San Diego Law Review
The premise of this Article is that the approach drafted by Professor Speidel is far superior to the original approach. The denial of any remedy to an aggrieved party because it stumbles with respect to some aspect of a notification is draconian, and section 2-607(3)(a) should not be retained in its present form. The original provision's requirement that notification be given within a reasonable time and its silence as to the required contents give the courts a great deal of discretion, and they can do much to ameliorate its harsh effects by using only the prejudicial effect of a delay or lack of sufficiency as the basis for determining whether proper notification has been given. Under our suggested approach, a buyer would lose all remedial rights only if its notification failure significantly prejudiced an interest of the seller.
William H. Henning & William H. Lawrence,
A Unified Rationale for Section 2-607(3)(A) Notification,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol46/iss3/4