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San Diego International Law Journal

Library of Congress Authority File

http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79122466.html

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This Article draws upon the principles of nemo iudex in causa sua and par in parem non habet imperium to emphasize the moral and legal contradictions inherent in the current use and structure of the Permanent 5 (P5) veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC, Security Council, or Council). This Article proposes that targeted reform to suspend the veto power in very limited cases where the P5 members are direct parties to a dispute would address these moral and legal contradictions. The Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies how the (mis)use of the veto power by a P5 member can paralyze the Council’s ability to take effective measures to maintain international peace and security. The suspension of veto power in such cases would serve not only as a corrective mechanism, but also as a deterrent against future abuse of rights.

Without significant reform, P5 members will continue to shield themselves from accountability in disputes where their restraint and impartiality are crucial for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security.

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