4-15-2004

From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: Preventing Deadly Conflict

General Anthony C. Zinni

Follow this and additional works at: http://digital.sandiego.edu/lecture_series

Digital@USanDiego Citation
Zinni, General Anthony C., "From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: Preventing Deadly Conflict" (2004). Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series. 27.
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lecture_series/27

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
JOAN B. KROC
Distinguished Lecture Series

Anthony C. Zinni

From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table
Preventing Deadly Conflict

JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE
University of San Diego
JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE

Distinguished Lecture Series

Delivered on the 15th of April, 2004 at the

JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE
University of San Diego
San Diego, California

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)

From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table:
Preventing Deadly Conflict
CONTENTS

Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice  

Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series  

Biography of General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)  

Interview with General Zinni by Major Stanton Coerr, Dr. Joyce Neu, and Dr. Randy Willoughby  

Introduction by Dr. Joyce Neu  

Lecture - From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: Preventing Deadly Conflict  

Questions and Answers  

Related Resources  

About the University of San Diego
The mission of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice (IPJ) is to foster peace, cultivate justice, and create a safer world. Through education, research, and peacemaking activities, the IPJ offers programs that advance scholarship and practice in conflict resolution and human rights. The Institute for Peace & Justice, located at the University of San Diego, draws upon Catholic social teaching that sees peace as inseparable from justice and acts to prevent and resolve conflicts that threaten local, national, and international peace. The IPJ was established in 2000 through a generous gift from the late Joan B. Kroc to the University of San Diego to create an institute for the study and practice of peace and justice. Programming began in early 2001 and the building was dedicated in December 2001 with a conference, “Peacemaking with Justice: Policy for the 21st Century.”

The Institute for Peace & Justice strives, in Joan B. Kroc’s words, to “not only talk about peace, but to make peace.” The IPJ offers its services to parties in conflict to provide mediation and facilitation, assessments, training, and consultations. It advances peace with justice through work with members of civil society in zones of conflict and has a focus on mainstreaming women in peace processes.

The Women PeaceMakers Program brings into residence at the IPJ women who have been actively engaged in peacemaking in conflict areas around the world to document their stories, share experiences with others working in peacemaking, and allow time for reflection on their work.

A Master’s Program in Peace & Justice Studies trains future leaders in the field and will be expanded into the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, supported by a $50 million endowment from the estate of Mrs. Kroc.

WorldLink, a year-round educational program for high school students from San Diego and Baja California connects youth to global affairs.

Country programs, such as the Nepal project, offer wide-ranging conflict assessments, mediation, and conflict resolution training workshops.

Community outreach includes speakers, films, art, and opportunities for discussion between community members, academics, and practitioners on issues of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international leaders in government, non-governmental organizations, and the military.
JOAN B. KROC DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES

Endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice from the late Joan Kroc, philanthropist and international peace proponent, the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum for high-level national and international leaders and policy makers to share their knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. The goal of the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve conflict and promote peace with justice.

The Distinguished Lecture Series offers the community at large an opportunity to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues with parties in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create an enduring peace for tomorrow. The series, which is held at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego, examines new developments in the search for effective tools to prevent and resolve conflict while protecting human rights and ensuring social justice.

DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES SPEAKERS

May 8, 2003  Helen Caldicott, M.D.
President, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
The New Nuclear Danger

April 15, 2003  Robert Edgar, Ph.D.
General Secretary, The National Council of Churches
The Role of the Church in U.S. Foreign Policy

October 15, 2003  Richard J. Goldstone
Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
Preventing Deadly Conflict: The Role of International Law

January 14, 2004  Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg
U.S. Department of State
Conflict, Gender, and Human Rights: Lessons Learned from the Field

April 15, 2004  General Anthony C. Zinni
United States Marine Corps (retired)
From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: Preventing Deadly Conflict
BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL
ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RETIRED)

General Zinni joined the Marine Corps in 1961 and was commissioned an infantry second lieutenant in 1965 upon graduation from Villanova University. He has held numerous command and staff assignments that include platoon, company, battalion, regimental, Marine expeditionary unit, and Marine expeditionary force command. His staff assignments included service in operations, training, special operations, counter-terrorism, and manpower billets. He has also been a tactics and operations instructor at several Marine Corps schools and was selected as a fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. General Zinni's joint assignments include command of a joint task force and a unified command. He has also had several joint and combined staff billets at task force and unified command levels.

General Zinni has made deployments to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Western Pacific, Northern Europe and Korea. He has also served tours in Okinawa and Germany. His operational experiences include two tours in Vietnam, emergency relief and security operations in the Philippines, Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey and northern Iraq, Operation Provide Hope in the former Soviet Union, Operations Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield in Somalia, Operations Resolute Response and Noble Response in Kenya, Operations Desert Thunder, Desert Fox, Desert Viper, Desert Spring, Southern Watch and the Maritime Intercept Operations in the Persian Gulf, and Operation Infinite Reach against terrorist targets in the Central Region. He was involved in the planning and execution of Operation Proven Force and Operation Patriot Defender in support of the Gulf War and noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Eritrea. He has also participated in presidential diplomatic missions to Somalia, Pakistan, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, and State Department missions involving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and conflicts in Indonesia.

General Zinni has attended numerous military schools and courses including the National War College. He holds a bachelor's degree in economics, a master's in international relations, a master's in management and supervision, and honorary doctorates from William and Mary College and the Maine Maritime Academy.

General Zinni's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Distinguished Service Medal; the Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters; the Bronze Star with Combat "V" and gold star; the Purple Heart; the Meritorious Service Medal with gold star; the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V" and gold star; the Navy Achievement Medal with gold star; the Combat Action Ribbon; and personal decorations from South Vietnam, France, Italy, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain. He also holds 36 unit, service, and campaign awards. His civilian awards include the Papal Gold Cross of Honor, the Union Leagues Abraham Lincoln Award, the Italian Studies Institute Global Peace Award, the Distinguished Sea Service Award from the Naval Order of the United States, the Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award from the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Chaplin Award from the Marine Corps University Foundation, the Penn Club Award, and the St. Thomas of Villanova Alumni Medal.
the same war that I saw. War became something very important to me—this whole idea of understanding different cultures and conflicts and what we needed to do. At the same time, within the Marine Corps, Army and all the services, we were undergoing our own cultural problems. We had the racial issues, the drug issues, the generational issues. We had to struggle through all those and adapt to the new all-volunteer force. There was almost an internal-cultural thing going on. The nature of the Marine Corps allows you to travel all over the world and expose yourself to many cultures and I was always fascinated by them.

I had a fascination with trying to solve problems. I always was fortunate enough to have bosses who gave me that opportunity. When I was in the European command and issues or problems came up in Eastern Europe or somewhere, General Jack Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and General Jim McCarthy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European Command, would send me off saying, “Go figure out what to do.” These were the only instructions—I loved that. Back from my time in Vietnam, I liked the ops [operations] where you are solving problems that you have to unravel or solve. Some you do and some you don’t, but you try to understand why you didn’t.

JN: When you talk about problem solving—did you put things together as a kid?

Z: I did. I made a lot of models as a kid. I collected all sorts of things. My mother and father were immigrants; they came with my grandmother and grandfather from the same place in Italy. My father only had a third grade education. He worked for a very wealthy family on the Main Line in Philadelphia. He was a chauffeur, a caretaker of property, and he really believed strongly in education. He believed that we needed to read. This very wealthy family subscribed to every magazine known to mankind: Newsweek, Time.
Collier’s, Look, U.S. News and World Report. So every week my father would come home with a stack—he wanted us to read all these things. When I was a little kid I was caught up in reading all these magazines. Of course any book that they were through with, he would bring home. We always had a house full of books, periodicals, and newspapers and he would encourage us all to make sure we read and understood them. He always felt that our family, maybe more than other families in our situation, was aware of what was going on.

JN: And the problem-solving stuff?

Z: I don’t know where that came from. I’m not a mechanic. I like interaction with people and trying to solve big problems by people interacting with each other.

RW: Your assignment in Vietnam, living in a Vietnamese village, speaking the language, isn’t that an unusual assignment for a young Marine? Isn’t that what the Green Berets do?

Z: The Vietnamese had a small Marine Corps and we had advisors there. But it was unusual in that I was the only second lieutenant ever assigned there. Normally more senior officers, like senior captains, are chosen because, obviously, if you’re going to be giving advice you’d better know a little bit more about what you are doing. They were surprised to see a second lieutenant show up. I was assigned there because we were out of officers and they needed replacements for some sick and wounded advisors. They were at the end of the alphabet when they were assigning people to do this.

RW: Of all the books about Vietnam, are there any that you consider particularly good?

Z: I don’t know if you remember Lieutenant Colonel William Corson. He wrote a book about Vietnam, The Betrayal, about why we were approaching this all wrong. It was a big issue. Here was a lieutenant colonel, very outspoken, who had served down in Saigon and Bac Vie, and it was a very powerful book. He described things in an amazing way.

I recall one chapter called “Westie’s Aviary.” This chapter described all the people around Westmoreland, the birds of all different colors we called “Westie’s Aviary.” In those days, people like John Paul Vann were beginning to see that the approach to this situation was wrong; the strategy was wrong. Many of the military decisions, like one-year individual rotations and not mobilizing the reserves, were flawed. There were many mistakes made. It was apparent from the ground, too. For us, it seemed to me, it wasn’t just about defeating the Viet Cong. It was also about bringing something the South Vietnamese were willing to fight for.

The same thing is happening in Iraq. If we give the Iraqis something to fight for, our control and occupation and dealing with security issues should be diminishing just as the U.S. is kicking into high gear. But the underpinning is not just security issues or creating more jobs; it’s something that they want to fight for and that means something. I look at the governing council in Baghdad who hold a coup every month. The Vietnamese Marines had a coup force where they would go into Saigon and decide who was going to be the next general and who was going to be to be the next president. It was ridiculous. You could see it wasn’t going to hold up.

We, as civil society, were leading ourselves to believe that we were providing democracy, freedom. They [the Vietnamese] didn’t see it. They saw a bankrupt system in Saigon that didn’t make them better off. The South Vietnamese would have slightly preferred the South over the North for slightly different reasons, that’s politics. But after a while it wasn’t worth dying for and they were caught in between. And a lot of young Americans couldn’t understand. “We are here dying for you, and you don’t care.” But you have to look at it from the Vietnamese point of view. “What is the U.S. leaving us with and is it any better than before?” When America gets involved,
the expectations soar. I think the problem there and in Iraq is that when we got involved, the expectations were really high. We should have done a lot more to lower those expectations.

RW: Before we ask more questions about Iraq, could we talk about some of the other places you have served since Vietnam, like Okinawa? Chalmers Johnson, an Asian studies scholar now living here in San Diego, has become one of the leading critics of American imperialism after an early career that included defending the war in Vietnam. One of the lightning rods of his book that appeared a few years ago, Blowback, is Okinawa. Do you have any feelings about how we have managed our military presence there?

