Abstract
In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened ifthe Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.
Keywords
Libertarian, Moral Responsibility, Normativity, Reasons
Document Type
Article
Year
2014
Publication Info
Open Journal of Philosophy, 2014.
Digital USD Citation
Alexander, Larry, "The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example and What It Shows: Or Why Determinis Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility" (2014). Faculty Scholarship. 20.
https://digital.sandiego.edu/law_fac_works/20
