ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THEIR CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES?

The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting of a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to that rule.¹

INTRODUCTION

In Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,² a federal district court recently ruled that an academic researcher³ need not disclose information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality. The decision in Richards is notable in two respects.

3. Though referring to the academic researcher, the Richards court does not define the term. As used in this Comment, the term refers to academicians and scholars who engage in the scholarly investigation and analysis of the policy considerations of public issues with a view towards dissemination in a wide variety of media, including pamphlets, monographs, and books. Some commentators have adopted the term public scholar to describe such individuals. Note, The Public Scholar and the First Amendment: A Compelling Need for Compelling Testimony?, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 1010-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Public Scholar]. However, this Comment retains the use of academic researcher for clarity inasmuch as it is used by the Richards decision.
First, it clearly recognizes a public interest in protecting the confidential relationships between academic researchers and their sources of information. Second, though not answering the question of whether the public interest warrants a constitutional privilege, the decision relies heavily on cases involving the newsman’s qualified first amendment privilege in civil litigation.

The last two decades have witnessed a continuing controversy over whether the Constitution’s free press guarantee protects newsmen from legally compelled disclosure of confidential information sources. The jailing of four California newsmen in the late summer of 1976 for refusing to disclose a source is a recent example of this controversy. However, the disagreement has generally centered on journalists rather than on academic researchers.

4. See note 31 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
6. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), was the first case in which the constitutional argument that freedom of the press privileged a reporter to protect and conceal his information sources was raised. See, e.g., Note, Reporter’s Privilege—Guardian of the People’s Right to Know?, 11 New Eng. L. Rev. 405, 410 (1976).
7. “Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the freedom . . . . of the press . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I.
9. L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1976, pt. 2, at 1, col. 5. Managing Editor George Gruner, City Editor James Bort, and reporters William Patterson and Joe Rosato of the Fresno Bee were held in civil contempt for failing to disclose their source of material leaked from a county grand jury transcript ordered sealed by a California superior court. Id. The case went to the United States Supreme Court three times, once on the ground that reporters have an absolute constitutional right to protect their sources. Id. at 12, col. 1. See Fair Trial—Free Press, Newsmen’s Shield Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 119 (1976).
10. The controversy over the existence of a newsmen’s privilege has generally concerned all instances of compulsory disclosure. However, the arguments for and against a privilege vary depending upon whether the litigation background is criminal or civil. See, e.g., Murasky, The Journalist’s Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 823, 878-915 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Murasky]. The focus of this Comment is upon first amendment privilege in civil litigation.
Richards is a noteworthy extension of the rationale of those cases articulating the strong public interest in protecting confidential relationships which promote the flow of information on matters of public concern.

The first section of this Comment describes the Richards decision. As will be seen, that decision reflects the exercise of judicial discretion to ensure that the quest for discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not override other important interests. The validity of that exercise is then examined. Finally, the Comment addresses the constitutional privilege issue left unanswered by Richards. It advances the thesis that academic researchers deserve a qualified first amendment privilege against compulsory disclosure of their confidential sources.

The Richards Case

In 1974, Harvard economics professor Marc J. Roberts conducted a research project investigating the manner in which utility companies make environmental decisions. The research, to be used for a book, focused on the relationship between organizational structure and decisionmaking. During his research, Professor


13. 71 F.R.D. at 391.
14. Id. at 390. See note 34 infra.
17. TRIAL MAGAZINE, Aug. 1976, at 5, col. 2.
18. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
Roberts interviewed employees of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, a California public utility. In exchange for the interviews, Roberts gave the company a signed pledge of secrecy. One subject of inquiry for Roberts' research was a decision by the utility company to install spray cooling equipment manufactured by Richards of Rockford, Inc., at one of its power plants.

Subsequently, a dispute arose between Pacific Gas & Electric and Richards over the quality and performance of the spray cooling equipment, and the utility company withheld final payment. Richards brought suit in federal court for breach of contract and defamation. In particular, Richards alleged it had been defamed by Pacific Gas & Electric employees during their confidential interviews with Professor Roberts. In conducting pretrial discovery, Richards sought from Professor Roberts the identity of the employees interviewed and the content of their statements. Roberts declined to disclose that information, and Richards moved for an order to compel Roberts' research assistant to produce research notes and disclose the identity of the employees.

United States District Court Judge Charles B. Renfrew denied Richards' motion. Citing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Renfrew invoked his broad judicial discretion to supervise the course and scope of discovery. He noted that the exercise of this discretion often requires balancing competing interests.

19. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 389.
25. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) provides in pertinent part: "A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery."
27. Id. at 388.
28. The liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are an integral part of the overall scheme of litigation in the federal courts. Their scope is unquestionably broad. It is for that very reason that the application of the rules of discovery is subject to the supervisory discretion of the trial judge, whose duty it is to ensure that the quest for discovery does not subsume other important interests.
29. "The exercise of this discretion often requires that the court balance..."
On the one hand, both the private litigant and the public have a strong interest in the fair and efficient resolution of civil disputes. On the other hand, "society has a profound interest in the research of its scholars, work which has the unique potential to facilitate change through knowledge."

Judge Renfrew, however, found the interests at stake in Richards not easily comparable. He turned to the cases recognizing a qualified first amendment privilege for newsmen's sources. Judge Renfrew did not resolve the question of whether the first amendment privileges academic researchers' sources. However, he did rely on the newsmen's privilege cases for "useful guidelines" in striking the balance between the competing interests. Those guidelines include the nature of the proceedings, whether the deponent is a party, availability of the information from other sources, and whether the information sought goes to the heart of plaintiff's claim.

