-Vietnam era). One-way ANOVAs allow comparisons of more than two groups on a single variable and were conducted whenever more than two groups were compared (e.g., comparisons among ranks).

For the purpose of statistical analysis, the scaled survey items were categorized into four groups. The scaled survey items in each of the four analysis groups correspond to the research questions. Statistical analysis group one, the nature of leadership, corresponds with research questions one and two: how, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States, and how, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank? Statistical analysis group two, attitudes towards current Navy leadership, and three, changes in Navy leadership, also correspond with research questions one and two. Lastly, statistical analysis group four, events that led to changes in Navy leadership, corresponds with research question three: is there any

evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam era veterans' perception of change in Navy leadership? The four statistical analysis groups were as follows:

1. The nature of leadership comprised six items: (a) "Courage is a key component of Navy leadership"; (b) "Leadership is a gender-neutral term"; (c) "There is a difference between moral and physical courage"; (d) "Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership"; (e) "Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage"; and (f) "Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage."

2. Attitudes towards current Navy leadership comprised four items: (a) "Current Navy leadership is too political"; (b) "Current Navy leadership is not political enough"; (c) "The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many 'warriors' in senior positions"; and (d) "The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough 'warriors' in senior positions."

3. Change in Navy leadership comprised six items: (a) "Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty"; (b) "The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy"; (c) "Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership"; (d) "Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy"; (e) "The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy"; and (f) "I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading."

4. Events that led to changes in Navy leadership comprised seven items: (a) "Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty"; (b) "The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy"; (c) "Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership"; (d) "Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy"; (e) "Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam"; (f) "The

change in change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy”; and (g) “I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.”

The survey statements suggesting that change was good for the Navy were answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the previous item. For example, unless a participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam,” they would not respond to the next item, “The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.”

For analysis purposes, all questions were equally weighted within each group. Six independent *t*-tests were conducted for each item. The first three compared Vietnam-era participants with the post-Vietnam group in the following configurations: total sample, aviators only, and triangulation sample. The second group of *t*-tests compared groups within the post-Vietnam sample by gender, race/ethnicity (white/non-white), and designator (surface warfare and aviation).

In addition, within the post-Vietnam sample, an ANOVA was calculated for each item, using highest pay grade as the independent variable. Three groups were compared: senior enlisted personnel, O-1 to O-4, and O-5/O-6. There were not enough warrant or flag officers in the sample to include them in the analyses. Because the *F* test is an omnibus test (i.e., it indicates there is a significant difference among groups, but not where the difference lies), when a significant *F*-ratio was found, a post hoc Tukey-HSD test was conducted to determine specifically which groups in the overall analysis were significantly different from each other. The Tukey test is designed to allow comparisons of all pairs of means while maintaining the significance level set for the study. It uses the studentized range (*Q*) distributions. The *Q* distributions provide the

minimum difference between the largest and smallest means in a set of means that is necessary to reject the hypothesis that the means are equal (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1998).

Ethical Considerations: The Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.

The established procedures of the University of San Diego's Committee on Protection of Human Subjects were followed in undertaking the research study. Participation in the study was entirely voluntary. There were no expenses or risks to the participants. All participants were consenting adults and all participants signed a consent form (see Appendix D for interview research participants and Appendix E for survey research participants) prior to participating in the study. The consent form assured the participant that his or her information would remain confidential and that every effort would be made to report findings in a manner that would not identify the participant. Participant numbers and/or rank were used in quotes or descriptive materials. The content of all quotes or descriptions were reviewed and modified, as necessary, to ensure that the identities of participants were not inadvertently revealed. Interviewed participants were provided written transcripts of their interviews.

Entry, Access, and Document Collection.

The researcher obtained entry and access to current military personnel from higher authority, i.e., commanding officers of the individuals who were surveyed. Permission to interview officers came from their commanding officers (see Appendix F). For active duty personnel, surveys were distributed by an administrator who was chosen by the commanding officer to ensure that the researcher's identity was not known to anyone but the commanding officer. This eliminated the possibility that the researcher's rank and position in the Navy might unduly influence an individual who participated in the study. The researcher's rank and position

were not factors vis-à-vis civilian participants, i.e., rank and military position did not unduly influence civilian participants.

Entry and access to non-active duty veterans was obtained directly from the individuals being surveyed and interviewed; in addition, various veterans groups, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Navy League, and the Tailhook Association, were used as a conduit to obtain access to a greater number of non-active duty veterans (see Appendix G).

Limitations

There were five major limitations of this study. The first limitation was that some active duty Navy personnel surveyed were indirectly in the researcher's chain of command. The researcher compensated for this limitation by using the various layers of the chain-of-command to buffer himself from the individuals being surveyed, eliminating any perceived or real pressure to participate in the study. A second limitation was that some older Vietnam veterans have been removed from naval service for many years and had to rely on long-term memory to answer the survey and/or follow-on interview questions. Their recollection of events and perceptions may be clouded by time and media events since they served on active duty; nonetheless, their views are extremely valuable for establishing a baseline for perceptions about Vietnam-era leadership. A third limitation was that veterans who left the Navy just after Vietnam may have different perceptions than Vietnam veterans who stayed on active duty to the study's triangulation year of 1985 and possibly beyond. A fourth limitation of this study was that distribution of surveys to post-Vietnam participants was not random; therefore, the post-Vietnam group does not represent a random sample of battle group personnel and caution should be used when generalizing to the entire battle group and to all Navy battle groups. In addition, battle group demographics are not representative of the Navy as a whole; therefore, generalizations to the entire Navy should not be

made. Lastly, the vast majority of Vietnam-era aviator survey participants were, at one time, members of the Tailhook Association and the issues covered by the survey may have been particularly salient to this group.

Role of the Researcher

At the time of this study, the researcher was an active duty Navy Captain, naval aviator, and carrier battle group chief of staff. He was very familiar with Navy leadership theory and practice, had attended formal leadership training during his 20 years in the Navy, and approached this study from the context of his professional experiences and educational background. He recognized that his experiences helped to shape the questions and assumptions that underlie this research but also believed that the quantitative methodology provided objectivity to the process.

The next chapter addresses the results of the survey.

CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of this study. The study combined qualitative and quantitative methodology using a 5-point Likert-type scale survey that included a written comments section. Where appropriate, selected excerpts from the written comments have been added to the explanations of the quantitative data for the purpose of amplifying the data. The survey was designed to answer three research questions:

1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?⁶
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank?⁷
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam veterans perception of change in Navy leadership?⁸

Frequency distributions of responses were calculated for all survey items for the Vietnam-era

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⁶ This research question was answered by survey items 1-5, 9-16, 20-23, 25, 27-29, 31-37, and the comments. See Appendix C.

⁷ This research question was answered by survey items 6-8, 17-18, 24, and the comments. See Appendix C.

⁸ This research question was answered by survey items 19, 26, 30, 36-38, and the comments. See Appendix C.

sample and for the post-Vietnam sample (see Appendix H). As described in the previous chapter, a series of *t*-tests and ANOVAs were computed for each survey item; three compared Vietnam-era participants with the post-Vietnam group (total sample, aviators only, and triangulation sample) and three assessed differences between subgroups within the post-Vietnam sample (gender and race/ethnicity). In addition, within the post-Vietnam sample, an ANOVA was calculated for each item, using highest pay grade as the independent variable, with post-hoc tests computed when a significant *F*-ratio resulted.

Three cautions must be kept in mind when interpreting the data. First, the large number of *t*-tests and ANOVAs resulted in an increase in the probability of a Type I error. Therefore, a more stringent than usual significance level of .01 was adopted. Second, the *N*s listed in tables are the total number of cases in each group, not necessarily the number of cases in each analysis. It was not unusual for a few participants to leave out an item. Therefore, the table *N*s are approximate. If a particular analysis had a greatly reduced *N*, it was footnoted on the table where it appeared. Third, since there were only 22 women in the sample, generalizations should not be made from the gender comparisons described in this chapter.

The Nature of Leadership

Six items defined the nature of leadership category. Table 2 contains means and *t*-test results for the Vietnam-era/Post-Vietnam group comparisons. Table 3 shows Post-Vietnam means and *t*-test results for gender, race/ethnicity, and designator comparisons. Table 4 looks at the items by rank. Each item is discussed separately.

Table 2
Means and *T*-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 178)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 383)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 170)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 146)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 73)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 162)	<i>t</i> -value
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.46	4.09	4.13**	4.45	4.15	2.75**	4.56	4.09	3.53**
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.09	4.33	-2.97**	4.10	4.34	-2.33	4.14	4.30	-1.28
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.20	4.23	-.34	4.19	4.38	-1.84	4.19	4.16	.25
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.34	3.71	-3.06**	3.30	3.52	-1.43	3.19	3.71	-2.64**
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.91	3.68	2.46	3.90	3.71	1.55	3.92	3.63	2.05
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.04	2.23	-2.75**	2.05	2.23	-1.95	1.92	2.25	-3.36**

** $p < .01$

Table 3
Means and *T*-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender			Race/ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)	<i>t</i> -value	White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfar e (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.12	3.86	1.18	4.08	4.18	-.77	4.01	4.15	-1.24
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.34	4.50	-.91	4.33	4.33	.02	4.30	4.31	-.13
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.25	4.27	-.15	4.29	3.97	2.76**	4.14	4.37	-2.53
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.69	4.00	-1.48	3.74	3.59	.90	3.89	3.48	2.96**
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.68	3.82	-.63	3.73	3.46	2.03	3.69	3.70	-.07
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.22	2.19	.21	2.19	2.40	-2.17	2.25	2.24	.18

** $p < .01$

Table 4
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.17	4.06	4.21	<1.00
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.33	4.33	4.33	<1.00
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.15	4.29	4.00	2.04
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.78	3.72	3.36	1.48
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.76	3.71	3.36	2.09
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.30	2.19	2.30	<1.00

** $p < .01$

While all subgroups studied were fairly in agreement with the statement that courage is a key component of Navy leadership, Vietnam-era participants were significantly more likely than their post-Vietnam counterparts to support this idea. No significant differences were found in the post-Vietnam sample comparisons.

Again, all groups agreed with the statement “Leadership is a gender-neutral term.” However, post-Vietnam participants in general (but not among aviators or within the triangulation sample) showed a significantly higher level of agreement with the statement “Leadership is a gender-neutral term” than Vietnam-era participants in general.

Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants agreed that there is a difference in moral and physical courage. Non-white post-Vietnam participants were significantly less in agreement with the item “There is a difference between moral and physical courage” than were white/Caucasian participants. In general there was less agreement with the notion that peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership than was seen with previous items. Post-Vietnam era participants in general showed significantly more agreement with the item “Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership” than Vietnam-era participants.

The difference between the two groups within the triangulation sample was particularly pronounced. Within the post-Vietnam samples, mean agreement for surface warfare officers was significantly higher than for aviation officers in their agreement that peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.

There was mild agreement with the statement that moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage and no significant differences between groups was found.

Interestingly, significant differences were found for the item “Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage.” Vietnam-era participants in general and within the triangulation sample showed significantly more disagreement with the statement “Physical courage is more important than moral courage” than did their comparison groups. The strongest level of disagreement with the statement “Physical courage is more important than moral courage” was reported by Vietnam-era participants in the triangulation sample. Among post-Vietnam samples, white/Caucasian participants disagreed more strongly that “Physical courage is more important than moral courage” than did non-white participants.

In summary, group differences in defining the nature of leadership were most likely to be found between Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants. Vietnam-era participants were more likely to stress the importance of courage as a component of Navy leadership, particularly moral courage. They were less likely to see a difference between peacetime and wartime leadership. For several items, the difference between the two generations of participants was particularly pronounced within the triangulation sample, which indicated a change in how the nature of leadership is defined.

Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership

Two sets of items assessed attitudes towards current Navy leadership. Means and *t*-tests for Vietnam-era/post-Vietnam comparisons are found in Table 5, while comparisons within post-Vietnam groups are displayed in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 5
Means and *T*-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (<i>N</i> = 178)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 383)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 170)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 146)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 73)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 162)	<i>t</i> -value
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.40	4.15	3.23**	4.42	4.28	1.51	4.46	4.06	3.28**
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	1.58	1.79	-2.99**	1.57	1.70	-1.39	1.47	1.83	-3.43**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	1.54	2.00	-6.24**	1.52	1.78	-3.01**	1.39	2.20	-6.89**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.84	3.47	3.76**	3.87	3.68	1.57	3.91	3.37	3.75**

** $p < .01$

Table 6
Means and *T*-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership: Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/Ethnicity		<i>t</i> -value	Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)		Surface warfar e (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.18	3.82	1.90	4.18	4.00	1.53	4.01	4.29	-2.78**
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	1.78	1.91	-.75	1.76	1.93	-1.53	1.84	1.67	1.83
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	1.96	2.48	-2.72**	1.96	2.21	-2.15	2.15	1.73	4.40**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.51	2.84	2.72**	3.51	3.28	1.62	3.36	3.68	-2.67**

** *p* < .01

Table 7

Means and *T*-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam
Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.06	4.22	3.85	3.25
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	2.05	1.70	1.67	6.74**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	2.42	1.83	1.72	16.95**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.31	3.53	3.55	1.49

** $p < .01$

General agreement was expressed that current Navy leadership is too political. The attitude that Navy leadership is too political was more strongly held by Vietnam-era participants in general and in the triangulation sample, as well as by aviation officers in the post-Vietnam group. Interestingly, the responses of aviators in the post-Vietnam group were more similar to their Vietnam-era counterparts than to their post-Vietnam cohorts.

A second item assessed the opposite attitude—that current Navy leadership is not political enough. Given the responses to the previously discussed item, it is not surprising there was general disagreement with the item “Navy leadership is not political enough,” especially from Vietnam-era participants. Again, post-Vietnam aviators were similar in attitude to their Vietnam-era counterparts; however, their attitudes were not significantly different from their surface warfare cohorts. A significant difference in means was found on the basis of rank. A post-hoc test indicated that senior enlisted personnel disagreed less with the statement that Navy leadership was not political enough than did O-1 to O-4 and O-5/O-6 participants.

There was general disagreement with the item “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions.” Vietnam-era participants were stronger in their disagreement that “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than their post-Vietnam counterparts; the difference was especially notable within the triangulation sample.

Within the post-Vietnam sample, men demonstrated significantly greater disagreement with the item “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than did women. In addition, the mean response among aviation officers was significantly lower than for surface warfare officers. Officers

showed more disagreement with the statement “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than did senior enlisted.

Again, an item assessing the opposite attitude was included in the survey—that “The problem with Navy leadership involves not having enough ‘warriors’ in senior positions.” Vietnam-era participants in general more strongly agreed with this attitude than the post-Vietnam group as a whole. A difference was not found when aviators were compared. The largest difference was seen within the triangulation sample. Women were less likely to agree with the statement “The problem with Navy leadership is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than men, while aviation officers were stronger in their agreement than were surface warfare officers.