Z: I think Okinawa is unique. The Okinawans are not ethnically Japanese; they are a mix of Polynesian and Chinese. They were an independent kingdom known as a nonviolent people, commercial traders, gentle people. Most Westerners commented that they couldn’t believe that there was a place on earth without any prisons, jails, or weapons. The Chinese wanted to stay isolated and wanted to use Okinawa as a trading center. Okinawans could face the outside world, so the Chinese had a nice set-up.

The Japanese decided they wanted to grab Okinawa for the trade but they still needed the Chinese to remain in the country. So Okinawa was very quietly invaded, taken over, and the people were instructed not to tell the Chinese that they were secretly under the control of the Japanese.

The Okinawan relationship with the Japanese has always been poor. The Japanese always viewed the country something like the Puerto Rico of Japan. It didn’t get much support and was always considered to be inferior. I think the Japanese decided during the war that the Americans would not think of invading the homelands at the sacrifice of the Okinawans—50,000 Okinawans and innocent civilians were killed during the battle. And then the United States came in and occupied Okinawa. They were sort of victims in all this. Forty percent of Okinawans came back and they lost their cultural identities. It became a camp town. In a similar way, it was very sad when I returned to Vietnam and saw that their culture had disintegrated. Seeing the American occupation govern there was really tragic.

When the U.S. decided to leave Okinawa, we only offered two alternatives to the population. They could either remain under U.S. occupation or be under Japanese control. A third option was independence, which they felt they had a right to assert, their historical legitimacy, and we wouldn’t give them that opportunity. Of the two, they chose the Japanese. Their logic: “Better the devil you know. We’ve lived with the Japanese for years and this American occupation isn’t working out,” so they chose the Japanese.

We stayed of course. It was in our interest to have a base in the Pacific to deal with the Chinese threat so we packed into Okinawa. It also prevented the Japanese from rearming and getting weapons of mass destruction. The Japanese wanted our forces there on the mainland and now the Okinawans were not only under U.S. occupation but with a U.S. presence that was overwhelming. I think that was unfortunate until prosperity started. Obviously, in the boom days of Japan they started to put some money down and it started to pay off for the Okinawans who put up with the Americans. Okinawans no longer had to have bars and put up with everything else. In their own right things seemed to be improving and they regained some culture. I commanded a regiment there in the mid-1980s in a camp and I interacted with the local community in town. I would meet with the local leadership, with the local assembly, and the leaders. It was interesting because I felt that we had destroyed their culture and it was able to reemerge. Now, at the end of the Cold War, I think they feel very strongly about minimizing our presence.

Currently, I feel the value of training in Okinawa is limited. I think Okinawa is necessary as a logistics base in case conflict arises in Korea. I think we could keep logistics units, stocks, and storage maybe even an air base there in Kadena. Those don’t create much of a strain on Okinawans. But for ground units, like the Marines and the larger ground units, we ought to look somewhere else in the Pacific, like Australia.
RW: Could you translate in numbers of troops?

Z: I think we have about 35,000 troops there. That could probably be reduced to a third—but it would not be a visible third. Troop numbers are what upset the Okinawans the most, while the land issue is not a great problem because many of the original landowners are now collecting rent or leasing and, because it’s beginning to get a bit crowded, some of the bases and training could be turned over. What the Okinawans take issue with is shooting weapons and maneuvering; all that is involved in training. By maintaining only the logistics, my guess would be roughly a third of current U.S. forces would remain but they would not be involved in the kinds of activities that are unacceptable to the Okinawans.

I think the problem has been where do we go from Okinawa? I think expanding in South Korea is an option; the two previous governments in South Korea have been interested in that possibility. There has even been talk about Vietnam and the Vietnamese were interested in having a U.S. troop presence. General [Charles C.] Krulak looked at Australia very seriously, which probably wouldn’t be hard to do, although I think it would be useful mostly as a training area, maybe as a rotational training area. I wouldn’t do any major military construction or build up there because it is too far from the area that we are mostly concerned about—the Koreas, Taiwan, and Japan.

RW: Speaking of forces and numbers, let’s talk about the force mix in Iraq. There is an international mix, of course, and within the American deployment we have not only active duty but an enormous number of reserves and private contractors. Could you talk about some of the issues regarding this particular force composition, especially the very heavy reliance on Reserves?

Z: I think we are overly reliant on the Reserves. I think that insofar as the Reserves feel like they are a vital part of the force, that is good, but we should be able to operate effectively with our active forces. An example of what’s happened over time is that the Army has put a lot of their logistics in the Reserves, so they almost can’t do anything without a Reserve following. In addition to that, I believe we have abused the Guarded Reserve. People are focused on the Guarded Reserve now for this Iraq War, this war on terrorism but long before that, in the containment of Iraq and Iran, we had Guarded Reserve units pulling rotations.

When I first took over Central Command, I found that we had some ground Reserve units. An infantry company was protecting our base with, I think, a Guard unit. We had some sort of air traffic control unit from the Reserves. When I went out there, I was impressed by these people. I asked my staff to give me a list of all the Guard units who were doing this, who had served since the Gulf War, because I wanted to write a letter to their senators, governor, and employers to thank them. I had a stack of letters like this [indicates large number]. I couldn’t believe it.

I wanted to visit some of these Guard units. I went to New Jersey and I talked to leadership in the local community and what I heard was, “Look, if you need us then we are ready to go but you can’t call us two, three, four times. We can do it once, maybe twice in a stretch, but we can’t be like the active force.” By relying so heavily on the Reserves, you are hurting the community. Many are local police or firefighters. It hurts the local businesses trying to support them. Employers don’t want to fire them or give their jobs to somebody else but they have to get things done. Families suffer because they have to go on half-pay once they are activated. It is something they are willing to sacrifice for once but they didn’t know that they were going to be treated just like active forces.

I also think that we contract out too much. Our intent was to get people specifically for security, but more than night watchmen. Suddenly, organizations popped up that hired former servicemen and women to fill the need. They had a little more “oomph” to them, but they were competent. We contracted with Vinell and Dime Corp. and every one of their employees were former Army and Marine NCOs [non-commissioned officers]. We used their services in the Persian Gulf to protect our pre-position sites. You’d go out and they had an unusual uniform and they would salute and they ran things very well. It was very cost-effective and they were very professional and they did a great job.
But they got carried away when we had 20,000 contractors in Iraq. They were not a coherent group. They were this disparate collection and there wasn’t control over them. Their interface with the military is uncertain. In the Fallujah incident, they weren’t supposed to drive through the center of town. They were supposed to go around the town. Why, in Fallujah, the hotbed of this militant resistance (even the military was standing off from it) did four lightly-armed civilians drive through the center of town in a commercial vehicle? I think that got people’s attention. It is cost-effective, but we took a good idea and ran too far with it.

JN: Earlier this week, Robert Perito of the U.S. Institute of Peace spoke here at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice. He is a former career Foreign Service officer who has written a book about post-conflict stability forces and he says that we are the only country to subcontract these tasks.

Z: The Brits do it. When we did Aceh [Indonesia] with HDC [Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue], we hired contractors to do the implementation and the monitoring. There’s a British company called Blue Scot that does that kind of work too. In that case we didn’t use them for security per se. We brought them on to do the monitoring of agreements. These are all former military British SAS [Special Air Service] and Marine commandos. For our mission, they used more senior officers because of the monitoring role. Some had NATO experience and peacekeeping experience, that sort of thing.

JN: Perito was talking about the fact that you put these people in unstable post-conflict situations for policing but, as you just said, they are not a unit, they are not cohesive, they are not trained together and they are immune to prosecution.

Z: It’s a question of what happens when the transition occurs. We don’t have a standard SOPA [Standard Operating Procedure Agreement] with Iraq. Some other countries out in the Gulf don’t have one. We just seem to agree to disagree. We all know that if something happens we’ll get the guilty party out of there before they have to be subject to their laws. What happens if one of them, in a drunken fit, uses a weapon and kills an Iraqi, and the Iraqi police arrest him? It would be an interesting situation. It’s a small issue, but these situations haven’t been thought through in this transition. I’m not sure what these subcontractors are subject to in terms of rules of engagement and that type of thing. Sometimes they are over-trained. When just basic security is needed in a situation and former high-ranking Special Forces NCOs are used, it is excessive. I’d rather have some former military policemen doing basic security police function. There are some organizations that I really respect and trust and others that are a little bit loose and worry military leadership.

SC: In December of 2002, right before the ramp-up for Iraq, you gave a speech at Quantico saying, “This is the wrong war at the wrong time.” If you were in command, what would you do from here out?

Z: I would do a number of things. First thing I would do is mend fences and strained relationships with friends in the region. Even our closest allies complain that there has been no consultation. I wasn’t surprised the other night when the President said that he was going to send Rich Armitage [Deputy Secretary of State] to tell them something. Send him out to ask them something. And now, with the announcement on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, our stock dropped even lower. We’ve got to get out there and engage the region. Most countries in the region are not going to be able to participate actively in Iraq, but I do believe that they can help us on the margin. They have contacts in Iraq and they know the cultures. I think you can build training camps for Iraqi security forces in some of our neighboring countries and they could work with the Iraqis. I think quietly you could ask countries to send in a handful of people to serve as advisors to our units. If I were a Marine Battalion Commander or Regimental Commander, it would be great to have three or four Kuwaiti or Bahraini officers who speak the language, know the culture and can give advice when the Marine Corps command staff comes.

Second, I would talk to the permanent members of the Security Council and to Kofi Annan about what it would take to get a UN [United Nations]
resolution and authority. Bite the bullet about their involvement with the
political reconstruction and the economic reconstruction; that's what it's going
to take. I would say that we could use their help in border security in places
that are not casualty intensive but are important.

I would hold an exposition for Iraqi business and development in Amman,
Jordan. I would bring in Iraqi businessmen and ask, “What do you need in the
way of promoting security? How many jobs can you produce?”

I would try to bring in investors by going to the UN and allowing them to
participate in the economic development. This would be encouraging to
French businessmen, Saudi businessmen, American businessmen. I was
surprised by the amount of the investment that's waiting out there to be
committed to Iraq and the number of Iraqi businessmen who want to move on
it but are unable to get it together.

You need to get jobs. I would look at these contractors, Halliburton, Kellogg,
Brown and Root, and others, and push them to hire Iraqis as opposed to ex-
patriots or foreigners. It doesn't take a genius to drive a truck. Why are we
paying $120,000 for someone to drive a truck as unemployed Iraqis stand by
and watch? I would try to get as many Iraqi security forces on the street as soon
as possible, even if they aren't fully trained, but begin a training cycle. We're
going to experience some problems, like the forces not standing up to the fight,
or melting away, or not feeding them very well, but constantly retrain them.
I would get their officers and leadership well-trained and put their advisor cadre
with them. But instead were waiting for the perfect unit and putting them out
too slowly. We made a mistake by disbanding the standing army, but we need
to put their security forces on the street and train them as we go.

