This Article is organized as follows. In Part II, I briefly explain my view of what privacy is - the particularized judgment account. I then turn to the question of privacy - value in Part III, where I examine several views prominent in the literature. In Part IV, I outline my view of privacy's value. I argue that, at its strongest, privacy has constitutive value, which is to say that privacy is a constituent part of intrinsically valuable states of affairs. However, in many cases, privacy's value is not morally weighty. Unlike other goods to which privacy is compared, I argue that we must examine the particular features of privacy in each context to determine whether it has value. This makes it difficult to establish whether persons have claims to privacy. Nonetheless, in Part V, I provide some principles that guide claims to privacy based on its constitutive value.
Claims to Privacy and the Distributed Value View,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol44/iss4/11