To summarize, participants generally agreed that “Current Navy leadership is too political” and generally disagreed that “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions.” Vietnam-era participants tended to be stronger in their attitudes that “Navy leadership is too political” than post-Vietnam participants. Again, this difference was, in several instances, particularly pronounced within the triangulation sample, which indicated that while active duty service of these participants overlapped in time, their attitudes towards current leadership did not overlap. Among post-Vietnam participants, officer responses concerning the Navy leadership being too political were more extreme than those of senior enlisted.

Has Navy Leadership Changed?

Four items assessed whether participants perceived that Navy leadership has changed. Three additional items measured whether such change was for the good of the Navy. Table 8 contains means and *t*-test results for the Vietnam-era/post-Vietnam group

comparisons. Table 9 shows means and *t*-test results for the gender, race/ethnicity, and designator comparisons, while Table 10 looks at rank. Again, each item is discussed separately.

Participants tended to agree that Navy leadership theory and practice had changed during their time on active duty, with the highest level of agreement that Navy leadership had changed among those participants in the triangulation sample and the post-Vietnam senior enlisted personnel. For E-7 to E-9 participants, the mean for the item “Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty” was significantly higher than the mean for O-1 to O-4 officers. Those who agreed or strongly agreed that Navy leadership theory and practice had changed during their time on active duty responded to the following statement: “The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.” It was clear that the Vietnam-era participants disagreed with the statement “The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.” Even though their post-Vietnam counterparts did not see the change as for the good of the Navy, active-duty participants were significantly more favorable in their assessment of changes than were Vietnam-era participants. Among the post-Vietnam groups, women showed significantly greater agreement with the statement “The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I was one active duty was for the good of the Navy” than did men (although even among women there was not strong agreement with the statement). Interestingly, the percentage of women who had agreed with the original statement that Navy leadership theory and practice

Table 8
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam-era (N = 178)	Post-Vietnam (N = 383)	t-value	Vietnam-era (N = 170)	Post-Vietnam (N = 146)	t-value	Vietnam-era (N = 73)	Post-Vietnam (N = 162)	t-value
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	3.81	3.87	-.51	3.82	3.84	-.12	4.25	4.16	.73
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	2.35	3.13	-6.24**	2.35	2.99	-4.09**	2.27	3.21	-5.45**
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.94	3.33	6.54**	3.93	3.38	4.62**	3.97	3.33	4.26**
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	1.63	2.51	-7.87**	1.62	2.21	-4.03**	1.58	2.42	-4.86**
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.41	4.23	2.58**	4.41	4.25	1.87	4.49	4.21	2.74**
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	1.95	3.39	-11.56**	1.93	3.22	-8.17**	1.99	3.45	-7.80**

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (<i>N</i> = 178)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 383)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 170)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 146)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 73)	Post- Vietna m (<i>N</i> = 162)	<i>t</i> -value
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	1.96	3.01	-11.13**	1.96	2.97	-8.25**	1.87	3.12	-8.68**

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Between 27% and 36% of the Post-Vietnam sample answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

Table 9
Means and *T*-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	3.90	3.52	1.74	3.81	4.13	-2.58	3.97	3.80	1.55
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	3.09	3.75	-3.40**	3.06	3.43	-2.15	3.28	2.93	2.31
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.36	3.19	.68	3.37	3.18	1.23	3.27	3.37	-.82
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	2.47	2.90	-1.12	2.44	2.88	-1.91	2.69	2.15	3.05**
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.25	4.19	.35	4.22	4.29	-.56	4.25	4.23	.22
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	3.38	3.35	.09	3.36	3.58	-.92	3.61	3.15	2.38

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Gender			Race/ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)	<i>t</i> -value	White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	2.99	3.32	-1.36	2.95	3.31	-2.51	3.08	2.92	1.25

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Except in the case of gender (with all but one woman responding to the item), between 27% and 37% of post-Vietnam samples answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

Table 10
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			F-ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (N = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (N = 252)	O-5/O-6 (N = 33)	
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	4.28	3.68	3.94	13.28**
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	3.22	3.09	3.10	<1.00
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.47	3.29	3.24	<1.00
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	2.59	2.55	2.41	<1.00
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.23	4.28	4.15	<1.00
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	3.34	3.46	3.65	<1.00
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	3.18	2.95	3.00	1.33

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Between 27% and 36% of the post-Vietnam sample answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

had changed was considerably smaller (59%) than the percentage of agreement for any other group (between 70% and 89%). So, women were less likely than men to view Navy leadership as having changed, but those women who did see a change in leadership theory and practice were more likely to view the change positively. Responses were mixed to the item "Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership." While post-Vietnam groups were slightly on the positive side of neutral, their Vietnam-era counterparts were in significantly greater agreement with the statement "Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership." Close to three-quarters of the Vietnam-era participants and about one-half of the Post-Vietnam participants then assessed the statement: "Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is for the good of the Navy." The means displayed in Table 8 clearly demonstrate that Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is not viewed positively, especially by those serving during the Vietnam-era. In fact, Vietnam-era veterans' responses were significantly more negative than their post-Vietnam counterparts.

Within the post-Vietnam groups, mean responses for the item assessing whether Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership were on the positive side of neutral and there were no significant differences between groups. About half the participants within the post-Vietnam groups agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that Navy leadership was becoming more like civilian leadership and then went on to assess whether the change was good. Again, the assessment of this change tended to be negative. There was a trend for women and non-white participants to be less negative in their assessment that "Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is for the good of the Navy." Aviation officers showed significantly greater disagreement with the

statement that “Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is for the good of the Navy” than did surface warfare officers.

There was agreement by all groups that Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam.⁹ (It should be noted that, depending on the analysis, between 27% and 36% of the post-Vietnam participants were unable to answer this question.)¹⁰ Vietnam-era participants, in general, and those in the triangulation sample were stronger in their agreement that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam than were their post-Vietnam counterparts. When those who agreed that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam assessed whether this change was good, an interesting difference emerged. Vietnam-era participants were clear in their disagreement that changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam was for the good of the Navy. Post-Vietnam participants, however, were more favorable in their assessment that change in Navy leadership since Vietnam was for the good of the Navy, with means on the positive side of the middle of the scale. This item generated a very large difference in response and all group differences between Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam group means were significant. No differences between the Post-Vietnam groups were significant, although there was a trend for aviation officers to see changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam in a less positive light than did surface warfare officers.

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9 This item should not be confused with the item “Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I was on active duty.”

10 The researcher believed that the inability of participants to answer this survey item is attributed to the limited service time of some of the younger officers.

The final item in this group was “I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.” This item again exposed large, statistically significant differences between the Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants. The mean responses for Vietnam-era participants showed clear disagreement with the item “I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading,” while Post-Vietnam responses hovered around the middle of the scale. Among post-Vietnam groups, no significant differences were found; however, there was a trend with whites expressing a more favorable attitude to the direction Navy leadership is taking than did non-whites.

In summary, participants (especially Vietnam-era) tended to see Navy leadership as having changed and, generally, this change was not viewed positively. Vietnam-era participants were particularly negative in their assessment of change and the direction in which Navy leadership is heading. As discussed with previous items, the participants on active duty within the triangulation sample were more similar in attitude to post-Vietnam participants in general than to the Vietnam-era participants in the triangulation sample. Again, this indicates that there has been a shift over time in perceptions about how Navy leadership has changed.

Events Contributing to Changes in Navy Leadership

The final set of scaled items, displayed in Tables 11, 12, and 13, assessed the impact of three “events” on Navy leadership: technology, Tailhook, and the Post Cold War drawdown (downsizing). In addition, an open-ended item asked participants to list the world, national, or social events they thought most contributed to changes in Navy leadership. A second item listed several years and asked which was most pivotal to changes in post-Vietnam Navy leadership.

Table 11

Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (N = 178)	Post- Vietnam (N = 383)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 170)	Post- Vietnam (N = 146)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 73)	Post- Vietnam (N =162)	t-value
<u>Technology</u>									
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.57	3.98	-5.43**	3.55	3.87	-3.52**	3.56	3.98	-3.72**
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.31	3.68	-3.67**	3.31	3.77	-3.97**	3.35	3.73	-2.39
<u>Tailhook</u>									
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	4.18	4.00	1.95	4.19	4.26	-.61	4.29	3.94	2.55
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	4.16	3.90	2.98**	4.18	4.09	.95	4.23	3.86	2.73**
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	4.37	3.35	12.21**	4.40	3.66	6.53**	4.40	3.22	9.34**
<u>Drawdown</u>									
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown	3.56	3.78	-2.41	3.55	3.73	-1.55	3.57	3.72	-1.10

(table continues)

Item	Changes in Leadership Theory								
	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.78	3.26	5.78**	3.78	3.56	3.69**	3.84	3.17	5.18**
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>									
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.66	3.25	4.00**	3.70	3.51	1.53	3.52	3.21	1.99
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.52	2.84	-3.41**	2.50	2.62	-1.11	2.53	2.86	-2.39

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

Table 12

Means and *T*-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender			Race/ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)	<i>t</i> -value	White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
<u>Technology</u>									
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.98	4.09	-.67	3.96	4.11	-1.50	4.09	3.84	3.10**
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.67	3.74	-.30	3.62	3.94	-2.51	3.66	3.74	-.73
<u>Tailhook</u>									
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	3.98	4.29	-1.28	3.99	4.06	-.52	3.75	4.26	-4.25**
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	3.89	4.18	-1.43	3.91	3.89	.13	3.73	4.09	-3.26**
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	3.37	2.95	2.16	3.41	3.05	2.62**	3.08	3.70	-5.05**
<u>Drawdown</u>									
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown	3.77	3.82	-.22	3.75	3.88	-.96	3.80	3.71	.82

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.28	3.05	1.32	3.27	3.19	.63	3.18	3.39	-1.83
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>									
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.24	3.35	-.46	3.25	3.23	.14	3.03	3.51	-3.91**
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.85	2.80	.21	2.80	2.98	-1.59	3.08	2.59	4.47**

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

Table 13

Means and *T*-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
<u>Technology</u>				
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.93	4.00	4.09	<1.00
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.79	3.67	3.50	1.18
<u>Tailhook</u>				
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	3.90	4.06	3.94	<1.00
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	3.84	3.95	3.94	<1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	3.00	3.47	3.61	7.24**
<u>Drawdown</u>				
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the Post-Cold War drawdown	3.73	3.81	3.73	<1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.21	3.29	3.27	<1.00
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>				
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.38	3.19	3.39	1.25
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.98	2.85	2.42	4.10

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

Technology.

Two survey items considered the effect of technology. In response to the following statement: "Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy leadership," group means fell on the "agree" side of the 5-point Likert-type scale. Vietnam-era participants were significantly less in agreement that technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership than their Post-Vietnam counterparts. For example, post-Vietnam-era participant 342 said, "Technology has increased senior leadership's ability to micromanage." Another post-Vietnam era veteran participant 118 added, "Technology is good, but it's being crammed down our throats at a rate that we can't absorb." Not all post-Vietnam comments were negative however, as seen in participant 154's statement: "Information technology has made life easier and efficient..."

Among the post-Vietnam groups, the mean level of agreement of surface warfare officers that technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership was significantly higher than that of aviation officers.

Participants who agreed or strongly agreed that technology had contributed to changes in Navy leadership were then asked whether these changes were for the good of the Navy. While still on the positive side, the group means indicated that participants were somewhat unsure about whether technology's impact on Navy leadership had been positive. Vietnam-era participants in general, and aviators in particular, were significantly less positive in their assessment that technology contributed to changes in Navy leadership than their post-Vietnam counterparts. Interestingly, among post-Vietnam groups, non-white participants were more favorable in their ratings of the impact of technology than white participants.

Tailhook

In response to the four survey items addressing Tailhook, there was general agreement within almost all groups that Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership. Post-Vietnam aviators were significantly stronger in their agreement that Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership than were surface warfare officers. There was a trend within the triangulation sample for less agreement with the statement that Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership among Post-Vietnam participants than Vietnam-era participants. A similar question (“Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal”) yielded somewhat different responses. In this case, Vietnam-era participants in general, and within the triangulation sample, agreed more strongly with the statement “Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal” than did post-Vietnam participants in the same triangulation sample. As in the previously discussed item, post-Vietnam aviation officers agreed more strongly that “Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal” than did surface warfare officers.

The final Tailhook item assessed whether faith in senior Navy leadership had declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders. A clear difference was evident between all groups of Vietnam-era participants (who, for the most part, agreed with this item) and their Post-Vietnam counterparts (who were closer to the middle of the scale). Among post-Vietnam groups, women showed the most disagreement that their faith in senior Navy leadership had declined because of how Tailhook was handled, although their mean was not significantly different from that of the men. Non-white participants showed less agreement with the statement that their faith in senior Navy leadership had declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders than

white participants, and surface warfare officers showed less agreement with that statement than did aviation officers. Officers showed more agreement with this item “My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders” than senior enlisted participants.

Over 40% of Vietnam-era participants who responded in the comments section wrote about Tailhook. The lack of leadership on the part of senior officers was often mentioned. Vietnam-era participant 212 said, “No senior leadership agreed with it but none had the courage to stand and put career on the line. I am ashamed of these so-called leaders.” In addition, participant 108 declared, “Tailhook was mishandled by Navy leadership. They should have hammered the relatively small number of guilty and moved on.”

Drawdown.

There was some agreement that Navy leadership changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown, although group means hovered on the positive side of the middle of the scale. No significant differences between groups were found for the item “Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown.” While agreement again was lukewarm for the item assessing a decrease in faith in Navy leaders due to their handling of the drawdown, the means of Vietnam-era participants were significantly higher than their post-Vietnam counterparts. A typical comment on the negative effect that the post-Cold War drawdown had on Navy leadership can be seen in the following remark. Vietnam-era veteran participant 234 said, “Senior leadership failed to recognize how horribly damaging it was to throw out good, dedicated people, or live under the threat of involuntary termination.”

Tailhook Versus Drawdown

There was mild agreement to the notion that Tailhook was more of a catalyst for Navy leadership change than was the drawdown. Agreement was stronger among Vietnam-era participants in general when compared to the entire Post-Vietnam group. Post-Vietnam aviators were more like Vietnam-era participants than their cohorts; their agreement with the notion that Tailhook was more of a catalyst for Navy leadership change than the post-Cold War drawdown was significantly higher than surface warfare officers. The reverse of this item was also included. In general, there was mild disagreement that the post-Cold War drawdown was more a catalyst of change in Navy leadership than was Tailhook. Vietnam-era participants disagreed more strongly than post-Vietnam participants, and aviation officers in the Post-Vietnam group had significantly lower means than surface warfare officers that the post-Cold War drawdown was more of a catalyst of change in Navy leadership than was Tailhook.