I think in the political process we've got it backwards. We want to turn over
authority and push the elections, but they need to sit down and come to a
conclusion or be pushed towards a federation so we don't continue to bicker
this issue of whether the system will be proportional representation or one man,
one vote. Then we have to work hard to help them develop rival political parties.
They are developing these political parties on their own, but it's kind of shady,
especially the way some of the exiles are operating. We really need to have a
transparent, open, internationally supported effort to create political parties. If
not, it could end up like Pakistan with a bunch of corrupt political parties. Next,
we need to begin the process of educating the electorate. The electorate receives
its guidance from the pulpit at Friday prayers; there's no alternative to that. This
whole idea of educating the electorate has to become more formalized.

I would use the U.S. military as a major reaction force for the major problems.
I would pull our soldiers out of street patrolling unless it was absolutely
necessary for security. I would push the Iraqi security forces out there. I would
work with the outfits that still have militias and work to disband them. Some
militias could be combined into a larger force, but don't confront them unless
they do something unacceptable. You could bet the Shi'ia have formed militias
and pretty soon the Sunni will form them, too. Ex-Fedayeen and Republican
guard will have to be integrated or confronted in some way.

I also would go through at this point [and begin] a reconciliation process, very
formally. I would have an open trial for Saddam (Hussein) and make it last for
a year, where everybody could come and pour out their hearts about everything
he's done. It needs to be done. It's an experience that they need to go through
to get it out. At the same time I would try something like South Africa has
with the Truth and Reconciliation Committee to encourage reconciliation so
the country can move on.

JN: Your perspective on what's needed comes from your experience on the
ground. Many of our political leaders have been on the ground as well, for
an hour or two. You've just given an entire framework for the exit from
conflict and entry into a post-conflict phase in Iraq. To what extent do
military officers, like yourself, have input into the policy process?

Z: Not much. I think the closest we came was during the Clinton
Administration. I was asked by Senator [John] McCain if I ever made any
policy proposals to my bosses and I told him no. But I had. It was not that I
was trying to lie to him just that the proposals were never heard. I thought, in
my time, the sanctions in Iraq were dead. They were mismanaged, Saddam had
manipulated them. It was creating problems in the region. I thought we
shouldn’t lift all economic sanctions, just military sanctions. If we were to have
sanctions, the UN should have an Arab organization formed to administer
them. So in the Arab world, when they complained that the U.S. was punishing
them, they would see that it was Arab administered—it would be transparent.
I made a six-point recommendation for this. I was listened to off and on. So
were military people on the ground. It depends on the education you have, but
you are not really listened to.

The problem that struck me in this business is that policy is made in
Washington by a group of elites in Washington with a standard career pattern.
They go from academia, to think-tanks, to government. They make their
rounds to the intelligence services, talking heads you see on every news
network, the so-called experts. They all have their own pet strategic plans they
are trying to assert because it’s good recognition. It moves them along. In most
cases they really believe in it. It’s developed in a nice air-conditioned office on
K Street. They do touch-and-go’s in the region at best. They don’t have the
experience but when it comes time to quote their ideas (their ideas have appeal
because they are one or two pages), for a president like this it’s very nice and
neat, black and white and very clear. They don’t reflect the complexity and
reality of what’s happening.

The other impact is the Early Bird syndrome [the Current News Early Bird is
a Defense Department summary of military news stories from media around
the world]. I see senior officers passionately waiting for that Early Bird to
arrive in the morning. I used to tell my staff from Central Command that I
knew all the questions that were going to be coming from Washington that
morning. You read the Early Bird; you’ll know what the questions are.
Everything was done through that medium.

I remember giving testimony in front of the House Appropriations
Committee and asking them “Why are things like that?” And I got some bored looks. One of
the most senior and important guys said to me later, “They don’t care about that.”
Let me give you an example of this. I think it was Duncan Hunter who said
“Buy American.” That sounds good, but what president or legislature is going
to say “Buy American?” When we insisted that our military buy American
there were some problems with that. Sometimes you don’t get the best
equipment, believe it or not. Sometimes there’s a company overseas that
produces a better, more cost-effective result.

Second problem, a British company comes over and Tony Blair comes to our
President and says, “We backed you one-hundred percent and supplied troops
and we are blocked from competing. All I am saying is that if you are going to
buy something, allow my companies to show you what they have to see if it’s
quality or not.” We isolate allies a lot of times. What appears to be a good
idea is not a good idea. Plus, we could kill markets for our own businesses.

The way decisions are made in Washington does not reflect what is going on
in the field. Very little input from the field makes it up there. If I am Donald
Rumsfeld and I am about to launch into … have a breakfast at the Federal Building and bring
in all the generals to hear their concerns and answer their concerns.

What happened is that they turned on us and ran personal attacks. That was
Rumsfeld’s mechanism. Ours were voiced concerns, they weren’t put out as
attacks and they weren’t politically motivated. They never were followed through.
If the last set of commanders, going back God knows how far, thought that this
was going to be a mistake, I would sure like to hear what they were going to say.
I would sure like to hear from my staff. That’s a real consideration.

JN: Some of us who aren’t in the governmental sector or the military
sector, and I’m speaking for myself, feel that our current political leaders
are willing to commit our military to engagements that may not be, in
fact, defensive, may be, in fact, aggressive. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright said this was a war of choice. How does it affect our military when our political leaders commit them to war in an area of the world which is a hot spot, such as North Korea, South Korea, Kashmir, Pakistan, and India?

Z: The senior leadership in the military who have a more geo-political view would see the problems. Down the ranks they are basically focused on being able to fight the country in wars and battles. Once they are thrown into it, their basic assumption going in is that the decision was made by someone who knows what they are doing and now they need to try to make this work on the ground. It takes a long time for the troops in the ranks to begin to believe that political mistakes are now costing us lives, more importantly, costing us lives for no gain. In Vietnam, it took us years and years; we are certainly not there yet in Iraq, although there are some cracks.

The senior leaders see it pretty quickly. The decision becomes how to handle this. What do you do? You put your stars on the table and try quietly to represent the troops, answer the questions honestly. It takes a while until it filters down in the ranks. Everyone is going to want to be positive. I read the Union-Tribune's article on Bush's speech. I don't know what speech they heard but I certainly didn't come with that censored feeling that he answered the mail. I heard him say that we're going to stay the course. This course is going to lead us over Niagara Falls! That's not what the American people are going to want to hear.

RW: Hadn't Shinseki [former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki] been marginalized by this time? Were there any other high ranking active duty officers stepping forward, either in Vietnam and Iraq?

Z: Do you remember General [John K.] Singlaub in Korea? He made one mistake. He voiced his objection in uniform and didn't do it within the system like in a ceremony. Then he was told that to do it he had to take his uniform off and eventually he was fired.

Albright said this was a war of choice. How does it affect our military when our political leaders commit them to war in an area of the world which is a hot spot, such as North Korea, South Korea, Kashmir, Pakistan, and India?

Z: General David Shoup, Commandant in the Marine Corps. As Vietnam was starting up, his tenure was coming up and he voiced his concerns, that this was the wrong war, the wrong way, that the domino theory was mistaken. He recognized the difficulty of fighting a ground war in Asia. They isolated him. At one point in time, he became estranged, and they couldn't do it the way they wanted to because he was a Medal of Honor recipient in World War II. So there's this revered chief of service (unlike Shinseki, Shoup had the Medal of Honor around him), plus he was a character, smoked cigars, played poker. He came from retirement, too. Johnson's idea was to co-opt him. Get him on a plane, send him to Vietnam, show him around, and show him all the good things. Shoup told him to "Go to hell."

I can remember at that time we respected him but we thought maybe he has this wrong. We treated him with great respect but treated him in the ranks, like he didn't know what was going on. Of course, we later realized that he was right all along. We come back to the [General Douglas] MacArthur problem; he thought he was more powerful than the president. That view couldn't be maintained.

SC: You used the phrase “Gucci Generals” to describe some of the Iraqi ex-patriots, now having returned from London to Iraq. Who do you think will emerge as the leader?

Z: I don't think that there will be just one. I think [Ayatollah Ali] Sistani will need power from the Shi'a. The Kurds, Bahaman, Taliban will split power. The Sunnis need to find a leader that will come out of the Sunni center. What you are going to need to have is a governing council of men and women that the people and the real power players support. I don't see Sistani going to Baghdad and sitting on a governing council, but he'll have to be satisfied and that governing council will have to work that out. The actual structure, be it a rotating council or a president nominally and a set of vice-presidents along with some sort of legislature, will have to be decided. For democracy to work
in Iraq there needs to be a lot of autonomy in the regions. I could see the Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a regions with a tremendous amount of autonomy on local, domestic, and internal issues with Baghdad more like a capital military district with a different sort of mix. In terms of national security and foreign policy, that stuff would be in Baghdad. There are some models for that kind of diffusion of power, like the United Arab Emirates. There are some models that have that kind of diffusion of power. It might be something like a confederacy more than anything else.

JN: A lot of people join the military but don’t become generals. What types of qualities helped you succeed in your career?

Z: David Gherken once made an interesting comment about President Bush—that one thing the President lacked was curiosity. I think you must have a degree of curiosity or interest in whatever you want to do. If you are going to be in the military, you have to want to delve into that profession. In my generation, there were people that certainly wanted to become a Marine Corps general, but, unlike some of us, didn’t have the curiosity, the depth of interest that I saw. Some of my closest friends truly read, studied, discussed the profession, were interested in the component parts and facets of the profession and studied history. And then there were others who didn’t invest that much interest; they were successful but didn’t have that depth of curiosity.

I have students that come up to me and say, “Gee, that really intrigues me. How do you get there? Can you help me?” My response is, “How much do you really want it?” Sometimes a student will come back and say, “Well, I went online and pulled something online from the State Department and filled this thing out.” Then, another student will have doggedly pursued the career counselor, gone to Washington and visited different places, contacted NGOs. Pretty soon she gets somewhere. Soon you get an e-mail saying, “I am now working with this and I’m looking to work elsewhere.” It’s that sense of drive and determination, that sense of curiosity that makes the difference.

I have always had an interest in solving problems. I wanted to understand what created that problem. When I was in Vietnam, we had all the tactics and training, yet some things that we learned didn’t work on the battlefield. So I said, “Why don’t some things pan out on the battlefield? Why did they tell me to do this? It must have worked out in some historical aspect but now why doesn’t it here? Maybe it’s not right for this conflict but maybe for another. Since it doesn’t work here, what is the solution?” It came out as experience. If you walk around accepting everything then you won’t be invited for that second opportunity. We did this “Wisemen” business with the HDC and some “Wisemen” were effective and some were not.