**EVALUATION OF Richards FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE**

The Extent of the Discretion to Deny Discovery

The pre-trial discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve as a device for ascertaining the facts actually the interests of the private litigant in obtaining the information sought against the costs of providing it." Id. at 389.

30. Id.
31. [S]ociety has a profound interest in the research of its scholars, work which has the unique potential to facilitate change through knowledge. Counsel ... have produced an impressive series of affidavits from scholars throughout the country attesting to the necessity of maintaining confidential relationships if their research is to be accomplished. Much of the raw data on which research is based simply is not made available except upon a pledge of confidentiality. Compelled disclosure of confidential information would without question severely stifle research into questions of public policy, the very subjects in which the public interest is greatest. Id. at 389-90.
32. Id. at 389.
33. Id. at 390.
34. "Whether the public interest in protecting confidential relationships between academic researchers and their sources rises to the stature of a constitutional privilege need not be resolved by the instant case." Id. (emphasis added).
35. "[T]he cases involving the newsmen provide useful guidelines for striking a balance between discovery and non-disclosure: the nature of the proceeding, whether the deponent is a party, whether the information sought is available from other sources, and whether the information sought goes to the heart of the claim." Id.
36. Id.
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
They promote the fair and efficient resolution of civil disputes. In keeping with this purpose, the discovery principles underlying the Federal Rules are liberal in allowing either party to compel the other to disclose facts in his possession. A strong showing of good cause is required before a party will be denied entirely the right to discovery.

Exceptions to the principle of liberal discovery are derogations from the positive general rule. Nevertheless, a discovery motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. That court may limit discovery to protect parties and witnesses from annoyance and excessive expense, and its discretion is necessarily broad. Rule 26(c), in pertinent part, provides:

(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the

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38. See 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26.02[1], at 2662 (2d ed. 1976). The United States Supreme Court has stated: “Modern instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose. . . . They together with pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blind man’s buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.” United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).


42. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396–97 (D.D.C. 1973). The court noted that underlying the right to compel discovery is “the basic proposition that the public has a right to every man’s evidence.” Id.


court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had.45

The central problem inherent in the discovery rules is providing
a litigant access to needed information without imposing an onerous
burden on the party who must provide it.46

In Richards the burden and expense on defendant Pacific Gas &
Electric and the deponent were neither onerous nor excessive.
Rather, the court found that the real burden and expense were on
society; disclosure would stifle research into questions of public
policy.47 Richards thus presents the question of whether the trial
judge has discretion to deny discovery when in his opinion the social
costs are too great. In at least two instances the federal courts have
answered that question affirmatively.48

In Baker v. F & F Investment,49 the Second Circuit held that
a freelance writer for the Saturday Evening Post did not have to
disclose the source for his article about block-busting in Chicago.
An action had been filed charging racial discrimination in housing
that violated federal and state law. The writer was subpoenaed
to disclose his confidential source of information.50 Judge Kaufman,
writing for the court, concluded that the district court judge acted
within his discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in denying the motion to compel disclosure of the writer's confiden-
tial information source. The court balanced the litigants' private
interests against the public interest in non-disclosure.51 He stressed
that freedom of the press is fundamental to our way of life and
that the first amendment tolerates no restraints absent a compelling
state interest.52 The Baker court noted that compelled disclosure

47. 71 F.R.D. at 390.
    (D.D.C. 1973). In McCord newsmen were served with subpoenas for news
    material including information from confidential sources. The newsmen
    sought protection from the subpoenas under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
    dure 26(c), but the district court found the subpoenas to be neither unrea-
    sonable nor oppressive. However, the court did quash the subpoenas after
    finding the information sought was conditionally privileged under the first
    amendment. Id. at 1396-97.
50. Id. at 781.
51. Id.
52. It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional
    way of life, that where the press remains free so too will a people
    remain free. Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or,
of confidential sources threatens a journalist's ability to secure information. Such disclosure thereby threatens freedom of the press and undermines values traditionally protected by the federal courts.

In *Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.*, a federal district court applied a balancing test as in *Baker*. The court denied a motion to compel disclosure by a medical newsletter of the identity of people who had contributed information to an article on the drug Innovar, produced by defendant McNeil Laboratories. Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant for personal injuries caused by the use of Innovar. Although recognizing the information's logical relevance and the litigants' right to discover relevant evidence in civil litigation, the court denied discovery. Noting that no absolute privilege protects newsmen's confidential sources, the court found that the policy protecting these sources is sufficiently strong to warrant exclusion from discovery in some instances. The *Apicella* court cited Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in *Branzburg v. Hayes*.

The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and more subtly, by indirect restraints. Happily, the First Amendment tolerates neither, absent a concern so compelling as to override the precious rights of freedom of speech and the press.

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53. Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a confidential basis. ... The deterrent effect such disclosure is likely to have upon future "undercover" investigative reporting, the dividends of which are revealed in articles such as Balk's, threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be informed. It thereby undermines values which traditionally have been protected by federal courts applying federal public policy.

54. Id. at 785.


56. Id. at 80.

57. Id. at 82.

58. Id. at 85.

59. The court stated: "No absolute rule of privilege protects newsmen. Nevertheless, the policy protecting news reporters' sources is sufficiently close to a privilege to warrant exclusion from discovery in some instances." Id. at 83.