Significant Events and Years

In an open-ended question, participants were asked: "If you believe that Navy leadership has changed, what world, national, or social event/events most contributed to the change?" Up to four responses were content coded for each participant, and the results tallied. Participants were also presented with six choices of years: 1975, 1979, 1985, 1991, 1994, and "other," and asked which was most pivotal to changes in post-Vietnam Navy leadership.

The top event was Tailhook; mentioned by 35% of Vietnam-era participants and 34% of post-Vietnam participants who responded to this particular open-ended question. Not surprisingly, 1991 was the year chosen most often by both post-Vietnam (52%) and

Vietnam-era (39%) participants as the year most pivotal to changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam. Among post-Vietnam participants, the other important events were: the end of the Cold War (31%), the drawdown (25%), and information technology (8%).

To summarize this section, Tailhook was viewed as a major event associated with changes in Navy leadership. Vietnam-era participants and post-Vietnam aviators were strongest in this belief. Again, patterns of significance within the triangulation sample mirrored, in general, the patterns found for the Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam groups in general, supporting the notion that Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. The next chapter is a discussion of the results, including recommendations and areas for future research.

CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY

Chapter Five provides a summary of this research, which includes the purpose, the methodology, and findings. The chapter concludes with recommendations for the United States Navy and areas for future research.

Purpose

The purpose of the study was threefold: (a) to assess the perception of change in Navy leadership in the past quarter of a century since Vietnam; (b) to establish if the perception of change in Navy leadership varied by race, gender, or rank; and (c) to determine if any significant social or world event contributed to changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam.

Methodology

A 38-item, 5-point Likert-type scale survey, which included open-ended questions to add explanatory power, was designed to answer three research questions. The study methodology was predominately quantitative with a total of 561 surveys returned. Two distinct groups of Navy veterans served as survey participants: Vietnam-era veterans and post-Vietnam veterans. Vietnam-era veterans included officers and senior enlisted who served in the Navy at any time during the Vietnam War but were not on active duty in the year 2000. Post-Vietnam veterans were defined as officers and senior enlisted who served in the Navy after 1975, the end of the Vietnam War. The survey response rate for Vietnam-era veterans was 47% and for post-Vietnam veterans it was 85%.

A triangulation methodology was specifically designed and used to determine whether there is a perception that Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. For this analysis, the year 1985 was set as the point of triangulation to determine if and how Navy leadership changed for the two participant groups, i.e., Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam veterans. Data from participants in each group who served on active duty in 1985 were compared to see if and/or how Navy leadership changed. For a Vietnam-era veteran to be in the triangulation group, he or she must have served both during Vietnam and in 1985 but not in 2000. Conversely, a post-Vietnam veteran must have served after 1975 and during 1985. Participants of these two groups share in common the year 1985. However, the two groups do not share the same experiences of serving while the Vietnam War was in progress. A total of 73 Vietnam-era veterans and 162 post-Vietnam veterans met the triangulation criteria and were compared.

Perceptions of change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were obtained by comparing how the two groups in the triangulation sample answered the following survey questions: (a) "Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty"; (b) "The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy"; (c) "Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership"; (d) "Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy"; (e) "Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam, the change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy"; and (f) "I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading." If the two groups responded more like their larger group cohorts than like each other, there would be support for the notion that perceptions of Navy leadership have changed.

Summary of Findings

The first of the researcher's three research questions asked if the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed since the end of the Vietnam War. The answer was unequivocally yes. All three groups studied, Vietnam-era veterans, post-Vietnam veterans, and the triangulation group (Vietnam-era veterans who served between 1965 and 1974 and also in 1985 but had left the Navy prior to 2000, and post-Vietnam veterans who served between 1976 and 2000, including 1985) were in agreement that Navy leadership had changed. The most agreement resided in the triangulation group, which was the group that was specifically designed to measure change in Navy leadership. The triangulation year (1985), was the common year that both of these groups overlapped. It represented the heart of the Reagan military buildup, the quest for a 600-ship navy, stealth bombers and fighters, and the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The second research question asked how, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by gender, race, or rank. The answer to this question was more nuanced than the first. There were a number of differences in how women, non-whites, and senior enlisted answered some of the survey questions. For example, officers felt more strongly than senior enlisted that Navy leadership was too political. Of the participants who agreed that Navy leadership has changed, officers were also stronger in their attitude that Tailhook contributed to their decline in faith in Navy leadership. Women felt more strongly than men that changes in Navy leadership have been for the good of the Navy. Although the women were more likely than any other group to view Navy leadership as not having changed at all, those who did believe that the Navy had changed thought the changes were for the good of the Navy. Further, women

disagreed more than men with the statement that there are not enough 'warriors' in leadership positions. Women showed the most disagreement to the statement that their faith in Navy leadership declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leadership. Whites felt more positively about the direction Navy leadership was taking than non-whites. Non-whites were more favorable in their rating technology as an agent of change for Navy leadership. Perhaps the most positive finding of this study had nothing to do with differences between gender, race, or rank. All groups felt that leadership was gender neutral. Even Vietnam-era veterans affirmed the gender neutrality of leadership, even though many indicated that women do not belong in combat units.

The third research question asked if there was any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to the perception of change in Navy leadership. As with the first research question, the answer was yes. In fact, the single world, national, or social event that survey participants chose most frequently as contributing to change in Navy leadership was the 1991 Tailhook Scandal. Thirty-five percent of post-Vietnam participants and 34% of Vietnam-era participants listed Tailhook as an event that contributed to changes in Navy leadership. As well, when asked to choose what year represented the year most pivotal to change in Navy leadership, 52% of post-Vietnam veterans and 39% Vietnam-era veterans chose 1991. It was very telling that one single social event--Tailhook--so greatly contributed to the perception of change in Navy leadership. It was not the only event that participants felt contributed to change in Navy leadership, but, it was the most frequently chosen event and one that aviators felt very strongly about. This finding is important because the majority of unrestricted line officers, the Navy's warfighters, believe that Tailhook had a negative impact on Navy leadership.

Based on the findings, it is evident that the 1990s were not kind to Navy leadership. During the early '90s, the Navy was forced to reconcile with the effects of Tailhook, the end of the Cold War, and the massive personnel and material drawdown that followed. The devastation done by Tailhook was immediate and shocking, whereas the drawdown, which was less public, had a lingering negative effect on the Navy. However, the fallout from both Tailhook and the drawdown still affect Navy leadership today. To a much lesser extent, the use of technology impacted veterans' perception of changes in Navy leadership. Tailhook, the drawdown, and the information age are addressed below.

Tailhook.

There are many events that have challenged Navy leadership since Vietnam. However, none had the influence of Tailhook. The mishandling of Tailhook by senior Navy leadership had a grave and negative impact on the Navy and damaged how officers, aviators in particular, view Navy leadership today. Faith in senior leadership at the flag level was destroyed. A typical response can be seen in the following survey comment by survey participant 39,

Tailhook was mishandled by Navy leadership. They should have hammered the relatively small number of guilty and moved on. They, however, let it simmer for years. I retired in 1992 after Tailhook and Clinton's election. I am an USNA '73 [Naval Academy class of 1973] grad and saw the leadership in the Navy abandon its officers because of the political atmosphere. Many of my classmates followed suit [retired] after 20 years of service.

Tailhook was a product of failed leadership just as the Department of Defense's Office of Inspector General (IG) (1992) asserted when it attributed the breakdown of

behavior at the 1991 Tailhook Convention to leadership. The IG stated that commanding officers did not ensure appropriate behavior and attitudes of those under their command.

As the Tailhook generation retires and/or resigns from the naval service, the residual effect of Tailhook will lessen and its impact on Navy leadership will diminish. However, the lessons of Tailhook should never be forgotten. The Navy needs to reflect on Tailhook lessons learned prior to the next crisis. Just as the IG found fault in the commanding officers for the behavior of their subordinates during the 1991 Tailhook scandal, a future Tailhook would still hold commanding officers accountable and responsible for every member in their command. According to *United States Navy Regulations* (1990), the responsibility of the commanding officer for his or her command is absolute. This philosophy is contrary to some contemporary views on leadership. For example, Heifitz and Laurie (1997) believed that leadership is the responsibility of every individual at every level and should no longer be thought of as “the responsibility of the few, a rare event, or a once in a lifetime opportunity” (p.134). However, Heifitz and Laurie’s assessment of how leaders get removed from organizations certainly applies to Tailhook. They asserted that leaders are not removed from organizational life because they take risks. They are removed because they fail to see that an action or course of action will get them fired. The commanding officers whose careers were terminated because of Tailhook had no clue that they were in danger. Perhaps one of the key lessons learned from Tailhook is for Navy officers to remember that they are held to a higher standard of conduct than the average American. Prior to Tailhook, Bennis and Nanus (1985) heightened the importance of morality as a component of leadership. Since Tailhook, the Navy has emphasized ethics and morality in its leadership training.

End of the Cold War/Drawdown.

Many Navy officers perceived that the post-Cold War drawdown of personnel, ships, and squadrons contributed to changes in Navy leadership. The effect of the drawdown was significant for post-Vietnam veterans and for surface warfare officers, more so than it was for aviators. The clearest perspective of the impact of the post-Cold War drawdown can be seen in the comments of participant 257:

My great complaint against our leadership over the past decade is lack of vision, plus lack of insight as to how to make a vision into reality. Our utter failure to manage the drawdown bears testimony--15 years and not a single new aircraft design has reached the fleet. The only new submarine design proved utterly unaffordable. Our surface fleet is aging and ill maintained. I'm not saying I could do better, but I would like to see better from those we entrust with stars [Admirals].

Almost one-third (31%) of post-Vietnam veterans cited the end of the Cold War and 25% cited the drawdown as an important contributor to changes in Navy leadership. The most radical comments were provided by post-Vietnam veteran participant 302 who believed the following¹¹:

The cold war ended and the country wanted to spend less on the military.

Downsizing occurred. This caused the competition among officers and CPOs to increase dramatically. The competitiveness generated a bunch of ass kissing, so

---

¹¹ The comment represented the contempt many post-Vietnam veteran participants had for the type of leader the post-Cold War drawdown created

that the senior personnel could be assured advancement in rate/rank. These weak leaders and this trend started 8 years ago and now these guys are the Master Chiefs and O-5s who are not Navy leaders but in the CO/CMC [command master chief] position! This combined with the implement of TQL--and the kinder/gentler bullshit is killing my Navy.

Information Technology.

Information technology was cited by 8% of post-Vietnam veterans as an important world, national, or social event that contributed to changes in Navy leadership. The recent developments of the information age and the speed and means by which information travels, present a challenge to traditional Navy leadership practices. The most provocative perspective can be seen in the comment by participant 327 who stated,

Technology has increased senior leadership's ability to micromanage. Rather than decreasing demands on junior personnel and freeing more time for hands-on leadership, junior personnel spend more time responding to minutia from senior leadership...I believe technology has degraded leadership. Management by e-mail will kill us all.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered for the United States Navy:

1. Build on the finding that the majority of Navy officers and senior enlisted feel that leadership is gender-neutral. This is a very positive finding and should be made known to leadership and throughout the ranks. It is an indication that Navy culture is changing and that leadership training is reaching many in the fleet and those in key positions.

2. Make use of the fact that this leadership survey revealed that at least one current carrier battle group felt neutral about the direction in which Navy leadership is heading.

This too is very positive. Neutral is good, especially vis-à-vis leadership and the past decade. It is doubtful that the same results would have been achieved if this survey were administered 4 or 5 years ago.

3. Try to determine why current Navy officers and senior enlisted place physical courage in higher esteem than moral courage, contrary to Vietnam-era Navy personnel.

4. Read the Survey Comments (see Appendix J). Although they were not germane to answering this study's three research questions and not included in the main body of the study, they provide insight into the feelings and perceptions of the 561 Vietnam and active duty veteran survey participants.

The results of this study will be made available to senior Navy leaders, officers, and enlisted. It will also be briefed to the Navy's leadership school and other organizations and individuals who are responsible for leadership training and implementing change in Navy leadership theory and practice.

Areas for Future Research

Many areas were highlighted as a result of this study that still need further research. A more comprehensive study on the differences of race and gender vis-à-vis Navy leadership also needs to be addressed. This study only scratched the surface of race, gender, and leadership. The survey used in this study should be administered to Vietnam-era surface warfare officers, comparing the results to those of the aviator participants of this study. This will establish if there are any significant differences between those two groups.