I talk a lot, especially with the ROTC students who ask, “Is this a calling, profession, or a job?” If it isn’t a calling, you’re not going to be successful or you’re going to be unhappy or you’re not going to be at the level you want to get at. Most of this you’re going to have to seek out on your own. Students come up to me and ask, “What’s the way?” There is no way. There is no career pattern that you go through, certainly not business negotiation, mediation. It is a tough business, so if you think you are going to be successful most of the time, you’re going to be disappointed.
INTRODUCTION BY DR. JOYCE NEU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE

Good evening everyone, my name is Joyce Neu and I am the Executive Director of the Joan Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice. It is a very special honor this evening to have General Tony Zinni as our special distinguished lecturer, as actually the last distinguished lecturer of the 2003-2004 academic year. The Institute’s purpose is to foster peace, cultivate justice, and create a safer world, and General Zinni exemplifies, I think, this mission. We are honored to have him speaking this evening on the topic of “From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table Preventing Deadly Conflict.” Given especially that we are a nation at war, we look forward to hearing this talk by a remarkable person who has served his country both as a military leader and as a diplomat. Coordination between the military and civilians is critical if we are to more effectively prevent deadly conflict and secure the peace. As I mentioned, this lecture marks the end of our 2003-2004 theme of “Preventing Deadly Conflict.” Following the talk this evening, General Zinni will be happy to take your questions.

General Zinni is the youngest of four children born to a family of Italian immigrants in Philadelphia, and, in fact, if you listen carefully, you may still hear a little Philadelphia in his accent. He attended Villanova University where he received a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics. Upon graduation, General Zinni was commissioned as an Infantry second lieutenant in the Marine Corps, following in the footsteps of his father, who served in World War I. General Zinni once said in an interview that he had never intended to have a long military career, but through over three decades of service to this country, he distinguished himself through his hands-on style and his lack of reticence in challenging conventional wisdom.

During the last three years of his career with the armed forces, General Zinni was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, responsible for U.S. forces in a twenty-five-country region ranging from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to parts of the former Soviet Union. He joined the U.S. Central Command in September 1996 as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Following Desert Storm, he served as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined Task Force Private Comfort, a Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq. In 1992 and 1993, General Zinni directed Unified Task Force Somalia. During and previous to Operation Continue Hope, he was Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. General Zinni also holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations, and in fact, I think we may have some students here in International Relations tonight, and certainly we have some students here in the Master’s program in Peace and Justice Studies. He also holds a Master’s in Management and Supervision.

His many decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat V and gold star, the Purple Heart, the Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, and personal decorations from South Vietnam, France, Italy, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain. He has also received numerous civilian awards, including the Papal Gold Cross of Honor, the Union League’s Abraham Lincoln Award, the Italian Studies Institute’s Global Peace Award, and a number of others.
Early in his career, General Zinni served in Vietnam, in what appears to have been a transformative experience. He has said that his experience there taught him the importance of developing an understanding of different cultures, particularly non-western ones. This sensitivity to other cultures and peoples comes through clearly in a book he is presently writing with Tom Clancy entitled *Battle Ready*, to be published by Putnam. Since retiring from the Marine Corps, General Zinni has effectively bridged the divide between the military and diplomatic service by being named Special Envoy to the Middle East by Secretary of State Colin Powell and has taken part in diplomatic missions to a number of countries. General Zinni notes in this soon-to-be-published book that when he retired, he had hoped to be able to continue to be active and to make a contribution to peacemaking. He is doing so today through work on conflicts in Aceh in Indonesia with the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, with the U.S. Institute of Peace on the conflict in Mindanao in the Philippines and also working with our neighbors at the University of California—their Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation on a project in the Middle East. When he is not traveling, he teaches at William and Mary College. From a conversation with him this afternoon, I must say that it seems quite evident that General Zinni is very passionate about his teaching, has great care and consideration for his students, and also great optimism for this new generation of college students. General Zinni has been an outspoken critic of the war in Iraq and at a talk at the Middle East Institute in Washington in October 2002, he said “It’s not whether you’re greeted in the streets as a hero; it’s whether you’re still greeted as a hero when you come back a year later.” It gives me great pleasure to welcome retired General Anthony Zinni.

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (retired)
Thank you. You know you’re getting old when the introduction lasts longer than your career but I appreciate it, Joyce. I don’t want to leave you with the idea that I suddenly retired and became a pacifist. My 39 years in the Marine Corps was where we resolved some conflicts in the way we best knew how. Some need to be resolved that way. After the Marine Corps, I learned to use diplomacy, the art of mediation, negotiation, facilitation, and to try to solve problems in that way. I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s like baseball; if you bat .300 you’re in the Hall of Fame. So, I try to win one out of three and I think that’s doing well. But, most importantly, I think in these efforts you find that even in the negotiations that aren’t successful, you save a few lives along the way, or you delay the conflict, or you create a situation where the conflict isn’t as bad as it might have been. So any little bit that you do counts. It’s not a game where the final score is the issue. In many cases, in the mediation efforts I’ve participated in, we were pleased and thrilled to get an agreement, only to find later that it couldn’t be implemented on the ground, and I’ll talk a little bit tonight about the parts of all this and how they work, how the military functions in all this, how we have to learn to cooperate with each other and how we’re just discovering the tools we need.

I want to take you back to the beginning of the last decade of the last century—about 1989, 1990. I had been assigned my first Brigadier General assignment to the European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and I had just arrived there as the wall came down. And I would tell you that the place was in a state of shock. This was a half century of Cold War—a military that had grown with U.S. participation into the hundreds of thousands, a way of life, careers that had known nothing but the Cold War. We had believed that we could contain Communism; that Communism was flawed, innately flawed, and it would collapse. And yet when it did, we were shocked. When that wall came down, I happened to be in Berlin, and I was with a young Army second lieutenant from the Berlin Brigade. He had a couple of us generals with him and he was stuck with the job of escorting us around. And he looked at us and he said “Let’s go on the other side of the wall to East Berlin.” Of course, we said “Can we do that?” And like a second lieutenant should, he said “I don’t know, let’s try.”

...even in the negotiations that aren’t successful, you save a few lives along the way, or you delay the conflict, or you create a situation where the conflict isn’t as bad as it might have been...

It’s not a game where the final score is the issue.

So we jumped in a van that he had and we drove through the now-abandoned Checkpoint Charlie into the other side of Berlin, only to discover that the main street was a façade. There were still potholes, bullet holes in the buildings right off the main street. We drove into a Russian casemate and they were confused. They didn’t know whether to shoot us or kiss us or what. And to all of us this was a shock. As we drove through there and as we stopped and we talked to East Germans and Russian military people, we saw them in a state of shock too. And for me, I was trying to come to grips with what this all meant and what it would mean.

During my time there, President Bush had said, President Bush 41 (President George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st President of the United States), that this represented a new Europe, a new world order, and a peace dividend on top of it. We watched as the military in Europe was reduced drastically. In my time there, there was a massive reduction in force, the wholesale disbanding of units. We had a remarkable Commander-in-Chief, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe at the time, Jack Galvin, someone whom we revered, an enlisted corporal in the Second World War who made it up to the position of Supreme Allied Commander, respected and admired and honored by all those NATO forces, those who were fortunate to serve with him. And he said, “I don’t think it’s going to be that clean.” And he believed that we needed to do something to shape this post-Cold War period. He immediately required us to go into the former Soviet Union and into Eastern Europe with instructions to grab hold of the militaries there, the Russian military, the militaries that were then fragmenting into different republics and the militaries of Eastern European countries. Our job was to convince them that there was
no victory here for our side, the victory was for their people, and to help them understand how a military should function in a democracy, and to convince them that they should be the models for that democracy.

We spent a lot of time working with these militaries. We spent a lot of time sitting in conference rooms like this talking to them. We found that they were as confused as we were. In one case, each of us NATO generals were to present a talk on democratization and the military and what it meant. The first general we had got up was a Dutch general who spoke about the importance of unionizing your military in a democracy. Of course we grabbed him off the stage right away and started to argue as the Russians looked at us and said, “Well, what do we do? Do we unionize or not?” So we were more confused about what to teach them.

Not long after that experience, the war in Iraq started. Saddam (Hussein) invaded Kuwait. Obviously, that fantastic military we had created to deter the Soviets or fight the Cold War in its last great act (I remember the mighty Seventh Corps of the United States army that was in Europe was about to be disbanded) went home via Iraq and managed the course that defeated Saddam brilliantly. I went in after that, after the war was over and the confetti and ticker tape parades were going on back home down Broadway and other places in the country. We suddenly had to go back into northern Iraq because there was this punishment of the Kurds that Saddam was inflicting. We got involved in resettling the Kurds and trying to resolve what we saw as a potential conflict that would last for quite a while.

In the meantime, Secretary of State (James) Baker decided that the former Soviet Union wouldn't repair and reconstruct on its own; we needed to help them. And he decided that we needed was something akin to the Marshall Plan; we needed to get the international community to participate. Ambassador Rich Armitage, now Deputy Secretary of State, was assigned to lead the effort. I was assigned as his military coordinator for support. We tried mightily to go into this vast region of the former Soviet Union and help it adjust to this new life, democracy, free market economy, political, economic, social change. We did not get the support we needed. We did not get the resources, the commitment by donors. The world believed that this was going to be an automatic re-ordering that we need do nothing but pull back our defense spending and enjoy the fruits that we would gain from that and be able to apply to other programs, other issues, other needs that we might have.

We couldn't have been more wrong. In that decade of the 1990s, we found that out in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo. I was three times in Somalia. One leg after another of these problems, such as Rwanda and Burundi, and it seemed like the world was just coming apart. It was remarkable that in the bi-polar world, the Soviets and we had managed to keep a lid on all this. So once that lid was lifted, and the places that had been controlled by the pressures and investments from the West and the East to make sure that things didn't explode were released from that control, all the ethnic hatreds, past rivalries, and the effects of poverty flared up.
I remember during my time in Somalia looking at the amount of military equipment that was in that country—Soviet MIGs, U.S. M-16s. We had both bid on the country in the time that Somalia had changed sides and all it had to show for its association with the West or the Soviet bloc was this collection of weapons that permeated every inch of that country and caused problems before and after the U.S. was there. Our military went through a tremendous adjustment to this new world order. The pressure was on to reduce the size of the military. The military was phasing down, losing structure, but not changing; it was still a mini-Cold War military, not really adjusted to this new environment. These constant missions that they were faced with included peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, complex emergency operations.