60. Id.

the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.\footnote{62}

The Apicella court found this balancing approach to be even more justified in a civil proceeding than in a criminal case.\footnote{63}

Further, the 1970 Notes of the Advisory Committee state that "Rule 26(c) . . . confers broad powers on the court to regulate or prevent discovery even though the materials sought are [relevant] and these powers have always been freely exercised."\footnote{64}

There are "many situations, not capable of governance by precise rule, in which courts must exercise judgment [with respect to discovery]."\footnote{65} Thus, it appears that the federal courts may take into account the social costs inherent in compelling disclosure of confidential news sources when exercising their discretionary power over discovery;\footnote{66} the social interest in a free press seems to extend to academic research outside the organized media.\footnote{67} The question then arises of how the various interests should be weighed in a case such as Richards.

The Exercise of the Discretion in Richards

The Richards decision rests on factual analysis founded upon four factors: the nature of the proceeding, the status of the

\footnote{62. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).}
\footnote{63. 66 F.R.D. at 83. Accord, Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d at 785. Circuit Judge Kaufman stated for the court in Baker:

If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in [Branzburg], instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in nondisclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure. Id. at 784-85.}
\footnote{64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (Advisory Comm. Note, 1970 Amend. to Subdivision (b), 28 U.S.C.A. 155 (West 1972)). In 1935, when the Supreme Court decided to act under its then recently acquired statutory power to draft rules for a unified system of law and equity in the federal courts, it appointed an Advisory Committee to assist it. The Advisory Committee's purpose was to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1935). In early 1942, the Court recreated the Advisory Committee to act as a standing rules committee in respect to amendments to the Federal Rules. See 314 U.S. 720 (1942).}
\footnote{66. But cf. note 48 supra (federal court in civil action denied claim that subpoenas requiring disclosure of news sources were unreasonably oppressive under the Federal Rules).}
\footnote{67. This question is discussed at length in text accompanying notes 139-57 infra.}
deponent in the litigation, the exhaustion of alternative sources of the information, and the relationship of the information to the heart of the claim. Because these factors had been suggested to the court by the closely analogous newsmen privilege cases, these cases will now be considered to determine whether the competing interests in Richards were properly weighed.

The Nature of the Proceedings

The heart of newsmen's arguments for a privilege has been that forced disclosure of confidential information drives a wedge between them and their sources, blocking the free flow of information to the public which the first amendment was designed to protect. Controversy over the newsmen's asserted first amendment privilege culminated in the much publicized 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes. This case involved three reporters who had been called before grand juries to testify about information they had individually received in their capacities as newsmen. Two of the re-

70. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
71. The Branzburg opinion involved a trilogy of cases consolidated for appeal to the Supreme Court as follows:
Branzburg v. Hayes, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App. 1971), involved Paul Branzburg, an investigative reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal, who wrote an article about local drug abuse practices. He was subpoenaed before a grand jury but refused to reveal the confidential sources who had provided information for his article. Branzburg raised the first amendment issue of privilege but later abandoned it in favor of reliance upon Kentucky's newsmen shield statute. Id. at 346 n.1. The Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to quash the subpoenas, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), concerned Paul Pappas, a reporter for a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television station. Pappas gained entrance to a Black Panther meeting on the condition he would not disclose anything he saw or heard inside the building. He appeared before a grand jury but refused to answer questions concerning his attendance at the Black Panther meeting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to quash the subpoena and stated: "We adhere to the view that there exists no constitutional newsmen's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury." Id. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302. The Supreme Court refused to disturb this holding.
Caldwell v. United States, 464 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), involved New
porters claimed a privilege to withhold confidential sources and information, while the third claimed a privilege not to appear at all before a grand jury. All three claims of privilege were based on first amendment protection of the press to gather and disseminate news and information. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the first amendment affords newsmen no privilege against appearing and testifying before a grand jury. Thus, 

However, as Circuit Judge Kaufman pointed out in Baker, the sole issue in Branzburg was "the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." According to Judge Kaufman, the Supreme Court had been concerned with the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal justice system. No such criminal overtones color the facts in civil litigation. Further, Mr. Justice Powell had written a concurring opinion in Branzburg which many commentators view as the key to the decision. He had indicated that when subpoenaed by a

York Times reporter Earl Caldwell, who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify about the aims, purposes, and activities of the Black Panthers, an organization he had been assigned to cover. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoenas, and the Supreme Court reversed.

73. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1970).
75. 408 U.S. at 667. Mr. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. However, Justice Powell filed a brief concurring opinion stressing "the limited nature of the Court's holding." Id. at 709.
76. Id. at 667.
77. 470 F.2d at 784.
78. Id. at 784, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682.
79. 470 F.2d at 784.

In the context of a civil trial, the rationales for forcing a newsman to reveal his confidences are much less weighty than those involved in criminal proceedings. For example, in such a context, one cannot validly contend that a newsman is concealing the criminal conduct of his source, or shielding the anonymity of criminal figures.

Id. at 510.
81. In view of the plurality decision, many courts and commentators have characterized Justice Powell's concurring opinion as the key to the decision in Branzburg. See United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 376
grand jury, newsmen are not totally without first amendment
rights to protect their sources. Justice Powell had noted that
even in criminal cases instances will arise in which first amendment
values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify. If first amend-
ment “free press” values can outweigh the duty of the newsmen to
testify in a criminal case, surely in civil cases the public interest
in non-disclosure of confidential sources will often be weightier
than the private litigant’s interest in disclosure. The newsmen’s
claim for non-disclosure is strongest in civil actions such as
Richards.

