In a free society, there is a strong presumption in favor of letting individuals act as they choose without interference by others. William A. Galston has developed this argument with exemplary clarity. He is wrong. The idea that value incommensurability is a reason for toleration of diverse ways of life and protection of the individual's freedom to choose among diverse ways of life is a mistake. Value pluralism does not establish any normative presumption in favor of liberty, so the worry "does this presumption hold without limit," or "are there good reasons that constrain it at some point," is otiose.
Richard J. Arnesto,
Value Pluralism Does Not Support Liberalism: A Comment on William A. Galston's What Value Pluralism Means For Legal-Constitutional Orders,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol46/iss4/11