The military desired to be the force that fought the nation's wars. Military leadership did not want to embrace, nor did they like, these other kinds of missions. They felt these missions degraded their ability to carry out their primary war-fighting role. They felt that these missions were not suited to the training, education, equipment, and organization that they had. And besides, they were going through the throes of this change which was very disorderly, not programmed, not thought through. There was no vision for transformation. There was reluctance among the old leadership to find ourselves as peacekeepers or humanitarian workers, even though these were the missions that kept getting thrown on our plate.

We did not work well with others out there. We found ourselves on these new battlefields trying to deal with political problems, with humanitarian problems, with economic reconstruction, with social problems. We found ourselves, in many cases, at odds with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with the political representatives from regional or international political bodies or from own diplomatic efforts.

We found ourselves trying to work in areas we had no experience in. When I was in Somalia, I was made the chief of police of Mogadishu. I sat on the judicial committee; I sat on the political committee for reconstructing the country. Nothing in my infantry experience prepared me for that. I worked and met everyday with the NGOs. And when that 20-year-old girl with that “Save the Whales” t-shirt walked in and this 55-year-old general in his flack jacket and helmet met her, there was automatic friction. She reminded me of my daughter; I reminded her of her father; this wasn’t going to work out. We could never bring ourselves to figure out how to make this work. We could never find ourselves in the military accepting this mission. We even tried to define what it was. We went through calling it everything from “small wars” to “military operations other than war” to “stability operations.” We can’t even define it, let alone give it the kind of attention we normally provide for these sorts of missions, in doctrine and organization and material, in training and education. We viewed it as sort of a dirty little additional job, to be done with as quickly as possible. Never did we figure that this was going to become the norm and this would be the kind of mission we would be faced with throughout that decade and well into the 21st century.

I want to take you back a little bit in history to the end of the First World War. At the end of the First World War, we had a visionary President Wilson who saw if the conditions in the world that led to this war and the one previous to that were not changed, we would repeat it. He saw the old ways the world ordered itself as obsolete and part of the problem; colonialism and monarchies that were unresponsive. And he wanted to change the world. Obviously, he was branded an idealist and our country, which is basically isolationist, rejected his idea to lead the effort to reshape Europe to change the conditions in the world that led to these problems. We were doomed to repeat the Second World War.

Remarkably, at the end of the Second World War, President Truman and George Marshall, the Secretary of State, saw the same problem. But even in the
face of lack of popular support they decided that they would lead the effort and we had the Marshall Plan, the European recovery plan. We had, for the first time in our history, joined a major military alliance, NATO, and we were actually the heart of forming it. We signed up the treaties and alliances that changed the security structure in Europe and in the Far East. We aided in changing economic systems and political systems in this part of the world. And it once and for all rid this region of the world of the chronic problems and structures that had led to the problems that we had had.

We are faced with the same problem now, in my mind. We have a region of the world that stretches from North Africa to the Philippines, from Central Asia to Central Africa, what we call the Islamic world, that is in turmoil, that is in need of change that is in need of understanding, that is in need of help, that is in need of encouragement, that is in need of the rest of the world, the free world community, assisting it and aiding it. Its problems are all known to us. They're called the war on terrorism, they're called the Iraq war, it is what goes on in Afghanistan, in Iran, it's the Middle East peace process or lack of a peace process, it's the breaking of the relationships we had in the region and it is the lack of a security structure. It is in desperate need of political reform and change, economic reform and change, social reform and change. The region needs to have an internal dialogue with its own religious beliefs, an Islamic dialogue to sort out what the other Abrahamic religions had sorted out centuries ago. It is the part of the world that if we don't help it to change, we don't encourage it to change if we don't pressure it to change, we don't assist it to change, then we are going to go through the problems we have now well into this century.

We need to act like the Trumans and Marshalls. We need to step back and get a strategic view. We need a grand strategy for dealing with this and by “we” I don't only mean the United States but the rest of the world. In this part of the world, predominantly, is where we find the conflicts. These conflicts come out of ethnic hatred, religious hatred, poverty, environmental degradation, all sorts of issues. They are not religious. Religion is a rationale; it is a means to an end. It is the way you take a young man or woman who is politically, economically, socially repressed and give them the rationale to blow themselves up and to kill other innocents.

It costs us. I was looking the other day on the internet on the World Bank website and they had some statistics that were interesting. Eighty percent of the 20 poorest countries in the last 15 years have ended up in civil war. Sixteen percent of the World Bank loans go to mitigating these conflicts. And about 44% of these conflicts repeat themselves in 5 years; they don't get resolved even though there is assistance. We probably can go through a list of lessons learned that would tell us how to better do things. We've done that many times.

But it is really a question of will. Do we want to take on something that may be as politically unpopular as President Truman did? The Marshall plan had 19 percent popular support in the United States at the time and Truman's approval ratings had dropped in one year from 82 percent to around 20 percent when he made these decisions and made these moves. Talk about tough hard decisions. But if we don't change the world it will cost us more in the long run. The issue, the political will, means that we have to get involved earlier. We wait until it is a true catastrophe and we reject the idea of going in early when we first sense there is a problem.

All of these issues and these conflicts can be broken down into three phases. There is the pre-conflict phase, when you can sense the issues and the problems, when we need to do a better job in gathering the intelligence of knowing what's brewing, when we could have some effect and maybe with the work of institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice in prevention. There is the conflict stage when we go in and have to mitigate and resolve the issues. And then there is the post-conflict phase when we have to monitor and maintain a stable situation and ensure that it doesn't become one of those countries that in five years relapses.

Now, we have been reluctant to jump in until the situation is so bad that it requires a major effort, it requires military intervention and is beyond the point that we can step back from violence; that's been the issue. Before I retired, I wrote down 20 lessons learned on my experiences in eight of these operations. At the top, the very first one was “the earlier the intervention the
easier it is to solve them.” Now, since retiring, I have discovered institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the Henry Dunant Centre, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, political organizations at the international and regional level, and NGOs which show potential for working in these areas, bringing parties together, gathering aid and support and encouraging resolution at the table as opposed to the battlefield. We need to invest in those.

Even after the conflict begins, we need to bring the professionals together. Joyce and I were talking earlier about the lack of coordination we find all the time. All those who join us on this unusual battlefield come as strangers to each other: the NGOs, those that are responsible for political reconstruction, those that are responsible for re-establishing the economy, those who’ve been there trying to effect social change, and those wearing uniforms that are in there trying to maintain security. They don’t work well together.

Believe me, the undercurrents coming out of Iraq are that the Coalition Provisional Authority and the military do not have a good relationship. And that’s been repeated almost everywhere else where we’ve had those kinds of entities on the ground. We each see the mission differently. We come from different cultures. We don’t train and work together. We don’t have a common understanding of what we are trying to do. And that, in the end, causes us those problems. We are now soul searching in Washington about the lack of our ability to know when we are going to have problems, intelligence failures. This is the area where we have intelligence failures by the dozens, where we don’t foresee these conflicts. We don’t put enough emphasis on this. I remember when Rwanda and Burundi flared up. The Secretary of State at the time said the first thing they had to do at the Principals Meeting was to find the map and figure out where Rwanda and Burundi were. I mean, we are in the middle of genocide and we can’t even locate the problem.

If you listen to the testimony of the 9/11 Commission, one thing ought to strike you—our government agencies don’t work well together. They only come together at the very top. When you hear terms like Principals Committee that means that only at the top, at the senior cabinet levels, can they bring it together. I’ve been on working groups that were thrown together when a crisis has reached its peak instead of before when we could actually have done something about the crisis that would have been less costly.

During the Clinton administration, the President proposed a national security strategy that emphasized multilateralism and engagement. It was somewhat ill-defined. The Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, actually put it into the quadrennial defense review and assigned to us regional commanders (in those days we were called commanders-in-chief: but Secretary Rumsfeld didn’t like that, too much power, so he removed that title) but the commanders-in-chief were then ordered to shape, prepare, and respond. The “prepare and respond” parts we knew. It had to do with the war fighting piece, with the ability to ready to take military action with our allies in the region to protect our interests and our friends. We understood that. But this new word came out, “shape.” What did “shape” mean? Basically, he left it to us to decide what we needed to do from a military perspective to change the conditions in our part of the world or help it improve. I took this and divided up my goals and CENTCOM into three areas: one was the war fighting; second was the day-to-day engagement that I had to conduct in the region; third was a new category that none of my predecessors had which I called development. What do I want this region to look like 10, 15 years from now and what can I do to make it happen? What can I do to make the region more stable?

I found myself involved in more than military efforts, as a matter of fact, way beyond military responsibilities. PACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM were all doing the same thing: taking charge, developing regional strategies, working very closely with our diplomatic colleagues in the State Department and others in trying to change the environment. There was one flaw in all this, although I believe it was the correct view. The flaw was no resources. The

---

3 The Principals Meeting is a meeting of high-level administration officials.

4 U.S. Pacific Command, European Command, and Southern Command are some of the Unified Commands that have control of U.S. combat forces in various regions of the world.
Congress then did not believe in aid, did not believe in anything that looked like aid and assistance, did not believe the military should step outside its bounds of pure military activities, and did not fund the other agencies of government like the State Department to pick that up.

So in the end we were developing strategies that did not acknowledge the resources that were needed. As a matter of fact, we were required to prepare something called the theater engagement plan and, in that theater engagement plan, we were only to address the ends and ways, not the means. We would not even identify where these resources might come from. What might have been an investment, a small investment, to prevent conflict was not made. So in the end, what you end up doing is paying much more dearly once the conflict begins.

Even in just the area of the military you could do things to prevent conflict. You can train militaries to handle problems before they get serious. You can educate their leadership and train militaries to be responsible, to learn how to function properly. We went on an effort on a skimpy budget to try to help the Africans help themselves. Countries like Kenya had militaries that were willing to work, like preventing humanitarian disasters, preventing conflict, becoming more proficient at peacekeeping in its early stages. They were willing to engage in humanitarian intervention before it became a problem that erupted into something they couldn't handle. They were interested in changing the image of their militaries, becoming much more responsible, becoming models for their own people. All this was possible with minimal investment; yet we would not make that investment. Instead, we paid for it later in interventions and wars.

I think we're at a point now where we need to step back from all these problems and we need to think of them as component parts of a larger issue. And we need to develop that strategic view. And we need partners out there. I talked to my friends in the Middle East who were discouraged since no one comes to them and asks for their input. There is no formal process of consultation. They are discouraged because the security structure they had before the Iraq war is now gone. The troop presence out there has been changed. The unofficial alliances and the understanding that we created with the countries in the region has now been erased. They look to us to say, “What follows? What is the new arrangement? Who do we fall in behind? How many troops are you going to have here?”

When we contained Saddam Hussein on a day-to-day basis in the entire CENTCOM [Central Command] region, we were containing him with fewer troops than the number of workers who work in the Pentagon every day. That was the cost. We had countries in the region paying $300 - 500 million a year to support our presence. We had countries in the region like Saudi Arabia that built a $240 million housing complex for our troops. We had every country in the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Egypt and Jordan that, every time we struck Iraq, they took military action, supported us with bases, and over-flight rights.