The Status of the Deponent in the Litigation

Although the cases do not shed light on how much significance
courts attach to the status of deponent as a party, the deponent’s
status in the underlying litigation is a factor frequently mentioned
in the decisions. However, all courts refusing to compel disclosure
of a newsmen’s confidential sources in civil litigation found, in ad-
dition to the deponent’s non-party status, either that the party
seeking disclosure failed to exhaust alternative sources or that the
information was not necessary to his case. All the cases requiring

(4th Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778,
784 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976); Apicella v. McNeil Labora-
tories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299, 1301 & 1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Mc-
2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976). See, e.g., Goodale, supra note 11, at 916-17; Com-
82. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 710. Mr. Justice Powell implied that the Branzburg
holding does not compel a journalist “to give information bearing only a remote
and tenuous relationship to the subject of the [grand jury] investigation.”
Id.
84. Id. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. St. Peter,
132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755,
204 S.E.2d 429 (1974).
85. See Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
ned, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Murasky, supra note 10, at 988-99; Note, Report-
er’s Privilege—Guardian of the People’s Right to Know?, 11 New Eng. L.
86. E.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (court found other avail-
able sources of the information sought; the information did not go to the
heart of plaintiff’s claim), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied
disclosure of confidential sources were libel actions in which the deponent was a party defendant.\textsuperscript{87} However, it is likely that this factor was subsumed into the inquiry about whether the information sought went to the heart of plaintiff's claim.\textsuperscript{88} No civil court has decided a case in which the newsman deponent was a party, but in which all relevant factors cut in favor of non-disclosure. Thus, the importance of this factor is unclear.

The Exhaustion of Alternative Sources

The importance of this factor is not readily ascertained. Exhaustion of alternative sources of the information sought is relevant, but it may not be essential for a decision compelling disclosure.\textsuperscript{89} All decisions refusing to compel disclosure found no exhaustion of alternative sources of information.\textsuperscript{90} However, these cases also found that the information sought either was irrelevant\textsuperscript{91}

\begin{itemize}
\item Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976) (no showing that the confidential information sought was crucial to plaintiff's case or that such information was not practically accessible through other channels); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (parties requesting disclosure did not show unavailability of information from other sources); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (plaintiff showed no compelling need for information and did not show that it was unavailable from other sources); Buchanan v. Cronkite, Civ. No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974) (order denying motion to compel answer) (no showing of the relevance of the information sought and no attempt to exhaust alternative sources of the information); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973) (no showing by moving parties that alternative sources of evidence were exhausted or that the testimony and materials sought went to the heart of the claim).
\item \textsuperscript{88} The cases all involved libel suits filed against the reporters seeking a privilege from disclosure of their confidential news sources, and the courts in each case found that the information sought was necessary to each plaintiff's claim. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
\item \textsuperscript{90} See cases cited note 86 supra.
\item \textsuperscript{91} See Buchanan v. Cronkite, Civ. No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. July 18, 1974) (order denying motion to compel answer).
\end{itemize}
or failed to go to the "heart of the claim." Moreover, two cases held that a newsman's confidential sources should be disclosed when the information sought goes to the heart of plaintiff's libel claim, even if plaintiff has not shown exhaustion of alternative sources of information. The only safe generalization is that failure to exhaust alternative sources, if coupled with a failure to show that the information goes to the heart of the claim, will result in judicial refusal to compel disclosure of confidential news sources.

The "Heart of the Claim" Test

Regardless of how a court views the preceding factors, inquiry into the relevance and materiality of the information will always be made before a federal court orders discovery. The newsmen libel cases best demonstrate the federal courts' attitude toward materiality. In *Garland v. Torre*, columnist Marie Torre attributed to unnamed CBS executives a statement describing actress Judy Garland as overweight. Garland sued for libel and sought from CBS the identity of the people who had made the statements. After a futile attempt to obtain the information from other sources, Garland sought to depose Torre. Torre refused on first amendment grounds to disclose her source, and the federal district court held her in criminal contempt. The court of appeals upheld the contempt citation. Circuit Judge Stewart, writing for the court, noted that compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources raises

92. *See* cases cited note 96 *supra*.
93. In *Carey v. Hume*, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court noted that plaintiff had made no effort to discover the source of Hume's information. However, it excused such failing with the statement that it would be unreasonable to have plaintiff interview all the United Mine Workers' employees to discover the source. *Id.* at 638-39. In *Adams v. Associated Press*, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), the district court made no attempt whatever to determine whether alternative sources of the information sought were available but rather was satisfied with a determination that the information was necessary to preparation of plaintiff's case. *Id.* at 441.
95. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides in part:
   (b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: . . . Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .
   (emphasis added).
97. *Id.* at 546.
serious constitutional issues. Any infringement on first amendment rights must be justified by an overriding public interest. This decision was the first to articulate the requirement that the requested confidential information go to the "heart of the claim." The confidential information must bear directly on the major thrust of the moving party's claim. In *Garland* the identity of Torre's source was essential to Judy Garland's libel action. The "heart of the claim" test is more stringent than a test of mere relevancy: Unless the information sought is essential to the moving party's claim, there is no compelling state interest in using legal process to compel disclosure.

*Garland* was cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in *Branzburg*, and the "heart of the claim" test has been followed by federal courts in newsman libel cases both before and after *Branzburg*. The test has been almost uniformly used by federal courts dealing with compulsory disclosure of a newsman's confidential sources in non-libel civil actions as well. Thus, information sought from a newsman about his news gathering activities not only must be relevant but also must go to the heart of the claim of the party seeking disclosure.

