Nudging Mutual Fund Fees Downward: Using Default Rules to Combat Excessive Advisory Fees

Authors

Colin B. Davis

Library of Congress Authority File

http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79122466

Document Type

Comments

Abstract

Part II of this Comment provides a brief introduction to mutual funds, the fund-investment adviser relationship, and the regulation of this relationship under the Investment Company Act. Part III outlines the problem of excessive mutual fund advisory fees and provides some contemporary evidence suggesting that advisory fees remain excessive despite regulatory efforts. Part IV discusses mutual funds conflicted governance structure, the lack of competition in the mutual fund market, and section 36(b)'s impotent shareholder remedy - all of which have serve to perpetuate excessive advisory fees. Finally, Part V offers a proposal to implement a penalty default regime aimed at encouraging independent directors. Part V concludes by suggesting a more reserved proposal intended to introduce the mutual fund market to default rules' efficacy.

Recommended Citation

Colin B. Davis, Nudging Mutual Fund Fees Downward: Using Default Rules to Combat Excessive Advisory Fees, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 185 (2010).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol47/iss1/6