We had countries in the region which went to war with us elsewhere. Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait sent troops to join us in Somalia. In the Balkans, we had troops from Jordan. Pakistan paid the price in Somalia for joining us with more killed and wounded than we had in that conflict. Many of those things go unacknowledged but that involvement is the result of building those alliances and working toward that prevention.

Now I spend a lot of my time in mediation, or facilitation, or negotiation, or whatever you want to call it, and I have learned a whole new world of techniques: how to build and improve capacities of the sides negotiating to move them up to an even plane, how to put in third parties with different roles (not only mediators but those who can stand above the process and provide advice), how to bring in technicians who understand the art of negotiation and who can help one side or the other.
When I was in Indonesia working with the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia...imagine this...you have a government in Jakarta, the negotiations are being done by a professional diplomat and a team under the auspices of their leading minister, under the direction of the President, and the Free Aceh Movement and the jungles of Sumatra have a small exile government in Stockholm, Sweden. Many of them have day jobs. The Foreign Minister worked at the post office in Stockholm and had to get a day off when we had negotiations. Now bring them to the table. It's uneven. The work you need to do is to improve one side to build the capacity to negotiate and to understand how the agreements will be formed, implemented, monitored, and carried out, how complaints and problems will be brought forth, how these things will be adjusted and handled in the end, and how we take civil society and make sure they have a separate voice.

It's too easy to say we have two sides and that each side speaks for their people. How do you create the people as a separate entity at that table? Many times I found in these negotiations that people say, “A pox on both your houses. We are the ones that are suffering and we want a direct voice in these negotiations.” The art of bringing them to the table is critically important, empowering them and giving them a voice, especially elements of the population that don’t normally have a voice: in many cases women, in many cases minorities, in many cases ethnic groups or religious groups that have been oppressed for years. How do you bring them in and legitimize them and move them to a position at the table where they have a say and can be confident in the outcome? This is the kind of work that is done by institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, by the Henry Dunant Centre, by the U.S. Institute of Peace and many other organizations around the world. The investment in these organizations will pay richly in conflict prevention and in conflict mitigation.

We learn lessons everyday on this. We learn that agreements themselves can’t stand. I was involved for a year in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Believe me, we could paper the walls of this room with all the agreements that had been signed and agreed to and not ever carried out and implemented on the ground, for whatever reason. Every one of these problems is unique, but after we experience them, whether they work or don’t work, we add to our tool box. We add to our own lessons, to our own techniques, and we learn again.

I would just close by saying, as a former military person, that we have to come to grips with the world of the military. That’s probably the most important issue we have now. Are we going to legitimize the military’s role in this end of the business? If so, in this process of transformation, the military needs elements and capabilities within it, the doctrine, the training, and the organization to handle these responsibilities. If we are not going to legitimize it, then are we going to put those functions somewhere else?

What we ought to learn from Iraq is that when the State Department has to deploy to the field, they don’t have a field force. They scrape the bottom of every embassy to get 144 people. They pull people out there who don’t know the region, the culture, the language, the issues, who are not qualified for the specific area that they are thrown into to run an oil ministry, to help coordinate security or develop the police. We can’t have pick-up teams in this business. It’s too complex and too difficult. Either the military is going to do
it and we're going to legitimize it or we're going to have other agencies of
government do it and we're going to have to give them the resources and the
capacity to develop the component parts they should provide—political,
economic, social—in addition to the military's provision of security. Then
train them together, develop a strategy, develop what we need to understand
how we perform on this battlefield together. The third option is to keep doing
it the way we are and we will keep paying in blood and treasure if we do.

Thank you, I'll be glad to take your questions.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Neu: Thank you. I think all of our men and women in uniform and all of us out of uniform, who have never been in uniform, can be very proud to have someone of the caliber of General Zinni representing the U.S. and we're glad that he's still doing so as an unofficial diplomat. In recognition of his contributions this evening and our appreciation for him for coming to San Diego, to the University of San Diego and the Institute for Peace & Justice, we'd like to offer him a memento of the Institute. Thank you very much.

We will be happy to take some questions and answers. I will start with a question while we collect some of the audience's questions. You mentioned that U.S. foreign aid has really not been dedicated to prevention and, since our focus in this Distinguished Lecture Series has been preventing deadly conflict, now that you're more on the diplomatic side, do you have any recommendations for what we can do to try to get more resources dedicated to early warning and prevention?

Zinni: Obviously there's a lot of competition for budget money. The Congress supports the U.S. Institute of Peace for example. It was created by Congress and funded by Congress. I think what Congress needs to understand and be educated on is the value of investing in prevention. I think, on the other hand, we, those institutions that work on prevention (I include not the military but institutes like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the U.S. Institute of Peace and others) need to demonstrate what the investment could provide and how effective it could be. It is amazing how many times we have stopped conflict and we don't even realize it.

During the 1988 build up between the Pakistanis and the Indians, they were getting ready for the third World War, believe me. They had scared themselves and it was like World War I where mobilization was on automatic and they were about to go to war over the incursion into Kargil by the Pakistanis. President Clinton sent me out to talk to [Pakistani] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and to General Pervez Musharraf to see if we could convince them to withdraw from Kargil. It was a long shot. He sent me because the only connection we had with Pakistan (because of the sanctions we had imposed on them) was the military-to-military friendship that I had maintained with President Musharraf and his predecessor. When I got out there, Prime Minister Sharif would not see me. He didn't want to see a general. He said if somebody is going to come see me it should be the Secretary of State or somebody more senior. I had to send him a message that this was the best he was going to get. General Musharraf saw me and I told General Musharraf that the Prime Minister won't see me but I need to convey a message from the President and we've got to stop this before we end up in a bloody war that could be a disaster. He said, “Give me ten minutes,” and ten minutes later I was in to see Prime Minister Sharif.

What Sharif needed to back down and to stop this potential catastrophe was some face-saving measure. What he needed was a meeting with the President of the United States showing that that relationship may be coming back and that he was listening to the concerns of the most powerful nation in the world, which could help him with his own people and could help justify withdrawing from the conflict. I was empowered to tell him the President would meet with him if he demonstrated movement out of Kargil. We monitored him, of course, from our satellites. When his forces began to move, President Clinton immediately had Prime Minister Sharif to Blair House in Washington, met with him, and they both announced the agreement that Pakistan would withdraw. Tensions were reduced and we prevented a war.

Now, I'm going to tell you, on the thin thread of a personal relationship, we were able to make that happen because we took a chance on a small effort. I imagine formalizing that, imagine providing an institute that understands the issues, understands the cultures, understands the methods that can be used in these situations to help both sides come to agreement. It is a small investment to make and I think what we've got to do is show those who determine where our resources go how this can work. We need to legitimize this process and
internationalize it because, in many cases, the U.S. can't work alone. There needs to be an international component to this work; it shows the international legitimacy of your effort and it shows the will of the international community to want it to happen. Sometimes that's face saving enough for those who don't really want to go to war but need some foundation for telling their people that they've chosen another course.

Neu: We have a lot of questions that are coming in on Iraq so we'll try to group them together. But we're going to start with the Middle East, something easy (laughter). How would you advise President Bush on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and what needs to be done first, second, etc.?

Zinni: Well, I think what we have tried to do, but what has failed, is that we have tried to return the two sides to where they were in the late 1990s during the Camp David talks. Then they were at a point where they were putting the final status issues on the table and they were working up possible solutions. What we have tried to do is bring it back to that point by putting other confidence-building arrangements in place first.

There was a feeling, as the Intifada grew and the violence grew and the so-called cycle of violence continued, that we needed to take some steps first before they got back to that table with the final status issues. So, Senator Mitchell was sent out and he proposed the Mitchell Plan. The Mitchell Plan was designed to take some confidence-building measures first before stepping back into that final status negotiation. Both sides agreed to the Mitchell Plan but it never got implemented. So we sent George Tenet out. George Tenet was going to work on security issues and put together a security plan. The security issues would be worked first, then we would go into the Mitchell Plan, then we would go into the final status issues. Both sides agreed to the Tenet Plan but nothing happened. Then Zinni was sent out. My mission was to get the Tenet Plan into play. I made the mistake of putting the Zinni Plan on the table, although I said I wouldn't, and pretty soon come to the realization that we're moving backwards, not forwards.

I think it was well intentioned but this idea of sequentialism in this narrow path to peace or roadmap is the wrong way to go. Everybody knows what the final status issues are. Everybody probably knows within a percentage of a mile or two how they're going to turn out. I think there are incentives that could be put on the table by the outside world to help but several things have to happen. One is that we have to stop the business of special envoys, high profile special envoys that do “touch and go’s” out there. As soon as there's a violent act or something doesn't go right, the envoy is pulled and another envoy comes in a year later. We need a large delegation on the ground. It needs to be international. It needs to work political, economic, social, and monitoring issues all at the same time and it needs to stay there and have an address there. It needs to try to light a thousand fires instead of one fuse which is very narrow and can be very easily upset.

The second thing that has to happen is that the President of the United States has to be directly involved. He can't subcontract it out to the Secretary of State or a special envoy or anybody else. Unfortunately, given everything else the President has on his agenda, this has to be his. It takes the out and the power of the office of the President of the United States, I think, to make these two parties negotiate in good faith and come to the point where they have to make the kinds of compromises needed to live in peace in the long term. The third thing that I think has to happen is that the parties have to become involved. I found myself walking the streets of Tel Aviv or Ramallah and having people come up to me in tears, begging me not to abandon them, not to leave them, to find some way they can live in peace with the people on the other side, some kind of arrangement. Sometimes I think the politics by the parties involved misses the point and misses what the people want.

This Geneva Accord that was put together probably had a lot of flaws in it but it had an idea of serving the people on both sides in a way they would accept. The leadership on both sides did not like the idea. I liked the idea. I think we ought to poll the Israeli people and the Palestinian people to see what's acceptable in the long term. It's their peace.
I heard one of our senior leaders say that he was shocked at how these institutions just collapsed. Well hello, Saddam Hussein controlled them all. You're going to walk in and rip him out, de-Baathify, get rid of all the Baathists, who knew how the trains run, right down to the lowest level. You disband the army and tell anybody who is in business that if he is a Baathist (which he had to be in order to do business before) he can't do business anymore. You're going to bring in the exiles who had no credibility inside Iraq and prop them up in the Governing Council. And then you wonder why the institutions came apart? You're going to go in there with insufficient troops to freeze the situation, allowing the looting and the chaos. I am amazed that we are surprised by the kidnappings today. There were 400 kidnappings of Iraqis per day when the major fighting stopped; they've just switched the kidnapping to other nationalities. It should not be a surprise.