**Did the Trial Court Properly Apply These Factors in Richards?**

The underlying litigation in *Richards* was a civil action for breach
of contract and defamation. Neither the professor nor his assistant was a party to the underlying suit. The research was not conducted with a view to litigation, and most facts were available to plaintiff through interrogatories propounded to defendant. Thus, any information the professor or his assistant had in regard to the breach of contract claim was largely supplementary. In short, the first three factors cut against disclosure. At first glance, the fourth factor seems to weigh in favor of disclosure; plaintiff Richards alleged that it was defamed during the interviews between Roberts and defendant's employees. If the allegations were true, Roberts' information would go to the heart of Richards' defamation claim. However, Judge Renfrew found the evidence insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of defamation. Richards failed to show that the confidential information it sought from Roberts and his assistant went to the heart of a valid claim. Thus, all four factors support Judge Renfrew's determination that Richards' need for the information was not weightier than the public interest in maintaining confidentiality. The denial of the motion to compel disclosure of Professor Roberts' confidential sources was a proper exercise of the court's discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

106. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
107. Id. at 390.
108. The research project for which the interviews were conducted was not initiated with an eye to this litigation. The central subject of this action, the events surrounding the decision to discontinue using the spray cooling system, . . . was not a focus of the study. The factual issues which divide the parties may certainly be resolved without resort to statements made by PG&E employees to Professor Roberts. . . . Any information Professor Roberts or Lane McIntosh [the research assistant] may have as to the identity of those PG&E officials who decided to abandon the system and the reasons for their decision is available to plaintiffs through interrogatories propounded to PG&E. In short, the information sought is largely supplementary.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
109. Id.
110. "Given the importance of maintaining confidential channels of communication between academic researchers and their sources, the Court will not compel disclosure absent at least a prima facie showing that Richards was in fact defamed in the course of the interviews conducted by Professor Roberts." Id. at 390-91.
Does the Public Interest in Academic Research Warrant a First Amendment Privilege for Confidential Sources?

Since *Garland v. Torre*, there has been a continuing controversy over the existence of a first amendment privilege for newsmen's confidential sources of information. Some commentators viewed *Branzburg* as a negative resolution of that controversy. However, a growing number of post-*Branzburg* decisions, both state and federal, have recognized a qualified first amendment privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources. This recognition is particularly apparent in civil litigation, in which the qualified privilege will give way only upon a showing of some compelling state interest.

*Baker v. F & F Investment* was one of the first federal civil decisions after *Branzburg*. In light of *Branzburg*, the *Baker* court concluded that federal law does not recognize an absolute or conditional journalist's testimonial privilege. Nonetheless, the court upheld the lower court's denial of a motion to compel the non-party journalist to disclose his confidential source for an article on block-busting in Chicago. *Baker* read *Branzburg* as limited to criminal investigations and noted the adverse effects that compulsory disclosure of sources has on a free press. The *Baker* court was concerned that freedom of the press not be infringed without a counter-
vailing compelling interest,\textsuperscript{121} which it found to be absent on the facts before it.\textsuperscript{122} Thus, the \textit{Baker} court evidently regarded the newsman-source relationship as conditionally privileged.\textsuperscript{123}

Despite the \textit{Baker} court's reluctance to expressly recognize a newsman's qualified first amendment privilege in the face of \textit{Branzburg}, a number of lower federal courts have done so. \textit{Democratic National Committee v. McCord}\textsuperscript{124} followed \textit{Baker}'s lead by denying compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources in a civil action. Following the Watergate break-in, the Democratic Party brought damages actions against the Committee for the Re-election of the President and others. Reporters for \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{The Washington Post}, \textit{The Washington Star-News} and \textit{Time Magazine} were subpoenaed by the defendants for depositions. They were to produce documents, audio and video tapes, and other materials relating to the break-in or other political espionage against the Democratic Party. The district court quashed the subpoenas, stating that the great public importance of the case dictated a finding that the reporters were entitled to a qualified first amendment privilege.\textsuperscript{125} To enforce the subpoenas, the court said, might inhibit reporting about a major political party and people within the highest circles of government.\textsuperscript{126} The court found that defendants had not demonstrated that the information sought went to the heart of their claim\textsuperscript{127} or that they had exhausted alternative sources of the information.\textsuperscript{128} The court concluded that the "scales . . . [were]

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Id. at 784-85.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Id. at 785.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} See Goodale, supra note 11, at 736.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Id. at 1396. The McCord court distinguished the cases before it from \textit{Branzburg} by noting that they were not "criminal" cases as was \textit{Branzburg}. Id. at 1397.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} What is ultimately involved in these cases between the major political parties is the very integrity of the judicial and executive branches of our government and our political processes, for without information concerning the workings of government, the public's confidence in that integrity will inevitably suffer. This is especially true where, as here, strong allegations have been made of corruption within the highest circles of government. . . . This Court cannot blind itself to the possible "chilling effect" the enforcement of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the press, and so to the public.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} 356 F. Supp. at 1397. See Goodale, supra note 11, at 735.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Id. at 1398.
\end{itemize}
heavily weighted in the [reporters'] favor."

The 1975 case of *Loadholtz v. Fields* is in accord. The case arose in Florida, a state with no statutory shield protection for newsman. A newspaper article quoted a couple who claimed they had been intimidated and harassed when arrested by police. In a libel action by the arresting officer against the couple, the reporter was subpoenaed to appear at a deposition to testify about his interview with the couple. He refused to comply, and plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery. The court denied the motion and distinguished the holding in *Branzburg* as being limited to criminal cases. The court cited *McCord* as authority that the first amendment affords a newsman a qualified privilege in a civil action when no compelling interest justifies compelled disclosure.

