San Diego Law Review
Document Type
Article
Abstract
In this Article, Professor Neuman gives serious attention to how the "some evidence" requirement has worked in the past, what functions it appears to serve and how it should work in the future. The requirement arose from the principle that "a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence." Yet the phrase remains largely undefined and its proper application remains obscured. This issue constitutional, jurisprudential, and federalism issues. The author concludes by stating that the notion of "some evidence" should be understood in terms of due process norms respecting the integrity of adjudicative procedure, principally norms of impartiality and conscientious attention to an individual's contributions.
Recommended Citation
Gerald L. Neuman,
The Constitutional Requirement of Some Evidence,
25
San Diego L. Rev.
631
(1988).
Available at:
https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol25/iss4/2