In this paper, “legal moralism” is to be understood in a wide sense as the promotion, outright coercive, or otherwise, of conceptions of the good by the state—assuming in a Kelsenian way that any state action means legal action. Under consideration is the possibility of excluding the good from the bounds of the law under a theory of political right of Machiavellian origin. Anticipating the conclusion, this paper will seek to verify whether the Machiavellian case is the only one excluding the good from the bounds of the law in a coherent manner, regardless of its merits and the inherent condemnation of legal moralism in conclusive terms.
Luis P. Coutinho,
The Machiavellian Case Against Legal Moralism,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol54/iss2/9