*McCord* and *Loadholtz* were recently followed in *Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp.*, an action for personal injury damages allegedly resulting from contact with the chemical Kepone. During pre-trial discovery defendant Allied Chemical requested a subpoena requiring a non-party operator of television and radio stations to produce news material. The court quashed the subpoena, holding that newsmen have a privilege not to reveal their confidential news sources in civil proceedings that may be abrogated only in compelling circumstances. *Gilbert* refused to read *Branzburg* as holding that the first amendment offers no protection to the press from subpoenas. Rather, it relied on Mr. Justice Powell's view that a qualified privilege does exist to protect the confidential newsman-source relationship. In this case, defendant failed to show that the confidential information sought was crucial to its case or that the information was not practically accessible through other sources.

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129. Id.
131. "This Court has neither been cited nor has found any subsequent case which has extended the *Branzburg* case holding beyond the limited confines of the criminal justice system." Id. at 1301.
132. Id. at 1303.
134. However, the court refused to find a privilege for non-confidential news information. "Only if material requested directly leads to the disclosure of confidences does the privilege attach." Id. at 511.
135. Id. at 508.
136. Id.
137. The *Gilbert* court found Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion to be the "minimum common denominator" of all the views expressed in *Branzburg*. Id. at 510.
138. Id.
Given a qualified first amendment privilege for newsmen, the question arises of whether the privilege should extend to academic researchers. The inquiry is twofold. First, does the first amendment's guarantee of a free press extend to academic researchers outside the organized press? Second, do the underlying reasons for a qualified newsman's privilege warrant extension of that privilege to academic research?

Does "the Press" Mean Only the "Press"?

No court has squarely held that freedom of the press applies to academic researchers. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals . . . [but] in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.” Under the first amendment, the relevant inquiry is not whether the individual asserting freedom of the press is a newsman, but rather whether the individual performs a function furthering the social objectives of the first amendment. Thus it is the function which an individual performs, rather than the medium which he uses, that is the essential first amendment consideration. At least one federal court has extended the policy protecting news reporters' sources beyond the organized news media. In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., the trial court applied to a medical newsletter the same constitutional free press considerations it found to exist for members of the organized media. In particular, the court found that the medical letter performed a first amendment function by providing valuable information on various drugs to the medical profession and the public.

The Supreme Court itself stated in Branzburg: “The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the

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139. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1936). In Branzburg v. Hayes, Mr. Justice White stated for the Court that freedom of the press is the right of all types of reporters and includes “the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as . . . the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.” 408 U.S. at 704 (1972).

140. The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1012 n.111.


142. 66 F.R.D. at 85.
present case is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists." 143 Academicians play a special role in the communication of ideas. In order to carry out their task "[t]hey must have freedom of responsible inquiry." 144 This should be true even if the activity is only data collection; the Branzburg majority conceded that news gathering, not just dissemination, is also protected by the first amendment. 145 If an academic researcher is performing a first amendment function, he or she is entitled to the first amendment guarantees that members of the press enjoy with regard to their confidential sources of information. 146

Because Branzburg rejects an absolute privilege for newsmen, the courts recognizing a qualified privilege have stressed the underlying social interests served by maintaining confidential newsman-source relationships. 147 Thus, the extension of the qualified confidential

143. 408 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
145. The newsmen in Branzburg presented a constitutional argument. They claimed that the right to gather information is protected, for without such protection the recognized first amendment right to disseminate news would be hollow. The majority in Branzburg accepted this assertion in principle and conceded that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681. Two lower courts had accepted this argument even prior to Branzburg. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
146. But see United States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972). This case grew out of the federal grand jury investigations into the unauthorized release and publication of the Pentagon Papers. Samuel Popkin, a government professor at Harvard and author of a number of published works on the Vietnam War, was subpoenaed by the grand jury to answer questions concerning his knowledge of the release of the papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Popkin refused to answer certain questions, asserting a first amendment privilege against disclosing his sources akin to the one claimed by newsmen. The district court held him in contempt, and the court of appeals affirmed in part. In particular, the court of appeals denied Popkin's asserted first amendment privilege and stated that the scholar-source relationship is not covered by the "special canopy of the free press." Id. at 334. However, the court recognized that the privilege, if it exists, rests upon the important public interest in a continued flow of information that would be adversely affected were scholars forced to divulge their sources. Id. The court stated that this rationale falls short of immunizing a scholar from testifying about his nonconfidential conversations and found in this case that the questions put to Popkin did not call for disclosure of government officials or other "participant-sources." Id. at 334. Thus, the court of appeals, rather than explicitly rejecting a first amendment privilege for scholars, rejected only Popkin's assertion that the privilege is an unqualified one covering all sources of information.
source privilege to academician-source confidences will depend on
the extent to which they serve the same underlying social interests.

The principal objective of the Founding Fathers in providing for
a free press was to stimulate an interplay of diverse ideas which
would enable the public to act as an effective watchdog over
government. They also believed that a free press would promote
constructive change by providing the public with necessary infor-
mation on important issues. Correlative to these first amend-
ment objectives is the public right to access to ideas. The public
must have facts and opinions bearing on public issues, and the task
of reporting to the public falls principally on journalists of the or-
ganized media.

