Title
The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2014
Abstract
In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alterative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.
Digital USD Citation
Alexander, Larry, "The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility" (2014). Institute on Law and Philosophy. 15.
https://digital.sandiego.edu/law_philosophy_scholarship/15