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APPENDIX A SAMPLE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FORM

FITNESS REPORT & COUNSELING RECORD (E7-O6)

RCS BUPERS 1610-1

1. Name (Last, First MI Suffix)				2. Grade/Rate		3. Desig		4. SSN	
5. ACT	6. FAR	7. IMACT	8. AEDSW/205	9. UIC	10. Ship/Station	11. Promotion Status		12. Date Reported	
13. Occasion for Report		14. Detachment of Individual		15. Detachment of Reporting Senior		16. Special		17. Period of Report	
18. Periodic		19. Type of Report		20. Reporting Senior		21. Physical Readiness		22. Billet Subcategory (if any)	
23. Not Observed Report		24. Regular		25. Concurrence		26. Ops Cdr		27. To	
28. Reporting Senior (Last, FI MI)				29. Grade		30. Desig		31. Title	
32. UIC				33. SSN					
28. Command employment and command achievements.									
29. Primary/ collateral/ Watchstanding duties. (Enter primary duty abbreviation in box.)									
For Mid-term Counseling Use: (When completing FITREP, enter 10 and 11 from counseling record, sign 32.)				30. Date Counselor		31. Counselor		32. Signature of Individual Counselor	
PERFORMANCE TRAITS: 1.0 - Below standards/not progressing or UNSAT in any one standard; 2.0 - Does not yet meet all 3.0 standards; 3.0 - Meets all 3.0 standards; 4.0 - Exceeds most 3.0 standards; 5.0 - Meets overall criteria and most of the specific standards for 5.0. Standards are not all inclusive.									
PERFORMANCE TRAITS	1.0* Below Standards	2.0 Not progressing	3.0 Meets Standards	4.0 Above Standards	5.0* Greatly Exceeds Standards				
33. PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE: Professional proficiency, and qualifications.	-Lacks basic professional knowledge to perform effectively. -Cannot apply basic skills. -Fails to develop professionally or achieve timely qualifications.	-	-Has thorough professional knowledge. -Competently performs both routine and new tasks. -Steadily improves skills, achieves timely qualifications.	-	-Recognized expert, sought after to solve difficult problems. -Exceptionally skilled, develops and executes innovative ideas. -Achieves early/highly advanced qualifications.				
NOB									
34. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: Fairness, respect for human worth.	-Displays personal bias or engages in harassment. -Tolerates bias, unfairness or harassment in subordinates. -Lacks respect for EO objectives. -Interferes with order and discipline by disregarding rights of others.	-	-Always treats others with fairness and respect. -Does not condone bias or harassment in or outside of workplace. -Supports Navy EO objectives. -Contributes to unit cohesiveness and morale.	-	-Admired for fairness and human respect. -Ensures a climate of fairness and respect for human worth. -Pro-active EO leader, achieves concrete EO objectives. -Leader and model contributor to unit cohesiveness and morale.				
NOB									
35. MILITARY BEARING/ CHARACTER: Appearance, conduct, physical fitness, adherence to Navy Core Values.	-Consistently unsat appearance. -Unsatisfactory demeanor/conduct. -Unable to meet one or more physical readiness standards. -Fails to live up to one or more Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT.	-	-Excellent personal appearance. -Excellent demeanor or conduct. -Complies with physical readiness program, within all standards. -Always lives up to Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT.	-	-Exemplary personal appearance. -Exemplary representative of Navy. -Excellent or outstanding PRT A leader in physical readiness. -Exemplifies Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT.				
NOB									
36. TEAMWORK: Contributions to team building and team results.	-Creates conflict, unwilling to work with others, puts self above team. -Fails to understand team goals or teamwork techniques. -Does not take directions well.	-	-Reinforces others' efforts, meets personal commitments to team. -Understands team goals, employs good teamwork techniques. -Accepts and offers team direction.	-	-Team builder, inspires cooperation and progress. -Talented mentor, focuses goals and techniques for team. -The best at accepting and offering team direction.				
NOB									
37. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND INITIATIVE: Taking initiative, planning, prioritizing, achieving mission.	-Lacks initiative. -Unable to plan or prioritize. -Does not maintain readiness. -Fails to get the job done.	-	-Takes initiative to meet goals. -Plans/prioritizes effectively. -Maintains high state of readiness. -Always gets the job done.	-	-Develops innovative ways to accomplish mission. -Plans/prioritizes with exceptional skill and foresight. -Maintains superior readiness, even with limited resources. -Gets jobs done earlier and far better than expected.				
NOB									

APPENDIX B PILOT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

I would like to thank you for your time. Your insight will be key to helping me determine how, if at all, did Navy leadership changed since Vietnam.

1. Can you tell me a little bit about Navy leadership during the time you served?
2. How would you categorize and assess Navy leadership during your time on active duty?
3. Did you notice any changes in leadership theory or practice during the years you served?
4. (If participant did notice a change) What do you think may have caused or contributed to that change?
5. What is your assessment of that change on the Navy?

Did you attend any formal leadership training while you were in the Navy?

6. Is there anything that you would like to add?

Once again, thank you very much for giving up your valuable time.

APPENDIX C LEADERSHIP SURVEY

You are being asked to complete this brief survey as part of an effort to assess the changes in Navy leadership theory and practice, post-Vietnam. The results of this survey will be used as part of a doctoral dissertation in leadership studies for an active duty naval officer, and will be shared with the U.S. Navy. Your participation in this survey is strictly voluntary and your anonymity is assured. Please return this survey to the administrator who handed it out to you or if provided, place it in the addressed stamped envelope and return it for processing.

PART I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Please select the appropriate response.

1. Are you: ☐ Active duty Navy ☐ Retired Navy ☐ Former Navy (not retired)
2. I served in the Navy on active duty from 19____ to ____.
3. Are you: ☐ A combat veteran ☐ Not a combat veteran
4. Are you a Vietnam Veteran? ☐ Yes ☐ No
5. Are you: ☐ Surface Warfare ☐ Aviation ☐ Submarine Warfare
☐ a SEAL ☐ Other (please specify) _____
6. Please select your highest military paygrade:
☐ E7-E9 ☐ W1-W4 ☐ O1-O4 ☐ O5-O6 ☐ Flag
7. What is your sex? ☐ Male ☐ Female
8. The following question is based on current DOD race/ethnic categories. If you are of multiple heritages, please choose the race/ethnic group with which you MOST closely identify or select on official Navy correspondence. Are you:
☐ Asian American/Pacific Islander
☐ Black/African American
☐ Hispanic/Latino
☐ Native American/Alaskan native
☐ White/Caucasian
☐ Other Racial/Ethnic Group
9. Did you attend formal leadership training while you were in the Navy?
☐ Don't know/Not applicable
☐ No
☐ Yes
     Please state school/training attended _____
     Approximate year _____

Part 2. NAVY LEADERSHIP: For each item, please circle the number that best indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about Navy leadership.

5 = Strongly agree
 4 = Agree
 3 = Neither agree nor disagree
 2 = Disagree
 1 = Strongly disagree
 0 = Don't know/Not applicable

	Don't know/Not applicable	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
10. Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	0	1	2	3	4	5
11. If your answer to the previous item was a 4 or 5, please rate the following statement. Otherwise, go on to the next item. The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.	0	1	2	3	4	5
12. Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership.	0	1	2	3	4	5
13. If your answer to the previous item was a 4 or 5, please rate the following statement. Otherwise, go on to the next item. Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy	0	1	2	3	4	5
14. Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam.	0	1	2	3	4	5
15. If your answer to the previous item was a 4 or 5, please rate the following statement. Otherwise, go on to the next item. The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.	0	1	2	3	4	5
16. Courage is a key component of Navy leadership.	0	1	2	3	4	5
17. Leadership is a gender-neutral term.	0	1	2	3	4	5
18. I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.	0	1	2	3	4	5
19. Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership.	0	1	2	3	4	5
20. Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War draw down.	0	1	2	3	4	5
21. There is a difference between moral and physical courage.	0	1	2	3	4	5
22. Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.	0	1	2	3	4	5

		3 = Neither agree nor disagree	2 = Disagree	1 = Strongly disagree	0 = Don't know/Not applicable	strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	strongly disagree	Not applicable
23.	Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
24.	My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the post-Cold War draw down was handled by senior Navy leaders.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
25.	Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
26.	Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the draw down (down sizing).	0	1	2	3	4	5			
27.	Current Navy leadership is too political.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
28.	The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
29.	Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
30.	The draw down was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
31.	Current Navy leadership is not political enough.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
32.	My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
33.	The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
34.	Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy leadership.	0	1	2	3	4	5			
35.	If your answer to the previous item was a 4 or 5, please rate the following statement. Otherwise, go on to the next item. The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.	0	1	2	3	4	5			

_____

_____

37. If you were to pick a year that most significantly marks a change in Navy leadership, that year would be _____

38. Which of the following years was most pivotal to changes in post-Vietnam Navy leadership?

_____ 1975   _____ 1979   _____ 1985   _____ 1991   _____ 1994

_____ Other: _____

I chose that year because:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Please use the space below to write comments about Navy leadership issues or about the survey.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you for your time.

APPENDIX D CONSENT TO ACT AS AN INTERVIEW RESEARCH PARTICIPANT

1. I agree to be interviewed about my position as _____ on board _____ . I realize that this one on one interview will be audio taped.
2. I understand that no risk to me as a result of this interview is anticipated and that minimal fatigue on my part is likely to occur. I realize that if I shall require a break for any reason, I can request one. I understand that this interview affords me an opportunity to discuss my position (former position) as _____, and that by sharing my insight and knowledge with others, I may positively impact the lives of the men and women of the United States Navy.
3. I understand that my participation in this study is strictly voluntary, I may stop the interview at any time I desire, and that I may at anytime withdraw my consent to use the information derived from this interview without fear of repercussion.
4. I understand that at anytime I have the opportunity to ask questions about the research I am participating in, and that the researcher will address my question in a truthful manner.
5. I agree to conduct this interview, not to exceed one hour, and if requested, I will consider making myself available to successive interviews as necessary, and within reason.
6. I realize that my identity will not be revealed and that no data will be used that can identify me.
7. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that expressed in this consent form.
8. I understand that I will be provided a transcript of this interview.
9. I feel no obligation to assist the interviewer based on his military position.

I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to my voluntary participation in this research.

_____
Signature of Participant

_____
Date

_____
Signature of Principal Researcher

_____
Date

APPENDIX E CONSENT TO ACT AS A SURVEY RESEARCH PARTICIPANT

1. I agree to participate in a survey _____ on board
_____.
2. I understand that this survey affords me an opportunity to express my view on Navy leadership, and that by sharing my insight and knowledge with others, I may positively impact the lives of the men and women of the United States Navy.
3. I understand that my participation in this survey is strictly voluntary.
4. I understand that at anytime I have the opportunity to ask questions about the research I am participating in, and that the administrator will address my question in a truthful manner.
5. I realize that my identity will be kept confidential that no data will be used that can identify me.
6. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that expressed in this consent form.
7. I feel no obligation to assist the administrator based on his or her military position.

I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to my voluntary participation in this survey.

_____
Signature of Participant

_____
Date

_____
Signature of Administrator

_____
Date

APPENDIX F LETTER TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

<<date>>

<<name>>

<<address>>

_ AUTOTEXTLIST _Dear _<<rank and name>>

I am in the Navy Doctoral Program in Leadership Studies at the University of San Diego. My dissertation proposal, *Changes in Navy Leadership Theory and Practice: Post-Vietnam*, will involve surveys, interviews, and a review of pertinent Navy documents. I am writing you for permission to interview Navy personnel, on a not to interfere basis of course, to ascertain if our Navy officers and senior enlisted believe that Navy leadership has changed post-Vietnam, and if they do believe change has occurred, what were the possible causes? My results will be shared with the Navy through the Chief of Naval Education and Training or whatever avenue is deemed most appropriate.
Thank you for your time.

N. A. Trongale
Captain, U.S. Navy

APPENDIX G LETTER TO VETERANS GROUPS

<<date>>

Dear Commander << name>>,

I am an active duty Navy Captain and a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post # 2801 in Villa Park, Illinois. I am also a part time student at the University of San Diego, conducting research in the area of leadership for a doctoral dissertation. My research project is titled, *Changes in Navy Leadership Theory and Practice: Post-Vietnam. Since the Vietnam War*, Navy leadership theory and practice appears to be changing, becoming more like current civilian leadership theory and practice. Indicators of this shift can be seen in journal writings, the new Navy performance evaluation structure, current Navy leadership training, and by the birth of a Navy Command Leadership School.

My study will address: (1) How, if at all, has Navy leadership theory and practice changed? (2) If Navy leadership theory and practice did change, what caused those changes? And (3) How, if at all, do significant events that impact history affect Navy leadership theory and practice.

I am writing you for an introduction to your Navy post members who might be interested in granting a confidential interview and/or filling out a confidential survey (copy attached) that will help answer the above mentioned questions. Their opinions and experiences are valued, and add credibility to the results. The results of my study will be shared with the Navy and those participating individuals who request them.

Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Nicholas A. Trongale

APPENDIX H LEADERSHIP SURVEY ITEM FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

This appendix contains three frequency distributions: Vietnam-era sample, weighted post-Vietnam sample, and unweighted post-Vietnam sample. The percentage of participants who answered each possible response category is listed next to each survey question. The percentages that appear in columns headed by T% are total response percentages, i.e., these percentages account for all participants including those who answered Don't know/Not applicable or who left the item blank. The percentages listed under V% are "valid" percentages, i.e., the percentage calculated after responses of Don't know/Not applicable/Blank have been removed from the total.

Table H-1

Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Vietnam-era Participants

5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, NA = Don't know/Not applicable/Missing

Item	Level of agreement										
	NA	1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	0.0	3.9	3.9	15.2	15.2	8.4	8.4	40.4	40.4	32.0	32.0
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.	28.1	20.8	28.9	24.7	34.4	9.0	12.5	15.2	21.1	2.2	3.1
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership.	9.5	1.7	1.9	7.9	8.7	8.4	9.3	48.3	53.4	24.2	26.7
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy	28.1	37.6	52.3	28.1	39.1	2.2	3.1	3.4	4.7	0.6	0.8
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam.	6.2	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.8	1.1	1.2	47.8	50.9	43.3	46.1
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.	10.1	39.9	44.4	29.2	32.5	6.7	7.5	12.4	13.8	1.7	1.9

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement										
	NA	1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	0.0	3.9	3.9	15.2	15.2	8.4	8.4	40.4	40.4	32.0	32.0
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership.	0.6	1.7	1.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	24.7	24.9	64.0	64.4
Leadership is a gender-neutral term.	3.4	2.8	2.9	5.6	5.8	8.4	8.7	42.7	44.2	37.1	38.4
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.	7.3	36.0	38.8	32.6	35.2	16.9	18.2	6.2	6.7	1.1	1.2
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership.	2.2	1.7	1.7	8.4	8.6	4.5	4.6	38.8	39.7	44.4	45.4
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown.	11.8	2.8	3.2	10.1	11.5	19.1	21.7	47.2	53.5	9.0	10.2
There is a difference between moral and physical courage.	0.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	2.8	2.8	42.1	42.4	45.5	45.8
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.	0.6	15.2	15.3	18.0	18.1	5.6	5.6	39.3	39.5	21.3	21.5
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal.	7.3	0.0	0.0	6.2	6.7	10.7	11.5	37.6	40.6	38.2	41.2

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement										
	NA	1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	0.0	3.9	3.9	15.2	15.2	8.4	8.4	40.4	40.4	32.0	32.0
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the post-Cold War drawdown was handled by senior Navy leaders.	10.7	1.1	1.3	7.3	8.2	19.7	22.0	43.3	48.4	18.0	20.1
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage.	1.2	2.2	2.3	10.7	10.8	15.2	15.3	36.5	36.9	34.3	34.7
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown (down sizing).	8.4	4.5	4.9	9.6	10.4	18.5	20.2	39.3	42.9	19.7	21.5
Current Navy leadership is too political.	6.7	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.8	9.6	10.2	32.0	34.3	50.0	53.6
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions.	5.6	54.5	57.7	30.3	32.1	8.4	8.9	1.1	1.2	0.0	0.0
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage.	1.7	23.0	23.4	53.4	54.3	18.0	18.3	2.8	2.9	1.1	1.1

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Level of agreement										
	NA	1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	0.0	3.9	3.9	15.2	15.2	8.4	8.4	40.4	40.4	32.0	32.0
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook.	9.0	9.6	10.5	44.4	48.8	18.0	19.8	18.0	19.8	1.1	1.2
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.	4.5	52.8	55.3	33.1	34.7	7.9	8.2	0.6	0.6	1.1	1.2
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders.	2.2	0.6	0.6	3.4	3.4	6.7	6.9	36.0	36.8	51.1	52.3
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions.	7.3	2.2	2.4	7.3	7.9	20.2	21.8	36.5	39.4	26.4	28.5
Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy leadership.	6.2	2.2	2.4	9.6	10.2	19.7	21.0	56.7	60.5	5.6	6.0
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.	39.9	2.2	3.7	9.6	15.9	16.9	28.0	30.3	50.5	1.1	1.9

