The first problem that we shall examine is raised by the cases in which by our tortious wrong act someone is either (1) made no worse off than he would have been because the injury is one he would have suffered anyway by another means or (2) made better off because, though the act produces an injury, it benefits him by interfering with an upcoming greater injury. Should we assign liability based on the fact that an injury was caused relative to how the person was in his prior uninjured state (namely, the causal approach)? Or, should we take account of the fact that the person either was made no worse off or received a benefit relative to how he would have been in the future had there been no tortious act (namely, the counterfatual approach).
Baselines and Compensation,
San Diego L. Rev.
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol40/iss4/11