Neu: I'm going to start in with some of the questions on the current situation in Iraq. One question has to do with the recent documentary, The Fog of War, in which former Secretary Robert McNamara expressed shock and surprise many years afterwards that the Vietnamese saw the war as a revolution, not a fight against Communism. How do you think the Iraqis see this war?

Zinni: First of all, going back to Vietnam, since I spoke Vietnamese and I wore the uniform of Vietnamese Marines and I lived in their villages, it didn't shock me when I was a second lieutenant. I am surprised that it shocked the Secretary of Defense. You have to understand who the Iraqis are. They've never known democracy. They have never known a free market economy. They have never been able in their history, their recent history, to determine their own fate. They got poopied out at the end of the Ottoman empire and along comes Winston Churchill and Lawrence of Arabia who draw the boundaries over dinner and immediately take the Hashemite king from the Hijaz, who has been ejected by King Abd al-Aziz, take him out of the Hijaz down in Mecca Medina and make him the king of Iraq. And it has been downhill since then.

Now, all of the sudden, we come in and we say “We want to solve your problems.” And they hear there’s going to be democracy. They're going to determine their own fate. There's going to be jobs and a new economy. Expectations were raised very high, very fast, as happens in these situations. They were raised too high, too fast. I think there was a major underestimation of the problems in Iraq and what reconstruction would take.

I think what I would say to anyone who is dealing with this now that we have two hopes left. One is named Ambassador Brahimi [UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi] and he's got to pull a rabbit out of the hat to save our bacon. The other is the one I put my faith in... the Iraqi people. Despite all this, they are going to realize that we are not providing any magic solution and that they are going to have to do this themselves. That's our last hope—that they can pull this off. But we are going to be in there for a long time and we've broken a lot of china in this part of the world, not to mention Europe and other places where we've had allies.

Putting this back together gets more difficult everyday. There is a rule in ditch-digging— when you find yourself in the hole, stop digging. The trouble is that we keep making more mistakes. A 3000-man embassy in Baghdad?
You've got to be out of your mind. Why do we want a 3000-man embassy in Baghdad? We will still look like occupation forces. When we turn this over on June 30th to we don't know whom, what's their responsibility? Will the people of Iraq, the different groups, listen to them, abide by their rulings? What is the role of our military? I have some simple questions like “Who do all these contractors answer to then?” If the 20,000 contractors that we subcontracted to do this business out there are running around with guns and they shoot somebody, whose court do they answer to? Ours or the Iraqi's, once it is in place? There are a lot of small issues like that that have to be dealt with. Unfortunately, I think we're going to run into a long stretch here without much help from anybody else on the outside. Again, our two hopes are Brahimi and the Iraqi people—that's what it comes down to.

Neu: Thank you. From a graduate student of history we have, “How can the U.S., as the perceived occupying force in Iraq, successfully transition into the role of a peace facilitator in a legitimate constitutional development process?”

Zinni: By turning it over to UN and by figuring out what it would take because the UN, being the other nations that make up the Security Council, will take it on only if they have a say in the political reconstruction and the economic reconstruction. If they are going to take it off our hands and oversee this and contribute in sharing the burden, not only in terms of troops but also in terms of what it's going to take to reconstruct the country and resources, then they have a right to have a say.

We should have let the UN process play out. The UN has always delivered the authority to use force in the past. The first President Bush spent a lot of time making sure he had that UN resolution in building a coalition before the first Gulf War. It took time, it took Secretary Baker, it took Secretary Cheney, it took Colin Powell running around the world constructing this thing and making sure we had this thing in place. We had a remarkable turnout for the first Gulf War. Secretary Powell, when he went to UN, pulled a 15-0 vote for Resolution 1441 at the beginning of this. All we had to do was to let those inspectors play out. Those UN inspectors have always delivered in the past. In my time there, the inspectors called it as they saw it and were honest in their reporting so we got authorization from the UN to take military action and use force when those inspectors were faced with noncompliance and no cooperation. All we had to do was to wait for it. But what struck me this time was that the State Department and our diplomacy was working on one channel and our Department of Defense was going to war in March. The State Department channel was going to take longer. The Defense Department channel was going to war in March. All of the sudden, we were there. It's summertime, we have to attack. The only troops that train in the summer in the Persian Gulf are Americans. I've got to tell you from experience, so to me it was a bogus line.

Neu: We have an interesting question that just came in. If President Bush were standing here, what would you tell him to do right now vis-à-vis Iraq?

Zinni: Well, I think I'd say the same thing. There is nothing magic to what has to be done and it has all been said from the beginning. One, you've got to get the UN involved; you've got to internationalize it as much as possible. Two, you've got to get Iraqi security forces up and capable of handling the security situation. We've taken too long, moved too slowly, and we haven't equipped and trained them properly. We disbanded the army, which was a big mistake. You probably can't call it back now but we need more effort put on the training and development of Iraqi security forces. And the third thing is jobs, jobs, jobs. If you want an Iraqi to fight and die for his country, give him something to fight and die for. What he needs is a job, knowing that his family is secure, and knowing that he has a voice in his governance.

Those are the things you have to do right from the beginning. But we wasted a year and a half now. The economy is not where it should be. The jobs aren't on the street. Why aren't Iraqis driving those trucks? That's what I can't understand. It would mean more to them to be getting fuel through and getting convoys through if they were sitting in the cab of that damn thing instead of paying $180,000 to somebody from outside to come in and do it. Why do we de-Baathify down to the point where we've lost the administrators
and businessmen we need to make things run. Just to make sure some of the cronies that we brought in from outside could put their people in these places and we buckled in to that pressure.

If you want an Iraq to fight and die for his country, give him something to fight and die for. What he needs is a job knowing that his family is secure and knowing that he has a voice in his governance.

But the solution, again, is three parts: internationalize the problem; get the security situation straight (we ought to be coming off the borders, we are doing a lousy job of border security; we've got a Ho Chi Minh trail where the jihadists are coming in), and make sure we've got something for the Iraqis to fight for. Zogby [polling company Zogby International] took a poll in the Arab world and what they ranked number one throughout the Arab world — what they valued most, their main concern — was job security. What's new? It's the same thing in Iraq as it is here.

Neu: This questioner says, "Twelve months ago I was in Iraq doing things like purifying water, restoring electricity, clearing UXOs (unexploded ordinances) from schools, etc. Talking to my peers that are there today, the same things continue. What are your thoughts on the media's sole focus on the limited fighting instead of focusing on the good things that are going on?"

Zinni: I think we had the same problem in Vietnam because it's what sells newspapers. You can whitewash 80 schools [but] if you lose 15 troops that day, guess which story is going to carry. The bad news always sells more newspapers; always plays better on TV. But there's a deeper question here. It's not the issue of how the media covers it; the issue is the relevance of the activity. It's important to build schools and clean-up textbooks and get them accurate, but if you aren't giving something on the other side to balance that, you run into a problem.

I hate to keep [comparing Iraq] to Vietnam, but it's an experience burned into my soul. I remember living in a house in a village in Vietnam and an old woman in that house said to me, "Why are you here?" And I said, "Well, to protect democracy, to make you free." She looked at me, shook her head, and said, "If you want to help us, solve the problem" and she pointed south, towards Saigon. I said, "No, Hanoi," and she said, "No, Saigon." You can whitewash all the schools you want, but if you turn around and put a bad guy into a governing council and [the people] don't see that as representing their interests, you've got a problem politically. If they can't send their daughter to that school you whitewashed because she gets kidnapped on the way unless there are four males going with her armed to the teeth, then whitewashing that school doesn't matter. If father is home without a job, then that whitewashed school doesn't matter. It's the relevance of the activities. That doesn't mean that those things don't need to get done.

But what are the core issues that you have to change? What would be good news? Good news is that unemployment is down. Good news is that they feel good about who represents them in Baghdad and ... the 80 troops that we lost. I haven't heard any yet and I sure as hell don't want to go through another month like this.

Neu: One of USD's own, an alumnus who graduated in 2001, was killed last week while on duty in Iraq. The USD community is very affected by this as I think most communities are across the country. Next question: Who is controlling the oil industry in Iraq and where is the supposedly $7 billion in revenues from the oil [that has been earned] since the invasion?

Zinni: I have no idea. [laughter]
For my students, when I teach national security issues, I give them about three presidents’ National Security Strategies to compare: Clinton, Bush, and Bush 41 to compare to see why the changes were there, what came about and the rationale behind it.

President Bush 41 created a remarkable structure. When we fought the first Gulf War, it was the first post-Cold War major conflict and, as I said before, he went to the UN and got the cover, the authority, the legitimacy through the UN to conduct operations and to use force. Then he built a very broad coalition that became the model. It was used in Somalia; it was used in Bosnia and elsewhere. Even if we subcontracted it out in a way, where we led the coalition on the ground, we still used the UN resolution.

In the Clinton administration we tried to regionalize it more. If you look at East Timor, the Australians led and we supported. We tried to do that in Africa (again I go back to the point about the lack of resources provided) but we wanted to train an African force and African NGOs to deal with their problems so we didn’t have to put boots on the ground but we would provide logistics, communications, intelligence, strategic lift, the wherewithal to get in there and get things done. A lot of that failed, some of that hasn’t been carried through, and certainly that isn’t the model now in the way we are doing business in the Iraq war.

Neu: Some of us in the NGOs that you refer to and organizations like the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice are in fact trying to deal with groups that have been termed “terrorist organizations” by the U.S. administration, such as the Maoists in Nepal, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, you’re dealing with the Moro Islamic Front in Mindanao, and the question is, “Is it possible to negotiate with these kinds of non-state terrorist groups?”

Zinni: I think you have to pick and choose which ones you can negotiate with. I don’t believe you can negotiate with terrorist groups but if you find a group that is a separatist group or a group that is not a fanatic, radical,
extremist, terrorist organization but has had a long standing credible complaint, negotiation may be possible. Let's take the Moros and Mindanao, because even President Arroyo of the Philippines recognizes they have not been treated fairly along the way. In 1996, the Moro National Liberation Front signed an agreement with the government and has been at peace since then. The fulfillment of the agreement hasn't been the best, but it's about a 50/50 deal. USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] has come in and really helped the process with what they've done to help retrain the guerrillas, to give them a developing market for their agricultural products, develop facilities, and give them skills and training. They have something like a 96% rate since 1996 of guerrillas not returning to the field.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front is a splinter group who didn't sign up and is now willing to come to the table. Why is it important to negotiate with them? Well, guess who was trying to get them on their side—Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu-Sayaf or one of their surrogates. They are trying to radicalize these groups. They tried it with the Free Aceh Movement when I was out there and others. They're trying to tell these groups, “Look, you don't stand a prayer, join us, become more radical. Take on the larger global cause.” Even though they happen to be Muslim, the senior leadership of the groups in many cases does not want to do that and they're tugging against their membership because many of their members see no relief in pursuing negotiations that fail or are not engaged in by the government or are not encouraged and supported by those who can afford to do it—the rest of the first world.