(table continues)

Table H-2

Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Weighted Post-Vietnam Sample

5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, 0 = Don't know/Not applicable

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	2.2	1.1	1.1	9.2	9.4	8.5	8.7	50.0	51.2	29.0	29.6	
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.	21.9	6.8	8.7	17.8	22.8	16.1	20.7	31.3	40.1	6.0	7.7	
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership.	5.1	4.3	4.6	19.7	20.8	17.9	18.8	40.7	42.9	12.3	12.9	
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy	49.0	9.7	19.0	20.1	39.4	8.2	16.1	10.7	21.0	2.2	4.4	
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam.	36.3	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.8	9.0	14.1	27.1	42.6	26.5	41.6	
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.	49.0	5.3	10.5	6.7	13.1	10.3	20.2	19.4	38.1	9.3	18.2	

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership.	0.6	2.0	2.0	8.2	8.2	4.3	4.3	45.8	46.0	39.1	39.4	
Leadership is a gender-neutral term.	0.2	1.1	1.1	2.6	2.6	5.9	5.9	41.2	41.3	48.9	49.0	
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.	1.3	8.2	8.3	25.7	26.0	26.1	26.5	31.3	31.7	7.4	7.5	
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership.	3.4	2.7	2.8	8.1	8.3	13.3	13.7	38.3	39.7	34.3	35.5	
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown.	4.8	1.6	1.7	8.4	8.8	20.6	21.7	44.9	47.1	19.7	20.7	
There is a difference between moral and physical courage.	0.6	1.2	1.2	2.8	2.8	8.9	9.0	46.1	46.4	40.4	40.6	
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.	2.5	6.8	6.9	11.8	12.1	9.1	9.4	42.8	43.9	26.9	27.6	
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal.	7.0	1.6	1.7	6.6	7.1	14.9	16.0	48.5	52.1	21.5	23.1	

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the post-Cold War drawdown was handled by senior Navy leaders.	6.2	1.5	1.6	19.1	20.4	35.9	38.3	28.4	30.3	8.8	9.4	
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage.	0.4	2.4	2.5	7.3	7.4	28.0	28.1	42.4	42.5	19.4	19.5	
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown (down sizing).	6.3	4.0	4.3	18.9	20.2	29.2	31.1	30.6	32.6	11.0	11.7	
Current Navy leadership is too political.	0.6	0.4	0.4	4.0	4.0	15.9	16.0	39.2	39.4	40.0	40.2	
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many “warriors” in senior positions.	2.3	24.1	24.7	45.3	46.4	23.2	23.8	3.6	3.7	1.4	1.5	
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage.	0.6	13.8	13.9	49.9	50.2	33.8	34.0	1.2	1.2	0.7	0.7	
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook.	6.6	5.2	5.6	29.3	31.4	31.7	33.9	25.0	26.8	2.1	2.3	
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.	0.6	37.6	37.9	42.5	42.8	16.5	16.6	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.9	

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders.	5.4	2.8	3.0	18.9	20.0	36.5	38.6	24.4	25.8	11.9	12.6	
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough “warriors” in senior positions.	2.5	2.5	2.6	15.3	15.7	33.0	33.9	31.1	31.9	15.6	16.0	
Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy leadership.	0.4	0.2	0.2	3.8	3.8	15.1	15.1	60.1	60.3	20.5	20.6	
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.	21.4	0.9	1.2	10.7	13.6	11.3	14.4	43.5	55.4	12.2	15.5	

Table H-3

Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Sample

5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, 0 = Don't know/Not applicable

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty.	3.2	1.0	1.1	12.0	12.4	10.2	10.5	49.3	50.9	24.3	25.1	
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.	27.4	6.0	8.3	17.5	24.1	14.6	20.1	28.2	38.8	6.3	8.6	
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership.	5.5	4.7	5.0	20.4	21.5	18.5	19.6	40.5	42.8	10.4	11.0	
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy	50.4	9.9	20.0	18.5	37.4	7.8	15.8	11.2	22.6	2.1	4.2	
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam.	36.2	0.0	0.0	1.3	2.0	7.8	12.3	29.2	45.9	25.3	39.8	
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.	47.8	4.4	8.5	6.5	12.5	11.2	21.5	20.6	39.5	9.4	18.0	

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership.	0.8	2.6	2.6	7.8	7.9	5.2	5.3	45.4	45.8	38.1	38.4	
Leadership is a gender-neutral term.	0.3	1.3	1.3	2.9	2.9	5.5	5.5	42.0	42.1	48.0	48.2	
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.	1.3	7.8	7.9	27.2	27.5	26.6	27.0	30.0	30.4	7.0	7.1	
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership.	4.5	3.1	3.3	7.3	7.7	11.2	11.7	38.6	40.4	35.2	36.9	
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown.	6.6	1.3	1.4	8.9	9.5	19.1	20.4	44.4	47.5	19.8	21.2	
There is a difference between moral and physical courage.	0.8	1.8	1.8	3.1	3.2	7.0	7.1	45.4	45.8	41.8	42.1	
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.	3.1	7.0	7.3	12.8	13.2	7.0	7.3	44.1	45.6	25.8	26.7	
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal.	9.4	2.1	2.3	6.3	6.9	13.1	14.4	46.0	50.7	23.2	25.6	

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%		T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the post-Cold War drawdown was handled by senior Navy leaders.	8.4		1.6	1.7	19.1	20.8	34.5	37.6	27.2	29.6	9.4	10.3
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage.	0.5		2.9	2.9	8.1	8.1	27.2	27.3	41.0	41.2	20.4	20.5
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown (down sizing).	8.1		4.7	5.1	19.1	20.7	27.2	29.5	30.5	33.2	10.4	11.4
Current Navy leadership is too political.	0.8		0.5	0.5	5.0	5.0	13.1	13.2	41.5	41.8	39.2	39.5
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many “warriors” in senior positions.	2.6		28.5	29.2	45.2	46.4	20.1	20.6	2.6	2.7	1.0	1.1
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage.	0.8		14.4	14.5	50.4	50.8	32.4	32.6	1.6	1.6	0.5	0.5
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook.	8.1		5.7	6.3	31.6	34.4	28.5	31.0	24.3	26.4	1.8	2.0
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.	.8		38.9	39.2	45.4	45.8	12.3	12.4	1.8	1.8	0.8	0.8

(table continues)

Item	Level of agreement											
	0		1		2		3		4		5	
	T%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	T%	V%	
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders.	7.3	3.1	3.4	17.8	19.2	30.5	33.0	26.1	28.2	15.1	16.3	
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough “warriors” in senior positions.	2.9	2.9	3.0	14.4	14.8	31.6	32.5	30.5	31.5	17.8	18.3	
Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy leadership.	0.6	0.3	0.3	3.9	3.9	13.8	13.9	60.6	60.9	20.9	21.0	
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.	20.7	0.8	1.0	9.9	12.5	14.1	17.8	43.9	55.3	10.7	13.5	

(table continues)

**APPENDIX I LEADERSHIP SURVEY USING UNWEIGHTED POST-VIETNAM
DATA**

Statistical test results using unweighted post-Vietnam data.

Table I-1
Means and *T*-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 178)	Post- Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 383)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 170)	Post- Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 146)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam- era (<i>N</i> = 73)	Post- Vietnam (<i>N</i> =162)	<i>t</i> -value
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.46	4.09	4.13**	4.45	4.15	2.75**	4.56	4.09	3.53**
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.09	4.33	-2.97**	4.10	4.34	-2.33	4.14	4.30	-1.28
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.20	4.23	-.34	4.19	4.38	-1.84	4.19	4.16	.25
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.34	3.71	-3.06**	3.30	3.52	-1.43	3.19	3.71	-2.64**
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.91	3.68	2.46	3.90	3.71	1.55	3.92	3.63	2.05
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.04	2.23	-2.75**	2.05	2.23	-1.95	1.92	2.25	-3.36**

** $p < .01$

Table I-2
Means and *T*-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender			Race/Ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)	<i>t</i> -value	White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)	<i>t</i> -value	Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.12	3.86	1.18	4.08	4.18	-.77	4.01	4.15	-1.24
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.34	4.50	-.91	4.33	4.33	.02	4.30	4.31	-.13
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.25	4.27	-.15	4.29	3.97	2.76**	4.14	4.37	-2.53
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.69	4.00	-1.48	3.74	3.59	.90	3.89	3.48	2.96**
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.68	3.82	-.63	3.73	3.46	2.03	3.69	3.70	-.07
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.22	2.19	.21	2.19	2.40	-2.17	2.25	2.24	.18

** $p < .01$

Table I-3
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership	4.17	4.06	4.21	<1.00
Leadership is a gender-neutral term	4.33	4.33	4.33	<1.00
There is a difference between moral and physical courage	4.15	4.29	4.00	2.04
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership	3.78	3.72	3.36	1.48
Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage	3.76	3.71	3.36	2.09
Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage	2.30	2.19	2.30	<1.00

** $p < .01$

Table I-4

Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (N = 178)	Post- Vietnam (N = 383)	t-value	Vietnam- era (N = 170)	Post- Vietnam (N = 146)	t-value	Vietnam- era (N = 73)	Post- Vietnam (N =162)	t-value
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.40	4.15	3.23**	4.42	4.28	1.51	4.46	4.06	3.28**
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	1.58	1.79	-2.99**	1.57	1.70	-1.39	1.47	1.83	-3.43**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	1.54	2.00	-6.24**	1.52	1.78	-3.01**	1.39	2.20	-6.89**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.84	3.47	3.76**	3.87	3.68	1.57	3.91	3.37	3.75**

** $p < .01$

Table I-5
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/ethnicity		<i>t</i> -value	Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)		Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.18	3.82	1.90	4.18	4.00	1.53	4.01	4.29	-2.78**
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	1.78	1.91	-.75	1.76	1.93	-1.53	1.84	1.67	1.83
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	1.96	2.48	-2.72**	1.96	2.21	-2.15	2.15	1.73	4.40**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.51	2.84	2.72**	3.51	3.28	1.62	3.36	3.68	-2.67**

** *p* < .01

Table I-6

Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
Current Navy leadership is too political	4.06	4.22	3.85	3.25
Current Navy leadership is not political enough	2.05	1.70	1.67	6.74**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many "warriors" in senior positions	2.42	1.83	1.72	16.95**
The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough "warriors" in senior positions	3.31	3.53	3.55	1.49

** $p < .01$

Table I-7
Means and *T*-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 178)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 383)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 170)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 146)	<i>t</i> -value	Vietnam-era (<i>N</i> = 73)	Post-Vietnam (<i>N</i> = 162)	<i>t</i> -value
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	3.81	3.87	-.51	3.82	3.84	-.12	4.25	4.16	.73
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	2.35	3.13	-6.24**	2.35	2.99	-4.09**	2.27	3.21	-5.45**
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.94	3.33	6.54**	3.93	3.38	4.62**	3.97	3.33	4.26**
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	1.63	2.51	-7.87**	1.62	2.21	-4.03**	1.58	2.42	-4.86**
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.41	4.23	2.58**	4.41	4.25	1.87	4.49	4.21	2.74**
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	1.95	3.39	-11.56**	1.93	3.22	-8.17**	1.99	3.45	-7.80**
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	1.96	3.01	-11.13**	1.96	2.97	-8.25**	1.87	3.12	-8.68**

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Between 27% and 36% of the post-Vietnam sample answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

Table I-8

Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender			Race/Ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (N = 349)	Women (N = 22)	t-value	White (N = 316)	Non- white (N = 67)	t-value	Surface warfare (N = 177)	Aviation (N = 139)	t-value
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	3.90	3.52	1.74	3.81	4.13	-2.58	3.97	3.80	1.55
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	3.09	3.75	-3.40**	3.06	3.43	-2.15	3.28	2.93	2.31
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.36	3.19	.68	3.37	3.18	1.23	3.27	3.37	-.82
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	2.47	2.90	-1.12	2.44	2.88	-1.91	2.69	2.15	3.05**
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.25	4.19	.35	4.22	4.29	-.56	4.25	4.23	.22
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	3.38	3.35	.09	3.36	3.58	-.92	3.61	3.15	2.38

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Gender			Race/Ethnicity			Designator		
	Men (N = 349)	Women (N = 22)	t-value	White (N = 316)	Non- white (N = 67)	t-value	Surface warfare (N = 177)	Aviation (N = 139)	t-value
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	2.99	3.32	-1.36	2.95	3.31	-2.51	3.08	2.92	1.25

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Except in the case of gender (with all but one woman responding to the item), between 27% and 37% of Post-Vietnam samples answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

Table I-9

Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty	4.28	3.68	3.94	13.28**
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy ^a	3.22	3.09	3.10	<1.00
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership	3.47	3.29	3.24	<1.00
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy ^a	2.59	2.55	2.41	<1.00
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam ^b	4.23	4.28	4.15	<1.00
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy ^a	3.34	3.46	3.65	<1.00
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading	3.18	2.95	3.00	1.33

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

^b Between 27% and 36% of the post-Vietnam sample answered this item "Don't know/not applicable."

