The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis

Authors

Michael J. Trebilcock

Library of Congress Authority File

http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79122466

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This Article surveys the trends in the United States and Canadian tort systems and discusses how they have impacted American and Canadian liability insurance markets. A major thesis of this Article is that the changing complexion of the United States tort system, paralleled by similar trends in Canada, explains many of the recent problems in availability, affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Changes in parameters of liability and quantum of damage have made it increasingly difficult for insurers to price various types of risks. In particular, the author argues that attempts to pursue deterrence objectives and compensation (social insurance) objectives simultaneously through the tort system entail irresolvable contradictions that have destabilized the system and its associated private insurance arrangements.

Recommended Citation

Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 (1987).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol24/iss4/9