San Diego Law Review
Document Type
Comments
Abstract
Although the Supreme Court elaborated a standard for the admissibility of expert testimony in Daubert, that standard is often inadequate to judging nonscientific testimony. This article proposes a model for judges to apply to expert testimony: courts should discern the epistemological source of experts’ knowledge. If the knowledge underlying an expert’s opinion was derived from the scientific method, courts should apply a different reliability analysis than if the knowledge was derived from the more common experiences shaping daily life. Courts should not only consider the reliability of the underlying methodology upon which the opinions are formed, but also how that methodology is executed in the case at hand, as well as the scope and viability of the experts’ conclusions.
Recommended Citation
Edson McClellan,
Sharpening the Focus on Daubert's Distinction Between Scientific and Nonscientific Expert Testimony,
34
San Diego L. Rev.
1719
(1997).
Available at:
https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol34/iss4/6