** $p < .01$

Table I-10

Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (N = 178)	Post- Vietnam (N = 383)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 170)	Post- Vietnam (N = 146)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 73)	Post- Vietnam (N =162)	t-value
<u>Technology</u>									
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.57	3.98	-5.43**	3.55	3.87	-3.52**	3.56	3.98	-3.72**
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.31	3.68	-3.67**	3.31	3.77	-3.97**	3.35	3.73	-2.39
<u>Tailhook</u>									
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	4.18	4.00	1.95	4.19	4.26	-.61	4.29	3.94	2.55
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	4.16	3.90	2.98**	4.18	4.09	.95	4.23	3.86	2.73**
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	4.37	3.35	12.21**	4.40	3.66	6.53**	4.40	3.22	9.34**

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Total sample			Aviators only			Triangulation sample		
	Vietnam -era (N = 178)	Post- Vietnam (N = 383)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 170)	Post- Vietnam (N = 146)	t-value	Vietnam -era (N = 73)	Post- Vietnam (N = 162)	t-value
<u>Drawdown</u>									
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown	3.56	3.78	-2.41	3.55	3.73	-1.55	3.57	3.72	-1.10
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.78	3.26	5.78**	3.78	3.56	3.69**	3.84	3.17	5.18**
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>									
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.66	3.25	4.00**	3.70	3.51	1.53	3.52	3.21	1.99
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.52	2.84	-3.41**	2.50	2.62	-1.11	2.53	2.86	-2.39

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

Table I-11

Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/ethnicity		<i>t</i> -value	Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)		Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
<u>Technology</u>									
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.98	4.09	-.67	3.96	4.11	-1.50	4.09	3.84	3.10**
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.67	3.74	-.30	3.62	3.94	-2.51	3.66	3.74	-.73
<u>Tailhook</u>									
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	3.98	4.29	-1.28	3.99	4.06	-.52	3.75	4.26	-4.25**
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	3.89	4.18	-1.43	3.91	3.89	.13	3.73	4.09	-3.26**
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	3.37	2.95	2.16	3.41	3.05	2.62**	3.08	3.70	-5.05**
<u>Drawdown</u>									
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown	3.77	3.82	-.22	3.75	3.88	-.96	3.80	3.71	.82

(table continues)

Changes in Leadership Theory

Item	Gender		<i>t</i> -value	Race/ethnicity		<i>t</i> -value	Designator		
	Men (<i>N</i> = 349)	Women (<i>N</i> = 22)		White (<i>N</i> = 316)	Non- white (<i>N</i> = 67)		Surface warfare (<i>N</i> = 177)	Aviation (<i>N</i> = 139)	<i>t</i> -value
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.28	3.05	1.32	3.27	3.19	.63	3.18	3.39	-1.83
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>									
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.24	3.35	-.46	3.25	3.23	.14	3.03	3.51	-3.91**
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.85	2.80	.21	2.80	2.98	-1.59	3.08	2.59	4.47**

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

Table I-12

Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank

Item	Pay grade/rank			<i>F</i> -ratio
	E-7 to E-9 (<i>N</i> = 86)	O-1 to O-4 (<i>N</i> = 252)	O-5/O-6 (<i>N</i> = 33)	
<u>Technology</u>				
Technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership	3.93	4.00	4.09	<1.00
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy ^a	3.79	3.67	3.50	1.18
<u>Tailhook</u>				
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership	3.90	4.06	3.94	<1.00
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal	3.84	3.95	3.94	<1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled	3.00	3.47	3.61	7.24**
<u>Drawdown</u>				
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the Post-Cold War drawdown	3.73	3.81	3.73	<1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the drawdown was handled	3.21	3.29	3.27	<1.00
<u>Tailhook versus drawdown</u>				
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown	3.38	3.19	3.39	1.25
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook	2.98	2.85	2.42	4.10

^a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.

** $p < .01$

APPENDIX J SURVEY COMMENTS

Each individual who participated in the leadership survey was offered the opportunity to comment about leadership or about the survey in general. Written comments many times reveal the thoughts of individuals and personalize impersonal quantitative data. A summary of the "written, self-generated comments may make the quantitative results more meaningful by uncovering some of the feelings behind the numbers" (Hollingsworth, p. vii). According to Hollingsworth, when individuals are afforded the opportunity to submit written comments, they tend to paint a negative picture by expressing their concerns and criticisms rather than their satisfactions and joys. Approximately 70 % of post-Vietnam veterans who participated in the survey chose to write remarks in the comments section of the survey. Over 90 % of Vietnam-era veterans remarked in the comment section of the survey; many sent personal letters, others emailed additional thoughts, and some sent in articles they felt would help the researcher with the study. Also, many Vietnam-era veterans provided their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses.

Vietnam-era Veteran Survey Comments

The following is a summary of the comment section of the surveys provided by Vietnam-era veterans, the majority of whom are combat veterans and aviators. Very similar themes are expressed by both groups of Navy veterans. However, Vietnam-era veterans are much more critical of the current president, the Clinton Administration, and

women in combat positions. The researcher extracted a number of themes from the survey remarks of Vietnam-era veterans and selected comments that supported the topics.

Leadership

Vietnam veterans expressed concern about senior Navy leadership and the direction senior leadership has taken since Vietnam. The following comments were chosen to frame how Vietnam-era veterans generally felt about Navy leadership.

"They [Navy leadership] should have resigned rather than carry out bad policy," (Participant 11).

"Straight talking naval leadership should not change with the times, technology or whatever..." (Participant 72¹²).

"Now it is hard to find a leader worthy to lead you around the block much less into combat," (Participant 32).

"There is no leadership," (Participant 236).

"Navy leadership has become more concerned with being politically correct and protecting their own careers than leading," (Participant 25).

"Senior leaders are perceived by the troops as being more interested in their personal careers than in helping the average sailor or JO [junior officer]," (Participant 57).

"Senior officers are more concerned about their careers than about duty, honor, [and] country," (Participant 92).

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¹² This comment was submitted by a retired Vice Admiral who signed his name to the survey.

"Our Navy's 'so called' leaders are a bunch of wimps with zero morals who are only concerned about their next star or future civilian job plus their retired pay," (Participant 101).

"Until the flag [admiral] officers of the Navy gain the moral courage to tell the real story of 'Naval Readiness' [the ability of the Navy to respond to a crisis] little or nothing will change," (Participant 449).

Social Experimentation.

Some Vietnam-era veterans were concerned about using the Navy as a testing ground for social experimentation. This position is illustrated by the following comments.

"The most surprising and discouraging aspect of this [liberalism] is the lack of fortitude on the part of our military leaders in opposing societal and cultural changes to the U.S. armed forces that clearly degrade its effectiveness, "(Participant 103).

"When Adm. Zumwalt¹³ was CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] he effectively destroyed the 'chain of command' [Zumwalt's modernization of the Navy was viewed by many as changing the fundamental way the Navy gave orders and kept discipline] and unless that has been re-established since 1983 we are still in trouble. I do believe some real

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¹³ Many survey participants stated that the Zumwalt era represented a time for significant change in Navy leadership. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974. Zumwalt, a Naval Academy graduate and youngest officer ever to be promoted to the rank of rear admiral, was known for initiating wide-ranging reforms in a effort to revitalize the Navy during a time when the Navy and the country was in the middle of a long and extremely unpopular war, domestic social reform movements, and race riots on board aircraft carriers. In an attempt to close the gap that developed between society and the traditional Navy, Zumwalt tried to modernize Navy personnel policies and make the Navy more attractive to young recruits. Zumwalt's initiatives came out in messages called Z-NavOps or as they were referred to in the fleet at the time, Z-grams. Perhaps two of Zumwalt's most farsighted Z-grams were equal opportunity, and equal rights and opportunities for women in the Navy.

leaders, Adm. Arthur for instance, took hits from Tailhook '91 but the chain of command had not been reestablished by then. I don't believe women are the problem but I don't know--I haven't served since they have been on ships. I do believe they are a retention problem,"¹⁴ (Participant 113).

"The military is no place for affirmative action," (Participant 63).

"Current civilian government leaders are using the military for a social experiment rather than training our service men & women to win & survive in time of war," (Participant 328).

Marine Corps Leadership.

Some Vietnam-era veterans expressed that despite the same environmental influences, the Marine Corps leadership was able to maintain focus and remain true to its beliefs. This conviction can be seen in the following four comments.

"As of now, the only military group that is standing to its principles is the Marine Corps [Marine Corps does not allow men and women to go through bootcamp together]. The other services are bending to the 'PC' [political correctness] of the Clinton Administration and militant females," (Participant 402).

"Navy leadership, along with the other services, with the possible exception of the Marine Corps, have allowed the Clinton administration to degrade our military capabilities

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¹⁴ Admiral Arthur, a combat aviator and well respected as a warrior, had his career ended after he refused to reverse a decision to remove a female aviator from flight status because of poor performance grades. By virtue of his apolitical position, the Senate never confirmed Arthur's next assignment. The Chief of Naval Operations at the time, Admiral Boorda, did not support him. So, without a position to move into, he was forced to retire. Because he sacrificed his career for what he believed, Arthur is considered a hero by many in the Navy. Arthur is mentioned on numerous occasions by survey participants.

with hardly a protest from the service chiefs. The Navy leadership has not stood behind their 'Warriors' in high levels (Adm. Stan Arthur for example) and have allowed the political correct, left wingers to intimidate them," (Participant 297).

"Clinton's announcement of his advocacy of gays in the military could probably [have] been squelched had the Joint Chiefs threatened (behind scenes) to resign en masse if he pursued that tack--but they did not," (Participant 5).

Clinton Administration.

Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed strong negative views about the Clinton Administration, President Clinton, and how the views and policies of his administration have adversely affected the Navy. No longer serving on active duty, the Vietnam-era veterans can openly and legally criticize the commander in chief, unlike veterans serving on active duty. The following five comments are characteristic of the views of many Vietnam-era veterans.

"Current commander in chief has done more to degrade our overall military and truly doesn't get any respect from our current active duty officers," (Participant 98).

"The 'one world' attitude of this administration is criminal and must be reversed if we are to survive," (Participant 155).

"Having a commander-in-chief who lacks moral courage undermines the chain of command down to the lowest ranks," (Participant 284).

"This present administration has done more to destroy Military leadership than any thing else," (Participant 7).

"Without a commander in chief for 7-8 years that knew anything about the military, it was obvious to me that the military would decline," (Participant 239).

Technological Advancements.

For some Vietnam-era veterans, increased technological advancements are seen as a negative contributor to current state of Navy leadership. This point of view can be seen in the following two comments.

"Technology has increased senior leadership's ability to micromanage,"
(Participant 342).

"Technology is a tool, nothing more or less, that is managed rather than led,"
(Participant 75).

Political Correctness.

Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed resolute concerns about political correctness, and the role of women and homosexuals in the military, and the overall political nature of senior Navy leadership. For them, leadership's failure to take a stand on political issues has greatly contributed to the contemporary state of Navy leadership. The researcher chose the following five comments to illustrate the volatile nature of aforementioned issues.

"...you can not have an effective military fighting machine and run it like IBM... What does Pat Schroeder [former Congresswoman from Colorado who championed equality for women in the military] know about combat operations ?"
(Participant 127).

"The problem is that Navy leaders are not permitted to lead because of DOD policies. Kara Hultgren would be alive today if Navy leaders could have made decisions based upon ability rather than gender,"¹⁵ (Participant 196).

"John Lehman was a disaster to the Navy! His firing of good leaders created a pool of politicians, not leaders!"¹⁶ (Participant 389).

"Social pressures have changed the leadership. (O'clubs [officers clubs] closing, do not drink, worried about stock prices). Too many politicians, not enough warriors," (Participant 274).

"GOOD LUCK. I'm glad my Navy days are over. Too much bullshit," (Participant 119).

Women in Combat.

Many Vietnam-era veterans opposed the notion of opening up the role of combat to women. Some opposed the notion for ideological reasons while others felt that the implementation process and motivation was flawed. The following four comments were chosen to express these opinions.

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¹⁵ Lieutenant Kara Hultgren was killed when her F-14 Tomcat crashed behind the USS Abraham Lincoln during a day carrier landing. Many aviators believed that Hultgren, one of the first females to fly in a combat capable fighter squadron, was pushed too fast through training. They believe that she was not prepared to fly the Tomcat and that the Navy refused to acknowledge that because it wanted to appease Congress by demonstrating that it was fully supportive of having women in combat aviation.

¹⁶ John Lehman was the Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan Administration.

"Women do not belong in combat or in combat units. It destroys morale & combat effectiveness--men & women are different--they think differently & act differently--In combat, you don't have time to answer the feminist question 'How do you feel about that?'--A man wants to know what do you think about that (& disregard your feelings) & take action. As a flight instructor, I have taught both men & women to fly--& have yet to see any women I would want as a wingman or leader in combat. Combat units must have complete faith in each other & work together closer than most families do. Women just don't fit in! Check back & see how the Israelis trained their combat pilots for their wars up through 1967--They had a superb record--women would not fit into that regime of training & daily life--neither would homosexuals," (Participant 427).

"In the 1970s military leadership started to crumble in the face of increasing pressures from the feminists whose interests were narrowly focused on an across-the-board advancement of females with little or no regard for the impact of the movement on national security. Tailhook provided the breakthrough that opened the floodgates to women in the military by providing the political leverage needed in Washington. Kelso [Navy] and McPeak [Air Force] were prime enablers. It was at this point that the military services became a laboratory for social experimentation and the nation lost sight of the primary mission of the military, which is to ensure national security through COMBAT readiness and performance,"¹⁷ (Participant 42).

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¹⁷ Admiral Kelso was the Chief of Naval Operations and General McPeak was the Air Force Chief of Staff during and after Tailhook.

"The integration of females into Navy has had far-reaching negative impact on morale and has overly complicated personnel assignment considerations. It has placed an undue burden on Commanding Officers and officers in leadership positions," (Participant 141).

"Advancement solely due to the accomplishment of social engineering goals has been the Navy's biggest leadership problem," (Participant 52).

Tailhook.

Many Vietnam-era veterans had strong feelings about Tailhook and how senior Navy leadership failed the entire Navy by their inept handling of the crisis and their displayed lack of courage. Because of the great number of survey responses about Tailhook, the researcher chose 12 comments to demonstrate the breadth of passion that Vietnam-era veterans had about the event.

"We need to take back from congress and staffs responsibility for those matters clearly within our purview. The acquiescence allowing congressional black balling of promotional selectees with perceived Tailhook taint was shameful. No senior leadership agreed with it but none had the courage to stand and put a career on the line. I am ashamed of these so-called 'leaders.' Their cowardly actions (or inactions) left seeds that we are reaping even now," (Participant 212).

"Tailhook--Senior leadership seemed clueless, naval aviator participants placed a lot more importance on being aviators than on being naval officers," (Participant 94).

"Political nature of nations leaders will always have a direct effect upon [the] Navy," (Participant 415).

"Leadership--how Navy reacts and stands-up to dramatic changes like Tailhook can dramatically affect leadership," (Participant 332).

"The Tailhook 'witch-hunt' seriously degraded upper level Navy leadership confidence," (Participant 55).

"As an avid naval history buff and subscriber to the Naval Institute Proceedings, I am appalled by the overall timidity of the senior naval flag cadre in general on unpleasant issues such as women in combat, Tailhook mishandling, and the erosion of naval aviation in general. I hope your survey falls on some responsive ears somewhere!" (Participant 209).

"What disappoints me to read/hear [is] that some still believe that a 'warrior' must act like a dog in heat. An Officer & Gentleman must be both a warrior & a gentleman. No amount of excuses can change that. And--it is a Sr. officer's responsibility to control his 'troops.' Failure to accept that responsibility was a serious breach of faith by many at Tailhook. It was criminal after Tailhook. In spite of 26 yrs service, I was ashamed to admit my Navy background for 5 yrs after because of that failure," (Participant 17).

"Tailhook was mishandled by Navy leadership. They should have hammered the relatively small number of guilty and moved on. They, however, let it simmer for years," (Participant 108).

"I retired in 1992 after Tailhook & Clinton's election. I am an USNA '73 grad and saw the leadership in the Navy abandon its officers because of the political atmosphere. Many of my classmates followed suit after 20 years of service," (Participant 230).