I think we need to pay attention to these groups. These groups have the potential of being weaned away from radicalism and shown as models of how they can succeed if they come to the peace table and have their issues negotiated. Then other groups can see the rewards, like the work that USAID is doing in Mindanao. It's a small effort but if we don't do it, this larger al-Qaeda network is going to grow because they are casting out to some of these groups who have not had a radical Islamic agenda. There's an attempt now to push that into their agenda. To the credit of some governments, the Philippines is an example, this trend has gotten their attention. So the time is right to move in and make sure these groups don't go over and get added to that list of terrorist groups. Some of them that may have had some association with terrorist groups obviously should be held accountable, but I think they could be weaned away also. Again, it may have to be done through private institutions that don't threaten either the government or the group and that don't represent something that is difficult for them to deal with or negotiate with as a third party.

Neu: You suggest a somewhat broader role for our military throughout the world as a deterrent to further conflict but isn't the U.S. military presence causing a problem and is that not a primary motivation of the so-called terrorists?

Zinni: I think it depends on what kind of presence you have. Before the Gulf War, our presence in the Persian Gulf was minimal. We had basically a naval presence and, actually, that presence was appreciated when we re-flagged tankers and did other things that helped ensure the flow of energy, which of course is the driving part of the economies for most of these countries. I think we have to think through our presence and measure it in a way so it has the lowest visibility in sensitive places and, as the Foreign Minister of Qatar once told me, put a human face on your military. He encouraged me to do interviews on Al-Jazeera, which was pretty tough, but I did it because he said the people have to see your average human face. On one of the first interviews I did with Al-Jazeera, one of many, I had a question given to me about how we take into account ethics and morality in military operations. I was able to explain how we do that: how we have a system to look at everything from the way we conduct operations, to our targeting; how that's vetted; how we have a staff judge advocate organization. I was even able to discuss chaplains in each of our units. I was able to talk about our responsibility for morality; how we do restricted target lists; what's off limits; under what conditions we would act against a protected target and why. The Al-Jazeera interlocutor, who is known to be very aggressive, really was taken aback by a lot of that.
I didn't expect the question but it gave me a great opportunity to explain that we have built in those kinds of considerations that they may not have thought of. I also think that sometimes we make the mistake of thinking that we can do more with a greater presence but, in many cases, training the military of a particular government is more valuable than having a battalion or brigade on the ground. Putting in a training team and helping a small country develop its border security or coast guard is extremely valuable and appreciated because we are seen as contributing.

...sometimes we make the mistake of thinking that we can do more with a greater presence but, in many cases, training the military of a particular government is more valuable than having a battalion or brigade on the ground.

In many parts of the CENTCOM region, I think it was in eight or nine countries, we had military people from all services assisting in clearing mines left over from previous conflicts. We do humanitarian work. In my time, we ran several humanitarian missions, one at the cost of $800,000 and a small contingent of helicopters and troops—we saved three hundred thousand Kenyan lives during the flood that cut them off from food. NGOs were there with the food but couldn't move it and it just took a small investment to do that and move it, so automatically you put a better face on your military. The other thing we did in CENTCOM was to refuse ever to consider what's called the Signed Forces. In U.S. Central Command there is no force structure like there is in Europe and the Pacific. There are no military bases that belong to the United States of America out there. They're joint use spaces. All the forces that come out there—the combat forces, the ships, the battalions, the aircrafts, the squadrons—all come from somewhere else on temporary duty. They could go away. We never wanted to keep more forces than we absolutely needed for the missions we had. In those days it was the enforcement of sanctions, UN sanctions that were enforced under UN resolution, not U.S. sanctions.

So I think the point I'm making is to make it clear what your role is, keep your forces to a minimum, have flexibility and emphasize the things that have high pay-off. Look, we've had hundreds of thousands of troops sitting in Europe now for 50-some years. Now we're going to bring them back home. I think there comes a time when you have to look at things like that and make the adjustments. Should you keep them there? Are they necessary? In some places they are, in some places they could be shaped or reconfigured in a different way to be less visible, to improve their image or to contribute more on the ground other than just being there.

Neu: The final question is how do you see the role of senior military leaders in the political process of making policy before military forces are sent into conflict?

Zinni: The senior military leaders have an obligation to the President of the United States and to the Congress to give them their best advice and opinion on either the military mission or the application of the force. Remember before the war when General Shinseki testified before Congress and gave his honest opinion? When you get confirmed to be a chief of service or to be a combatant commander in a Unified Combatant Command, the first question from the Senate Armed Service Committee is, “Will you appear before this committee and give us your honest opinion and view, even if it contradicts the administration policy?” Well guess what? If you want that fourth star, you'd better say yes and you'd better deliver when that time comes. It is difficult but our senior military leaders must be confirmed by 100 senators, all 100. If you want to be confirmed, you owe an obligation to them as a representative of the American people to give them your honest view, even if it contradicts administration policy.

There comes a point in time when you may have to take off what's on your collar, put it on the table and say, “Here's the truth.”
It’s tough because you answer to your boss, the secretary of your service or the Secretary of Defense, depending on which position you hold, and then the President of the United States. So you have a dual obligation but your obligation is to speak the truth. I just spoke at the United States Naval Academy and they allowed me to choose the topic. I chose the topic, “the obligation to speak the truth.” There comes a point in time when you may have to take off what’s on your collar, put it on the table, and say, “Here’s the truth.” That’s what being an officer and a leader, especially a senior leader, is all about. It’s not blind loyalty. It is an obligation to make sure that your best, honest, professional opinion is given to those two places that you swore an allegiance to. Our primary allegiance is of course to the Constitution of the United States. If it means that the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense no longer have faith in you, then so be it. You have to leave. Our military only has two choices, either salute and follow the order or put your stars on the table, walk away, and speak the truth. Either way, you have to make a choice. I know which one I would choose. I would be long gone in this administration; I’ll tell you that.
RELATED RESOURCES

Disclaimer: The Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice takes no responsibility for the content of the websites or publications, nor does inclusion imply endorsement of the views presented.

WEBSITES:


International Alert (IA). A non-governmental organization based in the UK, IA believes that the core of conflict transformation work is the building of sustainable peace. The organization publishes articles on numerous aspects of conflict transformation including the role of the military. Retrieved August 2004 from http://wwwinternational-alert.org


Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Institute conducts research on questions of conflict and cooperation of importance for international peace and security, with the aim of contributing to an understanding of the conditions for peaceful solutions of international conflicts and for a stable peace. The annual Yearbook includes a discussion of global military expenditures. Retrieved August 2004 from http://www.sipri.se

United States Institute of Peace. An independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school through graduate school, conferences and workshops, library services, and publications. Retrieved August 2004 from http://wwwusip.org/

The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan. The mission of the DHS, as outlined in this document, is to lead the unified national effort to secure America, prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation, ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of commerce. Retrieved August 2004 from http://wwwdhs.gov/dhepublic/theme_home1.jsp

The U.S. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The Bureau is the principal link between the Departments of State and Defense. The Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, post-conflict stabilization, and defense trade. Retrieved August 2004 from http://www.state.gov/p/pm/

University of California Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation. An institute that facilitates innovative, rigorous research into the causes of international conflict and cooperation. Founded in 1983 as a research unit serving the entire UC System, IGCC’s multi-campus structure allows it to build research teams from all ten UC campuses and the UC-managed Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, providing broad-based links to the U.S. and foreign governments, and policy institutes from around the globe. Retrieved August 2004 from http://www.igcc.ucsd.edu/

BOOKS AND ARTICLES:


ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

Chartered in 1949, the University of San Diego is a Roman Catholic institution of higher learning located on 180 acres overlooking San Diego's Mission Bay. The University of San Diego is committed to promoting academic excellence, expanding liberal and professional knowledge, creating a diverse community, and preparing leaders dedicated to ethical and compassionate service.

USD enrolls nearly 7,000 undergraduate and graduate students in more than 60 degree programs in academic divisions including the College of Arts and Sciences and the schools of Business Administration, Education, Law, and Nursing and Health Science. A School of Peace Studies, funded by a $50 million gift from the late Mrs. Joan B. Kroc, is in development.

USD is committed to examination of the Catholic tradition as the basis of a continuing search for meaning in contemporary life. Global peace and development and the application of ethics and values are examined through campus centers and institutes such as the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the Values Institute, the TransBorder Institute, the Center for Public Interest Law, the Institute for Law and Philosophy, and the International Center for Character Education. Furthermore, through special campus events such as the Social Issues Conference, the James Bond Stockdale Leadership and Ethics Symposium, and the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series, we invite the community to join us in further exploration of these values.

In recent years, the University of San Diego has hosted many distinguished guests including Nobel Peace Laureates and former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Oscar Arias, Supreme Court justices, United Nations and United States government officials as well as ambassadors from countries around the world. In 1996, the university hosted a Presidential Debate between candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole.

The USD campus, considered one of the most architecturally unique in the nation, is known as Alcalá Park. Like the city of San Diego, the campus takes its name from San Diego de Alcalá, a Franciscan brother who served as the infirmarian at Alcalá de Henares, a monastery near Madrid, Spain. The Spanish Renaissance architecture that characterizes the five-century old University of Alcalá serves as the inspiration for the buildings on the USD campus. The architecture was intended by the founders, Bishop Charles Francis Gavis, Buddy and Mother Rosalie Hill, to enhance the search for truth through beauty and harmony. Recent additions, such as the state-of-art Donald P. Shiley Center for Science and Technology, carry on that tradition.

A member of the prestigious Phi Beta Kappa, USD is ranked among the nation's top 100 universities. USD recognizes that rigorous academic challenge is only part of a holistic education. At USD, students, faculty, and alumni are encouraged to develop knowledge, values, and skills to enrich their lives and to benefit their civic, global, and faith communities.
BE A PEACEMAKER.

Support the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice

You can support the educational, research and peacemaking activities of the Joan B. Kroc Institute by making a secure, tax-deductible, online donation at http://peace.sandiego.edu or mailing the donation form below to:

Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
University of San Diego
5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA 92110-2492

I would like to join the Institute’s Leadership Circle with a gift of $1000 or more and receive invitations to special receptions and events.

Enclosed is a check for my gift

I would like to support the Institute’s programs with a gift of:

- $500
- $250
- $100
- $50
- Other $________________________

Enclosed is a check for my gift

Please charge my credit card:

- American Express
- Discover
- Master Card
- Visa

Acct. # __________________________________________ Exp. __________________

Signature________________________________________________________________

Name ____________________________________________

Address __________________________________________

City/State/Zip/Country __________________________________________

Phone (Day) (______)_________________ (Even) (______)_________________

Email __________________________________________________________________

Please add me to your mailing list for information about Institute programs and upcoming events.