Rapidly increasing health care costs have created a national crisis. Perceiving physician referral behavior as the principal cause, Congress and several state legislatures have prohibited certain referrals. This Comment analyzes the data that spawned such legislation and critiques prohibition of referrals as a solution to the crisis. The Comment asserts that the prohibition remedy is overly broad and largely ineffective. The author recommends a more farsighted solution, such as the creation of a prepaid physician compensation system. The author argues that such a system would minimize the incentive to make unnecessary referrals while simultaneously reducing the level of health care costs borne by the government.
Christian D. Humphreys,
Regulation of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Is Prohibition the Answer Or Has Congress Operated on the Wrong Patient,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol30/iss1/5