"The failure of upper Flag leadership following Tailhook was classic. Cover your ass and feed the JOs (up to Sqd. [squadron] CMDR) to the wolves. While admirals hid

from congress and were desiccated by Pat Schroeder and her fellows in congress/media. Leadership should have proclaimed 'we'll clean our own house' and damn the reaction. I was an O-4 with 154 combat missions Vietnam '71-'73," (Participant 69).

"During John Lehman's tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Navy leadership was at its highest point. Flag officers could get support for creative leadership. Morale was high, and training budgets and op tempos were supported. After Lehman, Navy operations did not get the same support. Leadership in Washington became more & more political, until the collapse of moral courage in 1991 following [the] Tailhook scandal," (Participant 144).

"The Tailhook incident and the rise of women in the Navy have totally undermined mutual trust and confidence. If I were on active duty today, I wouldn't trust any woman--and I certainly wouldn't go on liberty with her--no exceptions!" (Participant 195).

"Senior Navy leadership let us down after Tailhook. Perception is that they did what was good for their careers instead of what was best for the Navy. (The one notable exception was ADM Stan Arthur. He was cashiered for his trouble, but if other four star admirals had followed his lead the Navy would be better off today.) That, plus the forced inclusion of women in combat units have dealt morale a severe blow," (Participant 206).

Leadership Similar to Civilian Management.

Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed that Navy leadership was more like civilian management than leadership. They viewed that as a detractor to Navy leadership. The following five comments demonstrate this point.

"The concept that TQL is wonderful is for corporate America--not the military-- This is no Democracy and it isn't a social proving ground. Somebody had better get some spine before it's totally destroyed!!" (Participant 410).

"Today's leadership: starting with CNO, is based on 'Managership.' Managers do things right. Leaders do the right thing, regardless of the consequences, moral or physical. Moral courage is always required in leadership situations. Physical courage is 'scenario or battle dependent' & usually spontaneous. To ALWAYS stand-up for what is right, regardless of the consequences or politics, is difficult and courageous. To be a spontaneous, Battle Field Hero, is often achieved without thought, without conviction & without courage," (Participant 165).

"Emphasis on business management vice people leadership hit hard in early '90s and has continued to grow. Value placed on managers vice leaders. The Navy is increasingly led by managers vice true leaders," (Participant 177).

"Today's Navy seems to be more interested in turning out managers than leaders. The warrior ethic has been totally removed from all the services--especially the Navy," (Participant 134).

Post-Cold War Drawdown.

The post-Cold War drawdown was commented on by some Vietnam-era veterans as having a negative effect on the Navy and Navy leadership. The following three comments illustrate this point.

"I felt that the Zumwalt changes put the Navy on a downward trend from which it may not recover due to the compound effects of social engineering and the Cold War drawdown," (Participant 182).

"Drawdown--Senior leadership failed to recognize how horribly damaging it was to throw out good, dedicated people, or live under the threat of involuntary termination. I thought that Navy leadership showed absolutely no backbone during the drawdown. They did not make the argument against the drastic reductions and morale and readiness is suffering," (Participant 234).

"The loss of Russia as our 1 enemy caused the military to lack focus on its world mission," (Participant 399).

Why Leadership Has Changed.

Some Vietnam-era veterans offered different opinions about leadership and how and why it changed. The three comments below articulate this position.

"I knew things had changed roughly 10 years ago when I observed that USNA Superintendent Tom Lynch had a lieutenant as his 'ethics officer,' to advise him on ethics. It used to be the admirals that advised the JOs on ethics--not the other way around. The Tailhook incident merely revealed the degree to which O-5s and above had failed in their duty to set the moral and legal tone for their subordinates," (Participant 412).

"Leadership changes probably started during the Vietnam era as the military fought a war that was directed by the politicians, or more specifically, micromanaged by politicians. These politicians had little sensitivity to what they were asking of their troops and no responsibility. Courage, both moral and physical, should be a part of leadership, but people with these attributes have been passed over, emasculating a majority of naval leaders," (Participant 210).

"New young leaders are not taught Duty, Honor, Country. They are taught global multiculturalism. Respect for authority does not exist in fact because it is not deserved...in part because it is not taught in schools. We are in trouble!" (Participant 160).

Leadership Training.

Some Vietnam-era veterans expressed the importance of leadership training. The following three comments illustrate this point.

"Leadership training is important. There will always be a changing environment. Real leaders are always in favor of continued training. Every rate and rank level needs the training," (Participant 199).

"The issues of leadership in the uniformed service have always been clear. However, teaching some of those principles is important. Reinforcement helps," (Participant 78).

"I applaud the efforts of the leadership continuum--essential but not sufficient. More needs to be done at the operational command level," (Participant 40).

Post-Vietnam Survey Comments

The following is a summary of the comments section of the surveys provided by post-Vietnam veterans. As with the Vietnam-era comments, select entire comments are used to present a more complete picture of the responses.

Senior Leadership.

Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed concern about senior Navy leadership and the direction leadership is taking the Navy. To present a more complete view of what active duty Navy personnel are thinking about Navy leadership, the researcher felt a great

number of comments needed to be shown. Therefore, the following eight comments are provided.

"Naval leadership is in a near-abysmal condition. While Tailhook served to 'rock' the world, the aftermath effect on perceptions of navy leadership (and its failures) has been properly characterized as extreme. Modifications to leadership values in an attempt to accommodate 'political correctness' and TQL have greatly reduced the quality and integrity of naval leadership. Additionally, the political scandals which have plagued the current administration [Clinton Administration] continue to contribute to a definite sense of 'double standards' and ethics lacking at the pinnacle of leadership," (Participant 322).

"Navy needs some Admirals and civilians willing to resign rather than compromise their positions. Senior leadership takes care of themselves and blames others. Specifically, they blame their subordinates and turn junior officers and enlisted men and women into scapegoats," (Participant 4).

"My time in the Navy is not long--11 years. I remember when I first joined--the idea of accountability--taking responsibility for actions was stressed to me. A critical aspect of this was senior leaders taking the hit when things went wrong. This has changed. I was involved in the investigation and prosecution of Tailhook cases--as a defense counsel. It was very clear that actions were taken at a senior level to protect senior officers at the expense of JOs. That message was received, and has jaded JOs about their leaders concern and moral courage," (Participant 60).'

"Navy leadership is weak. The drawdown, Tailhook, the administration, and TQL also contributed to our weakness. TQL concepts and ideas work great in a homogenous

society such as Japan, but difficult in Armed Services where diversity and cultures are different, such as our forces," (Participant 133).

"There does not appear to be any senior navy leader with the knowledge, charisma, and political skill necessary to regain the trust and confidence of the president, congress and the people of the United States--senior leadership is not in touch with most of the Navy because of generational and experiential differences. The Navy has not been able to keep pace with the many social, economic, and technological changes in the last decade," (Participant 85).

"Navy leadership doesn't have the courage to tell our civilian leadership what needs to be said," (Participant 22).

"I feel that naval leadership has a lot of room to improve, especially at the division officer/department head level. Taking care of your people is just as important as putting your people to work, and the former is often ignored," (Participant 367).

"It seems leadership is based strictly on seniority and admin [administrative] ability. No longer does it appear that the Navy is training war fighters," (Participant 309).

Self-Serving Leaders.

Like many of the Vietnam-era veterans, post-Vietnam veterans too were concerned about self-serving leaders and what they have done and continue to do to the Navy. The following three comments best illustrate this concern.

"No moral courage in senior leadership. Too much emphasis in being a showboat,"¹⁸ (Participant 419).

"Too many senior officers concerned with their own political agendas--inside or outside the Navy--not with the good of the service," (Participant 222).

"My impression of senior leadership throughout the military is that too many of the senior leaders are more concerned with being politically correct yes men than they are about ensuring the military is ready to defend the nation. I've seen way too many good junior officers leave the Navy, people who probably would have made superb senior leaders, because of poor leadership at the top. This leaves a cycle of poor leadership at the top because what's left to advance is generally less than 'the cream of the crop.' This can be said for all levels of leadership in the military. This blanket statement is not true in all cases, but is really the rule & not the exception based on my experience," (Participant 312).

Social Pressure.

Many post-Vietnam veterans felt that many leaders today have acquiesced to social pressures and are too timid to make the right decisions, or in some cases, any decision. This conviction can be seen in the following four comments.

"In my opinion the senior leadership sometimes overreacts to political and or media pressure. That is when the moral courage to do the right thing must be enacted," (Participant 15).

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¹⁸ The term "showboat" refers to leaders who are more concerned about their image and self-promotion than they are about the Navy.

"The zero defect mentality is still very prevalent amongst senior leadership. This mentality must be broken. We are forcing to many outstanding sailors out of the Navy with this attitude coming from senior positions,"¹⁹ (Participant 375).

"The Navy has lost all of its respect factor since most Navy leaders are fearful of being brought up on sexual harassment/racial discrimination/fraternization charges! This is not the same Navy I joined," (Participant 207).

"Our most senior leaders tend to be very timid and quite political in the Washington arena. Politics, a reality warriors must deal with, does not mean that we, as leaders, should sacrifice our ideals for...rather we need to choose our wars and have a united front so we can win...the political battles in the Washington arena are very real and have cost a few careers due to lack of moral courage. However, if our senior leaders would stand together and tell Congress how things really are and be willing to retire en masse to drive home their courage . . . Congress and the American people would listen," (Participant 315).

Leadership Training.

Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed views that the Navy is not training its leaders and others felt that Navy leadership training was not adequate. The following three comments are representative of these concerns.

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¹⁹ Zero defect mentality is the notion that just one mistake at anytime in a career will end the career and keep one from advancing further. That notion was substantiated during the '90s when the Navy was running gun shy from Tailhook and other media enhanced incidents and it needed to cut back at all levels due to the post-Cold War drawdown.

"The other main concern is how fast we are pushing SWOs [surface warfare officers] through the pipeline for command. I am sure they are trained but the truth will tell when the 'crap hits the fan.' We need to take the politics out of senior leadership and just train our people to be the best they can be and everything else will fall in place," (Participant 388).

"Leadership schools for Department Heads are a waste of money and time with current curriculum," (Participant 93).

"There is a lot of talk about training our junior personnel, however, it seems to be a 'forced' learning environment, not a good teaching/mentoring environment," (Participant 296).

Lack of Vision.

Some post-Vietnam veterans felt that Navy leaders lacked vision. This belief can be seen in the comment below.

"My great complaint against our leadership over the past decade is lack of vision, plus lack of insight as to how to make a vision into reality. Our utter failure to manage the drawdown bears testimony--the drawdown has managed us rather than the reverse. Look at us--15 years and not a single new aircraft design has reached the fleet. The only new sub design proved utterly unaffordable. Our surface fleet is aging and ill-maintained. I'm not saying I could do better, but I would like to see better from those we entrust with stars [admirals]," (Participant 21).

Leadership Training.

Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed dissatisfaction with Navy leadership and leadership training. The following four comments illustrate this point of view.

"Today's leadership seems to be guided by a 'zero-defect' mentality. Appearances are more important than actual capabilities. Technology is good, but it's being crammed down our throats at a rate that we can't absorb," (Participant 118).

"For all the emphasis on leadership, effective leadership education remains poorly implemented. There is a stark disconnect between leadership theory and practice," (Participant 426).

"Kinder/gentler Navy is not ALWAYS the best," (Participant 251).

"Current leadership schools are ineffective. They are too long and don't have a lasting effect. I believe large seminars of one or two days given by a professional speaker along with a well-organized, easy to read manual would be more effective," (Participant 84).

"The turn that Navy leadership has taken has de-emphasized the authority of senior enlisted and officers. It's hard to tell the difference between a new seaman or a fry cook at McDonalds. Same attitude,"²⁰ (Participant 265).

Pleased With Navy Leadership.

Some post-Vietnam veterans were pleased with the direction Navy leadership and leadership training was heading. Because of the positive nature of this perspective that is contrary to so many comments provided, seven comments are submitted for the reader.

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²⁰ This comment refers to the way Navy boot camp prepares sailors for the fleet and the way young sailors are indoctrinated in Navy life by their commands.

"In my career I've seen the extreme to the most extreme (the other way). I've taken the best & worst, compared them & come up w/ something that works and my people are happy & the job is getting done," (Participant 273).

"The changes in leadership I have encountered have been good. However, until we stop 'consuming' our workforce by demanding 70-100 hour workweeks, people will continue to jump ship. Why is that? Because there is a life outside of the Navy that everyone should have a chance to live. Families are being broken [up] in the name of readiness! Quality of Life . . . no matter how you word it, it's a lie!" (Participant 374).

"Overall Navy leadership is sound. That said, from the 'troop' level it often seems the 'upper' level brass tend to knee jerk and overreact from time-to-time to isolated events. Whatever the knee jerk response happens to be now becomes top priority regardless of what else is going on," (Participant 10).

"Navlead [Navy leadership] courses have improved greatly in past 1 to 2 years. Finally keeping a updated view of the Navy and our sailors," (Participant 77).

"The Command Leadership School in Newport, RI, is a positive step toward improving unit level (O-5) leadership," (Participant 366).

"The Navy that I am in today is a service I would be proud to have my daughter join. That was not true in 1983 when we drank ourselves silly, chased women and lied about readiness. Today's NAVY is approaching a steady state level of high professional standards and renewed respectability. We may be materially short of dollars, but at least the pride is back. We should never return to the old days (circa 1980)," (Participant 62).

"I feel that unit-level leadership (O-5) improved during my years but have seen a mixed bag at the senior level (O-6 and above)," (Participant 119).

Marine Corps Leadership.

Some post-Vietnam veterans, like a number of Vietnam-era veterans, felt that the Marine Corps did a better job of developing leaders. The comment below best illustrates this opinion.

"The Marine Corps has played second fiddle in the Department of the Navy for more than 200 years . . . I think it is time we switched things around a bit and let the Navy play second fiddle for a while...under Marine Corps leadership. They seem to have a system of developing leaders that is focused [on] leadership rather than technology or the other latest buzzwords. Naval leadership's job is to lead and leadership does not mean new planes, ships, or computers, you can only lead people," (Participant 31).

Technology Impact.

Technology was considered a variable in leadership for many post-Vietnam veterans. Most of them felt that advances in communications technology had a negative impact on Navy leadership by breaking down the time-tested tenants of military leadership such as the chain of command. Because technology represents a new frontier for military leadership, the following seven comments are provided.