However, with accelerated social change and the increasing com-
plexity of public issues, journalists alone are unable to meet the
great need for in-depth, analytical reporting. In response to this
need, academic researchers and scholars have assumed functions
which were formerly the province of the journalist. Scholarly
research provides the public with historical and analytical perspec-
tive on issues of public concern in government and private

148. See The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1009. In Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court noted: "It is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas.
... That right may not constitutionally be abridged. ... It is the pur-
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression
or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded
otherwise than with grave concern." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1954).
150. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969);
Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privi-
151. The Public Scholar, supra note 3, at 1009-10.
152. Id.
153. Id. The term public scholar has been adopted by some authorities
to describe those researchers, academicians, and others who engage in schol-
arily research and investigation of public issues. Id. at n.102. See note 3 supra.
154. In United States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel L. Popkin), the
public issue in question was that of United States military involvement in
Vietnam. 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972).
industry. As Academic researchers perform an important first amendment function by providing information to the public which the journalists are unable to provide. As Judge Renfrew aptly stated in Richards, the research of society’s scholars “has the unique potential to facilitate change through knowledge.” Thus, the free press guarantee should extend to academic researchers.

Does the Public Interest Warrant a Privilege for Academic Researchers’ Confidential Sources?

The qualified newsman’s privilege finds its roots in judicial recognition of the adverse impact compulsory disclosure of confidential sources may have on the press’ first amendment functions. Many courts, mindful of the first amendment’s preferred position in “the pantheon of freedoms,” have found that compelled disclosure of confidential sources threatens a newsman’s ability to secure information that is made available only on a confidential basis. Compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources impedes first amendment functions in two ways: by drying up sources of confidential information and by deterring future investigation and information gathering which rely upon confidential sources. Compulsory disclosure of academicians’ confidential sources interferes with academicians’ first amendment functions in a strikingly similar fashion.

Drying Up Sources

A strong argument supporting the newsman’s privilege is that informants will be reluctant to come forward with closely held in-
formation in the absence of a guarantee of anonymity.\textsuperscript{161} That reluctance may be attributed to both the informant’s fear that a subpoenaed newsman might reveal his identity under judicial order and the knowledge that a newsman who does not betray the confidence might go to jail.\textsuperscript{162} Given that fear and knowledge, the informant may keep the information to himself.\textsuperscript{163} In \textit{In re Caldwell},\textsuperscript{164} one of the \textit{Branzburg} trio of cases,\textsuperscript{165} the district court found that “confidential relationships . . . are commonly developed and maintained by professional journalists, and are indispensable to their work of gathering, analyzing and publishing the news . . . .”\textsuperscript{166} Furthermore, a number of journalists submitted affidavits supporting Caldwell’s position before the courts. These affidavits stated that sources often gave information only on the condition that their identity remain confidential.\textsuperscript{167} They also stated that sources occasionally refused to provide information because of the fear of disclosure by legal process.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, the protection of the identity of a news source is often essential to the source’s willingness to give information to the press.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{162} Id. \textit{See Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 215 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1975) (letter from Irwin Karp to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier).}
\textsuperscript{165} See note 71 supra.
\textsuperscript{166} 311 F. Supp. at 361.
\textsuperscript{167} The affidavit of Walter Cronkite, a CBS network television reporter, is one example of the views expressed. “In doing my work, I (and those who assist me) depend constantly on information, ideas, leads and opinions received in confidence. Such material is essential in digging out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and analyzing the significance of public events.” 408 U.S. at 730. Affidavits expressing the same general view were submitted by newsmen Gerald Fraser, Thomas Johnson, John Kifner, Timothy Knight, Nicholas Proffitt, Anthony Ripley, Wallace Turner, Gilbert Noble, Anthony Lukas, Martin Arnold, David Burnham, Jon Lowell, Frank Morgan, Min Yee, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace, Dan Rather, and Marvin Kalb. \textit{Id.} at 736 n.20.
\textsuperscript{168} 408 U.S. at 736 n.20.
Although the Supreme Court considered such affidavits as self-serving,\(^7\) a number of courts since \textit{Branzburg} have found that the drying-up effect represents a real threat to news gathering.\(^7\) The language in \textit{Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp.}\(^7\) is notable:

The Court recognizes that to effectively gather information for the conveyance of news to the public, it is often necessary for reporters to make assurances either not to identify the source . . . or to broadcast or publish only part of the information obtained, or both. If a news station or newspaper is forced to reveal the confidences of their reporters, the sources so disclosed, other confidential sources of other reporters, and potential confidential sources will be significantly deterred from furnishing further information to the press.\(^7\)

Information lost to the press because of the threat of compulsory disclosure of confidential sources is information lost to the public.\(^7\)

The same considerations apply with equal weight to academic researches and scholars. Scholars, in the course of their studies, rely to a significant extent on other individuals for information.\(^7\) In many cases, if the scholar's ties with his sources are severed, no alternative sources exist for the information sought.\(^7\) Yet, these ties can be extremely delicate and confidential in nature, readily destroyed by indiscriminate use of the subpoena power to compel disclosure.\(^7\) As the facts in \textit{Richards} indicate, Professor Roberts was able to obtain the interviews with Pacific Gas & Electric's employees only by pledging confidentiality.\(^7\) If Professor Roberts breached his pledge, particularly if to the detriment of Pacific Gas & Electric, it is unlikely that the company would be a fruitful source of information for future researchers. Therefore, compulsory disclosure for researchers may have as great a drying-up effect as for members of the organized press.

\(^7\) in \textit{Branzburg}, stated that "[w]e can and must accept the evidence . . . that overwhelmingly supports the premise that deterrence will occur with regularity in important types of news-gathering relationships. 408 U.S. at 736.

170. 408 U.S. at 694.


