Standards of Risk in War and Civil Life
Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, I argue that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, (b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed reciprocally. The conclusion — that we have a pro tanto reason for adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign innocents in war — has implications for not only what standards of risk we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives.
Digital USD Citation
Bazargan-Forward, Saba, "Standards of Risk in War and Civil Life" (2017). Institute on Law and Philosophy Scholarship. 169.