"I am of the opinion that the increase of connectivity is greatly reducing unit-level leadership. The near instantaneous ability (or misuse) of transferring unit-level information real time has the negative effect of detracting from a CO's ability to exercise independent thought or initiative. The operational aspects of this downplay (of critical decision making) at the unit level trickles over into the administrative running of a unit. I think this fosters a dependency on the ISIC [reporting senior] to solve or involve themselves in too much of a ships daily operation. This is to say that if I was so wrapped up in trying to inform and

appease my ISIC in the daily administration and operations of my vessel, how could I ever be expected to function w/boldness prowess and initiative on my own at the tip of the spear," (Participant 80).

"Navy leadership has been significantly impacted by the introduction of Internet and E-mail. The chain of command may no longer be as informed about issues because the chain no longer sees the issues," (Participant 301).

"Computers/email--makes it too easy to lead by email and not face-to-face," (Participant 401).

"Technology--with Internet connectivity, upper leadership has more of a hand in on site conflict. There is a great tendency towards micromanagement from upper levels!" (Participant 502).

Information Technology has made life easier and efficient in some cases; but we do less person-to-person interacting. We are managed by e-mail, there are less customer services and our leaders do not take care of people. A corporate Navy of outsourcing and contracting services is a scary picture for a war fighting force that does not generate a profit for stock holders. The U.S. and taxpayers--get more than enough out of overworked and underpaid/under appreciated service members who continue to put their lives, family and long hours on the line to preserve our freedom and national interest despite our weak leaders," (Participant 154).

"Technology--has enhanced C2 [command and control]. I believe technology has degraded leadership. Management by e-mail will kill us all. Nothing beats face-to-face leadership. Look 'em in the eye and tell 'em what you want," (Participant 161).

"Naval leadership is changing, and is, in my opinion, opening its eyes to the realities of the world around it. Senior leadership is recognizing the need to stay aware and abreast of the changing society it must draw personnel from. Technology is also changing the way senior leadership is making decisions. Sometimes trying to keep up, we let the 'tools' get in the way of the job. Lastly, Naval leadership must remain focused on the 'bottom line.' We're war fighters and must be prepared to do what we're paid to do," (Participant 172).

Political Correctness.

Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed concerns about political correctness, stating that it had a negative overall effect on the Navy and Navy leadership. The following four remarks are representative of the survey comments.

"Too many 'touchy-feely' programs and policies. I believe in equality and process improvement. But discipline and a strong chain of command have [been] sacrificed. Boot camp has softened. Evaluations/Fitrepos [officer and chief petty officer performance evaluations] and promotions are more politically driven than [related to] skill/performance. Moral courage is voicing a concern, identifying a problem and fixing it when it's unpopular to do so. Those with moral courage become blacklisted and their careers stagnant, while less competent, more politically aligned individuals excel. Many Navy traditions that built moral, unit bonding, and Navy pride have vanished due to peace-time public pressure. Navy training has suffered as well. We don't train the way we fight, but we will fight the way we train, and that's not something to be proud of. Tailhook was a single event where a handful of individuals were wronged. The majority was punished for the acts of the few," (Participant 330).

"Social experimentation in the military has greatly impacted leadership and discipline in the Navy. When the military takes the lead to obviate behavior that is concurrent with the law of the land, i.e., racial/sexual discrimination, the result is supportable morally & ethically. When this is not true and social experimentation is contrary to law of the land, as in sexual orientation driven from political desires, breakdown is inevitable. The leadership must remain in place to make decisions, but those decisions and discipline is counterproductive while the experiment is underway. We are doomed to fail!" (Participant 190).

"I think the Navy will be in a lot of trouble when a war starts. All of these social 'PC' changes are going to come back to haunt us," (Participant 283).

"Leadership cannot be effective if it is too afraid of offending a minority group, the opposite gender, etc. Too many leadership challenges are not handled properly because someone in the chain of command is afraid of being accused of sexual/other types of harassment," (Participant 20).

Tailhook Wasn't Important.

Tailhook was not as momentous for some post-Vietnam veterans as others, particularly more junior officers and senior enlisted personnel. The four comments below best present this perspective.

"From my perspective, while Tailhook was a juicy media event, it did not have the impact on Naval Leadership change that either the post-Vietnam drawdown and Zumwalt experiments, or the post Cold War/Fall of Soviet Union had. The latter released a wave of crises that required the commitment of U.S. forces abroad, in an era of shrinking Navy manpower. Result--increased deployments with less training, and more rapid turnarounds.

How to manage these changes and lead our sailors through this is a current and continuing problem," (Participant 140).

"Tailhook was not a Navy catalyst for Navy leadership degrading. Only a few mishandled it. Always taught 'respect oneself and others' with dignity. The individual that will have an aura of leadership if he or she respects others. It's an old cliché 'No warriors need to apply during a peacetime Navy.' 'Managers only required.' We have lost the leadership philosophy 'The buck stops here.' We have officers and sailors wanting the responsibility but refusing to be held accountable for the responsibility gained," (Participant 420).

"I believe Tailhook did not affect Navy leadership at all. It was just a political tool that the Navy used to cover high position officials. Leadership and Tailhook have nothing in common," (Participant 259).

"I'm a SWO. I don't care about Tailhook. There are other, more important questions. If I wasn't up to my eyeballs with SWODOM, I'd list them for you. Maybe I just did,"²¹ (Participant 184).

"Get off the Tailhook thing, let it die," (Participant 352).

Tailhook Was Significant.

Tailhook was a significant event for many post-Vietnam veterans. The four comments below illustrate this attitude.

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21 SWODOM is slang for the world in which Surface Warfare Officers live.

"Tailhook--Exposed gender discrimination. Embarrassing for senior leadership. Created a reverse discriminatory attitude towards women. Men seemed terrified to talk to us because of fear of harassment suit," (Participant 90).

"Tailhook--Leadership did not deal with the issue decisively. The whole Navy suffered from the actions of a few 'Officers & Gentlemen.' Solution--Problems must be dealt with immediately and move on. Navy leadership hasn't changed but merely reacted with the social trend of the day," (Participant 14).

"Tailhook marked a turning point for how leadership handled major problems. We still reel from this--note today's reaction to how we handle readiness issues. Leadership won't stand up and say we don't have enough money--we are trying to man a 12-carrier navy with a 10-carrier budget," (Participant 337).

"I believe Navy leadership has changed since the Vietnam era mainly because of the social climate in the country. Tailhook, I believe, shocked everybody in leadership positions into realizing they were accountable for the actions of their subordinates. This revelation is not a 'bad' thing. The bad side or fallout from all this, was that senior leaders were getting 'axed,' i.e., fired for things they allegedly did or did not do. The problem, as I see it, is that senior leaders are given great responsibilities and held accountable (good things) yet they are extremely constrained in their power to influence subordinate behavior. One small example: a CO of a squadron CANNOT prohibit squadron members from dating other squadron members. Why not? In my current command we have just had another female announce she is pregnant and she has been dating another squadron member. She is now, ineligible for the rest of workups and deployment, as now someone else will have to fill her spot and morale suffers. Why would I want to be a CO and have

such little ability to enforce any rules I deemed appropriate to good order and discipline in my command?" (Participant 356).

Leadership More Like Civilian Management.

Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed that Navy leadership was more like civilian management than leadership, citing that the Navy's initiative toward management marked the change. The researcher chose the following five comments to demonstrate this outlook.

"TQL brought about significant modifications. The navy moved away from leadership to management (i.e., TQM [Total Quality Management] vice TQL). Concentration on core leadership skills is and was lacking. Acquisition reform is good. Other TQM issues will certainly help. But, these are management not leadership issues. Leadership must not be dictatorial but engaged (ref. CNO and anthrax shots). We need to instill core values at all levels. We are not doing that," (Participant 304).

"My opinion is that in 20 years the Navy will look more like MSC (Microsoft Corporation) than you can image," (Participant 131).

"Micromanagement is a very strong management practice in the Navy. Too many managers and not enough leaders," (Participant 107).

"Navy life and Navy leadership seem to be compared to civilian life, and there seems to be an effort to make the Navy run more like a civilian organization. This is wrong--it's not a civilian organization," (Participant 54).

"Navy leadership is too management focused. That is the adoption of TQM as TQL has one managing people. One cannot manage people, one can manage projects or processes, but people must be led by example physically and morally," (Participant 117).

Post-Cold War Drawdown.

The post-Cold War drawdown was a major event for many post-Vietnam-era veterans, and was viewed as having a negative effect on the Navy by promoting a zero-defect mentality, careerism, and politics within the Navy's ranks. Because of the side-effect that many active duty personnel attributed to the drawdown and its importance to senior Navy leadership, the researcher felt the following seven comments needed to be provided to present the full impact of the post-Cold War downsizing.

"The drawdown has affected leadership because there has become too much politicking for careers. Money and career protection become overriding factors," (Participant 311).

"The Cold War ended and the country wanted to spend less on the military. Downsizing occurred. This caused the competition among officers and CPOs to increase dramatically. The competitiveness generated a bunch of ass kissing, so that the senior personnel could be assured advancement in rate/rank. No one could afford to piss off their CO or OIC because a bad mark on a fitrep would permanently screw their chances for advancement. This ass kissing, evident to the blue shirts, generated a huge group of gutless leadership and is still having a detrimental impact to our Navy. Chiefs do not run their divisions any more--they wait to be told what to do and are not proactive. This activity causes a loss of retention as the junior sailors see that their direct boss is not in control of their destiny. These weak leaders and this trend started 8 years ago and now these guys are the Master Chiefs and O-5s who are not Navy leaders but in the CO/CMC [command master chief] position! This combined with the implement of TQL--and the kinder/gentler bullshit is killing my Navy," (Participant 382).

"The stigma caused by downsizing is still felt by today's leadership. There are still a lot of leaders who try to outdo other leaders rather than work together as a team. It goes the same between officers and enlisted. Some junior officers, in their effort to impress senior leaders would lower themselves as workers or managers. They tend to lose their focus on a much bigger picture. Officers should refocus and be leaders again. They should leave the rest to senior enlisted men (Chiefs!)," (Participant 280).

"Navy leadership is going downhill because senior leaders are trying to please everybody! PC in boot camp! I don't think so. Plus, senior leadership is only concerned about making the next higher rank, not about those who work for them (in general)," (Participant 105).

"The Navy today seems to be a continuous paperwork production company and everyone is out for themselves at the leadership levels we speak of. If everyone came up through the ranks there would be more organization, proficiency, and working relationships would be tolerable. My experience with leaders today is just that. Those below you to do your job and if something goes wrong find someone to blame. The Navy has become a chore, no longer an adventure. Root canals are more interesting, they seem at least to be more fun," (Participant 68).

"I feel that Navy leaders have their hands tied in many situations because of politics and publicity. Senior officers worry about being put in the lime light over issues that would not necessarily be noticed in the civilian world. I do think that a positive change has occurred with regards to equal opportunity for leaders because the 'Good Old Boy' network is not as tolerated by seniors. Recognition is a key to good leadership. If our

sailors feel their job isn't worthwhile then we continue to fail as leaders," (Participant 218).

"Submarine community--leadership emphasizes engineering prowess over warfighting. I see efforts at leveling the playing field, but the 'nuke'ism of the sub force is a source of heartache for many JOs. More specifically, the zero tolerance for mistakes mentality of nuclear engineering carries over to other facets of Navy life. I plan to stay in the Navy because I see concrete efforts of my leadership at improving quality of life and taking care of people,"²² (Participant 51).

Cumulative Events.

Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed that neither Tailhook nor the drawdown contributed significantly to changes in Navy leadership. The following three comments illustrate this point of view.

"Navy leadership did not change overnight. It is significantly different than the Vietnam era, but it is constantly changing and always slowly evolving. It is a combination of Navy needs, Navy traditions, and a different attitude and outlook of a new generation of young sailors. It is comprised not only of moral and physical courage, but of the mental courage to challenge oneself, the social courage to stand for what you believe in, and the emotional courage to carry yourself and your subordinates through the tough times and still cultivate positive attitudes. Leadership is all about people," (Participant 345).

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²² "Nuke" ism, like SWODOM, is slang for nuclear trained personnell whose actions are heavily regulated by rules and a zero defect mentality that derived from the zero tolerance for mistakes vis-à-vis nuclear power.

"I think our society's attitudes and opinions about things have changed because of many, many local, national, and international events. These changes in the fabric of our society lead to the changes in leadership. You can't put everything on Tailhook, or the drawdown, they are not all inclusive events that caused changes. I think to an extent Tailhook was an effect of the changes that had already taken place in society and acted as a catalyst for causing changes in the military that had already begun in society," (Participant 262).

"Navy leadership has changed over the decades as generations have encountered different socio-economic conditions combined with past events, i.e., Tailhook and the drawdown. People are different--times are different and we must adapt to their views and thoughts on a wide array of issues. I think the basic concept of Navy leadership should not change it's just that people have evolved and changed over the decades," (Participant 87).

Meaning of "Warrior"

Some post-Vietnam respondents questioned the use of the term "warrior" in the survey while others appeared to have a definition of the term in mind. Three comments are provided as representative of this perspective.

"Warriors--Assumption; Warriors are combat vets. Moral and physical courage are required for leadership in peace & war. I believe combat leaders have a better appreciation for results (achievements) as opposed to how those results were attained. Combat leaders tend to steer their juniors towards initiative/action vice waiting for guidance and management," (Participant 29).

"One doesn't have to be a staff officer and lose the warrior outlook, many of ours have done that. The most important quality in a leader is the taking care of his troops! If that fails, all else is useless and futile," (Participant 3).

"Basic--More warriors, fewer bureaucrats = Better leadership. This isn't rocket science," (Participant 41).

Navy is Too Political

Some post-Vietnam veterans felt that the Navy in general was too political. The following four comments express this perspective.

"Leadership in the upper ranks has always and will continue to be too political. In aviation, if you don't fly a pointy nosed jet, then your chances of being an Admiral or CNO are minimal, as with most other choices (CVN CO [carrier CO], CVW CO [carrier air wing commander], etc.). I do believe the leadership has become stronger than it was in the past; however, the leadership training and requirements always seem to be in constant change," (Participant 124).

"Navy leaders are forced to 'play the game' both for their own careers and their people. This is an obvious and well-known problem, but no one seems to have a solution for it," (Participant 94).

"In my short experience, it seems to me that Navy leadership is generally more concerned with how it looks rather than how it acts. Spending your time worrying about how you appear causes you to spend less time on what you should actually be doing, i.e., training to fight," (Participant 61).

"With the fight for promotions (which are scarce) senior leadership is not voicing the strain it is on personnel to do more with less. Instead, senior leadership in the attempt

to further their careers, are striving to impress their supervisors by trying to do even more with less. These same leaders are also using Navy personnel and resources for superfluous and unnecessary personal luxuries causing more hardship for the common sailor. Junior officers most often follow the lead by brown nosing and apple polishing because performance does not outweigh presentation and ass kissing," (Participant 295).