176. \textit{The Public Scholar, supra} note 3, at 1013.

177. \textit{Id.}

178. 71 F.R.D. at 389.
The Deterrent Effect

Another argument favoring the newsman's privilege is that compulsory disclosure of confidential sources deters future investigation by intimidating the newsman forced to disclose and other newsmen who view the compelled disclosure as a threat to themselves. 179 Faced with a subpoena, the newsman is confronted with the dilemma of breaching the source's confidence or being held in contempt. 180 Many newsmen have accepted jail sentences to preserve their sources of information. 181 However, the price of preserving confidentiality includes not only a jail sentence but also the financial costs of fighting subpoenas in the courts 182 and employers' loss of their news employees' services. 183 The newsman must choose between obedience to the courts and the ethical scruple forbidding a breach of confidence. 184 To avoid such a dilemma, some news gatherers may refrain from collecting or publicizing information available only from confidential sources. 185 Consequently, such compulsory disclosure of confidential information sources chills the exercise of first amendment expression by such news gatherers. 186 Additionally, the more controversial the subject


181. Murasky, supra note 10, at 863. Case law demonstrates that newsmen have been willing in the past to exhaust their legal remedies and then to go to jail, if necessary, to protect their confidential sources. See Comment, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Right of Newsmen Not to Reveal Confidential Sources of Information to a Grand Jury, 11 Duq. L. Rev. 657, 658 (1973).

182. Fred Graham, legal correspondent for CBS News, related that when he was subpoenaed by Spiro Agnew—a subpoena lasting for only 10 days—his attorney's bill was twice his annual salary. ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, THE FUTURE OF "NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE": THE WHITHER & WHETHER OF DISCLOSURE FOR NEWS-PERSONS, Aug. 15, 1974, at 13 (comments of Fred Graham).

183. Murasky, supra note 10, at 864.

184. Accord, Gordon, Newsmen's Privilege Viewed in Context of Court Cases, Va. L. WEEKLY, Apr. 19, 1974, at 2, col. 3. Professor Gordon stated that "threats of punishment usually don't work—newsmen have almost always taken the attitude that a promise of confidentiality must be honored even at the cost of going to jail." Id.

185. See note 188 infra.

186. See authorities cited note 179 supra.
of the report, the more likely it is that the newsman will be subpoenaed to provide information.\textsuperscript{187} Hence, the newsman is inhibited from seeking out sources of information at the outset.\textsuperscript{188}

The deterrence argument has been accepted by some courts. In \textit{Baker v. F & F Investment},\textsuperscript{189} the court of appeals was concerned with the deterrent effect that compulsory disclosure of the journalist's confidential source would have on other undercover investigative reporting.\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, the court in \textit{Loadholtz v. Fields}\textsuperscript{191} accepted the newsman's argument that his attendance at a deposition would necessarily have a chilling effect on his functioning as a reporter and thus upon the flow of information to the public.\textsuperscript{192} The chilling effect of compulsory disclosure of confidential sources will work as harshly on academic researchers and scholars as it does on members of the organized press.\textsuperscript{193} Certainly the academic researcher in \textit{Richards}\textsuperscript{194} is in as great a dilemma as any reporter who is faced with a judicial demand for confidential information. In each case the detrimental effect is the same—a restriction on the free flow of information about public issues.\textsuperscript{195}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Shortly after the decision in \textit{Branzburg}, one commentator noted that several centuries ago journalists had their ears lopped off for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{The First Amendment in Jeopardy, supra} note 11, at 421. \textit{See Murasky, supra} note 10, at 884-85.
\item A number of instances have been documented in which news stories were cancelled or abandoned because of the lack of guarantee of confidentiality. Some of these cases are as follows:
- CBS News had arranged an interview with a woman who said she would disclose how she had cheated on welfare, if her identity would remain confidential. CBS declined to so promise, and the interview was cancelled.
- ABC News declined an opportunity to conduct filmed interviews with the Black Panthers in their headquarters because the network was unable to offer a firm promise of confidentiality.
- The \textit{Baton Rouge State-Times} was unable to follow up a public official corruption story after a key source expressed fear that his newsman contact would be subpoenaed.
- The \textit{Boston Globe} was unable to continue investigation of official corruption because sources told the newspaper investigative reporters they were afraid of being identified. \textit{The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Press Censorship Newsletter} No. 1, at 5-6 (Mar./Apr. 1973).
\item \textit{Id. at} 782.
\item \textit{Id. at} 1300.
\item \textit{See The Public Scholar, supra} note 3, at 1015-17.
\item \textit{See text accompanying notes 15-26 supra.}
\item Accord, \textit{The Public Scholar, supra} note 3, at 1023.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
publishing libel.\textsuperscript{196} He contended that today they continue to be denied the right to hear confidences, although in a subtler way. However, the trend of post-\textit{Branzburg} decisions shows growing recognition of a qualified first amendment privilege for the confidential newsman-source relationship. The privilege is necessary to provide a free flow of information to the public.\textsuperscript{197} As Mr. Justice White stated: “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”\textsuperscript{198}

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have the discretion to limit discovery when they find that the costs to society in compelling disclosure of a confidential source outweigh the countervailing need for the information. Moreover, the social interest in a free press justifies extension of a constitutional privilege to academicians who serve valuable first amendment functions. Society has a profound interest in the research of its scholars who provide a free flow of information and ideas to its “marketplace.” This interest should not be impaired by the indiscriminate use of judicial authority to compel disclosure of confidential sources.

\textit{Howard Gray Curtis}

